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Abstract
While the last few years have seen a strong attention by international lawyers towards 
alleged breaches of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, much less attention has been devoted 
to the effects produced by such interventions upon the victim state. Article 2(4),s main 
function is arguably to protect the ‘territorial integrity or political independence* o f states, 
and the aims and effects of military interventions often undermine states* territorial 
sovereignty well after the cessation of the hostilities. The thesis sheds light on the extent to 
which international law protects states* and peoples* territorial sovereignty by studying the 
phenomenon of unlawful territorial situations. An unlawful territorial situation can be 
defined as a territorial occupation established and maintained as a result of a violation of 
international law, such as in the case of the illegal use of force .
The thesis analyses unlawful territorial situations through the lenses of the legal- 
normative concepts o f effectiveness, legality and legitimacy. The concept o f effectiveness 
as a device for transforming effective realities into law was considered one of the 
fundamental principles of international law during the 19th century and the first part o f the 
20th century. It deeply influenced the notions of statehood and territorial sovereignty as 
inherited by contemporary international law. However, the second part of the 20th century 
has seen the emergence of principles of substantive legality limiting the action of  
effectiveness as a source of territorial entidement. The thesis shows how a situation o f  
territorial unlawfulness can be defined with regard to four international legal principles: the 
prohibition against the change of territorial status through the use of force; utipossidetis iu/is; 
self-determination; and territorial integrity. The thesis appraises the significance of 
effectiveness vis-a-vis these principles in the context o f unlawful territorial situations. It 
argues that while effectiveness is no longer a fundamental principle o f international law, it 
plays an important role when accompanied and enhanced by the legitimacy of the 
underlying claim, or by the external legitimation of an authoritative body, e.g. the Security 
Council. Whereas legitimacy is a concept supposedly built on the fundamental principles of 
the international community, it goes beyond positive legality, and it often represents a less 
objective, less transparent and less egalitarian device of power acceptance and recognition. 
However, adopting legitimacy as a device for transforming illegal effectiveness into a legal 
one, is paradoxically a way for the international community to safeguard the integrity o f its 
principles o f substantive legality, despite making them in some cases peripheral to the 
actual regulation of disputes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The thesis starts in the year 2203 featuring a person called Mr Smith. Mr Smith is a 
lawyer with a strong interest in history and international relations. He is currently 
reading the book The War in Iraq o f 2003, which has been recently published for the 
bicentennial of the War in Iraq. The book collects a series of documents including 
statements by political leaders, resolutions of international organisations and various 
commentaries from the beginning of the 21st Century. Mr Smith finds particularly 
striking and paradoxical two elements in the history of the war in Iraq. The first one is 
the casus belli, mainly based on the threat perceived by the United States and the United 
Kingdom concerning weapons of mass destruction. Not only were these weapons not 
used during the war as a last resort by the evil dictator Saddam Hussein, but also they 
were never found during the years of military occupation that followed. The second 
element is what most interests us. Looking at these documents Mr Smith becomes 
aware of a recurrent theme, which, as a lawyer, he finds striking: the constant reference 
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. Many of the documents re-affirm in 
fact the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. Among the objectives of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom the British Government spelled out the aim ‘to preserve wider regional 
security, including by maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq [...].*1 On 8 April 
2003, as Baghdad was about to fall, President George W Bush and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair stated that ‘we plan to seek the adoption of new United Nations Security Council 
resolutions that would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity [...].*2 United Nations (UN) 
Security Council (SC) Resolution 1483 adopted on 22 May 2003 did indeed reaffirm 
‘the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq’, despite recognising the authority of 
Coalition states over Iraq.3 In the debate following the adoption of the resolution a 
number of countries - including Angola, Chile, Pakistan, Russia - explained their
1 British Military Campaign Objectives, March 2003. Full text reproduced in House of Commons 
Research Paper, The Conflict in Iraq.
2 Cit. in Bowers, ‘Iraq: law of occupation’, June 2003, 10, in House of Commons Research Paper 03/51.
3 SC Res. 1483 (2003), Preamble.
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support for the resolution on the basis that it reaffirmed the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Iraq.4 A few days before, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) had issued Regulation n. 1 in which he spelled out the responsibility of 
the US Central Command to ‘directly support the CPA by [...] maintaining Iraq’s 
territorial integrity and security.’5 Commentators confirmed Iraqi sovereignty. For 
instance Frederic Kirgis writing on SC Resolution 1483 stated that
‘the fact that a country is occupied and is under the effective, but temporary, control of the 
occupying powers does not affect its continuing status as a sovereign state. Iraq remains a state as 
a matter of international law, with rights and obligations toward other sovereign states. The 
Security Council has imposed restrictions on some of those rights and obligations, and for the time 
being the occupying powers will act on behalf of Iraq in carrying them out, but Iraq’s sovereignty 
under international law remains intact.’6
Paul Bowers agreed with this view.7 Mr Smith cannot reconcile the presence of 
thousands of foreign troops on Iraqi soil, the exercise of a wide-ranging powers both at 
a civilian and a military level by foreign powers, the policy of ‘de-baathification’ of the 
Iraqi society by the occupying powers, and the fact that 21st Century international law 
assessed the territorial state of Iraq as that of a sovereign state whose territorial integrity 
was preserved in the year 2003. Mr Smith concludes that international law must have 
been a strange and weak law, a law which preferred symbols and formulas, and used 
words and concepts in a way exactly opposite to their original meaning.
The thesis sheds light on Mr Smith’s dilemmas. It also sheds light on the 
ambivalence permeating sovereignty discourse. It bridges the gap between the common 
idea of state sovereignty as synonymous with political independence and with exercise 
of supreme authority with regard to a certain territorial basis, and a formalistic idea of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity devoid of substantive meaning as the one observed 
by Mr Smith with regard to Iraq in 2003. It does this because an international law which 
opts for either of the two extremes is an international law incapable of assessing and 
regulating territorial sovereignty. By choosing the former concept of national 
sovereignty international law will always accept and recognise what is effective and 
real, in other words, it will recognise sheer power as it is; by choosing the latter, it will 
abstain from passing a judgement by simply invoking the abstract formula of ‘territorial
4 S/PV. 4761.
5 CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01.
6 Kirgis, ‘Security Council Resolution 1483 on the Rebuilding of Iraq’, in AS1L Insights May 2003, in 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl07.htm
7 Bowers, supra n. 2,18-19.
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status’. The way the thesis bridges that gap is by considering the concept of unlawful 
territorial situation.
A preliminary definition of an unlawful territorial situation is a territorial state of 
affairs, which is established and pursued in defiance of international norms and 
principles. In particular by using the category of territorial situation, the international 
lawyer can assess the legality of a territorial state of affairs with regard to international 
rules concerning states’ and peoples’ territorial sovereignty. The thesis argues that the 
well-established legal rules and principles protecting territorial sovereignty against 
external occupations are the prohibition to change a peaceful status quo through the use 
of force, the principle of uti possidetis, the principle of self-determination, and the 
principle of territorial integrity. The assessment of unlawfulness is contextual, in the 
sense that the territorial situation can be analysed at a particular point in time regardless 
as to whether the formal status is contested or not. This is not to deny that the review of 
legality of a territorial situation may be often controversial and the line between 
lawfulness and unlawfulness may appear blurred. In fact, the thesis shows how the 
interplay between those principles of legality and the legal protection of territorial 
sovereignty is much more complex than normally claimed, making a contextual 
assessment of legality often problematic. In particular, it is argued that the principles of 
‘territorial legality’ work at two distinct levels, one of source and preservation of 
territorial title, the other of protection of peoples* or states’ territorial sovereignty, and 
the lack of a territorial title by the occupier does not necessarily result in a situation of 
territorial unlawfulness.
Furthermore, to avoid replacing a formalist approach, that of ‘formal status’, with 
another formalist approach, that of ‘territorial illegality’, I build the normative 
framework for analysing territorial situations on the legal-normative concept of 
effectiveness. Effectiveness meant as the adaptation of the law to realities and status 
quo was considered until the 1960s one of the dominant principles of the international 
legal system. This was mostly due to a conception of international law as a law of co­
ordination of sovereign nations trying to maximise their self-interest. The lack of 
centralised enforcement mechanisms was also one of the main reasons why the principle 
of effectiveness played such a strong role. The principle of effectiveness as a juristic 
concept attracted a considerable amount of attention in the period between the 1950s 
and the 1970s in continental Europe. In common law countries its existence did not go 
unnoticed, but it was only considered with regard to specific legal issues, such as
statehood or territorial disputes. At a later stage, its use and elaboration as a general 
concept of international law was abandoned. This is possibly due to the perception that 
international law had reached a stage of development, where its function was no longer 
to accept social reality as it is, but rather to promote and occasionally impose common 
values and normative standards of international justice. In addition there was a shift in 
positivist jurisprudence towards an increasingly pragmatic approach to the study of 
international law, and of the development of new theoretical approaches, broadly 
defined post-modern, which were suspicious about modernist concepts such as 
effectiveness.8 It is, however, worth noting that Martti Koskenniemi nicely caught the 
ambivalence between the concreteness and normativity of international law in From 
Apology to Utopia, stressing the importance of ‘effectiveness discourse’ in the 
elaboration of statehood and territorial sovereignty in international law.9 Moreover, 
despite this lack of recent attention, the Commentary on the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility talks about the ‘the important role played by the principle of 
effectiveness in international law’.10 Although it is no longer a ‘fundamental’ or 
‘dominant* principle of the international legal system, this thesis argues for the enduring 
importance and relevance of the concept of effectiveness to a sound analysis of 
unlawful territorial situations, and it highlights its function in overcoming formalistic 
definitions of territorial sovereignty. It also proposes a possible reconciliation between 
effectiveness and the principles of legality mentioned above, by showing its nature as a 
device that can transform factual situations into law, if complemented and boosted by a 
process of ‘legitimation’ of originally unlawful territorial situations. It finally shows 
how the international legal system, by tolerating the legitimation of effectiveness, 
paradoxically preserves the internal coherence of the rule of law, at the same time 
gradually re-gaining influence over originally unlawful territorial situations.
This chapter sets out the meaning of unlawful territorial situation as a legal category. 
It then outlines the purpose and methodology of the thesis, and the reasons why it 
provides some original food for thought for the international lawyer. Finally, it briefly 
describes the thesis’ structure.
8 See infra Ch. 2, section 5.2.
9 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure o f the International Legal Argument (1989).
10 Crawford (ed.), The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries (2002), 110.
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1. Object of the thesis: defining unlawful territorial situations as a legal 
category
The definition of the international legal category of ‘unlawful territorial situation* 
should be addressed at the outset, as unlawful territorial situations represent the subject 
matter of the thesis. This is best done through an analysis of the three terms ‘unlawful*, 
‘territorial’ and ‘situation’ in their separate and joint meaning, to spell out a general 
working definition.
A. Situation
I consider the three terms in the reverse, looking first at the term ‘situation*. Its 
common literal meaning, as found in the Oxford Dictionary, varies from ‘a place (with 
its surroundings) which is occupied by something*, to a ‘state of affairs’ or, 
alternatively, a ‘set of circumstances*.11 However, the term ‘situation’ does not seem to 
entail in itself any distinctive legal meaning. In the UN Charter the term ‘situation’ is 
separated from the term ‘dispute* in Articles 34 and 35, which deal with the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. In Namibia the ICJ found the practice of the SC not to invite 
South Africa to participate in the discussion on the ‘Situation in Namibia’ in accordance 
with the procedural consequences of the distinction drawn in the Charter between the 
two concepts.12 However, the Court has not tried to define the distinction, nor are SC 
meetings of much help in this respect. Doctrinal contributions have also tended to 
downplay the legal difference between the two, by stating that disputes may represent a 
sub-category of situations, but in any case it is difficult to think of any ‘situation’ 
subject to a process of peaceful settlement according to Chapter VI and VII of the 
Charter, which is not also a dispute.13 The qualification of the concept of ‘situation’ 
with the terms ‘territorial’ and ‘unlawful’ may shed some light on this debate.
11 The Oxford Paperback Dictionary -  New Edition (1994), 751.
12 Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 22-23. See, however, the 
US apparently contradictory practice of claiming Art. 27 as a basis for justifying its absention on the 
question of permission of entry into its national territory of members of the Southern Rhodesian regime. 
S/PV.2090 and comment by Tavemier, ‘L’Annde des Nations Unies’ 24 Annuaire frangaise de droit 
international (1978), 520.
13 Conforti, Le Nazioni Unite (1986,4th ed.), 167-168; Treves, ‘La Prevention des Conflits Intemationaux 
dans la Declaration Adoptee en 1988 par l’Assemblee General de l’O.N.U.’ 34 Annuaire frangaise de 
droit international (1988), 437; Tavemier, ‘Article 27: Vote’, in Cot, Pellet (eds.), La Charte des Nations 
Unies (1991,2nd ed.), 505.
13
B. Territorial situation
The concept of territorial situation is, perhaps unintentionally, illustrated by the 
European Court of Human Rights decision on admissibility in Bankovic v. Belgium et 
al..14 The applicants were citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), whose 
relatives died as a result of NATO bombing of the Serbian Radio Television Centre in 
Belgrade on 23 April 1999. They claimed that each NATO country, which had taken 
part in the military actions in the FRY in 1999, should be held responsible for the 
breach of Article 2 (right to life), Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 13 (the 
right to an effective remedy). The main contentious point raised by the applicants was 
the jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione loci of the Court according to Article 1 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).15 They maintained that the 
criterion of effective control and effective situation in a foreign country developed by 
the same Court in Loizidou should be extended to include control over airspace as it was 
exercised by NATO over the FRY in 1999.16 The defendants counter-claimed that the 
term ‘jurisdiction* in Article 1 should be interpreted in its ordinary public international 
law meaning, as entailing an exercise of general legal authority over certain people and 
territories. The rationale of Loizidou should be strictly linked to an exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction in a country already party to the ECHR.17 It should not be extended, 
incurring the risk of considering NATO countries accountable under the ECHR for any 
kind of military operation abroad.18 The Court agreed with this latter argument. It stated 
that ‘the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial’ and that ‘a State 
may not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of another without the latter’s 
consent, invitation or acquiescence, unless the former is an occupying State in which 
case it can be found to exercise jurisdiction in that territory, at least in certain 
respects.’19 Based on this assumption, the Court dismissed the applicants’ argument that 
control over airspace could amount to territorial jurisdiction.20
14 Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al., European Court of Human Rights, Decision as to Admissibility of 
Application no. 52207/99,12 December 2001.
15 Art. 1 European Convention of Human Rights reads: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.’
16 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement of 18 December 1996, ECHR Series A (1996-VI), 2219; 
Bankovic, supra n. 14, para. 47.
17 Ibidem, para. 42.
18 Ibidem, para. 44.
19 Ibidem, paras. 59-60.
20 Ibidem, para. 76.
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The case is interesting from the perspective of defining the legal concept of 
‘territorial situation’. The concept can be equated to the exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction and legal authority over a certain territory by a certain international person, 
normally a State, but possibly also an international organisation, a national liberation 
movement, and potentially even a terrorist group. It could be argued that the Court’s 
approach in Bankovic depends on a restrictive definition of territory, which does not 
include airspace nor possibly sea areas. However, it is clear that the concept of territory 
is here taken in a legal rather than physical sense. It is the spatial framework within 
which legal authority is exercised.21 It is difficult to think that control over airspace 
alone may result in the exercise of any legal authority. The case of NATO in 1999 and 
the case of the US-UK no-fly zones in Iraq until 2003 seem to confirm the Court’s view 
that air space control is a form of factual control, without any level of legal authority 
involved. In this sense, it seems better to exclude instances of air space control from the 
scope of territorial situations, as they do not involve any display of legal authority. In 
conclusion, we can define a ‘territorial situation* as a state of affairs where an 
international actor displays factual control and legal authority over a certain territory.
Of course, such exercise of territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily exclusive and 
general, but can be limited in time and in purpose. An example mentioned in Bankovic 
is the exercise of military administration, which is often accompanied by the parallel 
exercise of civil administration by local authorities or international authorities, such as 
in Kosovo.22 We may think of geographically even more limited territorial situations, 
such as those deriving from the concession of military bases to a foreign country in the 
state’s own territory.23 Last but not least, nothing precludes using interchangeably the 
expression ‘territorial situation’ and ‘territorial status’, when referring to a state of 
affairs, indeed a status quo, characterised by an effective display of legal authority over
21 When referring to ‘legal authority’, I do not refer to an authority exercised in accordance with the law, 
or, more specifically, in accordance with international law, but to an authority capable of displaying 
extensive juridical effects, regardless whether the legal basis is valid or invalid. However, the reader must 
be warned that terms like ‘juristic’ and ‘juridical’ are terms and concepts imported from civil law 
countries, therefore ‘foreign’ to the English legal terminology. Thus I will avoid using those terms despite 
the ambiguity of the term ‘legal’, and refer the reader to the context in which the expressions ‘legal basis’, 
‘legal authority’ and ‘legal effects’ are found, in order to understand their meaning.
22 See on belligerent occupation infra Ch. 3, section 4, and Ch. 5, section 5.
23 This specific category of territorial situation is not analysed in this thesis. Of course, a foreign military 
basis in a state’s territory can be potentially included in the concept of unlawful territorial situation, 
however that will depend on the specific terms of the agreement between the host state and the foreign 
country through which usually these arrangements are made.
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a certain territory.24 However, I prefer ‘territorial situation’, as ‘territorial status’ often 
indicates the formal designation of a certain territory. Such formal designation -  for 
instance, Non-Self-Goveming Territory, Trusteeship Administration, province, 
international protectorate -  may have consequences on the way international law 
defines the unlawfulness of a certain territorial situation. However, the two concepts 
should be differentiated. At any rate, when referring to this latter meaning of territorial 
status, I use the expression ‘formal status’ or ‘formal territorial status’ for the sake of 
clarity, whereas ‘territorial status’ will be used synonymously with ‘territorial situation’.
C. Unlawful territorial situation
The exercise of jurisdiction, in other words of legal authority over a certain territory, 
is normally accompanied by the presumption that the subject exercising such 
jurisdiction has a right to do so. This is due to the role that the concept of effectiveness 
has played in the way international law has developed its basic concepts. However, the 
presumption can be rebutted, and, in certain circumstances, the display of legal 
authority may not be complemented by a valid legal basis. In other words, the basis of 
those legal powers may be invalid under international law or in conflict with one or 
more international law norms. Thus, the definition of unlawfulness concerning 
territorial situations relates in principle to the right or the competence to rule over a 
certain territorial area, rather than the fact that such competence is exercised, or the way 
in which it is exercised. For instance, the adoption of SC Resolution 554 declaring the 
1983 South-African constitution null and void, due to its discrimination between the 
white and Asian population, on the one hand, and the black population, on the other, 
indicates a situation of governmental illegitimacy, rather than of unlawfulness of the 
long-established South Africa state.25 The apartheid regime, fully institutionalised 
through that constitution affected the legality of that regime and constitutional 
framework, rather than the territorial situation as such, whose lawfulness was derived 
from the territorial competence of the state South Africa. The line between 
governmental illegitimacy and unlawfulness of the territorial situation can be more 
blurred, and the former can lead to the latter. In both the case of Southern Rhodesia and 
in the case of Transkei, the establishment of newly independent states was condemned
24 On the definition of status quo in international law see Grewe, ‘Status quo’, in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 
(2000) (Vol. IV), 687.
25 SC Res. 554 (1984). Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (2000), 243.
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by the international community due to the governmental racist structure, which in turn 
affected also the unlawfulness of the newly defined territorial situation.26
Unlawful territorial situations should be also kept conceptually distinct from 
territorial disputes. We can define a territorial dispute as a legal conflict between two or 
more international persons over the territory’s attribution.27 Whereas most of unlawful 
territorial situations are also territorial disputes, this is not necessarily so as an unlawful 
occupation may not always be the subject of a dispute. The case of Kosovo shows this 
possibility. Moreover, a territorial dispute does not necessarily involve an unlawful 
territorial situation: the occupying state may hold a lawful title or legal basis, or neither 
contendants may be in possession of the disputed territory.
2. Research aims and methodology
The concept of unlawful territorial situation, which is the topic of this thesis, is a 
relatively unexplored subject. The question of territorial disputes and territorial 
sovereignty has, on the other hand, received considerable attention in international law. 
Malcom Shaw’s Title to Territory in Africa and Marcelo Kohen’s Possession contestee 
et souverainete territoriale stand out as comprehensive monographs, which shed light 
on both the theoretical implications surrounding the law of territory and the practice of 
states and international tribunals.28 These two studies incidentally deal with the question 
of unlawful occupation of territories, yet the definition of unlawful territorial situation 
shows how this notion differs from that of territorial disputes. The issue of unlawful
26 SC Res. 216 (1965); GA Res. 3116 (XXVIII). Ziccardi Capaldo, Le situazioni territoriali illegittime nel 
diritto intemazionale (1977), 67.
27 I include in territorial disputes border disputes. In fact, whereas traditionally the doctrine had 
differentiated the two (e.g. La Pradelle, La frontikre. Etude de Droit Internationale (1928), 141-143; 
Jennings, The Acquisition o f Territory in International Law (1963), 12; Sharma, ‘Boundary Dispute and 
Territorial Dispute: a Comparison’ 10 Indian Journal o f International Law (1970), 162), the ICJ in 1986 
observed in Burkina Faso/Mali that the distinction between a territorial dispute concerning attribution to 
territory and frontier or border disputes ‘is not so much a difference in kind but rather a difference of 
degree as to the way the operation in question is carried out. The effect of any delimitation, no matter how 
small the disputed area crossed by the line, is an apportionment of the areas of land lying on either side of 
the line.[...] Moreover, the effect of any judicial decision rendered either in a dispute as to the attribution 
of territory or in a delimitation dispute, is necessarily to establish a frontier’ (Case Concerning the 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), ICJ Reports 1986, 554, at 563). See, however, criticism of the 
unqualified assertion that any territorial dispute inevitably involves considering a boundary in Jimenez de 
Arechaga, ‘The Work and the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 1947-1986’ LVm BYIL 
(1987), 24. The author explains how territorial disputes over islands do not involve drawing a boundary.
28 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (1986); Kohen, Possession contestie et souverainete territoriale 
(1997).
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territorial situations only covers one specific aspect of the law of territorial sovereignty, 
albeit a fundamental one. James Crawford’s The Creation o f States in International Law 
also considered a series of legal issues which have direct implications for the question 
of unlawful territorial situations.29 In fact, the concept of statehood represents the 
natural development and crystallisation of a territorial situation, exactly as modem legal 
conceptions of territorial sovereignty are derived from the same legal conceptions of 
statehood. Other contributions have dealt with individual cases of unlawful territorial 
situations or specific issues related to the concept. However, the only general 
contribution on unlawful territorial situations is that by Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo.31 
Ziccardi Capaldo analysed the practice of the main political organs of the UN, the SC 
and the General Assembly (GA), in non-recognising territorial situations in defiance of 
emerging international norms, and showed how these emerging international norms 
affected the law of territory. The author reached the conclusion that non-recognition 
cannot be derived from a general theory of invalidity, but rather it should be construed 
as a sanction.32
All these studies, to different extents, represent the main sources of inspiration for 
the development of a comprehensive and self-sustaining thesis on unlawful territorial 
situations. The thesis integrates an already impressive bulk of research undertaken on 
issues of territorial sovereignty, in order to elaborate a comprehensive reading of the 
concept of unlawful territorial situation through the lens of international law as it affects 
these phenomena in the beginning of the 21st Century. In this sense, it builds on 
Ziccardi Capaldo’s work to develop a comprehensive study, which includes most recent 
questions of territorial sovereignty such as the exercise of territorial competencies by 
the SC.33 It is submitted that this is of the outmost importance, since unlawful 
occupations of territories, often dressed up in new guises, represent one of the enduring 
problems of the international society, and one where lately international law has 
appeared to play only a peripheral role.
Second, the thesis elaborates its own original methodological and theoretical 
perspective, in order to read and interpret the issue of unlawful territorial situations in
29 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1979).
30 See infra Ch. 3, section 2.
31 Ziccardi Capaldo, supra n. 26. The book was published in Italian, but it contains also a final summary 
in the English language.
32 Ibidem, 130. For the confirmation of Ziccardi Capaldo’s conclusion see infra Ch. 5, section 2.
33 See infra Ch. 6.
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international law. The methodology adopted involves using effectiveness as the main 
organising concept. This thesis re-considers effectiveness as a juristic concept, by 
looking at its doctrinal elaboration and the functions it plays in international law. It then 
focuses on its main object, unlawful territorial situations, to consider the extent to which 
effectiveness still plays a role with regard to that specific issue, and to assess its 
interaction with principles of substantive legality as they have developed post 1945. It 
argues that the concept of effectiveness is deeply entrenched in the ideas of statehood 
and territorial sovereignty, and that the substantive principles of legality developed after 
World War II arose as a limitation on effectiveness. Furthermore, the thesis shows how 
these principles of legality often work at an unsophisticated level due to the inherent 
strength of the concept of effectiveness, as they fail to dictate a full invalidity of 
unlawful territorial situations and to decisively impact on the application of other legal 
norms and claims.
Third, it reconciles the inherent ambivalence of effectiveness as a juristic concept on 
the borderline between law and social reality, by looking at the concept of legitimacy, 
and how legitimacy may represent the key to reconciling an effectiveness that is in 
violation of international law and the creation of new law in illegal territorial 
occupations. While recognition is the process through which unlawful territorial 
situations can gradually become lawful, the legitimacy of the underlying claim or the 
legitimacy conferred by an authoritative body is the discoursive tool used by occupying 
powers to attract recognition of the unlawful territorial situation. The ambivalence of 
the concept of legitimacy and the fact that, while building on the fundamental principles 
of the international community, it goes beyond positive international legality show how 
legitimacy can be a very ‘efficient’ complement to effective power by providing, 
compared to legality, for less objective and less transparent criteria of power recognition 
in international law. Moreover, adopting the concept of legitimacy to explain the 
legalisation of effectiveness helps me explain the process through which the 
international community sidelines legal norms with regard to the solution of specific 
situations. The international community recalls the ‘unique’ or ‘exceptional’ nature of 
these situations -  in particular those where the legal norms cannot limit hegemony - and 
it uses broad and often vague principles, such as the ‘maintenance of peace and 
security’, ‘the protection of human rights’, ‘the promotion of self-determination’. By 
evading the troublesome question of the relation between the violation of the applicable
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norms and the recognition of its effects, it paradoxically maintains the general validity 
of those norms.
Fourth, while this thesis limits itself to the specific issue of unlawful territorial 
situations, and the methodology adopted does not allow general conclusions on the 
current state of international law or on the broader relevance of the concept of 
effectiveness in contemporary international law, it is submitted that the reconciliation 
between effectiveness, legality and legitimacy may be possibly tested in other related 
areas of international law, such as the use of force, statehood and governmental 
recognition. Thus, the thesis not only offers a general study on unlawful territorial 
situations, but also offers an original theoretical perspective, which may shed some light 
and stimulate debate on how contemporary international law is conceived, and the 
function it plays in international relations. In other words, is international law a vehicle 
of international justice, or rather, does it represent a code of legitimation of the will and 
actions of the stronger? It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the debate on this 
fundamental question.34
Finally, one working assumption should be made clear at the very outset. It will be 
assumed that international law is defined as a system of objective and determinate legal 
norms created by states, and, for the most part, addressed to states primarily to regulate 
their behaviour. This is not a general epistemological choice, but it represents the best 
description of international law as it relates to issues of territorial sovereignty. This 
assumption is based on the recognition that, while states are not the only actors, they are 
the major actors in our analysis of unlawful territorial situations. In fact this thesis also 
takes account of the position of peoples, national liberation movements and 
international organisations in challenging or, alternatively, endorsing unlawful 
territorial occupations. Moreover, this choice does not detract from the important role 
played by individuals and collective human groups other than states in the broader legal 
process associated to unlawful territorial situations. For instance, individuals and civil 
society, through non-governmental organisations, can seek to enforce legal claims with 
regard to human rights violations carried out by the occupying power before regional
34 A novel interest in the international legal literature for the impact of power relations on international 
law is signalled by Michael Byers’ monograph, Custom, Power, and the Power o f Rules (1999). Byers’ 
study differs from the present thesis insofar as it focuses on the distinctive issue of customary rules’ 
creation and modification.
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• I Stribunals, or, in some cases, even before the courts of the occupying power. On the 
other hand, civil society may also play a distinctive role in contesting territorial 
occupations and putting pressure on occupying powers to make them comply with 
international humanitarian law or human rights law, or, alternatively, in supporting the 
effectiveness of the occupying power on the ground. This legal dimension of unlawful 
territorial situations, involving the role of non-state actors and fundamental issues of 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, is not absent, but is dealt with 
only incidentally. Indeed, its analysis would require a full and extensive enquiry, which 
would be beyond the purpose and scope of this thesis.
3. Thesis plan
The present thesis is structured in six sections. Chapter 2 deals with the concept of 
effectiveness as a juristic concept. It addresses the conceptual meaning of effectiveness, 
its doctrinal elaboration within positivist jurisprudence, and the different functions it 
plays in the way international law affects international relations. It concludes by looking 
at the ‘critical’ aspects and the ‘dark’ sides of effectiveness. Chapter 3 considers the 
impact of the concept of effectiveness on the law of territory. It shows how 
effectiveness is deeply entrenched in well-established ideas of statehood, and how those 
ideas have been transposed to the legal idea of territory and territorial sovereignty. It 
examines its function in the traditional modes of territorial acquisition and in the law of 
belligerent occupation. Chapter 4 focuses on the unlawfulness of territorial situations, in 
other words it spells out those principles and norms of substantive legality, which define 
when a territorial situation is unlawful and limit the action of effectiveness in that 
respect. Chapter 5 looks at the consequences of territorial unlawfulness. It analyses the 
limitations to the concept of territorial invalidity inherent in legality discourse as a result 
of the dualism between national and international spheres, thereby confirming the 
enduring strength of the concept of effectiveness in territorial issues. It assesses the 
impact of a definition of unlawfulness upon related areas of international law such as
35 E.g., Loizidou, supra n. 16; The General Security Service Torture Case, Israeli Supreme Court (1999), 
in XI Palestine Yearbook of International Law (2000/2001), 261.
36 E.g. Amnesty International, ‘Israel and the Occupied Territories. The heavy price of Israeli incursions’, 
Report of 12 April 2002, in http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE150422002?open&of=ENG- 
ISR. The Yesha Council: Council of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza District, in 
http://www.moetzetyesha.co.il/archive_list.asp.
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the ius ad bellum, statehood and the law of state responsibility. It also considers the 
importance played by legitimacy in the ‘legalisation* of effective territorial occupations. 
Chapter 6 considers the territorial competencies of the UN, in particular of the SC, and 
how the exercise of such powers can produce or perpetuate an unlawful territorial 
situation. It spells out the criteria of legality and legitimacy to which such competencies 
are subject, and it considers the case of Kosovo as an example of unlawful territorial 
situation involving an ultra vires action by the SC, but also a reconciliation of 
effectiveness, legality and legitimacy in the longer run. Chapter 7 finally concludes 
recalling the main findings of the thesis concerning the possibility of reconciling the 
tensions between effectiveness, legality and legitimacy. It also reverses Jellinek’s 
famous expression ‘die normative Kraft des Faktischen’,37 by considering ‘die faktische 
Kraft des Normativen’;38 in other words, it assesses the effectiveness of international 
law towards unlawful territorial situations, thereby showing the inherent ambivalence of 
the concept of effectiveness itself.
37 Translation: ‘The normative force of facts’.
38 Translation: ‘The factual force of norms’.
Chapter 2 
The concept of effectiveness in international law
1. Introduction
The relationship between social reality and law is a basic problem of every legal 
order. Legal philosophers have debated this issue for 2500 years, without finding a 
conclusive argument supporting an ultimate causal relationship between the two. Yet 
some points are clear. On the one hand, every norm having a legal nature must be 
referred to reality. A norm providing for the prohibition of mammoth hunting is valid in 
the eyes of the strictest of positivists, if it derives from a formal source of law. 
However, it would obviously represent a nonsense from a contemporary point of view. 
On the other hand, to reduce norms to reality, that is to give them only a descriptive 
substance of what is already in the world of facts, would be tantamount to the negation 
of the normative order itself. For instance a norm simply stating ‘you can commit 
murder under any circumstance* would certainly be a fair description of everyday 
reality. However, it would have no substantive normative value. In other words, the 
world of the ‘is’ and the world of the ‘ought to be’ cannot be exclusive in a legal order, 
unless the legal order represents a pure fiction.
Normativity and concreteness, to use Koskenniemi’s words, are continuously in 
dialectical tension within international legal discourse, yet they are both necessary but 
not sufficient conditions of the discourse itself.1 In the analysis of unlawful territorial 
situations in international law, the term effectiveness recalls the second of the two 
terms, the material part of a certain situation, whereas the term unlawful draws from the 
normativity and validity of international law. Effectiveness is one of the founding 
characteristics of classic international law in territorial matters. Demands for legal 
certainty in international relations surely exceeded demands for international justice in 
pre-1945 international law. Therefore, the adaptation of law to reality was a paramount 
element in international law and therefore the material element played an important role
1 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure o f the International Legal Argument (1989).
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in territorial situations. What this research tries to explore is the contemporary relevance 
of effectiveness in respect to territorial matters and in particular in relation to unlawful 
territorial situations. It is submitted that in such cases the antinomy between the validity 
of international law and the material situation can be so strong, that one should ask 
whether international law really matters. Despite arguments to the contrary, territory 
and sovereignty are still among the most sensitive issues of states and peoples’ 
international life. Testing the validity and efficacy of international law in respect to 
these issues is a task that cannot be neglected and it can shed relevant light on the stage 
of development of international law today.
This chapter and the following one concentrate on the material element of territorial 
situations, whereas normativity is considered in the fourth and fifth chapters. This 
chapter considers the concept of effectiveness in international law using a broad 
theoretical perspective. Its main objective is to look into the theoretical and historical 
premises that sparked the doctrinal debate on effectiveness mostly in the 1950s and in 
the 1960s. This doctrinal debate is analysed, as well as more recent criticism from 
liberal international lawyers and critical legal studies representatives. The chapter 
concludes by introducing a few reflections on the ‘pathologic’ function played by 
effectiveness in unlawful territorial situations.
2. Effectiveness in international law: terminological and conceptual 
features
To what does the term effectiveness refer in international law? Effectiveness is 
deployed here as a measure of the relationship and congruence between a rule or a legal 
situation and social reality. It mainly refers to the role of factual situations in respect to 
the application and creation of international law. Therefore, it corresponds to the 
material, factual element of law, to its concreteness. A state is recognised as such in 
international law because it is represented by a stable and effective government, an 
insurrectional movement is responsible under international law because it has effective 
control of a certain human group and territory,2 sovereignty over a territory is
2 The international legal personality of insurrectional movements, which gain independence and effective 
control in the course of a civil conflict is accepted in modem and contemporary international law. See 
ELC Article 10 (2) on State Responsibility. More controversial is the test of effectiveness in relation to the 
national liberation movements, where the claim to legal representation and the recognition of such claim
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conditional on an effective display of jurisdiction, the citizenship of an individual is 
recognised in international law insofar as it entails an underlying effective relationship 
(‘genuine link’)3 between the state and the individual, the membership of a minority or 
ethnic group is determined under objective criteria of effective attachment.4 In all these 
cases, effectiveness is in general a necessary, and often sufficient, element of a certain 
juridical situation. Unlawful territorial situations seemingly do not escape this strict 
logic, at the very least because they very often involve a situation where a certain state 
or potential entity is effectively displaying power over a certain territory despite the 
prima facie unlawfulness of the situation. A legal order which does not keep a strict 
relationship to reality would be a useless abstract notion. Yet a problem arises where 
effectiveness allows the creation of law starting from an illegal act. Here, we encounter 
the concept of revolution, which has always been a critical point for lawyers.
Effectiveness has been also used interchangeably with the terms compliance and 
efficacy. Compliance is usually referred to as the conformity of states’ actions to some 
legal prescriptions. Efficacy designates a broader concept. It is usually deployed in legal 
theory referring to the fulfilment of a certain social scope by a certain rule. For instance, 
if we consider alcohol-related legislation in Britain we might measure its efficacy by the 
social results obtained in relation to the intentions of the legislature. Compliance instead 
refers to the conformity of British citizens to these behavioural regulations. The same 
could apply to an international treaty; for example, take the Kyoto Protocol, which 
imposes some limitations states’ emission of greenhouse gases. Once entered into force 
its efficacy will be measured on the objective to limit the greenhouse effect. Compliance 
will instead measure how many Western states have reduced the emission of greenhouse 
gases by a certain percentage within a certain time as prescribed by one or more norms 
of the treaty.
by states and international organisations (in particular the UN) is sometimes detached from an effective 
control of a territorial basis. This was true for the PLO until the signature of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 
where the Palestinian Authority was granted a limited territorial jurisdictional in the Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem. On the question of the international legal personality of the PLO see also Italian Court of 
Cassation, Judgement n. 1981,28 June 1985 in 69 Rivista di diritto intemazionale (1986), 884.
3 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein/Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955,23. See also Art. 3 (2) ICJ Statute; Mergi 
Claim, 22 ILR (1955), 443. However, see contra the rejection by the ICJ of an effective control test for 
corporate entities in Barcelona Traction (Belgium/Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3, at 42.
4 Rights o f Minorities in Upper Silesia, 1926 PCU Series A, n. 12. But see also dissenting opinion from 
Judge Nyholm warning on the dangers of rigid objective criteria. More recently compare the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda. In particular, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR, Case 96-4- 
T, in 37 ILM (1998), 1399 confirming effectiveness of attachment and Prosecutor v. Kayshama and 
Ruzindana, ICTR, Case 95-1-T, in http://www.ictr.org/default.htm, going towards a subjective definition 
of ethnic group.
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The sociological approach to international law has concentrated both on efficacy and 
compliance, and this may have some interesting implications for a study of the principle 
of effectiveness as a juristic concept; however, efficacy and compliance are not the 
object of this chapter.5 They become useful tools, when the effectiveness of 
international law in respect to unlawful territorial situations is tested.
One last use of the term effectiveness is in respect of the efficacy of international 
tribunals, in particular to those interpretative devices used to confer efficacy on the 
treaty provisions constituting international organisations.6 As a measure of effectiveness 
of tribunals it is usual to refer to those interpretations that look at the parties’ will, in 
order to make a treaty a living instrument according to changing reality. In a sense, this 
can be considered a wider application of the principle of effectiveness in its function of 
adaptation of law to reality. However, analysis on the effectiveness of tribunals has 
concentrated mostly on the implementation of social objectives sought within the spirit 
of the conventional instrument. That is why effectiveness in this context resembles the 
concept of efficacy of treaty instruments.7
In conclusion, effectiveness is here considered as a legal-normative organising 
concept, which allows the transformation of effective realities into international law. It 
represents possibly the concept par excellence showing the concreteness and material 
nature of international law. However, its exact nature as a device situated on the 
borderline between law and social reality, or, alternatively, as a device situated within 
international legal norms has been disputed. From the latter approach, one derives that 
effectiveness should be kept conceptually separated from overlapping concept of ‘socio- 
legal’ effectiveness, efficacy or compliance. From the former, one may infer that these 
concepts may end up overlapping. The thesis attempts to provide some elements to 
resolve these tensions.
5 Why do efficacy and compliance have interesting implications for effectiveness? The consistent pattern 
in the lack of application of a certain norm led some writers (Touscoz, Le principe d ’effectivite dans 
I’ordre international (1964) and J. Stone, ‘What Price Effectiveness’ Proceedings American Society of 
International Law (1951), 199) to talk about desuetude of a certain rule and the loss of its normative 
value. In this case, the lack of compliance and efficacy of a certain norm touches upon its legal value, 
therefore compliance, efficacy and effectiveness overlap, however the three terms should be kept distinct. 
Concerning this dual meaning of effectiveness see Ch. 7.
6 In particular Lauterpacht, The Development o f International Law by the International Court (1958), 227.
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3. Effectiveness in the doctrinal debate
Jellinek is probably the first author to theorise a principle of effectiveness, even if in 
his work it was never referred to by name.8 According to him, the relationship between 
fact and law in the creation of abstract norms either lies in the psychological attitude of 
people to consider as law what is customarily repeated in a given society; or the 
normative force of the fact lies in the fact itself, insofar as whatever exists in a stable 
way in the phenomenological reality has the tendency to transform itself into law. Thus, 
international law conceives the state as a social given, it accepts the de facto 
government as representative and with international capacity, and adverse prescription 
and occupation as titles to territory. Although some other contributions on the principle 
of effectiveness can be traced back to the inter-war period, the doctrinal debate is 
concentrated mostly in the three decades following the end of World War n.9
The existing law in those years was still exclusively based on the substantive and 
procedural framework of classic international law with the exception of the prohibition 
on the use of force as expressed in the UN Charter. The development of concepts like 
self-determination, ius cogens and erga omnes obligations at the end of the 1960s and 
the 1970s certainly represented a substantial limitation on the operation of the principle 
of effectiveness, and that may be why it is difficult to find many subsequent references
7 On the effectiveness of the ICJ, Peck, Lee (eds.), Increasing the Effectiveness o f the International Court 
o f Justice: Proceedings o f the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 5(fh Anniversary o f the Court 
(1997).
8 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1922).
9 Kelsen, ‘Theorid gendrald du droit international public’ 42 Recueil des Cours (1932), 121; Kelsen, 
Principles of International Law (1952); Kelsen, General Theory o f Law and State (1961); Ottolenghi, *11 
principio di effettivit& e la sua funzione nell’ordinamento intemazionale’ 15 Rivista di diritto 
intemazionale (1936), 3, 151, 363; Sperduti, L ’individuo nel diritto intemazionale: Contributo 
alVinterpretazione del diritto intemazionale secondo il principio dell’effettivitd (1950); Bellini, ‘II 
principio generale dell’effettivit&’ 27 Annuario di diritto intemazionale comparato e di studi legislativi 
(1951), 225; Tucker, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in International Law’, in Lipsky (ed.), Law and 
Politics in the World Community (1953), 31; Bouchez, ‘The concept of effectiveness as applied to 
territorial sovereignty over sea-areas, air space and outer space’ 4 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Intemationaal Recht (1957), 151; Kruger, ‘Das Prinzip der Effektivitat, oder: Uber die besondere 
Wirklichkeitsnahe des Volkerrecht’, in Festschrift fuer Jean Spiropulos (1957), 265; Mjaja de la Muela, 
El Principio de Effectividad en Derecho Intemacional (1958); Touscoz, supra n. 5; Jennings, ‘Nullity and 
Effectiveness in International Law’, in Cambridge Essays in International Law (1965), 64; De Visscher, 
Les effectiviti du droit international public (1967); Balekjian, Die Effektivitat und die Stellung 
Nichtanerkannter Staaten im Volkerrecht (1970); Chemillier-Gendreau, ‘A propos de l’effectivitd dans 
l’ordre international’ 11 Revue Beige de Droit International (1975), 38; Wildeman, ‘The Philosophical 
Background of Effectiveness’ 24 Netherlands International Law Journal (1977), 335.
For a more recent appraisal see Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (1986); Juste Ruiz, 
Derecho Intemacional Publico (1994); Miele, La comunita intemazionale (2000, 3rd ed.); Di Stefano, 
L ’ordre international entre legality et effectiviti (2002).
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to it. Yet, it has been rightly pointed out that the new principles of substantive legality 
build on the framework of existing international law rather than replace it.10
3.1 Effectiveness and international law: continental affair?
The international legal literature relating to the principle of effectiveness in the 
aftermath of World War II was initially developed in continental Europe, and 
preliminarily appears to have received little interest from Anglo-American writers. Is 
there any particular reason why the doctrinal debate is so characterised?
First we must look at the intellectual debate on international politics that took place 
in the Western world in the years after World War n, when there was a reaction against 
the idealistic political notions that had been shaped between the two World Wars. 
Concepts of self-determination, international organisation, and universal peace were 
blamed by many observers for having failed to observe reality and to control the 
expansion of aggressive and totalitarian powers. It was felt that people studying 
international society needed to go back to what really counts in inter-state life, that is 
the real power seen both in military and economic terms.11 Any attempt to shape the 
world on new idealistic projects would lead to another risky misjudgement of the 
balance of power in the international community. The criticism of political idealism as 
utopian was also extended to international law. Austin’s philosophy defining 
international law as ‘positive morality’ became newly fashionable. How could a system 
of norms be compelling for states if there did not exist any enforcement agency and 
compulsory jurisdiction? The answer was simple. States would follow rules of 
international law only as long as their self-interest was pursued. Every norm obliging 
them to do something contrary to their political interest would be ignored. The 
conclusion was that such a thing called ‘international law’ did not exist, and if a set of 
rules existed, they regulated only processes of secondary importance. An autonomous 
analysis of the reality of international society needed to be carried out. This could be an 
analysis on the powers involved in the international arena and could not be interested in 
the study of abstract norms.
This feeling was particularly strong in the United States, which was for the first time 
the only Western super-power, also facing an enhanced threat from the Soviet Union.
10 Cassese, supra n. 9, 31.
11 See Boyle, World Politics and International Law (1985).
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The 1950s and 1960s saw in the US both a separation of the two disciplines of 
international relations and international law,12 and, at the same time, the development of 
McDougal’s policy-oriented jurisprudence in Yale. This latter approach, albeit not 
rejecting the idea of international law as such, conceived it as a process of authoritative 
decision-making, where rules and their interpretations played a role in this process, 
rather than being the true and objective ‘essence’ of international law. Power structures 
and authority would also play a fundamental role in this decision-making process, in 
other words, they would represent an endogenous element of international law.13 In 
Western Europe the memories of a collective tragedy were very fresh and the division in 
two opposing worlds was present in everyday life. If the project of a new realism in the 
analysis of international society had a strong appeal, the natural consequence of this was 
not considered to be a complete separation of the two disciplines and an implicit 
preference for international relations, or a new approach that would transform the idea 
of international law as a system of legal rules equally binding upon all members of the 
international society. This separation would lead to an apologist approach to the 
analysis of international society that in the European environment could not be 
accepted. International law would be useful, for example, in making clear that every 
intervention against the independence of states would not be admitted, and this principle 
linked both Marxist and conservative observers. International law would be functional 
to a diminished role of Western European countries in the international arena.
Furthermore, the positivist tradition and the influence of Kelsen on international 
lawyers was strong. The Kelsenian idea that if there had to be an international legal 
system it had to be based on a set of positive norms, creating a self-sustaining structure 
independent from the social reality, shaped the whole jurisprudential debate in 
continental Europe. The debate was between those who supported Kelsen’s ‘pure’ 
theory of law, and those who considered his theory another dangerous idealistic 
abstraction failing to record the disruptive influence of reality on norms (Marxist 
theorists and realist theorists reached about the same conclusion). However, the 
abandonment of an international legal system as a system of given and ascertainable 
legal norms was not an issue at all for Kelsen’s critics, since this was considered 
destructive of the world order. Sociological jurisprudence deviated from Kelsen’s pure
12 E.g. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (1967).
13 McDougal, ‘International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception’ 82 Recueil des Cours 
(1953), 133.
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theory of law, above all stressing differences of degree in the use of methodological 
instruments (empirical and inductive approach), but it maintained its main assumptions 
(objectivity and normativity of law). The call for a realist approach to the study of 
international society was not effected through a shift towards the creation of 
international relations theory or through new conceptions of international law, but 
through an incorporation of factual elements in the law-making and amending process, 
which became the main function of the principle of effectiveness. Its progressive idea of 
the social reality could not but believe in a continuous shaping of the normative 
processes by factual situations. Therefore, a study on the principle of effectiveness was 
an absolute priority for those international lawyers.
Another issue which is relevant to the understanding of the doctrinal discussion on 
the principle of effectiveness in the 1950s and the 1960s is the codification of new areas 
of activity by states. The new technological means at states’ disposal brought their 
interest to consider the benefits involved in the use of the Antarctica, the outer space, 
the high seas and the seabed. Multilateral regimes were negotiated as a consequence of 
rapid changes in social reality. The need to regulate them in a prompt manner led states 
to conclude multilateral treaties. In order to understand the incorporation into 
international law by states and international organisations of the historical and 
phenomenological order, international lawyers often used the principle of effectiveness 
as an additional analytical tool outside the customary process. This interpretation and 
applicative function of the principle was proposed by the French and Belgian 
sociological positivism, in particular by such authors as Touscoz,14 De Visscher15 and 
Chemillier-Gendreau.16
The question of the existence of a general principle of effectiveness has rarely been 
dealt with in the Anglo-American literature. Tucker’s contribution is the only 
systematic work and needs to be put in the context of the sceptical approach to 
international law which turns quickly to international relations theory.17 In the English 
literature, for example, it is impossible to find a single systematic study on the principle 
of effectiveness. At most, effectiveness is considered in relation to specific issues like
1R 19the application of foreign laws in domestic courts, the recognition of governments,
14 Touscoz, supra n. 5.
15 De Visscher, supra n. 9.
16 Chemillier-Gendreau, supra n. 9.
17 Tucker, supra n. 9.
18 Mann, ‘Present Validity of Nazi Nationality Laws’ 89 Law Quarterly Review (1973), 201.
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territorial disputes,20 the validity of a legal system21 and the invalidity of international
In proposing his concept of diritto spontaneo (‘spontaneous law’), Ago seems to give 
some suggestions on the place of effectiveness in the continental legal tradition as 
opposed to the Anglo-American one. In Ago’s view, legal norms are not exclusively 
the result of certain processes determined by the law (in this sense he talks about 
positive law in a narrow sense, because it is ‘posited’ by something external to it), but 
the social reality itself would be its source.24 Ago maintains that this construction of 
reality as a source of law is normal among Anglo-American lawyers, as common law 
accepts the idea of a spontaneous creation of law through judicial policies.25 Hart argues 
on the same anti-dogmatic lines as Ago and states the crucial problem of the 
fundamental norm cannot be solved but through a reference to law-creating facts (to be 
kept distinct from legal law-creating facts, that is formal sources). This would emerge 
very clearly in a system like the English one, where the sovereignty of parliament is not 
an abstract postulate embodied in a constitutional charter but is part of an historical 
process in which the existence and content of rules is also derived from courts, officials 
and private persons’ practices.26 Wildeman apparently supports Ago’s idea by saying 
that the emergence of legal principle from factual reality is a given in common law 
systems since the judge is continuously legislating by departing from concrete cases.27 
In opposition to Ago and Wildeman, Sereni argues that this is a misinterpretation of the 
rule of precedent in the common law tradition.28 This tradition is based in Sereni’s 
perspective on a natural law conception, where the law is not exclusively a creation of 
the state. The sovereign government itself is subordinated to the law, and the 
introduction of this idea in civil law countries through constitutions would be 
historically later than in the Anglo-American world. Furthermore, he argues that the
19 Lauterpacht, supra n. 102.
20 Jennings, The Acquisition o f Territory in International Law (1963); Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa 
(1986); Brownlie, Principles o f International Law (2003,6* ed.).
21 Hart, The Concept o f Law (1994,2nd ed.), 292.
22 Jennings admits that ‘it is a curious fact that relatively little has been written, at any rate in English’ 
(supra n. 9,64).
23 Ago, Scienza Giuridica e Diritto Intemazionale (1950).
24 Ago, ‘Positive Law and International Law’ 51 AJIL (1957), 691.
25 Ago, supra n. 23, 91-92.
26 Hart, supra n. 21, 109-110.
27 Wildeman, supra n. 9, 351. The author maintains that in the Anglo-American tradition there ‘was a 
practical belief that “ius ex facto oritur”, and it was the duty of the judge to find it.’
Sereni, ‘Dottrine italiane di diritto intemazionale’, in Scritti di diritto intemazionale in onore di 
Tommaso Perassi (1950), Vol. 2,281.
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idea itself of the doctrine of precedent is grounded on the impossibility that the pre­
existent law can be modified by new factual situations. The same conclusion is reached 
by Mann who maintains that ‘whatever legal philosophers may have to say about it, 
there is no evidence that English law accepts the legitimating characters of facts, that is 
to say, in Jellinek’s famous phrase, the ‘Normative Kraft des Faktischen’, or the alleged 
principle of effectiveness, as a guide in the sense that facts or effectiveness create law 
and the absence of effectiveness involves the denial of a legal order.*29
These are only tentative deductions and a thorough investigation of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this research. It seems likely that the more pragmatic and case law 
oriented Anglo-American tradition led the doctrine to look at effectiveness in 
international law either in respect to specific issues or as a measure of efficacy of 
international tribunals and international law. However, to deny the law-making force of 
factual reality in the jurisprudence of common law countries is to deny the fact that, 
certainly more than in civil law countries, the law is not only the result of sovereign will 
expressed through legislation (and in this Sereni disputes Ago’s arguments stating 
exactly the same!) but it is also created through judicial policies and customary 
processes. The systematic theoretical approach taken in continental Europe in regard to 
the principle of effectiveness is probably due to the predominant influence played by the 
debate between Jellinek* s and Kelsen’s jurisprudence, and its application in 
international legal theory. Furthermore, the influence of sociological positivism in 
France and the widespread criticism of Kelsen’s theories developed in Italy in the post­
w ar period represented a fertile ground for the elaboration of a general principle of 
effectiveness.30 This, rather than an inherent abstract normativism of common law 
jurisprudence as opposed to a more ‘material* approach to law in the European 
continent, would explain the continental focus on effectiveness in particular in the 
1950s and the 1960s.
This is also confirmed by the fact that, despite a systematic treatment being initiated 
in the 1930s and developing in the post-War period, the legal roots of effectiveness can 
be dated back to the modem 19th Century positivist theory of international personality 
and sources, which is fully shared by British and American jurisprudence of that age. 
We now turn briefly to this historical and jurisprudential enquiry.
29 Mann, supra n. 18, 203.
30 E.g. Sperduti, La fonte suprema dell’ordinamento intemazionale (1946); Giuliano, La comunitd. 
intemazionale (1950).
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3.2 The law of nations and effectiveness in the 19th Century: peoples’ sovereignty 
and the material element of custom
Despite being systematically theorised in a more recent age, a material notion of 
international law dates back hundreds of years, and a more or less explicit incorporation 
of a principle of effectiveness is inherent in the development of different legal 
institutions. Issues of personality and sources were the most debated points of positivist 
jurisprudence as it started to develop in the second half of the 18th Century. The 
historical development of the concept of effectiveness in relation to issues of territorial 
sovereignty is dealt with in more depth in the next chapter.
As far as issues of international personality are concerned, it is important to look at 
the practice of recognition as it developed throughout the centuries. Throughout the 
16th, the 17th and the first half of the 18th Century recognition of foreign governments 
was not a preoccupation of European monarchies unless there were rival succession 
claims and different pretenders. As Grewe points out, even ‘the succession in electoral 
monarchies such as the Holy Roman Empire of the Germans or the Kingdom of Poland 
was regarded as an internal process which did not normally offer other powers a cause 
or justification for taking a position. When the separation of a part of the state 
occurred through dynastic succession, the practice of third states was to wait for 
recognition until the former sovereign had first given its own approval.32 The first 
author to put forward the principle of effectiveness as opposed to a principle of 
legitimacy as a guiding principle for the recognition of new governments was Vattel, 
who preceded the actual development of this principle in states* practice. The 
principle of effectiveness was embraced with great favour by the French monarchy and 
its foreign policy based on the rationalist principles of the raison d'etat. France’s 
attitude to the American revolution is the most clear expression of this approach. 
Shortly after the Declaration of Independence of 1776, France concluded a treaty of 
commerce and friendship and a military agreement of joint defence with the new 
government. On 14 March 1778, the French government informed London of these 
treaties and stated that the implicit recognition of the United States was based on the
31 Grewe, The Epochs o f International Law (2000), 343.
32 Frowein, ‘Die Entwicklung der Anerkennung von Staaten und Regierungen in Volkerrecht’ 11 Der 
Stoat (1972), 145.
33 The Swiss author wrote that ‘[pjour qu’une nation ait droit de figurer dans cette grand socidtd, il suffit 
qu’elle soit vdritablement souveraine et inddpdndante, c’est-k-dire qu’elle se gouveme elle-meme, par sa 
propre autoritd et par ses lois.’ De Vattel, Les droit des gens (1758),Vol. 1, Ch. 1,4.
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effective independence of the colonies. Evidence of this was the application by the 
British government of the ordinary laws of war as they were recognised between 
sovereign states, that British forces had signed capitulation agreements with American 
forces and that the British government was dispatching commissioners with the purpose 
of peace negotiations with the Congress.34 The British government responded that the 
situation was that of a mere rebellion, and stated that France had no right to intervene 
and support the unlawful activities of British citizens in North America. The French 
memorandum replied that it was not relevant whether independence had been obtained 
on a lawful basis and that neither the law of nations nor treaties, neither morality nor 
politics imposed a duty on France to preserve the loyalty of British colonies. It was 
sufficient that the American colonies had established themselves not only through a 
solemn declaration but also factually despite the British attempts to defeat them.35
Although the French revolution did not lead to the development of a new European 
public law, its ideals of self-determination and sovereignty of peoples can also be seen 
as having contributed to the decay of principles of legitimacy in the recognition of 
governments. This meant in principle a duty of non-intervention upon all European 
nations in respect of revolutionary events that would lead to a domestic constitutional 
upheaval. As a corollary of the idea of individual rights, revolutionary thought produced 
the idea of natural rights of sovereign states. In other words, the state was to be 
considered a natural person to which some inherent rights and duties would be attached. 
States would be sovereign and equal. Their legal existence would not be the result of a 
determination by rules of monarchic legitimacy but would arise as a sociological 
expression of peoples’ will. It goes without saying that this would go hand in hand with 
the application of a principle of effectiveness in the theory of international personality.37
Yet a discourse on the philosophical-theoretical basis of the concept of effectiveness 
cannot neglect to observe some profound contradictions that characterised this period. 
The practice of France from 1789 to the Congress of Vienna soon forgot these ideals 
and as Grewe has pointed out by the time ‘the French armed expansion extended to the
34 Grewe, supra n. 31, 348.
35 Martens, Causes celebres du droit des gens (1859,2Dded.), Vol. HI, 140.
36 Redslob, ‘Volkerrechtlichen Ideen der Franzosischen Revolution’, in Festgabe fiir O. Mayer (1916), 
273.
37 Frowein notes that these ideas of nation and peoples’ sovereignty were linked after First World War to 
a notion of peoples’ self-determination. Effectiveness as a rationalist criterion of recognition is linked by 
the US and Great Britain to the consensus of people (Frowein, supra n. 32, 228). See in this respect also 
Lauterpacht, supra n. 102, at 115,172.
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greater part of Europe the Revolution had come to an ideological standstill, its ideas 
began to fade away and its postulates had in large part been abandoned.’38 The ideals of 
the Revolution needed to be exported and the duty of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states as a result of their equality was soon replaced by revolutionary 
missionarism accompanied by a concept of just war.39 In other words, France was more 
equal among equals, and often the ascertainment of peoples* will through plebiscite 
became a pure formality.40 Furthermore, the non-universal nature of international law in 
the 19th Century should be borne in mind. The acceptance of non-European nations 
within the family of nations still built on the idea of the standard of civilisation. The 
recognition of a quasi-sovereign status to African and Asian political communities was 
often conditioned on the very acceptance by these communities of unequal treaties and 
protectorate agreements that, rather than celebrate their sovereignty, were an official 
seal for political dependence and ineffectiveness 41
Alexandrowicz provides us with a deep insight into the jurisprudential debate that the 
revolutionary events produced mostly in the German jurisprudence between the end of 
the 18th Century and the beginning of the 19th. Both legitimist and de-factoist theories 
were to different degrees represented and this witnesses the disputes typical of the age 
of transition when these international lawyers lived.42 Also, in the practice of states, the 
Holy Alliance reaffirmed in the 1820’s Century a principle of monarchic legitimacy 
through a system of collective security which was rejected only by Great Britain and led 
to the repression of republican insurgencies in Spain and Italy 43 However, this seems to 
be the last episode and since then effectiveness became the main criterion of recognition 
in modem positivism and the law of nations of the 19th Century.44
38 Ibidem, 412.
39 C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht des lus Public Europaeum (1950), 122.
40 Disregard for peoples’ will is indicated by the memoirs of General Dumuroiez about the plebiscite in 
Austrian Belgium in 1795 (Grewe, supra n. 31, 421) and it is also clear in regard to the ‘sale’ of 
Lombardy and Venice to Austria through the Treaty of Campoformio in 1797.
41 Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law’ 39 Harvard International Law Journal (1999), 1. See also infra Ch. 3, section 3.2.
42 Alexandrowickz, ‘The Theory of Recognition in Fieri’ 34 BYIL (1958), 176. See also Simpson, Great 
Powers and Outlaw States (2004, forthcoming), Ch. 4.
43 Lauterpacht, supra n. 102,103.
44 The content is the law of nations defined as the European Public Law, that is international law 
governing among all European Christian states plus the United States. Turkey was admitted as a full 
sovereign member of the ‘family of nations’ in 1856, and Japan in 1906. Outside this exclusive circle 
effectiveness did not apply, yet often some states were given partial recognition on condition of 
surrendering part of their competence to the colonial state. In other words, ineffectiveness was a condition 
of recognition. See infra Ch. 3, section 3.2 and Anghie, supra n. 41.
35
This conclusion is reinforced by the development throughout the 19th Century in the 
American continent of what Alvarez calls the American public law based on the 
principles of republicanism, constitutionalism, democracy, liberalism, equality of 
nations and non-intervention.45 Drawing from the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which 
formed the basis of a consistent refusal of the United States to allow any further colonial 
enterprise by European powers, Latin American countries created a net of political and 
economic relations through a series of treaty instruments that would give a distinctive 
character to the international law of the American continent, which would go beyond 
the mere pronouncement of the Monroe doctrine mostly elaborated according to the US 
national interest. Such international law would be generally based on the rule of law in 
diplomatic relations and in particular on the principle of non-intervention, of self- 
determination of nations and of amicable settlement of disputes. Despite a series of 
hegemonic and unfriendly acts by the United States like the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
(1850) and the proposal of its government to carry out a collective intervention with 
European powers in order to defeat the Cuban insurrectional government (1875), the US 
stance towards recognition and external intervention is clear in the following passages, 
part of the message forwarded to the British government by the American ambassador 
in London Mr. Bayard on behalf of the government and the Senate and the House of 
Representatives (1895), in order to avoid a British military intervention to settle a 
boundary dispute over British Guyana and Venezuela:
‘Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars that have so long 
agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remain the same, which is, not to interfere in the 
internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate 
government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, 
firm and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to 
injuries from none... We are now only concerned, therefore, only with that other practical 
application of the Monroe Doctrine the disregard of which by an European power is to be deemed 
an act of unfriendliness towards the United States. The precise scope and limitation of this rule 
cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general protectorate by the United 
States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligations as 
fixed by international law nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such 
obligations or inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any 
interference in the internal affairs of any American state or in the relations between it and other 
American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of 
government of any American state or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form 
according to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single purpose and object.
It is that no European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an 
American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping of itself for its own 
political fortunes and destinies...
45 See state practice in the American continent in Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the 
International Life o f the States o f the New World (1924).
46 Quoted in ibidem, 71-72.
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Effectiveness of legitimate government, international responsibility of this 
government, non-intervention in its internal affairs are all legal features accepted and 
expressed by the US government in the course of the 19th Century.
A principle of effectiveness can also be tracked down in the modem theory of 
custom. Law does not exclusively develop through states* consent, but also from their 
consistent and repeated factual behaviour. Despite the fact that classic writers from 
Grotius to Binkershoek elaborated a theory of custom which was deeply embedded in 
natural law principles and in particular in a guiding factor of recta ratio, states* and 
tribunals’ practice in particular in judicial dispute settlement reveals an almost exclusive 
reliance on the objective element of vetustas of a certain practice.47 During the whole of 
the 19th Century in particular American and British courts asserted the objective factor 
of usage as the only constitutive element of custom. Wheaton cites the exemplar 
judgement by Justice Marshall in the Antelope case (1825) where the President of the 
US Supreme Court declared illegal the capture by the US navy of Portuguese and 
Spanish vessels because they were trading in slaves. The argument put forward was that 
despite slavery being against the natural right of every human being to enjoy the fruits 
of their work, slave trade was rooted in a well-established and accepted usage of many 
of the civilised nations and therefore it could not be considered contrary to the law of 
nations.48
A concept of effectiveness was therefore present in the early positivist jurisprudence 
on sources. The norm is what the normal practice of states shows to be a common 
standard accepted as law. The abidance by principles of natural law was completely 
discarded in favour of a new rationalist approach. It is the repetition itself of certain 
behaviour that represents the main law-making factor. However, the doctrine soon 
proved not to be at ease with a purely objective concept of custom and therefore, 
starting from the German idealist thought with Puchta and Savigny, new subjective 
elements were put into play, no longer being expressed as divine or natural principles of 
just reason but as the common consciousness of a certain society, be it national or 
international. This develops in the modem theory of custom that sees the formation of a
47 For a detailed account of the historical development of sources’ theory see Guggenheim, ‘Contribution 
a l’histoire des sources du droit des gens’ 94 Recueil des Cours (1958), 5.
48 Cit. in Wheaton, Histoire des progris du droit des gens en Europe et en Amerique depuis la Paix de 
Westphalie jusqu’a nos jours (1865,4th ed.), Vol. n, 295.
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customary rule as subject to the existence of a certain usage plus the so-called opinio 
iuris ac necessitatis. This theory was recognised by the PCU in the Lotus case and later 
will be repeatedly adopted by the ICJ.49 Yet many distinguished authors even recently 
have disputed the necessary presence of a subjective element, and a careful analysis of 
states’ and courts* practice seems to confirm the hypothesis that most of the times proof 
of a well-established practice is considered sufficient in order to reconstruct a customary 
norm even nowadays.50
3.3 Effectiveness and its philosophical roots
Effectiveness as a distinctive feature of positivist jurisprudence in its more debated 
issues can also be interpreted from a philosophical perspective. According to Wildeman, 
effectiveness is deeply rooted in the philosophical debate of the 19th Century and the 
first part of the 20th Century.51 He distinguishes three main philosophical inspirational 
factors that lead to its development as a fundamental principle of modem positivism.
The first one is rationalism and empiricism as they developed in France. The 
adoption of the effectiveness criterion as the guiding principles for recognition of new 
governments by France can be seen as expression of rationalist principles in the conduct 
of foreign affairs. Furthermore, positivist sociology as developed by Comte became 
very influential in the jurisprudential debate and led jurists to leave aside abstract 
notions and go back to reality in its material sense. The eternal and immutable natural 
laws were radically rejected as utopian and the lawyers’ role became to simply observe 
the law as it is in its technical sense. The lawyer as a sociologist or as an engineer was 
seen as pure technician. Criticism of the content of the law was not his business. In 
other words, positivist jurisprudence developed a methodological analysis that was at 
the same time rigorous observation of the factual reality and legitimation of this latter.
49 Lotus Case, 1927 PCU Series A, n. 10, at 28. E.g. North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark and 
The Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, 3, at 43-45.
50 Kopelmanas, ‘Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law’ 18 BYIL (1937), 127; Kelsen, 
‘Theorie du droit coutumier’ 1 Revue international de la thiorie du droit (1939), 253; Guggenheim, ‘Les 
deux Elements de la coutume en droit international’, in La technique et les principes du droit public: 
Etudes en Vhormeur de G. Scelle (1950), Vol. I, 275; Lauterpacht, supra n. 6. More recently see 
Mendelson, ‘Formation of Customary International Law’ 272 Recueil des Cours (1998), 165, at 272. In 
Mendelson’s view the opinio iuris is not generally considered a necessary element when international 
courts try to track down a certain customary rule. It can become important in specific cases, i.e. when 
certain usages could by their nature give rise to certain duties and rights, but they are prevented from a 
certain opinio non iuris\ in cases of disclaimers; and when state practice is ambiguous like in the Nuclear 
Weapons case.
51 Wildeman, supra n. 9.
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To reduce it to one of the two terms, as Wildeman does to its legitimation role, is in my 
contention historically misleading.
Secondly, an apparently contradictory theory like the Kantian, which is nowadays 
source of inspiration for cosmopolitan ideals and natural law theories,52 triggered that 
distinction between Sein and Sollen that would fuel the jurisprudential debate in 
continental Europe for more than a century. A neat distinction between law and social 
reality was seen with scepticism in the age of empiricism. Apart from the Vienna 
School of law that systematically developed this distinction, the sociological approach 
looked for a trait d*union between a system like the legal one, which could not afford to 
lose its normativity, and the material reality whose features should be incorporated in 
the legal system itself. Jellinek* s normative Kraft des Faktischen or Duguit’s social 
solidarity prepared the ground for what international lawyers would eventually call the 
principle of effectiveness. Furthermore, the concept of effectiveness, as expressed in 
the formula of material constitution as opposed to a formal one, would become linked to 
a development of a state theory that would legitimise internally state power against 
counter-powers, such as religious institutions, in newly bom states like Germany and 
Italy.54 External legitimation of state power in the age of colonial imperialism happened 
by conferring a dominant role to effectiveness in international law as legal expression of 
the fait accomplit.
Last but not least, another ideological root identified by Wildeman is Darwinian 
thought. This doctrine permeated all sciences by the beginning of the 20th Century and 
would led in jurisprudence to the acceptance of might as a source of law. In other 
words, the law would be ‘naturally’ brought to accept the might of those in a given 
society that have been able to appropriate most of the resources. Different legal devices 
were elaborated by constitutional lawyers in order to explain the acceptance of this kind 
of law by the disadvantaged. According to Von Ihering for example the acceptance 
would derive from the fact that those layers of the society who do not benefit from most 
of the resources would be in relative terms better off than if there was not law at all.55 
For Jellinek, the acceptance would build through a psychological process of adaptation
52 See Teson, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’ 92 Columbia Law Review (1992), 53.
53 Wildeman, supra n. 9, 343.
54 Seminal works on constitutional material theory in Germany and Italy were written by Jellinek 
(Allgemeine Staatslehre, supra n. 8) and Santi Romano (L’ordinamento giuridico: studi sul concetto, le 
fonti e i caratteri del diritto (1917)) respectively.
55 Von Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht (1877), Vol. I.
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of the minds of those who live in a society to what is historically given.56 This recalls 
the idea of cultural hegemony developed by Gramsci some ten years later.57 On the one 
hand, ‘Darwinian’ thought legitimised the power of elites in all European societies; on 
the other, it was also at the basis of racist doctrines that would be incorporated in 
domestic legislation first in Germany and later in Italy.
Wildeman’s analysis is thought-provoking. Because of the complexity of referring 
such a multiform concept of effectiveness to these three philosophical bases, it fosters a 
contextual rather than a deterministic analysis. Yet, it sheds more light on the 
conclusions of the last section according to which effectiveness would be inextricably 
linked to positivism, in particular sociological, in its theoretical elaboration and that it 
would be mainly a ‘continental affair’. Finally, it indicates a crucial link between 
national socialism in Germany and effectiveness, whose analysis reveals both the limits 
and ‘dark sides’ of this concept and its inherent criticism of modem liberal thought.58
3.4 Overview of the literature on effectiveness
A brief overview of the main contributions to the study of effectiveness in 
international law reveals the complexity of its nature and the wide range of positions 
related to its definition in international law. However, it seems possible to conclude that 
the analysis of the principle of effectiveness was carried out within a wide range of 
positivist approaches that move between two ideal extremes. On the one hand, we have 
the approach of analytical positivism, also named pure or critical positivism. This 
stream of the positivist school argues that the legal nature of a certain norm lies in its 
conformity to a superior norm. The legal system is built on a hierarchical normative 
construction, with the constitution at its peak. But what does the constitution depend 
on? The ultimate rale is a juristic presupposition that the whole legal order is efficacious 
and valid. Being a hypothesis, it does not require any kind of validation. On the other 
hand, we have sociological positivism in which the validity of a norm does not rest on
56 Jellinek, supra n. 8.
57 See Gramsci, ‘Culture, Hegemony, Ideology, Intellectuals’ in Bennet (ed.), Culture, Ideology and 
Social Process: a Reader (1947), 192. And his recent re-interpretation in international relations by 
Halliday, ‘Culture and International Relations: a new Reductionism’, in Ebata, Neufeld, Confronting the 
Political in International Relations (2000), 47.
58 On the question of effectiveness, Nazi international legal jurisprudence and its critique of liberal 
thought, see Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945’ 
14 U IL  (2001), 25. And reply to Carty’s article in Gattini, ‘Sense and Quasisense of Schmitt’s Grofiraum 
Theory in International Law -  A Rejoinder to Carty’s “Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International 
Legal Order”’ 15 U IL  (2002), 53.
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its source, but on its effectiveness. The legal order accepts only those rules and legal 
situations that are effective. A fictitious rule is not valid from the beginning, and a rule 
which does not find any correspondence in the sociological order loses its validity by 
desuetude. As a rule of custom acquires its validity from the practice of states, the same 
rule will lose its validity if states behave consistently contrary to it. In other words, 
sociological positivism postulates the principle of effectiveness as super-constitutional 
positive norm, that would dominate the whole legal system.
We may say that analytical positivism underlines fact as a condition for the operation 
of law, whereas sociological positivism considers it as a ‘revolutionary* element, a 
juristic source itself. Some observations must be made on this theoretical differentiation. 
First, despite disguising profound divergence on the whole relationship between law 
and reality, it has as a presupposition only a different and opposite observational point 
of view. Let us consider a hypothetical example of how effectiveness operates. An 
example is a revolutionary event that leads to the creation of two new states (states B 
and C) from the ashes of an old one (state A). Setting aside the distinct issue of 
succession, we could argue that effectiveness, as a whole of historical and sociological 
changes, is itself the source of the new legal personality and identity. The sovereignty of 
state A is not protected anymore, it is states B’s and C’s distinct sovereignties which are 
protected. States B and C are now responsible for their own breaches of customary law 
due to the fact that they have become international persons. We could argue that here 
effectiveness operates as a fact-revolution. By contrast, if one wished to underline the 
normative nature of international law, he/she would stress fact as a condition for the 
operation of law, arguing that there is a rule of general international law that provides 
for the creation of a new state under the condition of effectiveness. As a corollary, there 
is a rule providing for the new state being bound by existing customary law and having 
those rights related to sovereignty. In this sense, fact would be a condition of the 
operation of existing law, not a source of the new law.
A number of authors have seen the principle of effectiveness as a general positive 
norm whose function is the adaptation of law to reality.59 Some, most notably Kelsen, 
Kruger, Kunz, Bellini, Touscoz, Tucker and Stone have advanced the idea that the 
principle of effectiveness is the dominant principle of the international legal system
59 Kelsen, Principles o f International Law, supra n. 9; Bellini, supra n. 9; Kunz, ‘Revolutionary Creation 
of Norms of International Law’ 41 AJIL (1947), 119; Touscoz, supra n. 5; Tucker, supra n. 9; Kruger, 
supra n. 9.
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since every rule’s and subjective situation’s validity would be determined by it.60 The 
role that effectiveness plays in these authors’ view resembles very closely a sociological 
form of positivism. This would be very clear in the institution of desuetude, the lack of 
value of verbal protest in stopping acquiescence, in the declaratory nature of recognition 
and the exclusively material nature of sovereignty. All these authors stress that the 
principle of effectiveness through its adaptation of law to reality brings security and 
order to international relations. According to Touscoz, the adoption of effectiveness as a 
measure of legal validity requires a close link between the study of international 
relations and of international law. In his opinion, the law is not the super-structure of the 
social and economic reality which determines it; it is not even a body of rules 
subordinated to a formal, abstract, a priori ideal. Legal sciences should never lose touch 
with reality in order to facilitate the process of adaptation of the two perspectives. 
Therefore, a separation and isolation of the two disciplines would give a very narrow 
perspective to the international lawyer.61
Strangely enough Kelsen, who in his earlier work Reinerechtslehre theorised a 
purely independent and formal theory of law, gives a radical opinion on the role that the 
principle of effectiveness plays in international law in a later monograph on 
international law.62 According to him the sphere of validity of a legal order is 
determined by the principle of effectiveness, which is a positive norm of international 
law. This norm operates when the state is effectively displaying a stable order. This is 
clear in territorial matters. States in international law are those organisations able to 
exercise an effective control of a certain territory and population. Their boundaries are 
determined according to the extent to which their legal orders are firmly established and 
obeyed, and acquisitions of territories can occur as a result of an illegal act, as far they 
are effective. Yet, international law as a horizontal system without any centralisation of
60 Oddly enough Kelsen has a very ambiguous stance on the relationship between law and reality, on the 
one hand, advocating the ‘purity’ of the international legal order and its separation from the 
phenomenological reality, on the other, asserting the pre-eminence of the principle of effectiveness, 
which seems to be more than a mere juristic presupposition in most of his writings.
61 Touscoz, supra n. 5.
62 It is clear that his opinions on the operation of a principle of effectiveness are moderated in the 2nd 
edition of Principles o f International Law (1966, 2nd ed.). However, the editor Robert Tucker admittedly 
modified the part concerned with effectiveness, in order to keep in due account the changes occurred from 
1952, the year of the first edition, to 1966. This is why for an original account of Kelsen’s thought I have 
referred to the first edition and to General Theory o f Law and State.
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powers, always confers a right on the holder of effective power when deciding on a 
conflict with a nominal title. Validity is dependant on effective coercive power.
On the other hand, Tucker’s choice is somewhat less clear-cut and is half way to a 
‘purely’ positivist stance. This is very well expressed by Tucker’s analysis of the 
positive rule of effectiveness:
‘The content of the positive rule of effectiveness in international law refers primarily to the 
conditions of validity of both those rules of a general character (general rules of conventional 
international law) and of an individual nature (individual norms creating concrete rights and duties 
for definite subjects). The positive rule of effectiveness does not have as part of its content the 
rights and duties specified by these rules themselves. Thus, the effective control of territory gives 
rise to specific rights and duties as a result of certain general rules of international law regarding 
territorial sovereignty. The rights and duties stipulated have nothing to do with the positive rule of 
effectiveness; but whether they apply in a given instance -  let us say when the territory has been 
seized illegally -  depends upon the interpretation states give to the content of this rule of 
effectiveness.’64
Tucker’s view is that the positive rule of effectiveness applies only insofar as it is 
recognised by the states themselves. In other words, there are no self-evident facts or 
acts in law, but only facts and acts determined by a competent agency in a manner 
prescribed by the law. In a decentralised system like the international one, this 
competent agency is the states themselves, which can give validity to a certain rule or 
territorial situation. Therefore recognition or acquiescence (formal protest is not 
considered sufficient to stop the process of acquiescence) are constitutive of rights and 
duties and the facts themselves can never be taken as a source of law. This can apply 
also in cases of illegal unilateral acts. The principle ex iniuria ius non oritur would be 
qualified by the principle of effectiveness.65 Furthermore, although agreeing with 
Kelsen that the validity of a legal system as a whole presupposes its effectiveness, he 
does not think that the principle of effectiveness in this respect represents a positive 
norm. It represents only ‘a juristic presupposition or hypothesis’, that is, a certain 
correspondence between normative prescriptions and reality which forms the basis for a 
normative interpretation of certain facts.66
A consistent group of authors represented by Balekjian, Verdross, Ottolenghi, Mjaja 
de la Muela, Sperduti, and Verzijil have taken a more critical position and have warned 
of the dangers involved in taking effectiveness as a measure of validity of the whole
63 Kelsen, Principles o f International Law, supra n. 9, 208.





legal system and its single norms. According to them, effectiveness constitutes a 
principle but does not have any kind of normative value. Its content cannot be clearly 
delimited. It refers to situations which may be qualified as objective, like the status of 
widely recognised states, and to situations which constitute the object of conflict and 
legal disputes, like the status of new unrecognised states. Since the concept of 
effectiveness cannot be clearly defined, the general normative function of the 
corresponding principle cannot be ascertained clearly. However, it seems that such a 
function can be conceived as one subordinated to international law. The claim that 
effectiveness dominates international law is tantamount to the negation of the latter as a 
legal order. In other words effectiveness does not impinge on validity, since the validity 
of a certain norm depends on its ‘legitimacy’ according to a superior one. Thus, the 
discourse advanced from these authors on the functional nature of the principle of 
effectiveness is important. In summary, these functions are: the promotion of peace and 
legal security; the mutual adaptation of legal norms and realities; its probative role in 
support of claims to international legal titles.
Ottolenghi, Balejikan, Verzijl, Mjaia de la Muela believe that the principle of 
effectiveness does not have any positive normative nature but is only a qualification of a 
certain fact. This qualification can entail a normative function insofar as it is 
‘recognised’ either by an existing norm of positive law or by a new norm in the process 
of creation through states’ willingness. Any departure from this idea of ‘legitimate’ 
effectiveness entails serious dangers, as a rule of effectiveness taken up as a source of 
law would mean a substitution of the law with the interpreter’s and interested party’s 
willingness. Its unlimited application would replace the rule of law in international 
relations with the rule of power.
3.5 Is there a general principle of effectiveness in contemporary international law?
According to Sperduti, the principle of effectiveness needs to be interpreted as an 
informing principle of international law {principio informatore). Kelsen’s mistake of 
giving normative value to the principle of effectiveness must be avoided, because this is 
not supported by state practice - for example, states do not only consider the customary 
process to be effected through actual behaviours but also through the expression of an
67 Balekjian, supra n. 9; Verdross, Universelles Voelkerrecht (1984, 3rd ed.); Ottolenghi, supra n. 9; Mjaja 
de la Muela, supra n. 9; Sperduti, supra n. 9; Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (1968).
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opinio iuris - .  Secondly, that would lead to a reduction of the rule of law to the rule of 
power. Even one of the basic principles of international law, the mutual respect of 
territorial sovereignty, would lose its value since this constitutional principle of 
effectiveness would translate the mere fact of an armed aggression into a legal title.
However, what does ‘informing’ principle mean, according to Sperduti? He means a 
general character qualifying a consistent body of norms of international law, that allows 
the continuous modification and shaping of the international legal system towards 
historical and sociological reality. Its meaning and its general content can be 
reconstructed through the examination of the content of different norms with a process 
of induction and generalisation. Through this operation, it is possible to identify the 
main informing principles of international law, including the principle of effectiveness 
(another informing principle is the equality of nations, which is one of the main 
principles on which classic international law is based, though embodied more recently 
in a formal instrument like the UN Charter (Article 2 (1)). In other words, it is so 
frequent to find norms of the greatest importance for states whose application is 
subordinated to the realisation of an effective situation, that it is reasonable to talk of a 
principle of effectiveness shaping the international legal system, which is not the same 
as claiming that every norm is subordinated to the principle of effectiveness and that if a 
norm is not effectively applied then it loses its binding value. Just to consider some of 
the legal questions relating to the creation of states, their governmental organisation, 
their legal personality, their responsibility are all questions traditionally dealt with by 
international law through a careful observation of the historical-sociological reality. The 
principle of effectiveness would be the most evident sign of a realistic concept of 
international law. It gives expression to a dialectical tension between the sphere of the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought to be’, a tension that through this principle is solved by a 
transformation of the legal reality and its adjustment to the phenomenological reality.
But if we employ the expression principle of effectiveness, what do we mean by 
principle? Is it a general principle of the civilised nations according to Article 38 (1) (c) 
of the ICJ Statute or is it a fundamental principle of the international legal order as 
meant by Schwarzenberger? If we were to mean Article 38 principles as those drawn 
from the most developed domestic systems we can certainly state that this is not the 
case, since one of the characteristics of a domestic system should be at the very least
68 Sperduti, supra n. 9.
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that effectiveness plays a very limited role (unlike in the international system, for the 
reasons seen above). Fundamental principles of international law might mean what 
Sperduti thinks is an ‘informing principle’, as in both cases the principle is inducted 
from a process of generalisation of norms and judicial policies. Effectiveness seems to 
satisfy the three tests set out by Schwarzenberger.69 Further, judicial recognition has 
been given in a number of cases, to mention few, in Island of Palmas™ Norwegian
71 79Fisheries, and Nottebohm. One of the characteristics of a fundamental principle is 
the fact that there should be a presumption of supremacy in respect to other norms and 
principles in their application. This has been traditionally recognised if we consider it in 
respect to sovereignty, state responsibility, territorial disputes and nationality issues. We 
might say that if Sperduti’s definition can be subsumed under Schwarzenberger’s, then 
we can conclude that effectiveness can be defined as a fundamental principle of 
international law, being careful not to confuse it with Article 38 general principles.
Yet, if one asks which international law has among its fundamental principles that of 
effectiveness, we must agree that this is likely to be valid for modem international law 
until 1945. Post World War II rules on the use of force, on governmental legitimacy and 
on the principle of self-determination, and a shift towards a more limited acceptance of 
power as a ‘source’ of law seem to tell us that effectiveness is no longer a fundamental 
principle, but must be taken in due consideration with other factors like principles of 
legality, recognition, acquiescence and protest. Certainly, as already stated 
contemporary international law builds on classic international law, rather than replaces 
it. Yet, it would probably be even better to dispose of the whole notion of principle, 
since it can be sometimes misleading. Principle refers to a basic, primary notion, which 
generates logical application. Effectiveness for the international lawyer has a multiform 
qualitative meaning, relating to the impact of fact on the law, both in conserving it and 
modifying it. Its impact occurs on a variety of legal aspects: norms, subjective rights,
69 According to Schwarzenberger, ‘to decide whether any individual principle of international law may be 
regarded as fundamental’ means applying the three following tests: ‘1) The principle must be especially 
significant for international law. Opinion on this matter is bound to be greatly influenced by anybody’s 
pictures of international law in perspective; 2) The principle must stand out from others by covering a 
relatively wide range of rules of international law which appear to fall naturally under its heading; 3) The 
principle must be one which is either so typical of international law that it is an essential part of any 
known system of international law or so characteristic of existing international law that if it were ignored, 
we would be in danger of losing sight of an essential feature of modem international law.’ ‘The 
Fundamental Principles of International Law’ 87 Recueil des Cours (1955), 191, at 204.
70 Island o f Palmas case (1928), RIAA (Vol. II), 829.
71 Norwegian Fisheries (UK/Norway), ICJ Reports 1949,116.
72 Nottebohm, supra n. 3.
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legal titles. We cannot say that it determines them, but it certainly influences them. That 
is why De Visscher talks about les effectivites, underlying the fact that the concept of 
effectiveness cannot be subsumed to unity, but refers to a set of different legal 
situations . It seems more appropriate to define it a legal-normative criterion or, more 
generally, concept, and this is clear if we analyse its role in international law today. 
Hence, the use of the expression ‘principle of effectiveness*, commonly adopted in the 
literature, will be generally avoided. When referred to for the sake of succinctness, the 
above qualifications should be borne in mind.
To draw some conclusions from this analysis of the doctrinal debate, we can assert 
that the role played by effectiveness in international law is a symptom of the strongly 
realist nature of international law, which can afford legal fictions only to a limited 
extent. As a policy matter we have seen how it underlines security and order in 
international relations. Its impact on the law in its different manifestations can be 
summed up by three main functions: constitutive, modificative and adjudicative.
Through its constitutive function the concept allows the adaptation of law to the 
order established, to the fait accompli. It has in this respect a conservative function, 
because it ‘freezes’ a certain sociological situation and projects it into the legal sphere 
therefore legitimising it erga omnes. This function can be seen traditionally in several 
respects: the concept of state under international law that requires the effective power of 
a certain governmental organisation over a certain territory and population; the fact that 
a government is recognised as long as it wields effective power through habitual 
obedience/support by its population; the fact that a state is entitled to sovereignty over 
unoccupied territories when it exerts its actual authority; the fact that the laws of war are 
applicable not in virtue of a declaration of war, but in virtue of an effective state of 
armed conflict; and the fact that a blockade is admitted under international law when it 
is effective.
Effectiveness has a modificative function in the sense that it allows the modification 
of the law as a result of social change. It therefore possesses an amending role that 
allows an adaptation of the law to the new social situation. This is inherent in the 
concept of revolution, which through a social-factual process creates a new Grundnorm 
for the legal system.74 For example, this role has been particularly strong in the
73 De Visscher, supra n. 98.
74 Kunz Csupra n. 59) denies that an internal revolution can represent a revolution under international law, 
because the internal revolution is ‘recognised’ by the general principle of effectiveness.
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aftermath of World War II as far as the new creation of states was carried out through 
national liberation movements has been concerned, and the new exigencies of regulation 
of the international society in respect of maritime delimitation and cosmic navigation. 
We could see this role of the concept of effectiveness as a progressive role.
A third function effected by the concept of effectiveness is adjudicative. It has indeed 
been used by international courts and arbitral tribunals as a principle of solution of legal 
disputes involving competing claims. It is in this function applied to: cases of conflicts 
of nationality both for people75 and ships76 and cases of territorial delimitation.77
To conclude, effectiveness is a critical concept for every international lawyer 
because it goes straight to the issue of the relationship between reality and law and the 
validity of the latter. It has important functions in the international legal order, yet I 
agree with those jurists who have held that to consider the principle of effectiveness as 
dominant in international law is tantamount to the negation of international law. 
Effectiveness was a fundamental principle in modem international law before 1945, as 
the function of international law was often to ‘co-ordinate* hegemonic behaviours and 
policies. This nature is what confers to effectiveness a sinister flavour in an era where 
international law, if not more egalitarian, has definitely become more value-oriented. 
And this also explains why it has been subject to radical criticism in the doctrinal 
debate. I now turn to this criticism, arguing that it presents some important flaws.
3.6 Neo-liberal international lawyers: the quest for justice and democratic 
legitimacy
A systematic criticism of the concept of effectiveness is explicit in the neo-liberal 
approach to international law.78 The theory of some of the representatives of this 
approach is that contemporary international law should be re-shaped according to 
justice and legitimacy rather than legality.79 Justice would be represented by those 
values of international morality that are shared by the international community 
comprising a whole range of non-state actors (individuals, transnational corporations,
75 Nottebohm, supra n. 3.
76 The MW Saiga (No. 2) Case, 38 ILM (1999), 1323.
77 E.g. arbitration between Yemen and Eritrea (S/1999/1265) and the commentary by Despeaux, ‘Das 
Schiedsurteil Jemen gegen Eritrea 11 vom 17. Dezember 1999: Entscheidung ueber die Seeabgrenzung’ 
60 ZadRV (2000), 447. Infra Ch. 3, section 3.3.
781 adopt here the expression ‘neo-liberal” referring to what Simpson also calls ‘anti-pluralist’ liberalism, 
which he rightly keeps distinct from ‘Charter’ liberalism. Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ 12 EJIL (2001), 
537.
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NGOs), but that are not embodied in international instruments due to the formalist 
nature of international law that is still based on an outdated concept of state’s 
sovereignty. Ultimately, international law would address the needs of individuals and 
that is why it would be useless and dangerous to address two different levels of 
legitimacy: one at a national level embodying a concept of justice, one at an 
international level stressing order, stability and compliance. That is why according to 
these authors the form of government of a particular state should become one of the 
main priorities to be addressed by international law, according to a concept of justice
O A
that would not recognise non-democratic states. Teson talks of the effectiveness 
criterion ‘as the result of applying the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes to the 
issue of international legitimacy. The notion of state sovereignty is Hobbesian because 
it underscores the citizens’ obedience toward the sovereign, based on fear, as the only
O 1
effective means of ending the internal state of nature.’ As a corollary of this revised 
concept of sovereignty Teson and Reisman even propose a unilateral right of
o 9
intervention. The duty of non-intervention is only directed to those states who are 
formally and genuinely committed to liberal democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights. The same conclusions on the point of governmental legitimacy have been 
reached by Franck, who however bases his arguments in a positivist fashion and does
83not conceive of intervention outside the security framework provided by the UN.
This radical rejection of effectiveness is controversial, if not also self-interested. If 
Teson’s premises on a new Kantian international law were followed, that is 
international law addresses itself exclusively to individuals, and the state would appear 
like an agent of the individuals’ will, I do not understand why he does not simply 
dispense with the notion of the state. Even if his likely argument would be that the state 
represents the most feasible solution to representation so far and that it is not realistic to 
abandon it, then one should ask why, if democracy and justice are universal matters, 
there should not be a more democratic decision-making process at the international 
level, e.g. the transformation of the GA into a legislative body where each state has a
79 Teson, supra n. 52; Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’ 76 Foreign Affairs (1997), 183.
80 E.g. Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ 6 EJIL (1995), 503.
81 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: an Inquiry into Law and Morality (1988), 79.
82 Ibidem; Reisman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Intervention’ 18 Fordham International 
Law Journal (1995), 795.
83 Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement’, in Fox and Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance 
and International Law (2000), 25, at 46.
proportional number of votes according to the population.84 It is odd enough that, if 
democracy is a universal matter, it should only be addressed at a national level.
There is certainly strong support for the concept of popular sovereignty in 
contemporary international law. However, the issue is one of empirical determination of 
this popular sovereignty and substantive democracy. Who can say that the holding of 
periodic and free elections is in general an absolute guarantee of popular sovereignty? 
Elections could become a periodical safe-conduct for oligarchic regimes, where two or 
three elites struggle for power.85 The situation nowadays in some Asian and African 
countries seems to confirm this opinion. In other words, we cannot circumvent a 
substantive problem of definition of democracy by referring to a formal, procedural one. 
Moreover, apart from imposing a Lockean liberal concept of democracy in open 
contrast with the view held by the ICJ in the Admissions case and in Nicaragua and 
embodied in more recent GA resolutions that seem to be expression of customary law86 
stressing the liberal pluralism that underlies international law on this issue, the 
democratic entitlement theory does not consider other achievements reached by other 
political systems. In addition, in the advocates of a right to democratic governance, the 
discourse on human rights is mostly centred on civil and political rights rather than 
economic and social rights in accordance with Rawls’ hierarchy between the two main 
principles of justice.87 Furthermore, the unilateral intervention in other states’ internal 
affairs in order to bring back democratic legitimacy, if not negotiated and decided 
within multilateral organisations, could become an easy way to enforce national 
political agendas.
As stated by Roth, due to the lack of empirical methods of determining popular 
sovereignty, effective control is still the most feasible way to determine governmental 
legitimacy.88 An effective government and an effective political organisation within 
certain defined borders is also a pre-condition for democratic governance from the local 
to the central levels of state’s governance. It is crucial for tackling matters of public
84 Onuma, ‘The ICJ: An Emperor Without Clothes? International Conflict Resolution, Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute and the Sources of International Law’, in Ando et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru 
Oda (2002), 191, at 207, note 37.
85 Franck takes as indicator of democracy the domestic legal committment to open and periodical 
elections. Supra n. 83, 27-28.
86 GA Res. 45/150 (1990), 45/151 (1990) and 49/180 (1994).
87 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (1999, 2nd ed.), 52. See on the point of self-interested human rights 
discourse Koskenniemi, ‘Whose intolerance, which democracy?’, in Fox and Roth (eds.), supra n. 83, 
436.
88 Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999), 137.
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policy that cannot be addressed from the outside. In an age where the most fundamental 
economic choices have been transferred to a grey area of international governance 
where forms of legal accountability are still at a very infant stage, effectiveness still 
provides the minimal basis for crucial distributive choices at the local level and 
international legal responsibility of state and non-state actors. To simply do away with it 
in international law would not serve any cause for justice and democracy.
Of course, adopting effectiveness as a general criterion of governmental legitimacy 
does not mean that this criterion is without exceptions. Sovereignty has both a 
normative value and a functional nature. Fundamental rules of protection of human 
rights can be a guarantee for individuals. That is why the ICJ in giving its advisory 
opinion in the Namibia case held that denial of the right of self-determination and the 
South-African regime of apartheid represented violation of erga omnes obligations, and 
that the illegality of such (effective) territorial situation was opposable also to non­
member states of the UN.89 The same would apply to the instalment of a government 
through foreign intervention, genocide, and mass deportation. It is further true then that 
the European experience of joint recognition of the new states from the former 
Yugoslavia seems to unveil a constitutive trend in the recognition policies of states, 
which stresses the respect for human and minority rights.90 However, its relevance 
outside the European context could not be tested so far and that is why it is too soon to 
say whether it represents a setback for the effectiveness criterion and a development 
towards a more universal substantive concept of legitimacy. What we can say today is 
that effectiveness is still a flexible criterion which can accommodate a relativist concept 
of justice in its general application and an universal concept of legitimacy in its 
exceptions.
3.7 Critical legal studies, deconstruction and language
The criticism advanced by the critical legal studies towards the concept of 
effectiveness concentrate on different issues. The first is epistemological. Effectiveness 
would be the product of the modernist attempt to divide between law on the one side
89 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 1, at 56.
90 EC Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, in Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law (1998, 5th ed.), 147. See comment in Craven, ‘The European 
Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’ 66 BYIL (1995), 333, at 411 hinting at the 
constitutive nature of the collective process of recognition in the case of the Former Yugoslavia.
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and politics and morality on the other side. The positivist project after all is to discern 
objectively the rule of law as it is and to read reality as it is through normative 
provisions. The concept of effectiveness is clearly a realist one, a material device whose 
significance in shaping legal issues has been highlighted in the course of this chapter. A 
government is recognised as it is effective on a certain territory and population, an 
occupation of territory nullius gives a valid title to sovereignty since it is effective. This 
is objectively discernible as it is possible to describe reality in an objective and 
scientific manner. The post-modern approach denies that such a description is possible 
without a commixture of personal moral beliefs and political views. The language itself 
is a result of moral and political beliefs, therefore objective knowledge is impossible 
and the quest for science is a sterile one. One should be aware of this intermingling of 
law and politics and therefore should engage its personal values to interpret reality in a 
subjective way. The concept of effectiveness is dangerous because it can bring to 
apology and is unhelpful and indeterminate as a device of judicial policy.
It is submitted that the underlying philosophy of critical legal studies has inspired a 
much needed and stimulating systematic deconstruction of the language and the 
argumentative patterns and devices of international law. In the case of effectiveness, it 
has made explicit how a continuous reliance on the factual, material dimension of state 
sovereignty opens the door to extreme subjectivism and apologetic analysis.91 However, 
it is submitted that the deconstruction of substantive arguments has always been, even if 
more implicitly, the normal task of every international lawyer and no scholar has ever 
engaged in a doctrinal debate without first analysing, in other words deconstructing, the 
literature on that debate. Furthermore, the systematic reduction of reality to language 
and the impossibility of studying the law and the reality as they are is not shared. It is 
not my intention to advocate a pure and dogmatic positivism, asserting a separation of 
the legal system from the surrounding world and giving to it a sort of logical- 
metaphysical nature. Yet putting the law into its historical and social context can allow 
the adoption of one or more hypotheses, that is one or more observational standpoints, 
and tries to verify them by looking at the role the law plays in the society. That is why 
the need of contextual analysis is shared here with critical legal studies, yet context 
analysis cannot be limited to language and discourse analysis but must be able to look
91Koskenniemi, supra n. 1; Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1987).
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further in the world of facts. According to these premises, deconstruction becomes only 
the very first stage of the thesis, construction being its second necessary stage.
Aristodemou, for instance, disputes the claim that effectiveness can be a useful 
device for domestic courts in order to deal with acts of unrecognised regimes.92 She 
develops her criticism in the following five points. 1) Does effectiveness mean only 
habitual obedience or also popular support? 2) When does a government become 
effective? 3) If effectiveness implies popular support, what does this latter mean? 4) 
How is the consent of people to be ascertained? 5) Observational standpoints and 
contexts diverge and that is why the evaluation of the same facts can diverge. The 
author states that the practice of tribunals has not given an answer to these questions.
As a general reply to Aristodemou’s criticism, it must be pointed out that 
effectiveness is taken as a general criterion or norm, because it enables courts to operate 
a contextual analysis of the situation without being forced in a straitjacket. Any legal 
criterion or norm has to be inevitably ‘general’, in order apply to different concrete 
situations. Of course, the sociological level of effectiveness ‘recognised’ by the legal 
criterion or norm is a fluid concept, in the sense that different evaluations of 
effectiveness will operate as a result of the concept of effectiveness being applied in 
different contexts (recognition of governments, creation of states, international 
humanitarian law, or state responsibility) or by different people. As far as point 2) is 
concerned, despite there being no ‘mathematical formula’ to determine when a 
government should be considered effective, some useful indicators can be identified 
such as the level of obedience and popular support in the population, the level of 
resistance by competing factions claiming to become the ‘official’ government, the level 
of express or implicit international recognition. As far as the divide between habitual 
obedience and popular support is concerned (1 and 3), this is a theoretical dichotomy, 
which does not fit into reality. Most of the time, the situation is a mixture of both things 
even in most mature democracies. Because of the lack in general of empirical evidence 
of popular support, effectiveness still gives a presumption in its favour (4).
The second main criticism advanced by Aristodemou is of a political nature. 
According to her, effectiveness is inevitably linked with an unconditional acceptance of 
the status quoP  Its role would be conservative. Apart from a separate analysis that the




political categories of ‘conservative* and ‘progressive’ would require, this argument is 
flawed from the analytic perspective that Aristodemou seems to consider. It is 
surprising that an author who has committed herself to linguistic and contextual analysis 
can fall into such a misinterpretation of language and context themselves. From the 
analysis made above of the concept of effectiveness, it is clear that it is a variable 
criterion, whose use can be both conservative and progressive. The recognition of a 
government because of its effectiveness in the long term, say, even if this government 
disregards basic human rights like the right to a fair trial or the right to minimal 
provision of food, involves a conservative role of effectiveness. However, the same will 
apply even if the government is fully devoted to democracy, substantial equality and the 
rule of law. In this case, effectiveness is conservative because it ‘freezes’ the situation 
and gives international legitimacy to that government. Yet, to define its influence on the 
development of the law of the sea in the last 50 years as a conservative role is 
misleading, since it has led to a considerable development in the regime of the 
continental shelf, which is seen by many as a very important achievement. Furthermore, 
inherent in the concept of effectiveness, and in the principle ex factis ius oritur, is the 
concept of revolution which is progressive par excellence in Hegelian analytic terms. 
Therefore, the qualification of effectiveness as conservative is a partial description of its 
function in international law and fails to record its progressive role in certain situations.
4. Ex iniuria ius non oritur and effectiveness: the ‘dark side’ of 
international law
Rather than the above-mentioned issues, the truly critical aspect of the concept of 
effectiveness, which is also particular relevant to the understanding of unlawful 
territorial situations, is that of the violation of international law and the creation of new 
law as a result of that violation. In other words, to what extent, if any, does international 
law recognise the effects produced by its violations, and what is the exact relationship 
between the original violation and subsequent recognition of legal effects?
International law lacks any centralised enforcement and amendment mechanism, 
which is why the action of facts on the legal order is ‘congenital’.94 In a national legal 
system, any violation of the law is theoretically sanctionable by a centralised authority,
94 Cf., Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (1986), 18.
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which is ostensibly in a situation of impartiality and supremacy in regard to the legal 
persons of that system. According to Kelsen, the state has a monopoly on the use of 
force and, as a corollary, the use of force in a national legal system is either a wrongful 
act or a sanction.95 When the legislator believes that a new sociological situation either 
encounters a vacuum in legal regulations - for example of new contract law regulating e- 
commerce - or, despite representing a violation of the existing law, displays 
representative patterns of new values that need to find normative protection, it has at its 
disposal a centralised amendment procedure that creates new law according to the new 
factual situation. In other words, the maxim ex factis ius oritur has its place even in a 
national legal system, and it is the correspondence of those factual behaviours with 
shared values that leads the legislator to the amendment or creation of new law.
In international law, the enforcement mechanism is mostly based on the concept of 
self-help. A violation of one state’s rights by another state can give rise to legitimate 
counter-measures by the interested state or, in certain cases, the whole international 
community according to the substantive value of that right.96 Sometimes it will be even 
possible to ascertain the illegality of a certain conduct or situation through a judicial 
body, where the states party to the dispute have consented to its jurisdiction. However, 
except those cases where the SC ascertains a threat to international peace and takes 
action under Chapter VII, the enforcement of the sanction is up to states.97 States often 
do not have any interest in enforcing the law. This is due to many reasons. These 
include the need of those affected by such violations to get away with their own 
breaches of the law; the fact that the interests at stake may merit no more than a verbal 
protest; or the disproportion in military and economic power between the offended state 
and the one breaching international law. If the wrongful act is not sanctioned, the new 
situation, if effective and stable, can produce legal effects that international law may 
recognise. Furthermore, the ‘normative Kraft des Faktischen’, to put it in Jellinek’s 
words, may determine in itself the amendment of the existing law, apart from those 
instances where a general consensus is found in international society and a new legal 
regulation determines which normative values have to be attached to the new
95 Kelsen, General Theory o f Law and State (1961).
96 Art. 22 and Art. 48, ILC Articles on State Responsibility, in Crawford (ed.), The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002).
97 This enforcement procedure has been put into effect only occasionally because of the SC inaction due 
to the political struggles between permanent members during the Cold War and in the post Cold War era, 
most recently the cases of Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003.
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sociological reality. This is clear in the customary process, which is one of the two 
ordinary law-creating facts in international law.98
We can infer from the lack of a system of compulsory jurisdiction and of a 
centralised system of amendment and enforcement that the Kelsenian principle of 
effectiveness appears to have a congenital role in international law.99 It is because of 
what has been defined as its ‘primitive’ status that international law needs a principle of 
effectiveness to operate and incorporate social and historical realities into the law. 
Consider a case that has been very much debated and that will be studied in detail later
• • • ion •in this thesis. Despite the claim to a customary right of humanitarian intervention, the 
aerial bombardment of the FRY by NATO countries in 1999 represented for many 
international lawyers a breach of the existing laws on the use of force as set out in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.101 In particular the breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter 
is usually considered a breach of a rule of ius cogens. A legal system strictly based on 
the principle ex iniuria ius non oritur as envisaged by Lauterpacht102 would not have 
recognised the effects of the military agreement on the decommissioning of Yugoslav 
troops annexed to SC Resolution 1244.103 The Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties, - which is binding on all NATO countries, except for the US and Turkey, and
98 The Truman declaration and the US and Latin American claims and effective assertions of jurisdiction 
on the continental shelf in the 1940s and in the 1950s represent an example of what Charles De Visscher 
has defined Veffectiviti en action, that is the law-amending and progressive nature of effectiveness in the 
customary process (Les effectivite du droit international public (1967), 67).
99 On the primitive nature of general international law, see Kelsen, supra n. 95, 338-339. Since he wrote 
in 1944, the international order has progressed towards a limitation of the concept of self-help. The 
increasing number of cases settled before the International Court of Justice, the proliferation of 
adjudicative bodies and ad hoc international tribunals above all in the 1990s, and the development of 
other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes have possibly helped in limiting the resort to the use of 
force after World War n. Yet the sanction of the international delict rests upon the single states, and the 
use of force outside those instances as provided for by the UN Charter is far for being eliminated from the 
international arena. The difference between war as a sanction and war as a delict or crime is still often 
blurred.
100 Infra Ch. 6, section 5.
101 For different approaches reaching the same conclusions on the unlawfulness of NATO intervention in 
the FRY see Brownlie, ‘Kosovo Crisis InquiryiMemorandum on the International Law Aspects’, and 
Chinkin, ‘The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) under 
International Law’, 4th Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, as reprinted in 49 
ICLQ (2000), 878; Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria jus oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community’ 10 EJIL (1999), 23; White, ‘The 
legality of bombing in the name of humanity’ 5 Journal o f Conflict and Security Law (2000), 27. For 
different conclusions envisaging the development of a new customary rule allowing humanitarian 
intervention see Greenwood, ‘International law and the NATO intervention in Kosovo’, 4th Report of the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, in 49 ICLQ (2000), 926. See also infra Ch. 6, para. 5.2.3.
102 Hersch Lauterpacht stated that ‘to admit that, apart from well-defined exceptions, an unlawful act, or 
its immediate consequences may become suo vigore a source of legal right for the wrongdoer is to 
introduce into the legal system a contradiction which cannot be solved except by a denial of its legal 
character.’ Recognition in International Law (1947), 421.
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on the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (USM) and is further considered expression of 
customary law by those states who have not ratified it declares in Article 52 that ‘a 
treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations.’ The agreement should be therefore void and non-binding on the USM, which 
would therefore be entitled to maintain its previous territorial status in Kosovo. 
Therefore, we could consider the new status quo an illegal territorial situation, brought 
about by a grave breach of international law. However, SC Resolution 1244 appears to 
have recognised the new state of affairs by legalising instantaneously the new territorial 
status.104 Resolution 1244 does not in fact legalise the intervention, which is never 
mentioned in the resolution; but it recognises the new territorial situation as set out in 
Annex 2, and it authorises under Chapter VII the establishment of a military security 
presence led by NATO.105 What we seem to face here is an operation of effectiveness 
that adapts the law to the new sociological reality. Paradoxically the only organ 
resembling, at least formally, an enforcement agency gives legitimation to a territorial 
situation resulting from an arguably grave breach of international law. Despite repeated 
protests against the intervention, Russia and China participated in the legitimation of the 
effective situation by not opposing the resolution. Even those international lawyers who 
had doubted the legality of the intervention in the first place simply recorded the fact 
that by passing Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII the SC restored its authority in the 
field of international peace and security and authorised the deployment of UNMIK and 
KFOR.
In conclusion, does the above example show that effectiveness prevail over the 
principle ex iniuria ius non oritur, thus allowing the automatic recognition of the effects 
produced by a violation of international law? One may argue that this is a part of the 
reality of the international legal system, or to use David Kennedy’s words, the ‘dark 
side’ of international law. The argument is that international law often cannot avoid the 
antinomy between effectiveness and validity and ‘the catastrophic alternative between 
either denying the normative character of international law, or creating a fiction,
* •  i q 6incapable of serving even the minimum needs of international intercourse.’ Another
103 Annex II to SC Res. 1244 (1999). See infra Ch. 6, section 5.2.1.
104 SC Res. 1244(1999).
105 Ibidem, para. 7.
106 Marek, Identity and Continuity o f States in Public International Law (1968, 2nd ed.), 566.
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approach would be to adopt a ‘normativist’ argument, by putting aside the legality of 
the intervention per se, and considering the new territorial situation as legalised by 
Resolution 1244. This would appear a tenable position, and it would have the advantage 
of denying the automatic operation of effectiveness and safeguarding the principle ex 
iniuria ius non oritur. On the other hand, apart from presenting some flaws from a 
strictly normative point of view as far as NATO’s authority is concerned,107 this latter 
approach only shifts the argument towards the procedure through which the effects of 
the violation are recognised. In other words, the factual situation created by the illegal 
intervention is indeed instantaneously recognised, with the aggravating factor that the 
organ allowing such recognition is the organ that, more than any other international 
actor, should uphold the rules of international law embodied in the Charter.
The thesis proposes a different solution by stressing the contradiction between the 
existence of a rule of law in the international society, and the fact that a violation of 
international law can produce per se legal effects. It maintains the ultra vires character 
of those Chapter VII SC Resolutions attempting to instantaneously legalise the status 
quo produced by a grave breach of the Charter. At the same time, it analyses the critical 
nature of effectiveness as a device of transformation of unlawful territorial situations 
into lawful territorial situations, by showing its interplay with the concept of legitimacy. 
It argues that only a ‘violating* effectiveness which is perceived as legitimate by the 
international community because of the underlying claim and/or because of the 
endorsement by authoritative bodies such as the SC can be gradually recognised in the 
long run. By using legitimacy discourse to reconcile effectiveness and legality, the 
international community can, on the one hand, accommodate more easily hegemonic 
relations in the international society, one the other, sideline positive legality in some
1 DRcases, in order to maintain the integrity of the rule of law.
107 For a more detailed analysis of these issues concerning Kosovo see infra Ch. 6, section 5.
108 On the tensions and the possibility of co-existence of sovereign equality and positivism, on the one 
hand, and hegemony, on the other, see Cosnard, ‘Sovereign equality -  “the Wimbledon sails on”, in 
Byers, Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundation o f International Law (2003), 117.
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Chapter 3
Statehood and territorial sovereignty: 
concreteness and realism
1. Introductory remarks
Once considered the theoretical discussion surrounding the concept of effectiveness 
and its definition, I now focus on its role in legal issues related to territorial sovereignty. 
Territorial sovereignty denotes a political and legal expression, which designates a 
relationship between an actor, the state, and an object, the territory. The qualitative 
expression of the relationship between state and territory, together constitute what is 
called territorial sovereignty. This chapter investigates the significance of effectiveness 
in its legal definition of statehood and how the concept of state in international law is 
transposed to the relationship of sovereignty that the state may have with a certain 
territory. In other words, the implications of the concept of effectiveness for 
international law issues concerning the question of unlawful territorial situations will be 
considered, namely statehood, territorial sovereignty and military occupation.
Specifically, this chapter examines the material concept of state in its theoretical 
and jurisprudential elaboration, by looking at effectiveness in its internal and external 
dimensions. It assesses how effectiveness discourse has been transposed in the legal 
definition of territorial sovereignty. In particular, the chapter deals with the notion of 
territory and the classic modes of acquisition of territory, and how these aspects of 
international law have been affected by the concept of effectiveness. It is submitted that 
the material concept of territorial sovereignty defines itself in the colonial encounter, in 
particular in the institution of occupation of terra nullius. Despite the attempt of 
positivist jurisprudence to differentiate forms of legal encounter with the non-European 
world, the analysis highlights both the inconsistencies of such differentiations, and also 
how the standard of civilisation made in fact such world a terra nullius. The recent 
Cameroon-Nigeria litigation proves that effectiveness played a legally dominant role 
also in cases of agreements with local populations, and how the ICJ is still keen on 
recognising such role. Furthermore, the predominant role of a material or objective
59
element in the institution of occupation of terra nullius, rather than a subjective 
requirement, according to the original scheme of the Roman law institute of occupatio 
is shown. Finally, the concept of military occupation is considered, as effectiveness 
heavily impacts on its legal definition, and it is often crucial to the understanding of 
unlawful territorial situations.
2. Statehood and effectiveness
By considering the role of effectiveness in determining legal issues related to 
statehood and sovereignty, we can fully appreciate its significance vis-a-vis the principle 
ex iniuria ius non oritur. It is instructive to recall Martti Koskenniemi’s analysis that the 
discourse on sovereignty in international law has been dominated by two contrasting 
positions on the nature of the state, the ‘pure fact* approach, and the ‘legal approach’, 
which have created a spectrum within which every writer and tribunal have ‘moved* 
their arguments.1 The view, defined as ‘Schmittian’ by Koskenniemi, presupposes the 
sociological nature of the state to the legal one - like a person, its physical existence is 
conditio sine qua non to its legal existence -, whereas the view, defined as Kelsenian, 
sees the state as a legal order tout court, whose social and political elements must be 
distinct from its ‘pure’ legal form and do not influence its legal existence. The question 
of governmental and territorial competencies does not escape this dualism, and therefore 
it is fundamental to examine those theories for a fuller understanding of the issue 
concerned.
The antinomy between the Schmittian and the Kelsenian approach is probably 
fictitious, since once we fix opposite observational standpoints we have different 
descriptions of what seems to be the same basic concept. Kelsen’s principle of 
effectiveness, which represents the Grundnorm of the domestic legal system, is 
presented, on the one hand, like that degree of coercive power on which the validity of 
every norm is based, on the other hand, as a positive norm of international law from
A #
which every national constitution is based. Kelsen begins by defining effectiveness m 
the former sense. However, in order to avoid a charge of presupposing a sociological 
axiom to a juristic one, he describes it as a ‘general norm of the international legal
1 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure o f the International Legal Argument (1989).
2 H. Kelsen, General Theory o f Law and State (1961), 115-122.
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order’. At this stage the author seems to maintain that the Grundnorm is a positive rule 
that because of its general character finds its foundation in the practice of states. But if 
state behaviour is a source of the Grundnorm, then it seems that either: a) the principle 
of effectiveness is not the basic norm, rather the basic norm is the principle consuetudo 
est servanda; or: b) states do pre-exist the basic norm, so the sociological existence of a 
state is a presupposition of its normative existence. To avoid this counter-argument 
Kelsen admits that the principle of effectiveness is the basic norm of the national legal 
system, and consuetudo est servanda that of international law. Further, he argues that 
we do not need to presuppose the state to custom, since primitive social groups 
developed into states simultaneously with the development of international law. He 
argues by analogy with tribal law that develops in parallel with inter-tribal law.4
Kelsen* s point is based on an historical observation. However, as a result, one can 
counter that socio-legal effectiveness plays a fundamental role in the break-up of Papal 
rule and the development of new political and legal forms of national allegiance. It is 
important to understand the role that prescription and adverse possession played 
throughout medieval times and in the establishment of the Westphalia system. This was 
the basis of French and English claims to independent sovereignty; the argument was 
that sovereignty could not merely consist in the ius alios excludendi, but should be 
accompanied by legal authority and actual jurisdiction.5 In the 14th Century, observing 
the legal regime of the Italian communal states, Bartolus held in his Commentaries in 
Infortatium: ‘You may observe that the Roman Emperor is the lord paramount of the 
world...This I think is true except in the case when prescription has been ruling for 
some considerable time.’6 The instructions issued by the Sicilian King Robert to his 
ambassador at the Holy See in 1312 are also instructive: ‘The Emperor may assert that 
they (viz. the Sicilians) are his subjects...according to the sequence of the above- 
mentioned scriptures...; but scripture has no force against a custom both contradictory 
and continued.’7 There are other examples of this aspect of effectiveness and the 
usurpation of imperial power by new nation states. However, it is important to note that
3 Ibidem, 121. Marek maintains that Kelsen’s argument of facts acquiring normative force ‘seems an 
intellectual tour deforce, performed for the sake of logical perfection.’ Marek, Identity and Continuity o f 
States in Public International Law (1968,2nd ed.), 47.
4 Kelsen, supra n. 2, 370.
5 Von der Heydte, ‘Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law’ 29 
AJIL (1935), 448, at 449.
6 Cit. in ibidem.
7 Cit. in ibidem, 450.
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the two elements, on the one hand the imperial law as embodied in the corpus iuris and 
the papal laws as embodied in the bible, and on the other hand the local statutes and the 
national laws, coexisted until 1648. Deference to the former was often a pure formality 
and to say that nation states developed only after Westphalia would be innacurate. Yet, 
we cannot assert the opposite view and say that classic international law develops 
before Westphalia, since this would be reading history with modem eyes. What we face 
here is the action of facts towards the law in a very slow process of adaptation of the 
two elements. In conclusion, it can be argued that sovereignty is historically 
presupposed to international law.
Kelsen seems well aware of this argument, and therefore states that even if national 
legal systems developed before international law, we could say that at that stage 
effectiveness was not yet a positive norm of international law - since this latter did not 
exist -, but only a juristic presupposition.8 Kelsen does not elaborate on this point, apart 
from saying that at a later stage, with the development of international law, 
effectiveness would become the basic norm and states would lose their sovereign status, 
thus becoming subordinated to international law.9
Crawford rejects the idea of a Grundnorm presupposing the state,10 but argues that 
the nature of effectiveness in the creation of states is not sociological, which 
automatically and as such becomes accepted by international law, but is rather the result 
of a process of recognition by certain rules. He argues:
‘The declaratory theory assumes that territorial entities can be -  by virtue of their mere existence -  
readily classified as having the one particular legal status, and thus, in a way, confuses ‘fact’ with 
‘law’. For, accepting that effectiveness is the dominant principle in this area, it must none the less 
be a legal principle. A State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; it is a fact in the sense in 
which it may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status attaching to a certain state of affairs by 
virtue of certain rules. And the declaratist’s equation of fact with law also obscures the possibility 
that the creation of State might be regulated by rules predicated on other fundamental principles -  
a possibility which, as we shall see, is borne out to some extent in modem practice.’11
8 Kelsen, supra n. 2, 369-370.
9 Ibidem.
10 Crawford states that ‘one can only know the basic norm of a State when the State itself is identified as 
such. Like international responsibility, the basic norm is a conclusion to the problems o f existence, 
identity, and continuity, not the means of their solution (italics added). Nor can there be such a thing as an 
“independent” basic norm; merely a basic norm of a State that is independent. Again, this is not to deny 
that the legal system of an entity is a part of its general system of government, and as such relevant to 
questions of existence, identity and continuity of statehood.’ Crawford, The Creation o f States in 
International Law (1976), 76.
11 Ibidem, 4.
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In other words, Crawford agrees with Kelsen* s idea that the principle of effectiveness 
is a positive customary rule, with the only difference that, writing 20 years later, he can 
observe the emergence of additional customary rules - such as the prohibition of 
aggression, the right of self-determination, the prohibition of apartheid - that condition 
the acceptance of territorial entities in the international community.
As a ‘Schmittian’ counter-argument, a series of judicial decisions, both international 
and national,12 and state practice throughout the 20th Century, seem to point to an 
opposite ‘sociological’ approach to effectiveness in the creation of states and their 
recognition.13 In the Aaland Islands case (1920) one of the questions that the 
International Commission of Jurists needed to answer was at which stage did Finland 
become a state. The commission held that
‘[i]t is, therefore, difficult to say at what exact date the Finnish Republic, in the legal sense of the 
term, actually became a definitely constituted sovereign State. This certainly did not take place 
until a stable political organisation had been created, and until the public authorities had been 
strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territories o f the State without the assistance o f 
foreign troops' (italics added).14
It is clear how the ‘factual* approach to statehood prevailed. In 1921 the Polish- 
German arbitration tribunal in the case of Deutsche Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. 
Poland stated that
‘according to the opinion rightly admitted by the great majority of writers on international law, the 
recognition of a State is not constitutive but merely declaratory. The State exists by itself and the 
recognition is nothing else than a declaration o f this existence, recognised by the State from which 
it emanates’ (italics added).15
The 1948 Bogota Treaty creating the Organization of American States re-asserts the 
material nature of statehood and a declaratory view on recognition. Article 6 states that 
‘[t]he right of each State depends not upon its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but 
upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international law’ (italics added).
12 E.g. Tribunal of Bolzano, Kweton c. Ullman, in 55 Rivista di diritto intemazionale (1972), 12; Italian 
Court of Cassation, Warenzeichenverband Regelungstechnik c. Ministero dell'industria, del commercio e 
dell'artigianato, Judgement n. 468, 7 February 1975, in 12 Rivista di diritto intemazionale privato e 
processuale (1976), 354; House of Lords, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rainer and Keeler LTD (no. 2) (1967) 
AC, 853.
13 For a sociological approach to statehood see Verhoeven, La Reconnaisance intemationale dans la 
pratique contemporaine (1975); Arangio-Ruiz, ‘L’Etat dans le sens du Droit des Gens et la Notion du 
Droit international’ 26 Osterreische Zeitschrift fur ojfentliches Recht (1975-1976), 3, 265.
14 Aaland Islands Case (1920), League o f Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 3, 3.
15 Deutsche Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. Polish State (1929), AD 11, at 13.
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Despite its ambiguous drafting, the material nature of statehood becomes clear in 
Article 9, which endorses a declaratory theory of recognition:
‘The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States. Even before 
being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its 
preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate 
concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and 
competence of its courts
Article 10 goes further, asserting that ‘[recognition implies that the State granting it 
accepts the personality of the new State.’16 More recently the EC Arbitration 
Commission on Yugoslavia has held in its Opinion n. 1 that ‘the existence or 
disappearance of the State is a question of fact’ and that ‘the effects of recognition are 
purely declaratory.’17 In its Opinion n. 8 it added that
‘the existence of a federal State, which is made up of a number of separate entities, is seriously 
compromised when a majority of these entities, embracing a greater part of the territory and 
population, constitute themselves as sovereign States with the result that federal authority may no 
longer be effectively exercised.’18
This judicial and state practice, which seems to point towards a sociological 
approach to statehood, could be reconciled with either Kelsen’s or Crawford’s view, if 
effectiveness is defined according to a general norm of international law. In other 
words, different points of view dictate different legitimate outcomes. It can be held that 
to name effectiveness a juristic presupposition or a positive norm is only a semantic and 
logical device used by lawyers in order to separate the sociological and juristic 
existence of the state. However, it is clear that its substantive, underlying value is a 
stable and organised political community, which is why the separation sounds overly 
fictitious.19 International law automatically recognises such existence. On the other 
hand, it can also be held that such recognition occurs through a general norm of 
effectiveness, which interacts with other norms in the acceptance of states by the
international community. From the perspective of legal consistency, the latter view can
20be better reconciled with the existence of other norms regulating the creation of states.
16 Charter of the Organization of the American States, reprinted in 46 AJIL (Documents) (1952), 44.
17Arbitration Commission, EC Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion n. 1 (29 November 1991), 92 ILR 
(1993), 162.
18 Opinion n. 8 (4 July 1992), in ibidem, 199. See comment in Craven, ‘The European Community 
Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’ 66 BYIL (1995), 333, at 357-375.
19 On a similar criticism of Kelsen’s Grundnorm see Hart, The Concept o f Law (1994,2nd ed.).
20 Craven, supra n. 18, 359.
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However, also a sociological approach does not necessarily rule out the existence of 
such norms, perhaps construed as exceptions to the general practice.
What is clear is that the underlying motive is a political-normative choice, and often, 
but not necessarily, a preference for either a dualist or monist conception of the relation 
between national law and international law. The sociological approach stresses the 
national community and its sovereignty as a source of legitimacy for its action not only 
at a domestic level, but also in the international arena. It usually adopts a dualist 
conception. The positivist approach stresses the overarching structure and principles of 
international society as the main source of legitimacy for state behaviour in the 
international arena. It frequently adopts a monist conception with a primacy of 
international law over national law. 21 However, both approaches in the 20th Century 
stress the crucial role of internal and ‘material’ effectiveness in the definition of state, 
regardless of whether such effectiveness is legalised by a superior norm, or whether its 
legalisation occurs automatically because of a ‘normative Kraft des Faktischen’.22 To 
use Koskenniemi’s categories, the former approach can also lead to an apology of state 
sovereignty and of its freedom in international relations, insofar as international law 
allows for effectiveness to display its fullest effects. Kelsen’s radical conception of the 
principle of effectiveness is a reminder of that.
21 The primacy of international law over national law and the monistic concept are accepted by Malcom 
Shaw (Title to Territory in Africa (1986), 16). However, the author advances some reservations and states 
that ‘this should not be understood so as to detract from the important social and psychological role 
played by the State in the life of a community. Sovereignty in international law reflects the need for 
security and stability, but it also constitutes, in Alvarez’s words, “an institution, an international social 
function of a psychological character”. Territorial sovereignty is the answer provided by international law 
as regards the needs for security, stability, and identity felt by a particular group within a certain area. It 
also constitutes the method by which a community may enter upon the international scene and by virtue 
of sovereign equality of States play a particular role in the development of the international system. It is 
submitted that, as regards these two functions, the concept of territory and sovereignty of States 
associated with it has been enthusiastically adopted by Third World States, although without foregoing 
the advantages of the global approach.’ The question of whether this social and psychological nature of 
the States presupposes its normative existence or is a pre-condition of its legal constitution is left 
unanswered.
22 The role of effectiveness can be also seen in the law of state responsibility with regard to the issue of 
imputability of actions of non-state actors to the state. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case developed the 
effective control test to assess whether some of the actions of the contras in Nicaragua could be imputable 
to the US {Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (Nicaragua/US), ICJ Reports 1986, 62, at 
64-65). The criterion of effectiveness has been subsequently ‘loosened’ by international tribunals in the 
context of human rights law {Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement of 18 December 1996, ECHR Series 
A (1996-VI), 2219, at 2232-2236) and international criminal law (Tadic case, Appeal’s Chamber 
Judgement (1997), 124 ILR (2003), 63, at 108-133). See ILC Commentary on Art. 8 of the 2001 ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility in Crawford (ed.), The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), 107.
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2.1 External effectiveness
In analysing the relevance of the principle of effectiveness for the purpose of 
studying de facto states, Balejikan maintains:
‘The international legal personality of a state is, in the total absence of inter-state relations and 
international intercourse, a total abstraction, because the domestic effectiveness of an entity as 
state is not per se identical with the effectiveness of the same as a subject of international law, and 
cannot per se induce, without the willingness of other states, the establishment of inter-state 
relations.’23
In fact, the author suggests an important argument on the issue of effectiveness in 
international law. As a linguistic matter, the term effectiveness recalls a situation 
producing effects. A government is effective if its power and control produces effects 
both of a legal and of a sociological nature. The link between nationality and a physical 
person is effective, if that person’s attachment to a certain state produces effects of a 
moral, religious or juridical nature. The occupation of a certain territory is effective if it 
produces effects, e.g. the occupation is not disturbed, persons and objects are under the 
occupant’s control. However, since the concept of state effectiveness is analysed here 
under the prospect of international law, it would seem paradoxical to envisage a state 
under international law that is effective only in internal matters, yet is completely 
ineffective at the international level.
In other words, for a state to be effective in its external relations, it must satisfy one 
of the traditional criteria of statehood laid down by the Montevideo Convention, that is 
‘the capacity to enter into relations with other states.’ This criterion has traditionally 
been made in reference to another criterion of statehood: independence. It has been 
submitted that an independent state per se has the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states. An entity superiorem non recognoscens is supposed to have no restriction 
on its capacity as an international person. External independence follows from internal 
independence, and I believe that the two sides of independence should not be confused. 
We may consider first the concept of independence.
In Anzilotti’s famous dissenting opinion, independence is presented in its formal 
sense:
‘no more than the normal condition of States according to international law; it may also be 
described as sovereignty (suprenia potestas), or external sovereignty by which is meant that the 
State has over it no other authority than that of international law [...]. The idea of dependence 
therefore necessarily implies a relation between a superior State (suzerain, protector, etc.) and an
23 Balekjian, Die Effektivitdt und die Stellung Nichtanerkannter Staaten im Volkerrecht (1970), 206.
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inferior or subject State (vassal, protege, etc.); the relation between the State that can impose its 
will and the State which is legally compelled to submit to that will [...]. It follows that the legal 
conception of independence has nothing to do with a State’s subordination to international law or 
with the numerous and constantly increasing states of de facto dependence which characterise the 
relation of one country to other countries.’
The formal nature of independence has been disputed,24 and Crawford admitted that 
despite there being a presumption for lack of independence by so-called puppet regimes 
constituted under belligerent occupation or following an illegal intervention, it is also a 
question of fact whether a state is independent or not.25 This is very clear from World 
War II cases, like Manchukuo, Slovakia and Albania, but also from more recent cases 
like the Srpska Republic.26 As a matter of fact, it is submitted that it is difficult to 
establish general criteria for determining whether a lack of factual independence affects 
statehood and an assessment will be needed in every case, since this determination is of 
the greatest importance for settling disputes on state succession and state responsibility.
The independence criterion is a complex intermingling of legal and factual elements. 
The purely positivist approach taken by Anzilotti fails to explain the situations of 
puppet states. A wide-ranging analysis of state practice reveals the fundamental 
importance of factual considerations in assessing independence. Traditionally, the 
internal situation of independence and effectiveness also made the state effective 
outside its borders. Yet today, independence as a matter of fact and of law does not 
alone make a state effective at the international level, where there is widespread 
consensus that it lacks international legitimacy.27 In other words, whereas a sociological 
notion of state underlines the sense of community and collective identity -  regardless 
whether genuinely formed or artificially driven -  and the ability of such community to 
carve up its Lebensraum as sources of international legitimacy, today the non- 
acceptance and non-compliance with fundamental principles of the international
community leads to a lack of legitimacy on the international plane. This occurs where
28the creation of a state contravenes an international norm, possibly a peremptory one.
24 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1948), 45; Marek, supra n. 3, 169; Kelsen, Das 
Problem der Souveranitdt und die Theorie des Volkerrecht (1920), 235.
25 Crawford, supra n. 10, 64.
26 Tadic case, Trial Chamber’s Judgement (1997), 112 ILR (1999), 188; Appeals Chamber’s Judgement
(1997), supra n. 22.
27 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 1.
28 See Crawford, supra n. 10, 79.
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Even then widespread recognition from other states can legitimise the existence of 
that state despite its illegal origins. Recognition, strictly speaking, creates only rights 
and duties between the recognising and the recognised state. Yet recognition by many 
states is strong evidence of statehood and makes the state effective outside its own 
borders. Recognition of the fact becomes the trait-d’union between the positivist 
perspective and the sociological perspective. The effectiveness of a certain factual 
situation is incorporated as a juridical situation valid erga omnes due to the recognition 
of other members of the community. The material and normative character of 
international law is preserved because of a notion of recognition that is both declaratory 
- it declares the existence of the state as a matter of fact -, and constitutive - it gives 
legal ‘dignity’ to an originally illegal situation -,29 However, according to Article 41 of 
the ILC Articles on State Responsibility when the creation of a state is pursued as a 
result of a serious breach of peremptory norms - such as, for instance, when it is 
effected in pursuance of racist policies, through denial of a right of self-determination, 
or as a result of aggression - the international community will have a general duty of 
non-recognition, with a view to making the state internationally ineffective.30
3. Territorial sovereignty and effectiveness
Having considered the ‘material nature’ of the state in international law, we now turn 
to the concepts of sovereignty and territory. The state is not a static concept. As the 
legal expression of an organised and independent political community, the state is a 
dynamic concept, like the political community it seeks to regulate and like the life of 
international relations with the other political communities in which it is involved. Its 
normal condition is referred to as sovereign, which is often equated with supreme and 
independent authority within a certain social and territorial framework. This is its 
condition in principle, but since sovereignty comprises substantive internal and external 
rights, duties, powers and competencies, it is also a dynamic concept and assumes 
different quantitative meanings in different historical periods.31 Both the quantitative 
growth of international legal instruments as a result of the growing interdependence and 
the development of human rights law and environmental law, limiting the extent of
29 De Visscher, Les effectivites du droit international public (1967), 39.
30 See Art. 41, 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra n. 22; and Namibia, supra n. 27, 56.
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reserved domain in domestic affairs, have produced a transformation of its content. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that its normative character is still a fundamental character 
of international law, which is why an enquiry into that character is still necessary in a 
study dealing with territorial matters.32
As a leading case concerning the definition of territorial sovereignty, reference is 
usually made to the Island o f Palmas. Indeed, Judge Huber’s definition of sovereignty 
remains enlightening, in particular for the understanding of its material nature:
‘Sovereignty in relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a 
portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the 
functions of a State. The development of the national organisation of States during the last few 
centuries and, as a corollary, the development of international law, have established this principle 
of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it 
the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international relations. .. .If a dispute 
arises as to the sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is customary to examine which of the 
States claiming sovereignty possesses a title -  cession, conquest, occupation, etc.- superior to that 
which the other State might be possibly bring forward against it. However, if the contestation is 
based on the fact that the other Party has actually displayed sovereignty, it cannot be sufficient to 
establish the title by which territorial sovereignty was validly acquired at a certain moment; it must 
also been shown that the territorial sovereignty has continued to exist and did exist at the moment 
which for the decision of the dispute must be considered as critical. This demonstration consists in 
the actual display of State activities, such as belongs only to the territorial sovereignty.
Titles of acquisition of territorial sovereignty in present-day international law are either based on 
an act of effective apprehension, such as occupation or conquest, or, like cession, presuppose that 
the ceding and the cessionary Powers or at least one of them, have the faculty of effectively 
disposing of the ceded territory. In the same way natural accretion can only be conceived of as an 
accretion to a portion of territory where there exists an actual sovereignty capable of extending to a 
spot which falls within its sphere of activity.’33
As is clear from Huber’s description, the actual display of state activities is of 
paramount importance in determining the lawful sovereign over a territory. It is not a 
coincidence that international law has developed as a corollary of the growth of 
independent political communities. Its material conception of sovereignty derives from 
a material conception of the state. This is still a valuable starting point for understanding 
international legal matters concerning territorial situations.
The terms ‘sovereignty’, ‘jurisdiction’, and ‘competence’ designate the legal 
manifestations of the state with respect to territory and individuals. The whole of 
exclusive rights, duties, privileges, immunities, and liberties emanating from the state’s
31 N. Schrijver, ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’ 70 BYIL (1999), 65.
32 On a comprehensive discussion of the normative value of sovereignty and the dangers entailed in its 
abandonment in terms of inequality among states see Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ 9 EJIL
(1998), 599.
33 Island o f Palmas case (1928), RIAA (Vol. 13), 829, at 831.
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legal order are usually designated in terms of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘jurisdiction.*34 These 
terms have been used interchangeably in international legal discourse, yet their use has 
not always reflected their precise meaning. According to Brownlie it is possible to find 
a certain regularity of meaning in the way these words have been used and to note a 
difference between the two terms:
‘The normal complement of state rights, the typical case of legal competence, is described 
commonly as “sovereignty”: particular rights, or accumulations of rights quantitatively less than 
the norm, are referred to as “jurisdiction”. In brief, “sovereignty” is legal shorthand for legal 
personality of a certain kind, that of statehood; “jurisdiction” refers to particular aspects of the 
substance, especially rights (or claims), liberties and powers. Immunities are described as such. Of 
particular significance is the criterion of consent. State A may have considerable forces stationed 
within the frontiers of State B. State A may also have exclusive use of a certain area of State B, 
and exclusive jurisdiction over its own forces. If, however, these rights exist with the consent of 
the host state then State A has no sovereignty over any part of State B. In such case there has been 
a derogation from the sovereignty of State B, but State A does not gain sovereignty as a 
consequence.’35
From this differentiation between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘jurisdiction*, it is clear that the 
former refers to the normal condition of exclusiveness of the state’s legal order because 
of its international personality, whereas the latter refers to the substantive legislative and 
enforcement faculties that are derived from that condition. Brownlie also shows that the 
two can be separated between two different legal persons in certain situations. The 
concept of territorial jurisdiction is instrumental for defining a territorial situation, 
whereas territorial sovereignty normally relates to the legal basis of that overall 
territorial jurisdiction; in other words, to its lawfulness or unlawfulness. Despite this 
theoretical differentiation, the derivation of the concept of territorial sovereignty from 
the concept of state, in particular from the independent exercise of its legal authority, 
shows that sovereignty and the exercise of territorial jurisdiction usually coexist, 
making the concept of effectiveness a protagonist in the international legal discourse 
concerning territory and territorial disputes. I now turn to the legal definition of 
territory, to consider different forms of territorial effectiveness and the role played by 
the concept of effectiveness in the colonial encounter.
34 The terms ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘competence’ have the same meaning. The former is mostly used in the 
Anglo-American tradition, the latter in civil law countries. See Miele, La comunitd, intemazionale (2000, 
3rd ed.), 107.
35 Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law (2003,6th ed.), 106.
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3.1 The concept of territory in international law
Territory is the spatial sphere within which a state’s sovereignty is normally 
manifested. Often the term sovereignty is used as a synonym of territorial sovereignty. 
The doctrinal debate has developed a number of theories in order to explain its meaning 
in international law, and authors have mixed elements from each rather than radically 
espouse one. Therefore, this classification is explanatory and does not aim at a 
comprehensive description of the whole range of positions taken by the doctrine.
The importance of territory in classic international law derives from the fact that the 
application of Roman law sources in medieval, feudal Europe created the belief that the 
territory was the object of state’s property. Like property, territorial sovereignty was 
exclusive and alienable. This was transposed in the belief of early writers who created a 
‘personification’ of the concept of state, where the territory was the public dominium of 
the prince. The difference between imperium and dominium, the former referring to the 
supreme state’s authority over a certain piece of territory and the latter referring to 
individuals’ and state organs’ properties was still unknown. This has been defined as the 
‘object theory’,36 ‘theory of property*, or Eigent hums theorie,31 and, despite the harsh 
criticism it has attracted,38 it still plays an important role in the legal discourse on
‘IQsovereignty.
Another theory which has found advocates mostly in Germany and which has been 
influenced by the organic Hegelian concept of state is the so-called 
Eigenschafisstheorie. According to that theory, the territory is an attribute of the state 
and not merely an object related to it. In other words, whereas in the ‘object theory* the 
territory is not a constitutive part of the state, but only the object of its right of property
36 Lauterpacht, International Law (1970); and more recently Shaw, supra n. 21, 15.
37 O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law (1967), Vol. I, 22; Donati, Stato 
e Territorio (1923). O’Connell states that the ‘theory of property’ is particularly strong in Anglo- 
American thinking, ‘which is still dominated by the feudal conception of eminent domain, and which 
resists the disengagement of imperium and dominium.’ An opposing view is given by Miele (supra n. 34, 
107) who, in asserting a functional concept of territory which eventually ends up overlapping with the 
concept of jurisdiction, states that a formal concept of territory based on its objective nature is unknown 
in the Anglo-American tradition.
38 The Eigentumstheorie has been much criticised as a) it fails to catch the public, political role of the 
state, which does not have a right to enjoy the territory, but regulates its enjoyment, and it confuses it with 
the feudal notion of patrimonial state (e.g. Westlake, Principles o f International Law (1894); Cavaglieri, 
‘Rfcgles gdndrales du droit de la paix’ 26 Recueil des Cours (1929), 315, at 385; Jennings, The Acquisition 
o f Territory in International Law (1963), 3; b) a cession of a territory from one state to another does not 
affect in principle the private properties of citizens (Westlake, supra, 132); c) it fails to consider the 
importance of conquest as a traditional mode of acquisition of territory, which is still important today in 
case of intertemporal application of international law (Marek, supra n. 3, 19).
39 This theory seems to underlie Brownlie’s example cited above.
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- to use a private law analogy - in the Eigenschaftstheorie the territory is the physical 
body of the state, a constitutive element of its personality. As a consequence, whereas a 
territorial modification does not affect the state’s personality in the former case - it 
affects only its ‘property’ rights - in the latter case the state’s personality is affected.40 
The theory has found little support due to its lack of adherence to state practice, which 
does not sustain the idea that a state’s personality changes according to its territorial 
changes.
The theory of competence (Kompetenztheorie) has been developed within the 
Austrian school of pure theory of law 41 According to this theory, the territory is neither 
object nor constitutive element of the state, but is only the spatial framework within 
which the national legal order is valid. A clear enunciation of this theory was given by 
France in its pleading before the PCU in the National Decrees in Tunis and Morocco 
case. In that case M. A. de La Pradelle stated:
‘...territory is neither an object not a substance, it is a framework. What sort of framework? The 
framework within which the public power is exercised...territory as such must not be considered, 
it must be regarded as the external, ostensible sign of the sphere within which the public power of 
the state is exercised.’42
Following these premises, Kelsen talks about territory both in a narrower and in a 
wider sense. In the former sense, he refers to the spatial sphere where the state is 
exclusively entitled to exercise coercive powers - the space within state boundaries -, 
and in the latter he refers to those areas where the state does not hold exclusive 
sovereign rights, but it exercises them together with other states, - i.e. the High Seas, the 
state exercises jurisdiction over those ships flying its flag -. Whether it assumes the 
state’s competence or jurisdiction as defined by the principle of effectiveness of general 
international law,43 or by the state as an organised community of individuals,44 the
40 Flicker, Vont Gebiet und Gebietshoheit (1867); Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1922). Jellinek, 
despite sharing the premises with Flicker’s theory, does not draw the logical conclusion that a treaty of 
cession should change the state’s personality.
41 The doctrine was originally formulated by Radintsky in 1906 (‘Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebiets’ 
20 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (1906), 313), and then systematised by Kelsen {supra n. 24) and 
Verdross (Die Verfassung der Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926)). It then found support outside the 
Austrian context. See inter alia Schoenbom ‘La nature juridique du territoire’ 5 Recueil des Cours 
(1929), 85; Guggenheim, Traits de droit international public (1953), Vol. I, 369; Rousseau, Droit 
international public (1953), Vol. HI, 8; Oppenheim, Lauterpacht, International Law: a Treatise (1947, 6th 
ed.), 408) seems to merge the object theory and the competence theory. In the same page it once declares 
the territory to be ‘the public property of the State’ and ‘the space within which the State exercises its 
supreme authority.’ Lauterpacht’s opinion is later held by Shaw (supra n. 21, 15).
42 National Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 PCU Series B, n. 4.
43 Kelsen, Principles o f International Law (1966,2nd ed.).
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competence theory stresses the importance of the effective display of state power.45 In 
other words, the territory of the state is a metaphysical essence, whose importance can 
be measured by reference to territorial (and personal, according to Verdross) 
competencies. The operation of effectiveness as a material element of a certain 
territorial situation in Kelsen is radical. He states that a treaty of cession only confers a 
right to the cessionary state to take possession of the territory, but the actual transfer of 
sovereignty happens only with the actual possession of the territory 46
A fourth theory has been proposed by Quadri and later by Conforti.47 The so-called 
functional theory expresses personal and territorial competencies as determined by the 
state function, which is considered worthy of protection by the international legal order. 
It defines competence as ‘the independent title to exercise coercive powers recognized 
by international law.’ Its starting point, in common with the Kompetenztheorie, is the 
rejection of a patrimonial notion of the state, which considers territory as an object of 
public property. Further, it considers competence as the central meaning of a legal 
notion of territory. Territorial sovereignty is nothing but ‘the competence (or right) of 
the state to exercise jurisdiction within the framework of the territory.’48 The cases of 
international administration, or belligerent occupation of parts of territory under 
nominal sovereignty by another state are nothing but cases of territorial sovereignty as 
exercised by the occupant state, ‘albeit qualified by particular international obligations 
in relation both to the actual exercise and to withdrawal from the territory after a certain 
time.’49 Therefore, territorial sovereignty cannot be divided from the actual exercise of 
territorial jurisdiction. Competencies outside the territorial framework are considered 
personal competencies and there is no need to discuss territory in a wider sense, because 
this gives rise to the overly artificial construction of territory as a movable object as 
advanced by the object theory and the competence theory (e.g. cases of jurisdiction on 
ships and aircraft explained with the metaphor of territoire flottant). The third
44 Verdross, supra n. 41.
45 Conforti, ‘The theory of competence in Alfred Verdross’ 6 EJIL (1995), 70.
46 However, his explanation of the relationship between ceding state and cessionary state in case the 
former does not abide by the treaty shows his point of view: ‘If the ceding state, in violation of its treaty 
obligation, refuses to withdraw horn the ceded territory, it commits an international delict, and the 
cessionary is authorised by general international law to take enforcement actions against the delinquent 
state; but the territory concerned remains the territory of the delinquent state, no territorial change taking 
place.’ Kelsen, Principles o f International Law (1952), 214.
Quadri, ‘Cours gdndral de droit international public’ 113 Recueil des Cours (1963), 245; Conforti, 
supra n. 45.
48 Ibidem, at 75.
49 Ibidem.
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distinctive category of competence is the functional one. This is related to the case in 
which a state’s jurisdictional power is conferred by international law not in relation to a 
territorial or personal link, but in relation to a definite common or state’s interest. This 
includes, for example, the right to arrest ships in the High Seas engaging in piracy, 
hijacking or major environmental pollution; and the powers of coastal states over the 
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf. The functional 
theory stresses the role of effectiveness in territorial matters, above all when 
competence is conceived as a state’s subjective right rather than as an attribute 
recognised by international law.
The competence and the functional theory best represent the concept of territory 
under international law, by equating it to the legal competence and authority exercised 
in a defined spatial sphere. In other words, territory and territorial sovereignty assume 
the same legal meaning. The functional theory, however, has the merit of making a 
useful distinction between territorial sovereignty and sovereign powers outside state 
borders, which is not part of the competence theory. Therefore, the difference between 
the expression sovereignty and territorial sovereignty becomes clear. Moreover, it has 
the merit of envisaging the emergence of new competencies such as those related to the 
protection of the environment, which go beyond the strict divide between territorial and 
personal jurisdiction. Finally, it does away with the strict territorial approach to the 
theory of international legal personality, including national liberation movements and 
governments in exile at the stage where they do not have any permanent territorial 
basis.50 However, the theory ought to be rejected when stating the identity territorial 
sovereignty-territorial jurisdiction.51 Rather, the object theory still provides a valuable 
interpretative tool in cases of belligerent occupation and cases of international 
administration of territories, where territorial sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction
50 This approach enables us to understand the international legal personality of national liberation 
movements like the PLO, which despite not having a permanent territorial basis until the Oslo Accords, 
was considered having legal capacity and as representative of the Palestinian population living in the 
occupied territories. The same applies to governments in exile. See Gdynia Ameryka Linie Zeglugowe 
Spolka Akcyjna v. Boguslawski (1953) AC 11.
This is stated also by Marek with regard to the question of identity and continuity of states. She states 
that adopting the principle of effectiveness as the exclusive criterion for deciding whether a state 
continues its existence or not can be deceiving. Tor there are cases in which customary international law 
temporarily dispenses with the principle of effectiveness as a condition for the continued existence of a 
State. The classical example is supplied by belligerent occupation which the occupied State survives even 
though its legal order may have become totally ineffective in the whole of its territory. There may be 
other cases of a State retaining only a nudum ius in its own territory, in which its legal order has yielded 
all effectiveness to the legal order of other States. Therefore, the absence of effectiveness does not 
necessarily mean the extinction of a State.’ Marek, supra n. 3, 8.
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become divorced. It also has the merit of underlining the difference between sovereign 
rights deriving from a title or a general norm and the effective exercise of power in 
territorial issues, so clearly spelled out by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec
52case.
3.2 Effectiveness and territorial sovereignty in the colonial encounter: are 
occupation of terra nullius and transfer of sovereignty through agreement two 
sides of the same coin?
The material nature of the concept of state and the functional nature of territorial 
sovereignty can be traced back to the main legal institutions, which were utilised by the 
European powers in order to expand their influence over new territorial discoveries in 
the late 15th and 16th Centuries and during their colonial expansion of the 19th Century. 
The legal devices developed mostly in the 19th Century, - the age in which international 
law saw an attempt by the European international legal doctrine to systematise its 
contribution to the colonial expansion -, were the so-called occupation of terra nullius, 
and the transfer of sovereignty through agreement with the local populations. According 
to the status of the territory, if considered inhabited or uninhabited, European powers 
would proceed with their expansion through either an effective occupation, or through 
agreement with the local populations to the effect that the European powers would 
become sovereign over those territories.53
Such an apparently simple solution was complicated by two factors: a) the definition 
of terra nullius notwithstanding the long-established presence of local people; b) the 
real status of the local populations. In other words, did indigenous people have an 
international legal personality, thus being able to transfer their territorial sovereignty? 
The question is not merely of historical interest. First, as cogently argued by Anghie ‘no 
adequate account of sovereignty can be given without analyzing the constitutive effect 
of colonialism on sovereignty. Colonialism cannot be accounted for as an example of 
the application of sovereignty; rather, sovereignty was constituted and shaped through 
colonialism.’54 This is evident when considering the material nature of state and
52 Re Reference by the Governor in Council concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of 
Quebec from Canada, 115ILR (1999), 535. See infra Ch. 4 section 5.
53 New Zealand, for instance, unlike Australia, represents a case of title derived from an agreement with 
the local population. See Ehrmann, ‘The Status and Rights of Indigenous People in New Zealand’ 59 
ZaoRV(1999), 463.
54 Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law’ 39 Harvard International Law Journal (1999), 1, at 6.
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territorial sovereignty. In fact, the institution of the occupation of terra nullius allowed 
the development of the concept of effectiveness in territorial disputes, as we know it 
today in territorial litigation. Furthermore, and despite a ‘flavour* to the contrary 
provided by the ICJ in 1975 in the classic Western Sahara, the concept of effectiveness 
as a legal category played an important role also when European states entered into 
agreements with indigenous people.55 This is due to the fact that despite the attempt to 
differentiate such acquisitions of territory from the occupation of terra nulliusy those 
territories were and, indeed, still are retrospectively considered terrae nullius: literally, 
lands without any sovereign authority. This is exemplified by the recent dispute 
between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula, which also shows how 
colonial titles and different interpretations given to the concept of intertemporal law can 
affect outcomes in territorial disputes.
3.2.1 The concept of terra nullius: struggling with history in domestic and international 
courts
The term terra nullius is misleading, because the condition of territory was not 
necessarily the condition of an uninhabited and remote land, but could also be 
characterised by the presence of indigenous populations. A unilateral assertion of 
territorial sovereignty over territories inhabited by indigenous people could not be 
considered conquest, as this implied a state of war between two equal international 
persons. As the PCU held in the Eastern Greenland case, it would be inappropriate to 
describe forcible subjugation of such territories as conquest, since ‘conquest only 
operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty when there is war between two States and by 
reason of the defeat of one of them sovereignty passes from the loser to the victorious 
State.’56 In other words, terra nullius was used as a device to justify control and 
jurisdiction of areas, which very often were populated by indigenous people, who were 
not considered equals. Much of the international law of those times was based on the 
idea of the standard of civilization, by which an entity could enter into the realm of 
international society.57 Such standards were nearly exclusively European, and they did 
not allow the participation of any other form of social organisation.
55 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12.
56 Eastern Greenland, 1933 PCU Series A/B, n. 53,50.
57 Crawford, supra n. 10, 176. Oppenheim in 1905 cited as members of the Family of Nations all 
European states including Turkey and Russia, all American states, Liberia, the Congo Free State and 
Japan (International Law: a Treatise (1905), 154-157). As Kingsbury stated ‘the Eurocentric system
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This Euro-centric criterion adopted by international law in defining what could be 
appropriated as terra nullius and what could be appropriated through cession and 
conquest, therefore giving recognition to local political organisations, has been the 
object of much jurisprudential debate before Australian courts.58 The primary legal 
point was whether pre-colonisation indigenous property rights could be considered 
valid. This was logically determined by the mode of acquisition of sovereignty over 
Australia by the British. If such sovereignty was acquired through occupation - or 
‘settlement’ as defined by Australian courts - of terra nullius, those proprietary rights 
were to be considered as replaced in toto by the new proprietary rights of the British 
settlers. If it was acquired through conquest or cession those property rights were to be 
considered as still existent, unless expressly repealed by British legislation. The issue 
revolved around the question of whether Australia could be considered terra nullius 
under international law. Drawing inspiration from Blackstone’s Commentaries and 
despite admitting the presence of indigenous tribes, the Privy Council at the end of the 
19th Century in Cooper v. Stuart defined the land as unoccupied because of the lack of a 
legal system and a structured society.59 Australian courts moved on in Milirrpum v. 
Nabalco to admit according to updated historical and anthropological evidence that 
Australian land was not factually nullius because of the presence of settled societies and 
a legal system. However, as a matter of law stare decisis should prevail.60 And they 
finally reached the conclusion in Coe v. Commonwealth that social and legal local 
organisations did not satisfy the European standards of civilisation and therefore should
excluded from its purview entities that powerful recognised states were not willing to treat as “states”, 
whether because they wished to dominate or colonize these entities, or because these did not closely 
resemble “states” as the category had come to be understood, or because they showed little acceptance of 
the organizing ideas of the system or because they did not seem likely to uphold international legal 
obligations. While a weaker entity such as Abyssinia might be excluded on ground of difference, 
arguments that Meiji Japan was still too different were eclipsed by Japanese military victories, especially 
the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war. While power and interests were central to this system, they do not 
represent the whole explanation for the perpetuation of inequalities. The rejection of Japan’s proposal for 
a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant was evidence not just of the limited strength of 
Asian and African states in the Versailles diplomacy, but also of a deeper cognitive or identity-based 
resistance to racial equality as a global principle. This was connected not only with systematic racial 
discrimination in independent states, but also with colonial policy in territories where the maintenance of 
colonial rule had come increasingly to depend on the structuring of distinctions among ethnic groups.’ 
Supra n. 32,607. For a reconstruction of the historical development of territorial acquisitions stressing the 
importance of conquest rather than occupation see Korman, The Right o f Conquest: the Acquisition o f  
Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (1996).
58 See Simpson, *Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of Settlement: an Unresolved 
Jurisprudence’ 19 Melbourne University Law Review (1993), 195.
59 Cooper v. Stuart (1889) AC 286.
60 Milirrpum v. Nabalco 17 FLR (1970), 141.
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be considered as non-existent from a legal point of view.61 Due to current moral and 
political imperatives and new international legal commitments and trends represented 
by the ICJ decision in Western Sahara a corrigendum was added in Mabo.62 To 
consider Australia unoccupied land would be politically offensive and historically 
unjustified, therefore the whole application of the doctrine of terra nullius was 
discarded. However, the Court created a new category of acquisition, ‘settlement in 
occupied land’, which, despite recognising the legal existence of the indigenous 
communities as title holders, did not recognise any international legal standing to those 
communities. This would have led the Court to reach a determination to the effect that 
the British colonisation of Australia was the result of conquest, re-writing two hundreds 
year of history and identity. However, a shift from occupation of terra nullius to 
‘settlement in occupied land’, while a substantial and welcome shift from the point of 
view of Australian law, hardly represented any shift under international law.63
In fact, despite drawing progressive inspiration from Western Sahara, it puts its 
rationale into a slightly sinister light.64 Western Sahara was presented as the 
retrospective triumph of the right of self-determination, and the just recognition of the 
sovereign rights of the indigenous communities in the Sahara, and, more broadly, of 
pre-colonial non-European entities. However, as Cassese argues, the Court did not take 
any explicit position on the legal nature of colonial protectorates, and on the legality of 
the Spanish title to Western Sahara. In other words, the Court did not take a position in 
the dispute which characterised international legal doctrine at the turn of the 20th 
Century as to whether or not local entities were able to enter into international treaties 
with the European powers.65 The Australian court’s conclusions seem to support the 
idea that occupation of terra nullius, settlement in occupied land, and transfer through 
agreement were only different devices adopted by the European powers inter pares, to 
justify their colonial expansion. In other words, the difference would be only of a 
constitutional rather than an international nature.66 From an international law point of
61 Coe v. Commonwealth 24 ALR (1979), 118.
62 Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 112ILR (1999), 458.
63 Accordingly Judge J. Brennan, in ibidem, 492-494. And more recently Western Australia v. Ward 
(2002), 191 ALR 1, at 55-58; Yorta Yorta v. Victoria (2002), 194 ALR 538, at 550.
64 On the relation between Mabo and Western Sahara see Scott, ‘The Australian High Court’s Use of the 
Western Sahara case in Mabo’ 4 5 ICLQ (1996), 923.
65 Cassese, ‘The International Court of Justice and the right of peoples to self-determination’, in Lowe, 
Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty years o f the International Court o f Justice: Essays in honour o f Sir Robert 
Jennings (1996), 351, at 360-361.
66 See Brierly, The Law of Nations (1955, 5th ed.), 158-159.
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view those lands were indeed considered terrae nullius and free for unilateral 
appropriation.
The suspicions raised by Mabo with regard to Western Sahara's progress in 
recognising the international rights of indigenous populations have been confirmed by 
the recent Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Equatorial Guinea Intervening).61 The case was brought in 1994 before the 
Court by Cameroon for the violation by Nigeria of its territorial sovereignty over 
Bakassi and with a view to delimiting the maritime boundary between the two 
countries.68
The important issue for our purpose was the Nigerian claim to sovereignty over the 
Bakassi peninsula. Nigeria disputed the application requested by Cameroon of the uti 
possidetis principle on the basis that the 1913 Anglo-German Agreement through which 
Britain had transferred Bakassi to Germany would be invalid in its relevant provisions.69 
This would be due to the fact that the title over Bakassi was vested at that time with the 
Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, not with Britain. Britain had indeed established its 
sphere of influence over the southern part of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria 
in a Treaty of Protection between Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar 
signed in 1884. However, Nigeria argued that the 1884 Treaty of Protection was merely 
a treaty by which Old Calabar sought British protection in exchange for a territorial 
limitation to German commercial ambitions beyond the Cameroons. Its legal content 
should be sought in the normal means of treaty interpretation, and the treaty text would 
not support Cameroon’s argument that Old Calabar dissolved its international legal 
personality and relinquished its territorial sovereignty over the Cross River delta area in 
favour of Britain.70 In other words, Old Calabar retained its historical title over Bakassi, 
hence legally preventing Britain from unilaterally transferring title to Germany through
67 Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Equatorial 
Guinea Intervening), ICJ Decision of 10 October 2002, in http://www.icj- 
cij .org/icj www/idocket/icn/icn_ijudgment_20021010.PDF.
68 Ibidem, Application Instituting Proceedings, ICJ Reports 1996, 5. In the course of the same year 
Cameroon extended the scope of its application by requesting the Court to declare Cameroon’s 
sovereignty over the area of Lake Chad, Nigeria’s responsibility for the illegal occupation of Cameroon’s 
territory and a series of border incidents, and to fix the whole of the boundary between the two countries 
from Lake Chad to Bakassi. Ibidem, 77. Nigeria subsequently raised eight preliminary objections. Seven 
were rejected by the Court and the eighth was considered not to have an exclusively preliminary 
character. Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 11 June 1998, ICJ Reports 1998, 274.
69 Ibidem, Nigeria’s Counter-Memorial (1999), 158-171.
70 Ibidem.
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the 1913 Anglo-German Agreement, according to the principle nemo dat quod non 
habet.
In response, Cameroon argued that there was insufficient and contradictory 
evidence presented by Nigeria with regard to the existence of an Old Calabar polity at 
any point in history.71 Furthermore, Cameroon analysed the practice of colonial 
expansion in the second half of the 19th Century, in particular at the time of the Berlin 
Conference of 1885, showing that the creation of colonial protectorates was only 
another method of annexing territory.72 Such arrangements were often chosen by Britain 
to bypass the requirement of effective occupation that became embodied in the Final 
Act of Berlin in Article 35. In other words, the institution of a colonial protectorate was 
‘a cheap solution*, instrumental to the British colonial model of indirect rule.73 In the 
case of Calabar there would be no doubt that territorial sovereignty was vested into 
Britain and that the reliance of British consuls and diplomats on the existing Efik 
federation was a way to enlarge the territorial scope of its area of influence vis-a-vis 
Germany.
The Court agreed with Cameroon’s position in light of the legal nature of the 1884 
Treaty of Protection:
*205. The Court calls attention to the fact that the international legal status of a ‘Treaty of 
Protection” entered into under the law obtaining at the time cannot be deduced from its title alone. 
Some treaties of protection were entered into with entities which retained thereunder a previously 
existing sovereignty under international law. This was the case whether the protected party was 
henceforth termed “protectoraf ’ (as in the case of Morocco, Tunisia and Madagascar (1885; 1895) 
in their treaty relations with France) or “a protected State” (as in the case of Bahrain and Qatar in 
their treaty relations with Great Britain). In sub-Saharan Africa, however, treaties termed “treaties 
of protection” were entered into not with States, but rather with important indigenous rulers 
exercising local rule over identifiable areas of territory.’74
In support of this assertion the Court recalled a classic dictum of Judge Huber in the 
Island o f Palmas, who stated that a treaty of protection
‘is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form of internal organisation of a colonial 
territory, on the basis of the autonomy of the natives...And thus suzerainty over the native States 
becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as towards other members of the community of 
nations.’ (RIIA, Vol. n, pp. 858-859)
71 Ibidem, Cameroon’s Reply (2000), 245-254.
12 Ibidem, 260-275.
73 Ibidem, 262-267.
74 Ibidem, Decision, para. 205.
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The Court also recalled its previous decision in Western Sahara, in which it stated 
that agreements entered by Spain with local rules having a social and political 
organisation amounted to ‘derivative roots of title’. The annexation of territory was not 
effected through occupation of terra nullius. The difference between a treaty of cession 
and a treaty of protection was simply a matter of the internal organisation of the colonial 
power and did not affect its territorial sovereignty.
In arguing for the lack of international legal status of the 1884 Treaty of Protection, 
the Court recalled a number of treaties signed by Britain in Sub-saharian Africa, and it 
disputed the international legal personality of Old Calabar. It doubted the existence of a 
central authority of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar. It argued that Britain was not 
only ‘protecting’ Old Calabar but was indeed administering the region of the Cross 
River delta. It hinted at the lack of evidence provided by Nigeria of the international 
relations of Old Calabar after 1884, with the exception of the delegation sent from Old 
Calabar to London to discuss matters of land tenure. It stated that
‘Nigeria itself has been unable to point to any role, in matters relevant to the present case, played 
by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar after the conclusion of the 1884 Treaty...The Court notes 
that a characteristic of international protectorate is that of ongoing meetings and discussions 
between the protecting Power and the Rulers of the Protectorate. In the case concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) the Court 
was presented with substantial documentation of this character, in large part being old British State 
papers. In the present case the Court was informed that “Nigeria can neither say that no such 
meeting ever took place, or that they did take place...the records which would enable the question 
to be answered probably no longer exist” [...]
Old Calabar was not mentioned in any of the territorial administrative arrangements 
provided by Britain for Nigeria, and no evidence was presented by Nigeria of any 
protest at the transfer of sovereignty over Bakassi to Germany in 1913 and at the 
accession to independence of Nigeria in I960.76 Hence the conclusion of the Court that 
Britain had the right to transfer Bakassi to Germany in 1913.
It is telling that the reasoning of the Court with regard to Nigeria’s request for 
recognition of Old Calabar’s historical title was opposed by a considerable number of 
judges from developing countries. Judges Koroma, Rezek, Al-Kashawneh and Abjiola 
disputed the Court’s ‘light’ dismissal of the international relevance of the 1884 Treaty.77 
They held that the transfer of Bakassi to Germany was in breach of the principle pacta
75 Ibidem, para. 207.
76 Ibidem, para. 208.
77 Ibidem, Judge Koroma Diss. Op., 5; Judge Rezek Diss. Op., 1; Judge Al-Kashawneh Sep. Op.; Judge 
ad hoc Abjiola Diss. Op., 29.
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sunt servanda and the rights of Old Calabar under that treaty. In particular, they rejected 
the approach of the Court which was looking at reality on the grounds, and the fact that 
Britain was administering rather than merely protecting Old Calabar. They held that the 
task of the Court should have been to look at the intention of the parties according to the 
law of treaties, rather than looking at effective realities. According to the wording and 
the sense of Articles I and n, that intention was merely to ensure the protection of Old 
Calabar by Britain, and it was not to transfer territorial sovereignty to Britain. The 
judges also rejected the Court’s differentiation between international and colonial 
protectorates, accepting instead the Nigerian thesis that the legal substance of 
protectorates should be assessed looking at the express terms of the treaty of protection 
not to doubtful general categories.78 They therefore concluded that Britain did not have 
a right to transfer the title to Bakassi to Germany in 1913.
Judge Al-Khashawneh’s separate opinion is particularly interesting.79 According to 
Al-Kashawneh
‘the crucial factor is the agreement itself, and whilst it is entirely possible that such agreements 
vested sovereignty in the newcomers it is equally possible that they did not, in which case 
sovereignty was retained by the local ruler under an agreed scheme of protection or administration. 
These are questions of treaty interpretation and of the subsequent practice of the parties and cannot 
be circumvented by the invention of a fictitious sub-category of protectorates termed “colonial 
protectorates” where title is assumed to pass automatically and regardless of the terms of the terms 
of treaty protection to the protecting power, for that would be incompatible with the fundamental 
rule pacta sunt servanda and would lead to what has been termed “institutionalized treaty breach”, 
a situation that no rule of intertemporal law has ever excused.’80
As to Judge Huber’s passage in Island of Palmas quoted by the Court, the Jordanian 
judge criticised that rationale. First, he did not accept the point made by Huber on the 
inequality of status, saying that inequality in power does not amount to inequality in 
legal status. Second, he did not accept the ‘sweeping generalization* that whichever 
kind of regime these local rulers would enter into with the colonial powers, they would 
still become colonies under sovereignty of the European powers. He mentioned the two 
cases Mighell v. Sultan o f Johore and Sultan o f Johore v. Abubakar Tunku Aris 
Bendahur and Others on how different forms of legal status, some of them not entailing
78 Ibidem, Judge Koroma Diss. Op., 6; Judge A1 Kashawneh Sep. Op., 3.
79 A1 Kashawneh in fact agreed with the Court’s final decision, but he held that the Court should have 
limited itself to deal with the acquiescence by Old Calabar to the status quo created by the 1913 Treaty 
and the recognition by Nigeria to the 1961 de facto uti possidetis.
80 Ibidem.
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British sovereignty, have been well known to British courts, above all in South East 
Asia the region Judge Huber was dealing with. Thirdly,
‘such an approach is clearly rooted in an Eurocentric conception of international law based on 
notions of otherness, as evidenced by the fact that there were at the time in Europe protected 
principalities without anyone seriously entertaining the idea that they had lost their sovereignty to 
the protecting Power and could be disposed of at its will. Intertemporal law is general in its 
application, its underlying rationale and unity of purpose being time (tempore) as its name implies, 
not geography, and cannot be divided into regional intertemporal law, all the more so when no 
State in the concerned region, be it sub-Saharan African or South East Asia, participated in its 
formation.’81
As for the concept of intertemporal law, he stated that despite Max Huber’s 
seemingly straight-forward definition, its interpretation in practice is far from clear. In 
the case examined, he wondered why only the ‘abusive’ and ‘deforming* practice of 
European powers should be considered as the law in force at that time. For instance, the 
concept of protectorate was derived from a time-honoured concept of guardianship, 
which excluded territorial dominion, and those European lawyers who advised 
diplomats concerning these treaties were certainly aware of such normative distinctions. 
The same was true for the basic rule pacta sunt servanda. Furthermore, there is 
controversy as to how current principles and legal developments may come into play in 
the interpretation of old treaties. The Aegean Sea case with reference to Greece 
territorial reservation, the ICJ advisory opinion in Namibia, and the application of 
international criminal law in the Nuremberg trials, would all witness such contradictions 
in the understanding of the principle of intertemporal law. According to Al-Kashawneh, 
the lack of reference to intertemporal law in the VCLT would not be a coincidence, 
since neither the ILC nor the Vienna Conference were able to resolve the issue. On the 
basis of this critique the Jordanian judge held that the 1913 Treaty could not possibly 
represent a valid basis for the transfer of title to Germany per se, but rather that the 
inaction and acquiescence of Old Calabar would have extinguished that title.
A. Some comments on the reading of the colonial encounter in the above case law 
The Court’s approach in Cameroon/Nigeria to the effect that there exists no 
difference in international law between a treaty of cession and a treaty of protection 
with indigenous people suggests that the ICJ, like the Australian courts, is not ready to
81 Ibidem, 4.
82 Judge Ranjeva based his separate opinion on the same criticism of the concept of intertemporal law 
adopted by the Court. See Judge Ranjeva, Sep. Op., 3.
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recognise a fully-fledged international status to pre-colonial independent social 
organisations. In other words, whereas in Western Sahara the ICJ avoided taking a 
position on the legal nature of colonial protectorates confining itself to deny that that 
territory was terra nullius, in Cameroon/Nigeria that position is taken, thereby limiting 
the impact of Western Sahara. In effect, to say that Bakassi, like Western Sahara, was 
not terra nullius, and then to argue that Britain acquired sovereignty over it regardless 
of the content of the 1884 Treaty of Protection is clearly contradictory. To argue the 
latter is tantamount to saying that under international law Bakassi was indeed a terra 
nullius. I do not seek to underestimate the fact that by denying the doctrine of terra 
nullius in Western Sahara, Mabo and Cameroon/Nigeria at least the property rights of 
the indigenous populations are recognised. This may have an impact in the way 
domestic tribunals review the way colonial powers treated those rights. However, it is 
difficult to appreciate the impact that a revision of the terra nullius doctrine according 
to the allegedly identical ‘rules of engagement* of the colonial powers may have had on 
international law, if the European powers were free to disregard the explicit terms of 
those treaties. Cassese argues that the Court’s dictum in Western Sahara may apply to 
future or present relations. He states that:
‘Whenever there are territories inhabited by indigenous populations that are collectively organized 
(although not in such a manner as to constitute a state proper) and the state wielding sovereign 
authority over such territory decides to withdraw, it does not follow that the territories 
automatically become terra nullius, and hence open to appropriation by any state. Even if the 
indigenous populations may not come to be regarded as organized in the form of a state, they must 
be enabled freely to express their will as to the international status of the territory, i.e. whether 
they wish to associate or integrate into an existing sovereign state, or acquire some sort of 
international status gradually leading to independent statehood.’83
Cassese’s position is problematic for several reasons. First, in his own admission, the 
Court dealt with the qualification of Western Sahara as inhabited land rather than terra 
nullius at the time of Spanish colonisation, not at the time in which Spain withdrew 
from the region. In fact, apart from not being asked to answer this question, no one 
disputed the fact that Western Sahara was an inhabited region, whose people enjoyed a 
right to freely choose their status regardless of their level of ‘progress’ in terms of 
political and social organisation. Second, even taking as decisive test the qualification 
of a certain territory at the time of colonisation, international instruments do not restrict 
the right of people to exercise their right of self-determination subject to the population
83 Cassese, supra n. 65, 361.
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being considered as based on inhabited land according to colonial criteria, but they 
apply also to those regions considered terrae nullius at the time of colonisation. Third, 
the case of Bakassi shows that the withdrawal of colonial powers from the region did 
not mean a right for the people of Old Calabar to choose independently their own 
future, as their territory had been incorporated into wider territorial units by the colonial 
powers.
To summarise, Cameroon/Nigeria limits the progressive message of Western
Sahara, and it shows how the ICJ is keen to adopt the legal practice of European powers
in colonial encounters with indigenous populations. This inevitably reflects a choice
about the idea of international law in the 19th Century that the ICJ assumes: whether, in
Oppenheim’s words, it is ‘the name for the body of customary and conventional rules
which are considered legally binding by civilised nations in their intercourse with each
other’,84 or whether it is the law binding upon all collective organisations enjoying
territorial sovereignty and entering into legal relations with other similar collective
organisations. The former presupposes a narrow idea of intertemporal law, where the
interpretation of the law affecting those events is not affected by contemporary
developments. It is unsurprising that most of the judges from Africa, the Middle East
and Latin America were uneasy with it. The assumption is an international law working
unilaterally, rather than reciprocally, and a standard of civilisation based on a racial and
cultural inferiority of those regions which settles a dispute between countries in those 
86regions.
To conclude, the concept of effectiveness played an important role also when the 
colonial encounter was ‘legalised* through colonial protectorates and agreements with 
local populations. Rather than being the result of a process of the gradual establishment 
of state control and the exercise of state activities, the establishment of sovereignty was 
effected through a formal act. The substantive meaning did not in fact change, as 
international law considered those acts only as legally relevant facts, whose unilateral
84 Oppenheim, International Law (1912,2nd ed.), Vol. I, 3.
85 When considering the concept of intertemporal law, one should separate the process of application of 
the law in force at the time of the events considered, and the process of interpretation of that law. See 
Namibia, supra n. 27, 16; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Turkey/Greece), Decision on Jurisdiction, 
19 December 1978, ICJ Reports 1978, 4, at 35.
86 Despite all that, the Court’s decision appears correct in its conclusions rejecting Nigeria’s claim based 
on Old Calabar’s historic title. The lack of evidence presented by Nigeria in terms of protest or 
international commitments entered into by Old Calabar after 1884 and in the period between 1913 and 
1960 supports a conclusion in favour of Cameroon, at least on the basis of acquisitive prescription and the
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nature could not be disposed of easily. This process shaped the concept of territorial 
sovereignty, leading the concept of effectiveness to play an important role in most 
modes of acquisition of territory.87 Of course, the concept of effective control as a pre­
requisite for title was developed with regard to the institution of occupation of terra 
nullius. The next section shall in fact deal with the issue of material possession as a pre­
condition for territorial title.
3.3 Material possession and constitution of title
The concept of occupation was derived from Roman law. The analogy with private 
law institutions was effected by the first international lawyers who considered the 
principles inherited from the corpus iuris as just reason, in other words as principles of 
natural law. Ius gentium was the whole of these principles and states’ practice and 
usages gave confirmation to these natural laws.88 This was particularly true for the issue 
of territorial acquisitions, where the analogy between sovereignty and private property 
provided a strong case for this operation.
Occupation was effected through two necessary elements: first, an intention to take 
possession of the land (animus occupandi), and second, the effective display of 
activities over that piece of land, generally cultivating it (corpus possessionis). It is clear 
that possession, which in the very origin of Roman law was identified with property, 
became a just title to acquire property in the case of land belonging to nobody, and its 
theory was transposed to international territorial acquisitions. Possession stressed the 
role of effective occupation on a certain land. The material rather than the psychological 
element in the classic Roman doctrine emphasised its fundamental function, since the 
animus, the consciousness of a certain possessory relationship with the land was the 
natural consequence of a factual situation. Yet the re-elaboration of the original material 
by medieval lawyers brought a transformation by emphasising the psychological 
element and giving it complete autonomy and sometimes pre-eminence over the 
material element. Occupation of terra nullius became doctrine in 16th and 17th Century 
Roman law, conceived as a pure psychological status opposable erga omnes. This
consequent uti possidetis. However, I agree with Judge Al-Kashawneh that the Court should have reached 
this conclusion only on this basis, without supporting a very Euro-centric approach to intertemporal law.
87 See infra section 3.4.
88 Gentili, De lure Belli libri tres (1598), Vol. I, c. 3, Holland (ed.), Oxford, 1877, 16: ‘Ius etiam illis 
prescriptum libris Iustiniani non civitatis est tantum, sed et gentium et naturae...Ergo et princibus stat, 
etsi est privatis conditum a Iustiniano.’ E.g. Oppenheim, supra n. 84,53; Westlake, supra n. 38, 30.
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historical context inevitably influenced the fathers of international law, who dealt at the 
same time with individual property and territorial sovereignty, often making no 
distinction between them.89 Nevertheless, they were well aware of the distinctiveness of 
the ius gentium and of the novelty of the law governing independent and sovereign 
subjects, and therefore the requisite of possession was maintained as opposed to that of 
divine legitimacy as asserted by the Church. That is why, for example, in discussing the 
lawfulness of the Portuguese claims based on Alexander VPs Papal bull of 1493, that 
Grotius states in Mare Liberum (1608):
‘to discover a thing is not only to seize it (usurpare) with the eyes but to take real possession of it.
The grammarians accordingly use discover (invenire) and occupy (occupare) with the same 
meaning. Natural reason, the precise word of the law, and the interpretation of scholars all show 
clearly that discovery suffices to give a title to lordship only when it is accompanied by
• «Q 0possession.
The same emphasis on the material element of occupation can be also found in 
Victoria, Gryphyander, Zouche, Bynkershoek and Vattel. In 1758 the latter asserts in Le 
droit des Gens: ‘Le Droit des Gens ne reconnaitra done la propridtd et la Souverainetd 
d’une Nation que sur les pays vides, qu’elle aura occupds rdelment et de fait, dans 
lesquels elle aura formd un Etablissement, ou dont elle tirera un usage actuelle.’91 In 
more ambiguous terms this is also asserted by Pufendorf and Titius, who however gave 
clear pre-eminence to the subjective rather than the objective element.92 In general, it 
seems that according to 17th and 18th Century doctrine, physical occupation could be 
represented initially by a formal or symbolic declaration of sovereignty, therefore losing 
at its initial stage its objective characteristic, but being only considered a manifestation 
of the animus possidendi. This manifestation had its own legal effects, which were 
differentiated from those produced by a material occupation. Nonetheless, full 
sovereignty over a certain territory was effected only through a complete display of 
state activities. This would serve to give legal significance to claims based on discovery.
89 E.g. Pufendorf, Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis libri duo, cit. in Ago, II requisito 
dell'effettivita delVoccupazione (1934), 53.
90 Grotius, Mare Liberum, c. 2, cit. in Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (1927), 114.
91 De Vattel, Les droit des Gens, ou Principles de la Loi Naturelle, appliquis a la conduit at aux affaires 
des Nations et des Souverains (1758), 194.
92 Titius, Observations (1734), Vol. I, c. 12, 344, cit. in Ago, supra n. 89, 52; Pufendorf, Elementorum 
jurisprudentiae universalis libri duo (1913).
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In these doctrines the concept of inchoate title, which would later be advanced by 
Anglo-American writers, is already envisaged.93
It was often stated between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century 
that the criterion of effectiveness became of paramount importance to determine the 
lawful sovereign over a certain territory only at the beginning of the 19th Century. 
Before that age discovery and those symbolic acts relating to it, like the planting of a 
flag or the construction of a fortress on the coast of the discovered territory, would give 
rise to a perfect title.94 According to this doctrine there are three main periods 
characterising the law of acquisition of territory. The first period is between the 14th and 
16th Century, and is characterised by the conferral of sovereign rights through papal 
bulls. The second period is the period of discoveries, where title to territory would be 
conferred through acts of symbolic annexation. The third period is characterised by the 
requisite of effective occupation of the territory as embodied in the Final Act of the 
Berlin Conference of 1885.95
In reality, classic studies such as Goebel’s and Ago’s reveal that this doctrine is 
rather misleading.96 The very beginning of the age of discoveries is dominated by the 
medieval conception of divine legitimacy, but the development of the modem state and 
the end of religious unity in Europe brought growing pressure to the exclusive claims 
advanced by Spain and Portugal on the oceans and the New World. The conception of 
acquisition of new lands as original from the end of the 16th Century requires a legal 
basis which is consistent with the new historical developments. That is why the 
descriptions given by the first writers of the natural law principles concerning territorial 
sovereignty both influence and are influenced by states in their practice.
Yet even before 1550 claims of papal and imperial legitimacy and claims based on
q <7
discovery were mixed with claims based on effective possession. The real and 
systematic challenge to doctrines of universal legitimacy and symbolic annexation came 
after 1550 from England, France and Holland, which in that period were trying to
93 Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (1857); Wheaton, Elements o f International Law 
(1916); Oppenheim, supra n. 84.
94 In particular this theory was strong in France and Germany. E.g. Nys, Le droit international, les 
principes, les thiorie, les f  'aits (1912); Jeze, Etude theorique et pratique sur Voccupation comme mode 
d ’acquirir les territoires en droit international (1896); Bleiber, Die Entdeckung im Volkerrecht: Eine 
Studie zum Problem der Okkupation (1933); Verdross, supra n. 41. See also Judge Huber’s decision in 
Island o f Palmas, supra n. 33, 846.
95 Ago, supra n. 89, 66-70.
96 Ibidem', Goebel, supra n. 90.
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expand their influence in the Americas and to deny validity to Spanish and Portuguese 
claims based on these titles.98 Despite their assertions to sovereignty based on effective 
occupation, the lack of means and resources needed to take effective possession of such 
vast territories and the need to reach a compromise between conflicting conceptions, 
often led states to use discovery as a legal criterion to settle claims.99 In other words, in 
order to avoid permanent conflict, states took the view that acts of symbolic annexation 
produced their own legal effects that gave priority in claiming sovereignty over a certain 
territory. Nonetheless, perfect title was acquired by an effective occupation that needed 
to be brought about within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the Anglo-American 
doctrine developed the concept of inchoate title given by discovery, that only gave a 
right to occupy, but not a right to the territory itself.100 This was also in accordance with 
the theory of the two elements of occupation, which considered the animus possidendi 
as the element producing legal effects in the first instance.101
A significant development occurred in the course of the 19th Century. Whereas 
during the age of discoveries it had not been feasible for states to effectively occupy all 
territories discovered and so legal relevance had been given to the symbolic 
annexations, by the 1830s and 1840s this effective occupation had eventually happened 
and titles to those territories had been perfected. Furthermore, new technical means 
allowed for effective exploitation of most of the earth, and colonial competition in 
unexplored continents such as Africa was at its peak. That is why effective possession 
became the only relevant criterion and priority of discovery began to lose importance 
even as an inchoate title. For instance, Articles 34 and 35 of the General Final Act of the 
Berlin Conference of 1885 regulating the European colonial expansion in Africa gave a
97 For a thorough analysis of this period see Von der Heydte, supra n. 5; Goebel, supra n. 96, 90; 
Wheaton, supra n. 93, 339.
98 Von der Heydte, supra n. 5, 457-458.
99 As Westlake states: ‘In the application of this doctrine to particular cases, it is natural that the element 
of discovery which it contains should have been oftener appealed to by the Spaniards and the Portuguese, 
whose energies were so rapidly enfeebled that they failed to occupy the vast regions which they had been 
first to discover, and that the element of possession should have been oftener appealed to by the English 
and the other nations which entered on die field later. But there is no state which has not insisted in its 
turn on that part of the doctrine which best suited its convenience at the moment, or which has maintained 
a perfectly uniform attitude on the questions of detail into which the general doctrine revolves itself.’ 
Supra n. 38, 158.
100 The doctrine of inchoate title is developed by Anglo-American writers of the 19th and 20th Century 
(e.g. Phillimore, supra n. 93; Westlake, supra n. 38; Wheaton, supra n. 93; Oppenheim, supra n. 84). 
More recently, doubts about that doctrine have been expressed by Brownlie, who states that a title, ‘which 
is in practice a question of the relative strength of state activity, is never “inchoate”, though it may be 
“weak” in that it rests on a small amount of evidence of state activity.’ Brownlie, supra n. 35, 140.
101 Ago, supra n. 89, 56.
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treaty basis to what had already been developed by international custom, further 
imposing a duty of notification to the other parties to the treaty and spelling out the 
functions of the principle of effectiveness102. The mediation effected by Pope Leon XIII 
in 1885 and the treaty concluded by Spain and Germany regarding the Caroline and 
Palos Islands is confirmation of how effective occupation had become as the primary 
criterion for dispute settlement.103 A later systematic enunciation was then given by 
Judge Huber in Island o f Palmas: ‘[International law, the structure of which is not 
based on any super-State organisation, cannot be presumed to reduce a right such as 
territorial sovereignty, with which almost all international relations are bound up, to the 
category of an abstract right, without concrete manifestations.’104
In other words, in the course of the 19th Century states finally revolved to 
effectiveness as the main criterion for the settlement of territorial disputes. Yet state and 
judicial practice starting from that period and continuing in the 20th Century until 
present days has shown how the criterion of effective occupation has been qualified in 
some important respects. Effective occupation as title to sovereignty has not meant that 
jurisdiction should be effectively exercised over every ‘nook and comer’ of the 
occupied territory, but it refers rather to the possibility of excluding others from and to 
potentially extending jurisdiction over those parts of the territory which are not yet 
possessed. As long as there is a certain control and there is an intention to maintain it 
over the whole of the territory, effectiveness may become an ongoing process of 
‘progressive intensification of State control.’105 Such state ‘control’ may not be 
necessarily ‘material’ possession, in the sense of establishing enforcement agencies in 
that territory. Exercise of legislative and administrative functions are equally considered 
forms of ejfectivite.106 For instance, in the Minquiers and Echreos case, the ICJ
102 Art. 34 stated that ‘[t]he Power which henceforth shall take possession of a territory upon the coast of 
the African continent situated outside of its present possessions, or which, not having had such 
possessions hitherto, shall come to acquire them, and likewise, the Power which shall assume a 
protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification addressed to the other signatory 
Powers of the present Act, in order to put them in a condition to make available, if there be occasion for 
it, their reclamations.’ Art. 35 continued: ‘The signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the 
obligation to assure, in the territories occupied by them, upon the coasts of the African Continent, the 
existence of an authority sufficient to cause acquired rights to be respected and, the case occurring, the 
liberty of commerce and of transit in the conditions upon which it may be stipulated.’ Reprinted in 3 AJIL 
(Documents) (1909), 7, at 24.
103 Cit. in Cavaglieri, supra n. 38,410.
104 Island o f Palmas, supra n. 33, 831.
105 Ibidem, 867.
106 For a detailed and informative analysis of different forms of effectiveness considered by international 
tribunals see Kohen, Possession contestee et souverainete territoriale (1997), 208.
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considered as decisive in adjudicating the island of Echreos to the UK the initiation by 
the Royal Court of Jersey of criminal proceedings following events on that island.107 In 
the recent Ligitan and Sipadan case between Indonesia and Malaysia the ICJ considered 
North Borneo’s and Malaysia’s regulations and licensing concerning the collection of 
turtle eggs as sufficient evidence of peaceful display of state authority.108 Furthermore, 
as the arbitrators made clear in the Clipperton Islands and Aves Island cases pure 
symbolic effectiveness can be sufficient when considering uninhabited and remote 
islands.109 In other words, effectiveness has become a variable criterion according to 
geographical, economic and strategic conditions. Finally, it has also been envisaged as a 
matter of competing claims as made clear by the PCU in the Eastern Greenland case 
(1932):
‘It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial sovereignty without 
observing that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual 
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make out a superior claim. 
This is particularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or 
unsettled countries (italics added).’110
The same rationale was used some twenty years later by the ICJ in deciding the 
dispute between France and the UK on the small group of islands Echreos and 
Minquiers. In determining in favour of the UK, the Court looked at the administrative 
and legislative functions exercised by the two states on the islands and found British 
evidence to be ‘the nearest thing possible to the concept of effective occupation in terms 
of “possession” and “administration”.*111
Another principle used by international tribunals and states in order to adjudicate 
and support claims lacking a thorough effective basis has been geographical contiguity. 
For instance, where a group of islands was occupied, or a certain coast was occupied, 
those islands belonging to the archipelago and those lying adjacent to the coast were 
considered part of the geographic unity of the territory even if not necessarily actually
107 The Minquiers and Echreos Case (France/UK), ICJ Reports 1953, 47, at 64.
108 Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Decision 
of 17 December 2002, in http://www.icj-
cii.org/icjwww/idocket/iinma/iinmajudgment/IINMA_judgment_20011023.PDF, paras. 131-136.
Aves Island (1865), in Lapradelle-Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages Intemationaux, Vol. II (1924), 404. 
Clipperton Island Award (1931), in 26 AJIL (1932), 390. Even Judge Huber, despite his ‘radical’ 
approach to effectiveness in Island o f Palmas, stated quite clearly: ‘sovereignty cannot be exercised in 
fact at every moment on every point of a territory: The intermittence and discontinuity...necessarily differ 
according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved.’ Island o f Palmas, supra n. 33, 855.
110 Eastern Greenland, supra n. 56, 46.
111 The Minquiers and Echreos Case, supra n. 107,239.
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occupied. Again, this principle has found application in cases where a territory was
uncharted or remote. It has stressed the functional nature of modem state sovereignty
that was no more seen as settlement and exploitation but as a display of state 
•  •  •  112activities. In recognising its relevance in those cases the PCU held in Eastern 
Greenland that the administrative and legislative acts enacted by Denmark on 
Greenland, despite having as direct addressees only the Western inhabited part of the 
island, referred to Greenland in its unitary geographical meaning and therefore should 
be considered as an intention to exercise sovereignty on the whole territory.113
We must agree with Brownlie that contiguity is a modem expression of 
effectiveness and bases its value on state activities, which can have a mere legislative 
and administrative value.114 Its application by analogy is found in claims to the 
territorial sea and the continental shelf and in their regulation by the 1958 Geneva 
Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Thus, the terms effectiveness and 
contiguity should not be opposed. Nevertheless, the relevance of the principle should be 
limited to the particular geographical instances seen above as the ICJ stated very clearly 
in the Western Sahara case,115 and should be considered only under a clear 
manifestation of the willingness to rule over such uninhabited territories.
The animus occupandi can then qualify effectiveness in certain cases.116 For 
example it is instructive where it is not clear whether the first settlers in a certain 
territory acted as agent of a government or where jurisdictional powers are conferred 
with the consent of the sovereign state through a treaty. Yet it is not always the case that 
courts have investigated its presence,117 and a material display of state authority is 
normally considered the relevant test.
The different meaning given to the criterion of effectiveness according to the nature 
of territory and international standards applied in a certain historical context led Von der
1,2 Brownlie, supra n. 35, 142. Von der Heydte (supra n. 5,463-464) finds a consistent number of arbitral 
awards where the principle of contiguity has been applied like the Island o f Aves, the Lobos Island and 
the Spitzbergen.
113 Eastern Greenland, supra n. 56, 46.
114 Brownlie, supra n. 35,142.
115 Western Sahara, supra n. 55, 43.
116 According to the decision of the PCU in Eastern Greenland ‘a claim to sovereignty based not upon 
some particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely upon continuous display of authority, 
involves two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign 
and some actual exercise or display of such authority.’ Supra n. 56, 45-46. According to Brownlie this 
view does not always seem supported by practice {supra n. 35, 134).
117 See Anzilotti Diss. Op. in Eastern Greenland case, supra n. 56, 83.
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Heydte to talk about virtual effectiveness.118 Sanchez Rodriguez has talked about the 
relativisation of the peaceful and continuous exercise of state functions.119 Both ideas 
explain that effectiveness develops as a relative concept under certain circumstances 
and that it has to be understood in its functional nature. Therefore, during the 
discoveries period acts of symbolic annexation developed a sort of ‘inchoate’ 
effectiveness due to the fact that any counter-claim and intervention on territories 
discovered by another state would have been considered unfriendly acts and would have 
spread continuous tensions among the European powers. The emphasis in the act of 
occupation was put on the exploitation and cultivation of the land. Once almost the 
entire globe was explored, the whole purpose of effective occupation became to 
guarantee stability, order and freedom of trade in certain areas, protection of foreign 
states and their nationals, and thus the effective state was the one which was able to 
accomplish these tasks and to exercise ordinary state functions.120 Its application in the 
law of the sea has also had a functional nature, and it has aimed to guarantee optimal 
exploitation of resources and the freedom of navigation. Any current example of 
territorial litigation still shows the importance states attach to effectiveness as a way to 
prove a title to territory.121 States party to a dispute normally go at great lengths to 
accumulate different forms of effectivites to show that their material possession amounts 
to title.122
From this analysis of the development of the institution of occupation in 
international law, it is clear that effectiveness developed according to the historical 
exigencies of international coordination. It was instrumental for an orderly and balanced 
territorial expansion of European powers, by reproducing in the law power relations 
among these states and vis-a-vis non-European entities. This has inevitably imposed a 
concept of territorial sovereignty, which is functional in its nature. In fact, the emphasis
118 Von der Heydte, supra n. 5.
119 Sanchez Rodriguez, lUuti possidetis et les effectives’ 263 Recueil des Cours (1997), 161, at 259.
120 Island o f Palmas, supra n. 33, 846. According to Smedal (Acquisition o f sovereignty over polar area 
(1931), 51) effectiveness is to be considered as ‘the ability to secure respect for acquired rights, freedom 
of traffic and transit together with the maintenance of order.’ Compare with Basdevant who argued that 
‘[a] la base des droits du souverain territorial et spdcialment de son droit k etre reconnu, il y a les devoirs 
qui lui incombent; les premiers sont les moyens mis k sa disposition par le droit international pour lui 
permette de remplir ses fonctions.’ Basdevant, ‘Regies gdndrales du droit de la paix’ 58 Recueil des 
Cours (1936), 475, at 617.
121 E.g. Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), ICJ Reports 1999, 1045; Eritrea- 
Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision of 12 April 2003, in http://pca- 
cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/EEBC%20Decision-L.pdf; Cameroon/Nigeria, supra n. 67, Decision.
2 For an example of legal strategy in territorial litigation based on ‘accumulation’ of different forms of 
effectivites see Nigeria’s strategy in ibidem, Rejoinder of 2001, Vol. 1, Part 1, Ch. 2.
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on effective possession in the original mode of acquisition of territory has been 
transposed onto other derivative modes of acquisition of sovereignty like prescriptive 
acquisition, conquest and cession. I now turn to these modes of acquisition.
3.4 Effectiveness in derivative modes of acquisition of territory
As with the emergence of the concept of sovereignty in medieval times, the 
institution of prescriptive acquisition is derived from the Roman law concept of 
usucapio. Long, undisputed and peaceful possession overrides a formal title to 
sovereignty. Sovereignty must display a function, or the legal system does not afford it 
protection. Despite being sometimes impossible to distinguish between occupation of 
terra nullius and prescriptive acquisition, in theory the distinction is in the first instance 
determined by the nature of the territory itself. In the former case, a territory belonging 
to no sovereign is involved, whereas in the latter there will be a sovereign title and an 
adverse possession by another international subject. Furthermore, the burden of proof of 
effectiveness is in principle higher in cases of prescription, rather than in cases of 
occupation of terra nullius, both in terms of the intensity of state activities and in terms 
of length of time. Finally, the element of acquiescence from the formal sovereign and 
other interested parties will be of paramount importance in prescriptive acquisition. In a 
wider concept of prescriptive acquisition we can also include the category of historical 
consolidation. This category was originally envisaged by the ICJ in Norwegian 
Fisheries with regard to the delimitation of maritime boundaries, and later transposed 
by the doctrine in land disputes.123 However, recently in Cameroon/Nigeria, the ICJ 
seems to have declined any distinctive role concerning historical consolidation in 
adjudicating land boundaries as opposed to prescriptive acquisition.124
In the state and judicial practice the differentiation between the two categories has 
been blurred. As seen above, the distinction between terra nullius and inhabited land is
not easily tenable if we consider colonial territories.125 Often the issue has been a choice
126between competing claims based both on formal titles and on state activities. The 
Island o f Palmas case is an illustrative example, as it can be seen both as a case of
123 Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports 1949, 233. And also Johnson, ‘Consolidation as a Root of Title 
in International Law’ 12 Cambridge Law Journal (1955), 215, at 220; De Visscher, supra n. 29, 107.
124 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra n. 67, Decision, para. 62.
125 Supra, section 3.2.1.
126 See criticism from Verzijl in The Jurisprudence o f the World Court: a Case by Case Commentary 
(1966), 169; and Brownlie, supra n. 35, 147.
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occupation of terra nullius and of acquisitive prescription. Particular importance has 
always been given by international tribunals and states to the effective display of state
171activities. What counts most is that in both cases the material element of state 
authority and the interests that it creates must be seen as worthy of protection by the 
legal system in order to create a perfect title.128
Another mode of acquisition of sovereignty where effectiveness plays an important 
role is conquest. Conquest has been outlawed at least since 1945.129 Yet the application 
of principles of intertemporal law can still give to it some relevance. According to 
Oppenheim, conquest needs to be firmly established before it can give rise to a title 
through a formal treaty or declaration of annexation. Thus he says that ‘the practice, 
which sometimes prevails, of annexing a conquered part of enemy territory during war 
cannot be approved.’ It goes without saying that the criterion of effective control 
plays a paramount role in disputes concerning conquest. Even in post-1945 international 
law the invalidity of such acts has been in very few instances tempered by the 
possibility of general acquiescence or recognition, despite a general duty of non­
recognition of situations created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm. The 
international legitimacy of the factual situation produced by an act of conquest may, in 
this respect, play a paramount role in gradually transforming the illegal effective 
situation into a lawful territorial situation.131
Cession is the transfer of sovereignty through agreement between two or more 
states. The transfer of sovereignty is usually set out in detail, but problems may arise 
when the treaty is either ambiguous or silent on this point. Some authors have suggested 
that sovereignty is not transferred with the entry into force of the treaty, but with the 
actual transfer of political powers.132 Most, however, agree that sovereignty is
127 Shaw argues that there is no real normative difference between occupation of terra nullius and 
acquisitive prescription, since ‘although the time element has been seen as important for prescription, as 
distinct from occupation, it really is concerned with the effectiveness of such possession. Also in conquest 
effective and stable occupation is the most important requisite and its relevance is nowadays confirmed 
by international tribunals practice to use intertemporal law (see for example Western Sahara case).’ 
Shaw, supra n. 21,19.
128 Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (1997), 115.
129 The doctrine agrees entirely on the unlawfulness of an act of conquest. Disagreement is instead on the 
possibility that an act of conquest produces legal effects. See Korman, supra n. 57.
Oppenheim, supra n. 84, 305.
131 Infra Ch. 5 section 8.
132 Kelsen advanced the argument that also in cession the treaty itself only gives a legitimate title, but 
sovereignty is based on the actual apprehension of the territory concerned. His argument seems to recall 
the concept of inchoate title and was in line with the PCU decisions in Certain German Interests in Polish
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transferred through the entry into force of the treaty unless otherwise agreed and, 
possibly apart from Judge Huber’s award in Island o f Palmas case, this has been 
confirmed by relevant judicial decisions.133 Therefore, effectiveness does not have in 
principle a pivotal role in the acquisition of territory through cession. However, this role 
can and has been played in cases where one party is forced to the signature and 
ratification of the treaty. As stated earlier, during the 19th Century treaties often 
provided for the legal justification of the colonial expansion of European Powers. 
Because of the coercion under which those treaties where concluded and because of the 
ad hoc recognition of a quasi-sovereign status that non-European political organisations 
were granted, those treaties have been named unequal treaties. Effective coercion was 
the main principle governing these legal relationships and the treaties produced legal 
effects only vis-a-vis third-party European states.134 Nowadays, the 1969 Vienna 
Convention provides for the invalidity of such treaties.135 Yet, as for conquest, 
acquiescence and recognition driven by the international legitimacy of a certain 
situation may give rise to a transfer of sovereignty despite the invalidity of the treaty 
itself.136
4. Military occupation and effectiveness
Another legal institution in which the concept of effectiveness plays a fundamental 
role is that of belligerent or military occupation. The very essence of military 
occupation is based on effective control and command over foreign territory. The law of 
occupation applies regardless of the legality of the military presence in a region. In 
other words, its legal effects are produced even in cases, where such a presence is 
brought about by illegal means. In that sense it is worth considering the law of military 
occupation, insofar it is one of the branches of international law where the concept of
Upper Silesia (1926 PCU Series C, n. 11) and in the Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (1937 PCD Series 
C, n. 82). Kelsen, supra n. 46, 213-214; but also see Korman, supra n. 57,17-18.
133 See for example Colombia v. Venezuela, Swiss Federal Council, 24 March 1922, AD 1919-22, Case 
54; the Iloilo claims case, British-American Tribunal, 19 November 1925, AD 1925-26, Case 254.
134 See Anghie, supra n. 54.
135 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Art. 52.
136 See case of Kosovo infra Ch. 6, section 5.
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effectiveness plays a dominant role. The law of belligerent occupation is in fact often an 
important legal feature of unlawful territorial situations.137
4.1 The instruments regulating military occupation in international law
The term itself ‘belligerent occupation’ shows the original meaning taken by this 
institution at the beginning of the 20th Century through the 1907 Hague Convention. 
The 1907 Hague Convention mostly dealt with the powers and duties of the occupying 
power as a governmental authority. In fact, the first definition of occupation was limited 
to cases of occupation of enemy territory in the context of war. Article 42 of the 1907 
Hague Convention clearly showed the pre-condition of effectiveness applying to cases 
of belligerent occupation: Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory 
where such authority has been established and can be exercised.*138
In other words, occupation was not only limited by the exercise of effective military 
control and command over a certain area, but also by the existence of a state of war as 
formally defined by the practice of the 19th Century. The Second World War saw a 
series of invasions and occupations in particular by Germany, which did not fit into a 
state of war or armed conflict. For instance, the occupation of Czechoslovakia was 
effected through coerced ‘invitation’ and no hostility broke out between the two 
countries. In the case of Denmark, despite the lack of any formal document paving the 
way for the German occupation, there was only sporadic military resistance which did 
not create a state of war or armed conflict.139 This was the reason that led the 
Contracting Parties of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions to elaborate a common 
Article 2, which extended the concept of occupation to both situations of non-declared 
and non-recognised state of war and occupations meeting no armed resistance. The 
scope of application of the law of belligerent occupation was widened in 1977 to fill a 
gap with a category of conflicts related to decolonisation. In other words, a literal 
interpretation of Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as had been given by Israel
137 For two useful commentaries on the law of military occupation see Roberts, ‘What is a Military 
Occupation?’ 55 BYIL (1984), 249; Gasser, ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’, in Fleck (ed.), The 
Handbook o f Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995), 209, at 240. As for its relevance for 
territorial disputes see Kohen, supra n. 106,95.
138 The text of the 1907 Hague Convention and the other relevant instruments analysed in this section can 
be found in Schindler, Toman (eds.), The Laws o f Armed Conflict: a Collection o f Conventions, 
Resolutions and Other Documents (1981).
139 Roberts, supra n. 137,252.
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with regard to its post-1967 occupation of Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem, left 
outside the scope of application of the Fourth Geneva Convention occupations related to 
territories whose international status was as yet undecided, or foreign occupations of 
territorial units having a right of self-determination.140 This gap was filled by Article I, 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which extended the application of 
the laws of occupation to
‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.’141
Thus, the function of this provision was to include also those cases where the 
occupying power was exercising jurisdiction over a territory under sovereignty of a 
non-Contracting Party, whose sovereign status is unsettled as in the cases of colonial 
non-self governing territories or territories under Mandate or Trusteeship 
Administration or, finally, in cases of racist regimes. The extension effected by the 1977 
Additional Protocol I is of great importance, as it concerns the application of 
international humanitarian law to different categories of unlawful territorial situations. 
Furthermore, the adoption in 1977 of Protocol II extended the scope of application of 
international humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts. By adopting the additional 
instruments the drafters had in mind cases of attempted secession outside the colonial 
context, where the insurgent groups exercise effective control over a part of the territory 
of a state party ‘as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.’142 Again the criterion of effectiveness 
becomes important as it triggers the application of international humanitarian law to the
140 As of today the Israeli Government does not recognise the applicability of the 1907 Hague Convention 
and the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza because those territories do not belong to 
any Contracting Party. Nevertheless it agrees to a policy of de facto application of the principles 
concerning governance of the Hague Convention and the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. The position has been heavily criticised by international organisations such as the UN, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and numerous scholars (see for instance two Isreali scholars’ 
critiques in Dinstein, ‘The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights’ 8 Israeli 
Yearbook o f Human Rights (1978), 104; Benvenisti, The International Law o f Occupation (1991), 107). 
See, however, the stance taken by the Israeli Supreme Court in Affu v. Commander o f the IDF Forces in 
the West Bank (translated in 29 ILM (1990), 139), which has recognised the direct applicability of the 
Hague Regulations as customary law in Gaza.
141 Schindler, Toman, supra n. 138,558.
142 1977 Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Art. 1(1).
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category of unlawful territorial situations, involving an attempt of secession through 
forcible means.143
The relation between these instruments is formally one of complementarity.144 
However, from a substantive point of view Articles 42-56 of the Hague Regulations, 
which represented the classic formulation of the law of belligerent occupation, have 
been superseded by Articles 27-34 and 47-78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Whereas the approach of the Geneva Convention is much more focused on the rights of 
protected persons, it inevitably addresses the powers and duties of the occupying power 
as a governmental authority.145 However, the Hague Regulations still retain their 
importance as a separate source of law for specific issues such as the trigger of effective 
occupation for the application of the laws of war embodied in Article 42, and as a 
codification of customary law as stated at the Nuremberg Trials.146
Finally, it must be noted that the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been adhered to 
by 190 states, whereas the 1977 Additional Protocols by 161, excluding some important 
world and regional military powers such as the United States, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Israel, Morocco and Turkey.
4.2 Establishment and termination of a legal regime of military occupation
The establishment of a regime of military occupation is subject to the provision of 
Article 42 of the Hague Convention. What is required is effective control over foreign 
territory and foreign population. The British Manual suggests a dual objective test in 
order to assess effective control: a) due to a foreign invasion, the national authorities are 
no longer able to exercise jurisdiction over their own territory and population; b) by 
contrast, the invading forces can now exercise and enforce their authority.147 It follows 
that a simple incursion into foreign territory does not create a regime of occupation, 
despite being subject to the other provisions of international humanitarian law, in 
particular those dealing with the conduct of military operations and the protection of 
civilians. The Israeli Supreme Court has interpreted the Article 42 requirement in 
Tsemel et al. v. Minister o f Defence et al. and in Ansar Prison concerning the 1982
143 Infra Ch. 4, section 5.
144 1949 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 154.
145 See Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, Commentary (1958), Vol. IV, 614.
146 International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Trial o f the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal (1947), 65.
147 Para. 503 (cit. in Gasser, supra n. 137,243).
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invasion of Southern Lebanon as potentially fulfilled also in cases of temporally-, 
territorially- and purpose-limited occupations.148 In the Naletilic and Martinovic case 
the ICTY indicated some factors that may assist a tribunal in assessing the requirement 
of ‘actual authority* established by Article 42: the occupying power must have 
substituted the authority exercised by the occupied state or entity with its own authority, 
and the occupied state must be unable to function publicly; the enemy’s forces must 
have surrendered, withdrawn or been defeated, while sporadic, local resistance, even 
successful, does not affect the status of military occupation; the occupying force must 
be sufficiently present, or at least be in the position to send troops to restore control in a 
reasonable time; a temporary authority must have been established and the occupying 
power must be in the position to issue directives and regulations for the civilian 
population.149
A more troublesome aspect of the law of occupation is that of termination. As a 
corollary of Article 42, one would assume that the applicability of the law of occupation 
terminates when the occupying power no longer exercises effective authority over 
foreign territory. This is confirmed by Article 3 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I which 
states that the ‘application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall cease...in the case 
of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation [...].’ However, Article 6 
paragraph 3 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention introduces a limitation to the full 
applicability of Section HI concerning the law of belligerent occupation. This limitation 
applies after one year from the cessation of the military operations, and it concerns a 
series of provisions enumerated in Article 6 paragraph 3. This provision was introduced 
with the occupation of Germany and Japan by the Allies in mind.150
The importance of the one year time-limit should not be overestimated as it is 
mostly directed toward the possibility of the occupying power taking security measures, 
whose necessity is difficult to envisage months or years after the cessation of military 
activities.151 Furthermore, most of the humanitarian provisions concerning the vital 
interests of the population are still applicable after one year. Finally, Article 6 paragraph 
3 has been superseded by Article 3 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, hence it is as such 
still binding only on 30 states - although including influential ones. At any rate, the
148 The two case are respectively quoted in Benvenisti, supra n. 140,182 and Roberts, supra n. 137,286.
149 The Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber’s Judgement of 31 
March 2003, para. 217, in http://www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-tj030331-e.pdf.
150 Pictet, supra n. 145, 62.
151 E.g. Art. 78.
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rationale for the 1949 provision is difficult to understand even if it only minimally 
diminishes the humanitarian duties of the occupying power. If its purpose is to fight the 
idea that the law of occupation should apply indefinitely ‘as an enduring safety net 
against the consequences of diplomatic immobilism’,152 it is hardly conceivable that this 
should be the ideal means to do it. If the underlying idea is that the law of occupation 
should be limited in time, a natural step further may have been to terminate it all 
together after an additional maximum period -  say five years. A powerful counter­
argument is that a complete termination of the law of military occupation would leave 
those populations effectively at the mercy of the occupant’s good will, or with the 
unfortunate choice of seeking protection of their human rights based on the extension of 
the occupant’s legal system, hence annexation.
The reality is that the whole concept of belligerent occupation is so entrenched in 
the idea of effective control that any departure from it is likely to do more harm to 
civilian populations than anything else. At a practical level, it is impossible to find a 
single example of state practice that has invoked the Article 6 paragraph 3 provision to 
limit the legal extent of military occupation. In fact, what most occupations show is that 
the problem is not so much how to limit the application of these instruments, but exactly 
the contrary, how to make sure that these conventions are properly applied.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a duty of termination of the military presence
is imposed on the occupying power by norms of territorial unlawfulness and the use of
force that will be addressed in the next chapter. The fact that some legal consequences
follow from a military occupation, and that uncertainty and ambiguity may exist as to
the temporal limitation of these consequences, does not do away with a duty of
cessation of an internationally wrongful act, for instance in cases such as territorial
1aggressions or territorial annexations. This is confirmed by the 1970 GA Declaration 
on Friendly Relations, which states that ‘[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object 
of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions 
of the Charter.’ For example, it is my submission that the unlawfulness of the military 
action undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom in 2003 against Iraq 
makes their and the Coalition partners’ occupation of Iraq illegal in the first place, 
placing upon them a duty of withdrawal regardless of any conclusion concerning the
152 Roberts, supra n. 137,272.
153 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 30 (a).
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duration of application of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. It is doubtful whether 
even the SC is entitled to use its legal authority to recognise that status quo}54
4.3 Effectiveness and formal territorial status in military occupations
The law of military occupation represents a limitation to a full impact of the 
principle of effectiveness in international law. In fact, as argued by Kohen, its raison 
d'etre lies exactly in the possibility of distinguishing between a military de facto 
authority -  possibly temporally limited and the exercise of territorial sovereignty by 
the occupying power.155 In other words, the law of belligerent occupation does not 
affect issues of formal territorial status, leaving no room for implicit or explicit 
recognition of a formed acquisition of territory. This was already inherent in the classic 
enunciation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, which bound the occupying forces 
to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory. It is reiterated in Article 47 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which sets out the obligation of the occupying power not to 
deprive protected persons of the benefits granted under that convention following
‘any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or the 
government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the 
occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or 
part of the occupied territory.’
This latter provision is meant to protect the occupied territory and its inhabitants 
from any concessions granted by local authorities under duress or from an act of 
annexation.156
Despite that provision, the realistic nature of the institution of military occupation 
and its link with the concept of effectiveness should not be underestimated. The striking 
element already analysed concerns the establishment and termination of a military 
occupation, which is conditional on the existence of an objective situation of effective 
territorial control. The legal consequence flowing from the establishment of such 
military control is the recognition by international law of certain legal powers and legal 
obligations, regardless of the legality of the use of force in the first place and the 
territorial status of the occupied territories -  in other words, regardless of the legality of
154 SC Res. 1483 (2003). Infra Ch. 5, section 8.
155 Kohen, supra n. 106,102.
156 Note that both categories are also likely to be found in violation of international law under other sets of 
norms such as treaty law, in particular Art. 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, and 
the law of territory.
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the established military presence.157 This may appear to conflict with the affirmation of 
a series of principles of unlawfulness of territorial situations developed in the course of 
the 20th Century, which I consider in the next chapter. In particular, it may be difficult to 
reconcile the duty of non-recognition of territorial situations established and maintained 
in serious violation of ius cogens principles, and the acceptance of certain legal powers 
and duties by the occupying power when its presence is blatantly illegal.158 The solution 
and the rationale are likely to be found in the famous passage of the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion in Namibia, which exempted from the international duty of non-recognition 
those transactions and governmental acts ‘the effects of which can be ignored only to 
the detriment of inhabitants of the Territory.’159 In other words, the fact that laws of 
Geneva are primarily focused on safeguarding human rights in territories under 
occupation makes their limitation to only those situations which are not prima facie 
Unlawful out Of tune with the aim and purpose of the laws of war and the Consequences 
of territorial unlawfulness.
To conclude, the level of effectiveness ‘tolerated’ in the institution of military 
occupation responds to the overall humanitarian concern surrounding the laws of war. 
The real problem is not how to limit the role effectiveness plays in this respect, but 
rather to make humanitarian law applicable to occupying powers, which are often 
reluctant to consider themselves bound by it. In fact, claims of territorial sovereignty 
linked to formal acts of annexation make the application of the laws of military 
occupation and in particular Article 47 most often ignored. Where formal annexation 
does not occur, other ‘legal’ means may be adopted to circumvent the applicability of 
the laws of war, such as the extra-territorial application of civil legislation to occupied 
territories.160
5. Concluding remarks
This chapter has examined the role played by the concept of effectiveness with 
regard to the main legal institutions concerned with the law of territory. It shows the
157 This position is widely accepted by international lawyers, even if it was occasionally disputed by 
Soviet writers with regard to the German occupation in World War II (e.g. Tunkin, Theory o f 
International Law (1974), 411) and by the PLO in the past (see Roberts, supra n. 137,293, note 168).
158 See ILC Articles 40 and 41 and Commentary, supra n. 22, 288-289.
159 Namibia, supra n. 27,56.
160 Benvenisti, supra n. 140,132.
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relevance of the concept of effectiveness for territorial issues, specifically unlawful 
territorial situations. The chapter has considered how the theory of statehood was 
shaped around the concept of effectiveness, and how this notion of state was transposed 
into its main classic legal qualification: territorial sovereignty. The section concerning 
territorial sovereignty has also considered the legal notion of territory in international 
law, and how an eclectic model merging functional and object theory represents its best 
theoretical representation. The chapter has then looked at how the modem concept of 
territorial sovereignty has been shaped through the colonial encounter. Despite the 
jurisprudential elaboration behind this encounter and the different categories which have 
characterised colonial expansion, I have shown how the distinction between terra 
nullius and inhabited land has been fictitious. The progressive message spread by 
Western Sahara in terms of recognition of pre-colonial political organisations has been 
scaled down by recent jurisprudence of national tribunals and the ICJ. Indeed, the 
chapter proves how the non-European world was considered as a terra nullius from the 
point of view of international law. This ensured that the law of territory would recognise 
a dominant role played by effectiveness, as a device ensuring co-ordination between 
equal European powers and the subordination of local communities. The analysis of the 
concept of material possession and effective control as it developed originally in the 
institution of occupation of terra nullius shows how these legal factors have also 
developed their substance and content in parallel with European colonial expansion and 
functionally to their political and historical ambitions. Furthermore, the role of 
effectiveness in other modes of acquisition of territory, namely acquisitive prescription, 
conquest and cession has been considered. This analysis of the role played by 
effectiveness in modes of acquisition of territory is all-the-more crucial, since unlawful 
territorial situations are frequently contested and often given rise to territorial disputes. 
Within territorial disputes, territorial claims may be articulated in terms of various 
forms of effectivites as independent titles to territory. Finally, I have looked at 
effectiveness in military occupations, and I have assessed the extent to which the laws 
of war with regard to military occupation represent a limitation of its full impact on the 
laws of territory, despite effectiveness being the main prerequisite for their operation. 
This is also important for the purpose of the thesis, since military occupations are often 
part and parcel of unlawful territorial situations.
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Having considered the material and concrete nature of territorial sovereignty in 
international law, I now turn to address its normative side as a necessary complement to 
a comprehensive theory of unlawful territorial situations.
105
Chapter 4
Defining the boundaries of legality: unlawfulness 
of territorial situations
1. Introductory remarks
International law cannot reduce itself to recording reality. If effectiveness, that is 
the adherence of the law to the world of facts, was the dominant principle of 
international law, we would have to question the normativity of the international legal 
system and the capacity of international law to influence the behaviours of international 
actors. This would be particularly true of territorial situations, where the divide between 
lawful and unlawful would only rely on procedural restrictions on the ‘legalisation’ of 
effectiveness. The domination of concreteness over normativity was characteristic of 
pre-League of Nations international law, and consequently one of the main 
preoccupations of 19th Century international lawyers was to prove the juridical nature of 
international law. Legality was at best defined in procedural terms.
The Covenant of the League of Nations represented a benchmark in this sense. 
Despite being weak and ineffective, the League of Nations developed the first series of 
legal principles to limit war in international relations and the legal effects of waging 
war. So, among other important changes, conquest as a mode of acquisition of territory 
began to be seen as unlawful. The principle of non-recognition of territorial 
aggrandisement by means of war was then confirmed in 1945 by the creation of the UN 
and the entry into force of the UN Charter. In the following decades, in particular during 
the 1960s and the 1970s, two other substantive principles of unlawfulness of territorial 
situations developed as a result of political de-colonisation: on the one hand, the right of 
individuals to be ruled by a representative leadership, on the other hand, the right of the 
individuals as a group to freely determine their own political and territorial status 
without foreign or colonial interference.
This chapter outlines the way principles of substantive legality influence and 
determine territorial situations, completing a preliminary theoretical framework based 
on the dialectical tension between effectiveness and legality. The chapter defines the
106
unlawfulness of territorial situations with respect to four legal principles: a) the 
prohibition of the use of force as a mode of acquisition of territory or change of 
territorial status of a certain region; b) the principle of uti possidetis; c) the right to self- 
determination; d) the principle of territorial integrity. Despite arguing for the objectivity 
of the concept of legality, the chapter concludes by identifying some of the 
inconsistencies and difficulties that characterise legality discourse with respect to 
territorial situations.
2. Normative standards: the prohibition of the use of force as a means 
of modification of the territorial status of a certain region
The first principle of legality considered is that concerning the unlawfulness of a 
territorial situation established through the use of force. This question has been 
comprehensively dealt with in the legal literature, and I will only recall here some 
important points for my thesis.1 Traditionally, the enunciation of this principle is traced 
back to the so-called Stimson doctrine of 1931, when the US Secretary of State 
Stimson, in two identical notes transmitted to China and Japan, declared the illegality of 
the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the US willingness not to recognise any legal 
effect or instrument deriving from it.2 However, restrictions on how the use of military 
force could modify the territorial status of a certain region are not a 20th Century 
development in international law. The 18th and the 19th centuries saw the development 
of norms regulating the way sovereignty could be transferred through the use of force. 
For instance, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 represented a turning point in the history of 
the legal institution of conquest, by requiring that the transfer of sovereignty would be
1 E.g. Langer, Seizure o f Territory (1945); Jennings, The Acquisition o f Territory in International Law 
(1963); most recently see Korman, The Right of Conquest: the Acquisition o f Territory by Force in 
International Law and Practice (1996).
2 This is the text of the note: ‘In view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, 
the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and 
the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor 
does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents 
thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those 
which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial or administrative integrity of the 
Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, common known as the open-door 
policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought 
about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to 
which Treaty both China and Japan, as well the United States, are Parties.’ Cit. in Langer, supra n. 1, 58. 
On the Stimson doctrine see also Meng, ‘Stimson Doctrine’, in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (1982) (Vol. IV), 
690.
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legitimised by a peace treaty and not only by military occupation or annexation.3 These 
norms can be at best defined as procedural, but did not substantially impinge on the 
freedom of states to go to war in order to expand their own territory.
The principle of unlawfulness of territorial situations brought about through the use 
of force was developed first in Latin America and it can be considered as the other side 
of the coin of another important principle of international law, the one of uti possidetis. 
The principle prohibiting forcible annexations found expression in Article 11 of the Rio 
de Janeiro Treaty on Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933 and in Article 11 of the 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of the same year. These two 
conventions were regional conventions binding on American States.4 Article 11 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations represented the first universal treaty trying to limit 
the freedom of states to resort to war in order to enforce their claims; however, it was 
not until the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 (also named Pact of Paris) that such 
renunciation became unconditional. The corollary of this would be that conquest 
became outlawed, yet express provisions to that effect were never drafted. A Committee 
of 11 Members was created with a view to modifying the League of Nations Pact in 
order to harmonise it with the Pact of Paris. It considered on 14 January 1930 a proposal 
by the Peruvian delegate, whereby peace treaties leading to a territorial change imposed 
through the use of force in violation of the Pact would be affected by nullity and could 
not be registered at the League Secretariat.5 The amendment proposal was never 
brought into force. However, another important corollary of legality started to shape: the 
invalidity of peace treaties imposed through the use of force in violation of international 
law.6
The 1930s were an important turning point, as the League of Nations was faced for 
the first time with the chance to develop norms and policies with regard to the Japanese 
aggression of Manchuria in 1932, the Italian aggression of Ethiopia in 1935, and the 
German Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938. Apart from the consistent 
policy of American countries refusing any room for the seizure of territory through war 
- of which the Stimson Doctrine represents the most known, but neither the first nor the 
most significant expression - the reaction of the League of Nations organs was a
3 Kohen, Possession Contestee et Souverainete Territoriale (1997), 389.
4 See Bindschedler, ‘Annexation’, in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000) (Vol. I), 168, at 170.
5 Ziccardi Capaldo, Le situazioni territoriali illegittime nel diritto intemazionale (1977), 29-30.
6 League o f Nations Official Journal (1930), 78.
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tangible sign of the contradictory imperatives of two different ways of conceiving 
international law at that time: one as value-oriented social contract willing to promote 
the equality of states and the common progress, the other as a system of co-ordination 
with a view to maximising the benefits deriving from political, economic and military 
power. The latter was soon to prevail. On 16 February 1932, a few weeks after the 
Stimson Declaration was issued, the Members of the League Council directed a note to 
the Japanese government declaring that ‘no infringement of the territorial integrity and 
no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in 
disregard of this article ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by the Members of 
the League.*7 The same principle was re-affirmed by the League Assembly on 11 March
Q
1932. As to the Italian annexation of Ethiopia, despite the initial imposition of 
sanctions on Italy, the principles of the League were sacrificed in order to appease Italy 
in its territorial claims in Europe and to avoid an alliance between Rome and Berlin 
(sic!).9 By the end of 1938, apart from the Soviet Union, all European states had 
recognised the Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia and no explicit condemnation was ever 
expressed by any League organ of the Italian seizure. Even weaker, if not non-existent, 
was the reaction to the incorporation by Germany of Austria in early 1938 and of 
Sudetenland at the end of the same year. Also here, the appeasement policy of the 
Western democracies was dominant over any claim of illegality or condemnation and 
through the Munich Agreement the cession of Sudetenland was formally decided by 
France, UK, Italy and Germany.10 Spain and the USSR were isolated in condemning the 
inaction of the League.11 The assessment one can make of this narrative is that, despite 
the existence of Article 11 and the inevitable conclusion that League Members were 
supposedly prohibited from annexing territory by the use of force, there existed a 
dramatic contradiction between conventional law as embodied in the Pact of Paris and a 
general acquiescence to the effects of the use of force as a means of territorial 
modification, both in the exercise of military annexation and in the exercise of 
diplomatic coercion. One can conclude that such dramatic contradiction lay in the
7 Langer, supra n. 1, 62.
8 Ibidem, 63.
9 See statements before the Council of the Polish representative, Mr Komarincki, and of the Chinese 
representative, Mr Wellington Koo of 12 May 1938, in League o f Nations Official Journal (1938), 343.
10 See note issued on 30 September 1938 by the Czechoslovak Government, in Documents o f 
International Affairs (1938), Vol. 13, 326.
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legitimacy of resorting to force as a way to influence and settle the outcome of 
international disputes.12
The Post World War II system aimed to outlaw the phenomenon of war through a 
general prohibition on the resort to force included in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Article 2(4) explicitly refers to threat or use of force ‘against the territorial integrity’ of 
a state. However, no express provision was drafted to include the cases of illegal 
acquisition of territories. The attempt by the GA and the ILC to draft a Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of States, which would include the express legal requirement of 
non-recognition of territorial changes brought about by the use of force in Article 11, 
was never adopted due to disagreement among members on the definition of 
aggression.13 GA Resolution 2625 (1970) on Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States, albeit non-binding per se but widely accepted as representative of 
customary international law, is the first UN written instrument declaring that ‘[t]he 
territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from 
the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of 
force shall be recognised as legal.’14 The principle of non-recognition was reiterated in a 
later GA resolution of the same year.15 Furthermore, GA Resolution 2625 also states 
that ‘[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting 
from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter.* Finally, in 1969 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties had been adopted declaring the 
absolute nullity of treaties coerced over states through the unlawful use of force, thus 
including also treaties providing for the transfer or change of territorial status of 
territories.16
The existence of a rule of general international law providing for the unlawfulness 
of territorial situations, where the territorial formal status is modified through resort to 
the use of force is further evidenced by the practice of the UN political organs and other 
international bodies, which did not suffer from the inconsistencies of their League’s 
predecessors, at least, in the enunciation of the legal principle. After the Six Day War in
11 See statement of the Spanish Representative, Mr Del Vayo, 19 September 1938, in League o f Nations 
Official Journal (1938), Special Supplement 183, 78; and statement of the USSR Representative, Mr 
Litvinov, 21 September 1938, in ibidem.
12 See infra Ch. 5, section 8.
13 Ziccardi Capaldo, supra n. 5,44.
14 GA Res. 2625 (XXV).
15 GA Res. 2734 (XXV).
16 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Art. 52.
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1967 in which Israeli forces gained control over the West Bank of the river Jordan, the 
East Bank of the Suez Canal, East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights, the SC 
adopted under Chapter VI Resolution 242 reaffirming ‘the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by war* and requiring the ‘[withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from territories occupied in the recent conflict.’17 The Israeli legislation extending civil 
jurisdiction over the occupied areas and the 1980 Israeli Basic Law declaring 
‘Jerusalem, complete and united’ capital of Israel were declared to be null and void by 
both the GA and the SC.18 In 1974 the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus was 
condemned by GA Resolution 3212, which urged ‘all States to respect the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus’ and 
‘the speedily withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence*;19 
such condemnation and demands were renewed by SC Resolution 367 (1975), which 
also condemned the attempts by Turkey to create a ‘Turkish federated State* in the 
occupied part of the island.20 More recently, following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, the SC declared the annexation null and void in its Resolution 662 adopted 
under Chapter VII.21 During the Bosnian war the principle was clearly re-affirmed by 
the EC Arbitration Commission which stated that
‘[according to a well-established principle of international law the alteration of existing frontiers 
or boundaries by force is not capable of producing any legal effect. This principle is to be found, 
for instance, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (GA 
Resolution 2625 (XXV)) and in the Helsinki Final Act; it was cited by the Hague Conference on 7 
September 1991 and is enshrined in the draft Convention of 4 November 1991 drawn up by the 
Conference on Yugoslavia.’22
17 SC Res. 242 (1967), Preamble and Para. l(i). Compare however the ambiguity of the English version, 
that according to Israeli political leaders would leave room for an only partial withdrawal, and the French 
version, that is more in line with the principle of ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.’ 
For an interesting and critical discussion of the interpretation of Res. 242 see McHugo, ‘Resolution 242; 
A Legal Reappraisal of the Right-Wing Israeli Interpretation of the Withdrawal Phrase with Reference to 
the Conflict between Israel and the Palestinians’ 51 ICLQ (2002), 851.
18 See SC Res. 298 (1971); GA Res. 3215 (XXXII); SC Res. 478 (1980); SC Res. 497 (1981). The legal 
position of Israel with respect to the occupied territories is the one of belligerent occupant, despite 
contradictory claims put forward by the Israeli government in the course of the years (see Playfair, 
‘Introduction’, in Playfair (ed.), International Law and the Administration o f Occupied Territories: Two 
Decades o f Israeli Occupation o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1992), 1). The extension of civil 
jurisdiction over those areas is a violation of this status, a fortiori the extension of sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem effected by the 1980 Basic Law. However, the Israeli Supreme Court has recognised the 
annexation of Jerusalem since 1967. Hanzalis v. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate Court, 48 ILR (1969), 93, 
at 98.
19 GA Res. 3213 (XXIX).
20 SC Res. 367 (1975).
21 SC Res. 662 (1990).
22 Opinion n. 3, 11 January 1992, Arbitration Commission EC Conference on Yugoslavia, 92 ILR (1993), 
170.
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The principle has been also confirmed by several SC resolutions concerning the 
conflict.23
This consistent state practice of non-recognition of unlawful territorial situations 
produced by the use of force seems to be contradicted by the cases of Israel’s expansion 
in 1948, the Chinese incorporation of Tibet in 1951 and the Indian annexation of Goa in 
1961. Rather than undermine the existence of the rule, these cases qualify it in two 
different ways. The first qualification refers to its interpretation from 1945 to 1960. In 
fact, the state-centric legal framework of the Charter as it was conceived before the 
affirmation of the peoples’ right of self-determination in 1960 through GA Resolution 
1514 ensured that where the status of the territory was contested and it was not 
generally considered as being placed under a state’s sovereignty, the international 
community would be divided in taking a stance against such forcible annexations and 
extending the new principle of legality also to these situations. This was the case with 
the territorial aggrandisement of Israel in the 1948 war,24 and the Chinese incorporation 
of Tibet in 1950.25 Goa’s annexation in 1961 was indeed condemned by a large majority 
of the SC members, however the adoption of a resolution was vetoed by the Soviet 
Union. The subsequent recognition by the international community of India’s 
sovereignty was due to the legitimacy rather than the legality of its claim. This is the 
second qualification to the application of the principle, which refers to the role played 
by the concept of legitimacy in curing an originally unlawful territorial situation. This 
issue, with specific reference to Goa, is analysed more in detail at a later stage of the 
thesis.27 Finally, the case of Latvia and Estonia is interesting since it presents some 
elements of the League of Nations system and some of the post-1945 system. The two 
countries could revert to their original statehood thus implicitly claiming the return to 
their pre-annexation boundaries, yet the uti possidetis principle applied required the
23 E.g. SC Res. 752 (1992) and SC Res. 757 (1992).
24 On the 1948 Israeli-Arab conflict see Pelcovits, The Long Armistice (1993).
25 On the case of Tibet see Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law (1979), 212-213; Van 
Walt van Prag, The Status o f Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law (1987); Berkin, 
The Great Tibetan Stonewall o f China: the Status of Tibet in International Law and International Policy 
in Tibet (2000).
26 S.C.O.R., 16th Year, 987th and 988th Meeting, 18 December 1961.
27 Infra Ch. 5, para. 8.
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acceptance of the Soviet administrative boundary, which was the solution adopted, 
thereby conceding room to a principle of effectiveness.28
The illegality of changes of territorial status through forcible actions is also qualified 
by the link between the norms of jus ad bellum and the law of territory. Actions in 
contravention of the basic principles of international law cannot produce any legal 
effect. However, stating this obvious conclusion should not prevent us from looking at 
the complexities of the issue. What if the use of force was lawful? What if sovereignty 
is acquired as a result of an act of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 
of the UN Charter? What if sovereignty is acquired as a result of a collective 
enforcement measure of the SC? The question of self-defence and the acquisition of 
sovereignty is related to the 1967 Israeli occupation of the Sinai peninsula, the West 
Bank and Jerusalem. One of the claims put forward by the Israeli government was that 
it was acting in the exercise of its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. Some authors have linked this legality with the claim that the extension of 
sovereignty over those areas was lawful.29 However, as rightly argued by other authors, 
one should not consider the legality of the military action per se in the first place and 
then derive from it the lawfulness of whatever action follows.30 As confirmed by the ICJ 
in Nicaragua the exercise of self-defence must always fulfil the criteria of necessity and 
proportionality. What really counts under international law is the aim and scope of the
<51
exercise of self-defence, to repeal the armed attack. That must be strictly necessary 
and proportionate to the imminent threat represented by the attack and the means used 
by the aggressor state. It would be at the very least an odd law of armed conflicts which 
would enable a state to expand its territorial sovereignty, in order to respond to an 
aggressive action. Indeed, SC Resolution 242 declares the ‘inadmissibility of 
acquisition of territory by war’, without drawing a distinction between a lawful or an 
unlawful war. As to an SC enforcement measure under Chapter VII, this would very 
much depend on the mandate given by the SC resolution. In turn, were the mandate
28 Mullerson, ‘The Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former USSR and 
Yugoslavia’ 4 2 ICLQ (1993), 473, at 480-485.
29 Blum, ‘The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria’ 3 Israeli Law Review 
(1968), 279; Levine, ‘The Status of Sovereignty in East Jerusalem and the West Bank’ 5 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (1972), 485; Schwebel, ‘What Weight to Conquest’ 
64 AJIL (1977), 344.
30 Bowett, ‘International Law Related to Occupied Territory’ 87 The Law Quarterly Review (1971), 473; 
Jennings, supra n. 1, 55; Cassese, ‘Legal Considerations on the International Status of East Jerusalem’ 3 
Palestinian Yearbook of International Law (1986), 13; Kohen, supra n. 3, 395.
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given, the legality of the new territorial situation would depend on the legal limitations 
to which the SC is subject. These are analysed in Chapter 6.
3. Normative standards: the utipossidetis principle
The second important limitation of the role that effectiveness can play in determining 
territorial sovereignty is that of uti possidetis. As stated by Shaw ‘uti possidetis is not 
essentially a factual question, although dependant upon the same factual background, 
but a presumption of law concerning one aspect of the transmission of sovereignty from 
an existing state to a new state.’32 As a corollary of the finding that the difference 
between territorial disputes and boundary disputes is only a difference of degree rather 
than of kind, the uti possidetis, meant as a legal presumption freezing the existing 
boundaries, belongs in principle to both kinds of disputes. It is true that it will play a 
larger role in cases where the boundary itself and the instruments identifying it are at the 
core of the legal dispute. However, nothing prevents the uti possidetis from playing an 
important role in conflicts of attribution. For instance such role can be seen especially in 
conflicts over islands.33
A considerable amount of writing has been dedicated to the uti possidetis juris in 
the last few years, largely due to its revival in recent events such as the break-up of the 
Former Yugoslavia and the USSR.34 The principle provides for the maintenance of pre­
existing internal or international boundaries when a new state is created. It is 
antonymous to the principle of effectiveness, to the effect that an actual display of 
authority cannot in itself represent a better title to territory. It first developed in Latin 
America, where the creation of states as a result of the demise of the Spanish Empire 
was effected along the existing administrative boundaries. It played the function of 
claiming a duty of non-interference of the European powers in Latin American affairs
31 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/USA), ICJ Reports 1986,14, 
at 122.
32 Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries* 8 EJIL (1997), 478, at 497.
33 E.g. dispute between Venezuela and The Netherlands over the Aves Island, in La Pradelle and Politis 
(eds.), Recueil des arbitrages intemationaux, Vol. II (1856-1872), (1957), 412; and dispute between El 
Salvador and Honduras over certain islands in the Gulf of Fonseca in Land, Island and Maritime Dispute 
(El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports 1992, 351, at 558-559.
34 See Craven, ‘The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’ 66 BYIL (1995), 333, 
at 385-390; Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’ 67 BYIL (1996), 
75; Nesi, UUti Possidetis Iuris nel diritto intemazionale (1996); Kohen, supra n. 3; Sanchez-Rodriguez,
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based on the doctrine of terra nullius. It gained momentum once again during the de­
colonisation period, with the creation of the newly independent states of Africa and 
Asia, and more recently during the demise of the Former Yugoslavia. In these contexts, 
the needs stressed in the application of the principle were that of stability of frontiers 
and the prohibition of the use of force as a way to settle territorial disputes. Its existence 
as a dispositive rule of general international law, which applies whenever states do not 
reach an agreement to the contrary, has been confirmed by the ICJ in Burkina Faso v. 
Mali, El Salvador v. Honduras and by the Badinter Commission, even if such assertion 
has been other times disputed by writers and arguably some tribunals have hinted to its 
exclusively conventional nature.35
More often, the controversy over the exact nature of the principle of uti possidetis 
has revolved around its desirability rather than an analysis of international practice.36 
Firstly, one of the main policy objections is that its lack of flexibility works to the 
detriment of the bargaining power of some states in the process of dispute settlement. 
Similarly to maritime delimitation, equity should play an important role in deciding 
territorial disputes. Secondly, if the rationale is to prevent attempts of territorial 
aggrandisement by military force, one should not overlook the fact that there are other 
international rules addressing the issue. Thirdly and most importantly, the uti possidetis 
does not reflect the right of self-determination: it perpetuates and legitimises boundary 
lines drawn by the colonial powers irrespective of any ethnic distribution or will of 
inhabitants. In a sense, the uti possidetis, despite envisioned to promote stability, would 
encourage further division and eventually, in extreme cases, genocide and mass- 
expulsion.
I will not deal at length with this debate, but only raise a few arguments which 
validly defend the uti possidetis as a rule of customary law. The first argument is that 
the uti possidetis is a corollary of the principle of stability of frontiers. In other words, 
frontiers enjoy an objective status valid erga omnes, which is not dependent on the
‘L’uti possidetis et les effectives dans les contentieux territoriaux et firontaliers’ 263 Recueil des Cours 
(1997), 151.
35 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), ICJ Reports 1986, 554, at 558; Land, Island and Maritime 
Dispute, supra n. 33. See also Rann ofKutch Case (India/Pakistan), 7 UM  (1968), 633; Beagle Channel 
Arbitration (Argentina/Chile), 52 ILR (1979), 97; Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration (Dubai/Sharjah), 91 
ILR (1993), 543; Affaire de la Dilimitation de la Frontiere Maritime entre la Guinee-Bissau et le Senegal 
(Guinea Bissau/Senegal), Decision of 31 July 1989, RIAA (Vol. XX), 119.
36 For criticism of the principle on policy grounds see Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and 
the Border of New States’ 90 AJIL (1996), 590; Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities
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validity of a legal instrument.37 They can be modified through a new agreement, which 
can create a new objective situation, but the situation inherited is always the one
•  ‘l Oexisting before the creation of one or more new states. Uti possidetis is title to 
sovereignty in itself. To think that it does not do so, if not embodied in a conventional 
instrument, suggests that as long as an agreement is not reached two or more states may 
not have a frontier. Despite the existence of norms that address the prohibition of 
change of territorial status through forcible means, it is also true that military power and 
occupation will protract the territorial dispute, and eventually have an undeniable 
weight in reaching a final solution, the cases of Western Sahara and Palestine being two 
examples in this sense.39 Furthermore, the case of the Former Yugoslavia does not 
convincingly show that bloody conflict may have been avoided if the principle of uti 
possidetis had not frozen unilateral territorial claims. Moreover, in the case of Africa, 
wars for the actual modification of borders have been relatively few when compared to 
civil wars for the control of government or internal control over natural resources, and 
one wonders what would have happened if African leaders had not chosen the uti 
possidetis as a general principle.40 As correctly argued by Shaw, scrapping the uti 
possidetis would result in more foreign interventions and armed conflicts which would 
be by definition not considered internal41 Finally, purely basing the principle of self- 
determination on ethnic, religious and linguistic commonalties is likely to create even 
more difficulties for the articulation of a principle, which has been object of much 
criticism based on its alleged inconsistency and indeterminacy. Even when the difficult 
task of defining a people by its inherent characteristics was accomplished, imbalances in 
political power may result in transfer of populations with a view to changing the 
boundary.
3.1 The relation between uti possidetis and effectiveness
The conflict between uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis de facto in the Latin 
American continent, and in particular the reliance of the former Spanish colonies on the 
former and the reliance of Brazil on the latter, have been perceived to be one of the
(1997), 233; Salmon, in ‘D6bats’, Corten (ed.), Demembrements d ’Etats et dilimitations territoriales 
(1999), 325-331.
37 See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), ICJ Reports 1994,6, at 37.
38 Shaw, supra n. 32,495.
39 See infra Ch. 5, sections 6.2,6.4.
40 OAU Res. 16(1) (1964).
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instances where legality and effectiveness collide in international law. The preference 
appears to have been finally given to legality rather than effectiveness. In this sense, I 
have also taken the view that the uti possidetis principle represents one of the legal 
criteria that may define the unlawfulness of a certain territorial situation. In practice, 
however, the line between law and fact is not as neat as it may appear, exactly as the 
relation between legality and effectiveness in general is inherently ambiguous.
The ius of uti possidetis often refers to juridical acts having validity with respect to 
domestic law.42 Their normative value with respect to international law depends on the 
relation between international law and national law. If one takes a dualist position, a 
certain legislation drawing administrative boundaries will have the value of a juridical 
fact under international law, exactly as the actual exercise of jurisdiction will have. 
Therefore, the difference will be represented only by the form under which the two facts 
are presented, one being a title, the other being a set of behaviours. Thus, we are facing 
two forms of effectiveness, one legal and the other sociological43 This explains the 
assertion that the uti possidetis guarantees an objective situation erga omnes, the factual 
existence of a certain border, and not the legal validity of the underlying instrument.44 
International law gives priority to the latter, in order to ensure stability in international 
relations. However, that does not mean that material effectiveness does not play any 
role in determining a certain boundary 45 It only means that it will play a subsidiary role, 
by interpreting the formal instrument. It is important in this respect to recall a very 
eloquent passage of the decision of the ICJ in Burkina Faso/Mali on the relation 
between uti possidetis and effectiveness:
‘For this purpose, a distinction must be drawn among several eventualities. Where the act 
corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is additional to the uti possidetis juris, 
the only role of effectiviti is to confirm the exercise of the right derived from a legal title. Where 
the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is 
effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should 
be given to the holder of the title. In the event that the ejfectivite does not co-exist with any legal 
title, it must invariably be taken into consideration. Finally, there are cases where the legal title is
41 Shaw, supra n. 34,102.
42 See for example ICJ in El Salvador v. Honduras stating ‘[i]t should be recalled that when the principle 
of uti possidetis iuris is involved the ius referred to is not international law but the constitutional or 
administrative law of the pre-independence sovereign, in this case Spanish colonial law.’ Supra n. 33, 
559.
43 Frontier Dispute, supra n. 35,558.
44 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Art. 11. This norm is also 
considered part of customary law. See Marquez-Carrasco, ‘Succession d’Etats et questions territoriales’, 
in Eismann and Koskenniemi (eds.), State Succession: Codification Tested Against the Facts (2000), 491.
45 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Frontier Land (Belgium/The Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1959, 209, 
at 227-230.
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not capable of showing exactly the territorial expanse to which it relates. The effectivitts can then 
play an essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice.’46
The Court was envisaging four different possible relationships between formal title 
and effectiveness. First, the actual display of authority may simply confirm the content 
of an international treaty or internal act delimiting a frontier. This is obviously a case of 
lawful territorial situation most of the time not giving rise to any territorial dispute. 
Second, effectiveness may be contrary to the formal title, in which case pre-eminence 
will be given to the latter and the exercise of jurisdiction will be considered mere 
usurpation.47 This has been the way the ICJ for example interpreted the Libyan 
effectiveness contrary to a 1955 Treaty in the case between Libya and Chad in 1994 48 
Most recently, in the Land and Maritime Boundary dispute between Cameroon and 
Nigeria the same Court ruled against Nigeria’s claims of historical consolidation and 
display of state authority a titre de souverain over the Bakassi peninsula and the Lake 
Chad area due to Cameroon’s title on the basis of uti possidetis 49 In the same decision, 
the Court has however left open the possibility that, despite the existence of a uti 
possidetis juris, long evidenced acquiescence can lead to a passing of title from one 
country to another.50 In other words, the uti possidetis does not freeze a boundary 
forever, but it can be modified through formal agreement or acquiescence to effective 
control and display of sovereign authority. Third, when a formal title is missing, 
effectiveness will represent the factual territorial situation at a critical date and will 
represent a valid title to territory in itself. This was the case in the recent Ligitan and 
Sipadan dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, where the ICJ, after having denied 
the existence of any treaty-based title in favour of either party, held in favour of 
Malaysia on the basis of British ejfectivites on the two islands in the period leading to 
the critical date, as confirmed by Malaysia’s continuation of those state activities after 
its independence.51 Fourth, when the formal title is unclear, effectiveness, defined as
46 Frontier Dispute, supra n. 35,37.
47 However, see for example arbitral award on the frontier dispute between Guatemala and Honduras of 
1933 recognising effective control opposed to the line of uti possidetis as a title to sovereignty (Honduras 
Borders (Guatemala/Honduras) (1933), in RIAA (Vol. II), 1307. Note, however, that this possibility was 
already envisaged by the compromis.
48 Territorial Dispute, supra n. 37.
49 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon/Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea 
intervening), Decision of 10 October 2002, para. 220, at http://www.icj- 
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icn_ijudgment_20021010.PDF.
50 Ibidem, para. 67.
51 Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Decision 
of 17 December 2002, at http://www.icj-
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both physical control and acquiescence to a unilateral assertion of sovereignty, will be 
relevant to the understanding given by the parties to that particular instrument at the 
critical date. In Guatemala v. Honduras, the arbitral tribunal quite clearly stated that 
‘the concept of uti possidetis iuris of 1821...necessarily refers to an administrative 
control which rested on the will of the Spanish Crown’ and that ‘in ascertaining the 
necessary support for that administrative control in the will of the King of Spain, we are 
at liberty to resort to all manifestations of that will -  to royal cedulas, or rescripts, to 
royal orders, laws and decrees, and also, in the absence of precise law or rescripts, to 
conduct indicating royal acquiescence in colonial assertion of administrative 
authority.*52 This was the case for example in the Taba arbitration between Israel and 
Egypt, where physical demarcation carried out by the parties was taken as a definitive 
proof of the uti possidetis line between Palestine and Egypt established by a 1906 
agreement between the Turkish Sultan and the Egyptian Kehdiv;53 and also the thesis 
argued by Mali in its case against Burkina Faso at the ICJ, which was then confirmed by 
the Court in its decision.54
Following in particular the ICJ decision in Burkina Faso v. Mali, the interplay 
between effectiveness and uti possidetis has become one of the distinctive legal features 
of territorial disputes. As seen the uti possidetis principle represents a limitation on the 
effective display of state authority as a way of acquiring and maintaining a territorial 
title. Yet its specific definition within state disputes over territorial titles has somewhat 
shadowed its function of protection of states* territorial sovereignty. In other words, 
does an adverse occupation contrary to the uti possidetis automatically result in an 
unlawful territorial situation? The answer may seem self-evidently affirmative. 
However, the refusal of the ICJ in the recent Cameroon v. Nigeria to consider 
Cameroon’s claim for state responsibility related to the wrongful occupation of the 
Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad area by Nigeria casts some doubts as to exactly 
how the uti possidetis protects a state territorial sovereignty from the adverse display of
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iinma/iinmajudgment/nNMA_judgment_20011023.PDF, paras. 126-136. See 
also The Minquiers and Echreos Case (France/UK), ICJ Reports 1953, 47.
52 Guatemala v. Honduras, supra n. 47,1324.
53 Taba Arbitration (Egypt/Israel), 27 ILM (1988), 1501.
54 Frontier Dispute, supra n. 35, at 586.
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state authority.55 The issue is analysed in detail in the next chapter when dealing with 
question of state responsibility for wrongful occupations.56
4. Normative standards: the right of self-determination
The third limitation to the role of effectiveness in territorial situations is represented 
by the principle of self-determination. Despite having a long-standing pedigree as a 
political principle dating back to the idea of people sovereignty in the 18th Century, it is 
only with the League of Nations and the UN system that the principle of self- 
determination became part of the legal discourse. However, even the UN Charter took a 
rather ambiguous stance towards the status of the principle, envisaging an asymmetric 
relationship between the UN member states and the people subject to their 
administration. This relationship was based on the undertaking of the former to promote 
human rights, well-being and self-government for the latter. Yet the provisions did not 
create any legal entitlement, nor was the principle elaborated as an ultimate right 
belonging to the people to decide the territorial status of the land where they were
C7
based. In any event, even if not envisioning a ‘territorial right’, the Charter had the 
merit of focusing the right of self-determination to the colonial context, as divided in the 
two territorial macro-categories of Non-Self-Goveming Territories (NSGT) and Trust 
Administrations. However, it is only with the development of the de-colonisation 
movement in the 1950s, the accession to independence of many of the Asian and 
African non-self-governing and trust territories, and the new internal balances within the 
institution, that the GA became the ‘engine’ of the right of self-determination. The most 
important breakthrough came in 1960, when the GA passed Resolution 1514 and 
Resolution 1541. Paragraph 1 of 1514 states the incompatibility between the UN 
Charter and any form of alien ‘subjugation, domination and exploitation’; paragraph 2 
declares that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.’ Paragraph 5 draws the consequences of this statement of 
principle through a rather uncompromising language declaring that
55 Land and Maritime Boundary, supra n. 49, para. 319.
56 Infra Ch. 5, section 7.
57 UN Charter, Arts. 55-56,73-76.
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‘[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Goveming Territories (NSGT) or all 
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of 
those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely express 
will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy 
complete independence and freedom.’
Resolution 1514 was adopted by a vote of 89-0-9 and it applies to both NSGT and 
Trust Territories.
Resolution 1541 is fundamental insofar as it spells out the territorial consequences of 
the right of self-determination for NSGTs, where colonial powers tended to retain 
control more tightly. Firstly, it defines a NSGT as ‘a territory which is geographically 
separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it* 
and which is subject to ‘administrative, political, juridical, economic, or historical’ 
factors that ‘arbitrarily place it in a position or status of subordination.*58 Secondly, it 
spells out three ways according to which the right of self-determination can be exercised 
within NSGTs: ‘a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; b) Free association 
with an independent State; c) Integration with an independent State.’59 It is important to 
note, that in the two latter cases the expression of popular will is linked to procedural 
requirements such as ‘informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and 
based on universal adult suffrage’;60 whereas no such requirement is attached to the 
option of independence. This is in accordance with what Roth sees as a legitimisation of 
national liberation movements rather than the one head- one vote model of the UN at 
that time.61 Further, Resolution 1541 directly addresses the question of sovereignty, 
since NSGTs, unlike Trust Territories, were not only under the actual jurisdiction of the 
administering power but they were, according to the view of the colonial powers, also 
under their sovereignty.62 Thus, the principle of self-determination had to operate at two 
different levels: that of transfer of a legal title claimed by those in effective control and
58 GA Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, Principles I, IV, V.
59 Ibidem, Annex, Principles H, VI.
60 Ibidem, Annex, Principle IX.
61 Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999), 234.
62 This view was for example defended by the British representative at the GA in 1973 in a debate on the 
question of Guinea-Bissau, NSGT under Portuguese administration. According to the British view 
Portugal ‘was sovereign in international law’ over Guinea-Bissau, thus could not ‘be guilty of illegal 
occupation or acts of aggression.’ Ibidem, 211, note 26. For the status of Trust/Mandate Territories see 
Judge McNair’s separate opinion in International Status o f South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1950, 150 defining the question of sovereignty with respect to these territories as ‘in abeyance; if 
and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as an independent state,...sovereignty will 
revive and vest in the new state.’ This view has been generally accepted. See Roth, supra n. 61, 211, note 
26.
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that of transfer of effective control over these territories. The resolution was passed by a 
vote of 69-2-21.
It is interesting to note that the formulation of the principle of self-determination in 
the following decades by the UN political organs, and in particular by the GA, proposed 
the two-fold dimension that the principle has assumed in the previous decade. On the 
one hand, the right to create an independent state and to become an integral part of the 
UN system; on the other, the right to freely choose the internal form of governance. In 
other words, the right assumed since its inception both an internal and an external 
aspect, one having a governmental dimension and the other one having a territorial 
dimension. In both senses, the principle of self-determination put a substantive 
limitation on the operation of the principle of effectiveness intended in its traditional 
sense as territorial control.63 As to its relevance to the lawfulness of territorial situations 
the external dimension is the one that should be principally explored, even if in some 
cases the governmental dimension has affected the reaction of the international 
community to questions of territorial status.64
The mostly contested occasions which were presented to the UN organs to develop 
the principle of self-determination both in its internal and external dimension are the 
cases of Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. Namibia, previously denominated South West 
Africa, was a former German colony placed under a Mandate after First World War. 
The Union of South Africa was to exercise full administrative and legislative powers 
over the Territory for the purpose of promoting the well-being and development of the 
inhabitants. However, ultimate authority was to be vested with the League of Nations 
according to Article 119 of the Versailles Treaty and Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. The mandate survived the succession between the League and the 
UN in 1945, and South Africa never made the decision to put Namibia under the 
Trusteeship system.65 South Africa further claimed the extinction of the Mandate jointly 
with the extinction of the League of Nations and the right to rule over Namibia as legal
63 If we take a political concept of effectiveness intended as capacity to gather a popular consensus around 
a fighting faction able to channel internally and externally a claim of self-determination, we will find an 
enhanced, rather than frustrated, principle of effectiveness. This is witnessed by the legal recognition of 
the category of national liberation movements, like the PLO for Palestine, POLISARIO for Western 
Sahara, and the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and the representation of the people by armed factions very 
often without an electoral mandate. The line of argument here follows the dialectic between territorial 
effectiveness and substantive international law, however the dimension of political effectiveness should 
not be overlooked as an element trespassing this bi-dimensional discourse.
64 See supra Ch. 1, section 1.
65 International Status o f South-West Africa, supra n. 62,128.
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sovereign with a view to blatantly perpetuating the domination of the ‘white race’.66 
This started a long dispute between South Africa and the UN political organs, which 
reached its peak in the 1960s and the 1970s and would not be solved until Namibia’s 
accession to independence in 1990.
In 1966, the GA determined through Resolution 2145 (XXI) that South Africa had 
disavowed the Mandate by creating a regime of apartheid, which blatantly contradicted 
the thrust of the mandate. That provided the possibility in the same resolution to 
terminate the Mandate and to withdraw the right of South Africa to rule over Namibia.67 
Through Resolution 2248 the GA appointed a governing body, the UN Council for 
Namibia, with the task of administering the Namibian situation until the accession to 
independence. A whole series of sanctions and condemnations towards the continuing 
South African occupation followed in the years to come. The SC also adopted 
Resolution 276 that declared ‘the continued presence of the South African authorities 
[...] illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South Africa on 
behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and 
invalid.’69 This sparked also its request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, which was 
rendered by the Court on 21 June 1971. In order to address the request’s main question, 
that is the legal consequences for member states of Resolution 276, the Court also had 
to deal with the legal basis of Resolution 2145, which had declared the South African 
presence over Namibia illegal. The Court considered that the refusal of South Africa to 
submit itself to the political control of the UN and its disrespect for the right of self- 
determination of the Namibian people amounted to a material breach of the mandatory 
agreement.70 This would enable the GA, the supervisory organ, to terminate unilaterally 
the right of South Africa to govern the Namibian territory.71
In general, whether or not the specific justification given by the Court for revoking 
the mandate is accepted, one can safely assume the general authority exercised by the 
GA over Trust Territories according to Article 85 and Article 87 of the UN Charter and 
the customary expansion of its powers under Chapter XI in the 1960s, as recognised by
66 See Roth, supra n. 61,211, note 26. Ibidem, 243.
67 The power of the GA to terminate a mandate or a trusteeship had already been recognised by the ICJ in 
the Northern Cameroons Case (Cameroon/UK), ICJ Reports 1963,32.
68 GA Res. 2248 (XXI).
69 SC Res. 276 (1971), para. 2.
70 Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South-Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971,1, at 29-30.
71 Ibidem, 45-50.
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the ICJ in the case of Northern Cameroons of 1961.72 Despite the lack of legal 
entitlement to govern over Namibia, the occupation of South Africa continued until 
1990 when the first general free election was organised under UN auspices. Following 
the election, Namibia eventually gained its independence and statehood.
Another important case, which brings to the forefront the new legal entitlement 
related to the principle of self-determination, is the case of Southern Rhodesia. This is a 
clear instance where depriving the genuine right of self-governance in the internal 
affairs affected the legality of a certain territorial situation. Southern Rhodesia, formerly 
part of the federated state of Rhodesia, and nominally under British rule, had been 
effectively governed by an elite of white landowners since the beginning of the century. 
Due to increasing external pressure seeking to enhance the participation of the black 
majority in the political process, the ruling elite in 1961 decided to promulgate a new 
Constitution. According to the 1961 Constitution, a new electoral system was 
introduced which allowed a limited degree of political participation by the black 
majority. The system would ensure an overwhelming majority in the parliament to the 
white minority, and prevent the black ‘majority* from enforcing any constitutional 
check on discriminatory legislation.73 The GA responded by issuing a declaration that 
formally designated Southern Rhodesia as a NSGT and demanding that Britain, as 
administering power, promote a greater measure of self-government to the black 
majority.74 Three years later the GA requested the British government to suspend the 
1961 constitution, to declare null and void the elections and to call for a constitutional 
assembly for the purpose of granting the right of equal vote and representation to all 
members of the community.75 The British government for its part pointed to the 
effective independence of the Southern Rhodesian institutions and the impossibility of 
intervening notwithstanding simultaneously claiming formal sovereignty over the 
territory. Following further external pressures for including the black majority in a 
democratic political system, in 1965 the Southern Rhodesian government declared the 
independence of Southem-Rhodesia, notwithstanding the repeated invitations by the 
GA to refrain from such a action. As noted by Crawford in 1979, ‘there can be no doubt 
that, if the traditional tests for independence of a seceding colony were applied,
72 Northern Cameroon Case, supra n. 67.
73 Roth, supra n. 61,237.
74 GA Res. 1747 (XVI).
75 GA Res. 2012 (XX).
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*7( \Rhodesia would be an independent State.’ However, the emergence of the right of 
self-determination, not only as a way to pursue territorial independence, but also as an 
international norm ensuring an effective participation in the political system, made sure 
that the traditional tests were set aside.
It is interesting to note that the response of the UN political organs was immediate, 
but was hardly directed against the state of Southern Rhodesia as such. The day 
following the declaration of independence the SC condemned the declaration, defined 
the regime illegal and invited all states to deny recognition.77 The following year the 
Council toughened its stance by adopting Resolution 232 under Chapter VII, which for 
the first time determined an internal situation ‘a threat to international peace and 
security’ and demanded that member states implement an economic embargo against 
the regime of Ian Smith. In 1970 the SC went further calling upon member states to take 
appropriate steps ‘to ensure that any act performed by officials and institutions of the 
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia shall not be accorded any recognition, official or 
otherwise, including judicial notice, by the competent organs of their State.’78 
Moreover, it demanded member states to sever all diplomatic, consular, military and 
trade relations with the illegal regime. As to the normative meaning of the SC’s actions, 
Roth concludes:
‘[w]hereas the ordinary issue in self-determination is the legitimacy of a state’s claim to 
encompass a territory -  i.e, a question of whether the metropolitan state and the territory comprise 
one political community or two -  the fundamental issue in the Rhodesian case was the legitimacy 
of a ruling apparatus. It was “the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia”, not the political 
community encompassing the inhabitants of the territory, that was problematic. That same political 
community was deemed deserving of statehood, but on the basis of the political arrangements then 
existing within it. Had “Zimbabwe” made a unilateral declaration of independence and established 
that it was effectively self-governing, it could lawfully have taken its place among the sovereign 
states; “Rhodesia” could no t’79
Roth identifies a possible division between a situation of governmental illegitimacy 
and one of territorial ‘illegitimacy*, defining Southern Rhodesia as a former situation. It 
is true that the actions of the GA and of the SC targeted the illegality of the regime, 
hence it is correct to characterise the case of Southern Rhodesia as paradigmatic in 
terms of government illegitimacy. However, if the legal definition of territorial 
sovereignty is both the right and the competence to exercise jurisdiction over a certain
76 Crawford, supra n. 25,103.
77 SC Res. 216 (1965).
78 SC Res. 277 (1970).
79 Roth, supra n. 61,239-240.
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land, the way the competence is exercised may sometimes impinge on the right itself to 
exercise of jurisdiction.80 In other words, the way the right of self-determination acted 
on the legal internal organisation of the political community prevented that political 
community - meant as people and their institutions - from gaining sovereignty. Thus, in 
Resolution 216, it was the statehood of Southern Rhodesia to be condemned in the first 
instance as the expression of an oppressive minority. The right of self-determination, 
through its internal rather than external dimension, affected the legality of the 
Rhodesian territorial situation. It continued to do so until 1979, when, after a series of 
attempts by the white minority to accommodate the requests of the international 
community to allow a limited degree of participation by black people in ‘their’ 
institutions, the leader of the national liberation movement Robert Mugabe found 
overwhelming support to rule the country under a UN supervised election.
The final important case worth noting for the impact it had on the development of 
the principle of self-determination is the case of the Portuguese colonies in Asia and 
Africa, comprising Goa, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. These 
were regarded as internal provinces under the Portuguese constitution and the continued 
assertion of Portuguese sovereignty over those provinces received implied support for
Q  1
the ICJ in the Right o f Passage case. The GA had been prompt in declaring them 
NSGT in 1960 and requiring Portugal to submit itself to the ‘information transmission’ 
provision of Article 73(e) of the Charter.82 Because of the refusal of Portugal to comply 
with this request the SC passed in 1963 Resolution 180
‘urgently call(ing) upon Portugal to implement the following:
The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to 
self-determination and independence [...];
The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other 
forces at present employed for that purpose;
Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized 
representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer 
of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance 
with resolution 1514 (XV);
The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration 
in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples.’
Moreover, the SC adopted a series of sanctions against Portugal, requesting member 
states to refrain from trading in military equipment with Portugal where used ‘to
80 Compare with the definition of territory given in Ch. 2.
81 Right o f Passage Case (Portugal/India), ICJ Reports 1960,39.
82 GA Res. 1542 (XV).
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continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories.* In 1972 there was a fully- 
fledged arms embargo against Portugal.83 The debate at the GA over the specific 
continuation of the Portuguese administration over Guinea-Bissau once again showed 
the profound division between a strong majority of those states adhering to the Non- 
Aligned Movement and the Soviet Block, and the remaining colonial powers 
concerning the question of sovereignty over NSGTs. In 1973 the British representative 
to the GA asserted that Portugal was ‘sovereign in international law’ over its African 
territories, and therefore could not ‘be guilty of illegal occupation or acts of aggression*. 
In GA Resolution 3061 the British view was voted down 93-7-30. The question was 
eventually resolved with the return to democracy in Portugal the following year and the 
renunciation to all overseas possessions, even if such renunciation opened a new chapter 
of civil wars and foreign interventions which lasted until recently for some of these 
colonies.
The question of sovereignty over NSGTs and the possibility of the principle of self- 
determination to determine the illegality of a certain territorial situation is not free from 
difficulty in the way the ICJ considered the matter. In a sense the Charter was also 
ambiguous on this matter: Article 73 concerned ‘responsibility for the administration of 
territories’ that would arise directly from having effective control over those 
communities, but not necessarily possessing the full sovereign title. As already noted, 
even in 1961 the Court in the Right of Passage case took as implicit the existence of 
Portuguese sovereignty over its Indian possessions.84 In Western Sahara the Court 
deliberately avoided rendering any opinion on the type of legal title vested upon Spain 
during the colonisation of Western Sahara.85 Only Judge De Castro in his Separate 
Opinion states a view on the matter by arguing for the impossibility of a legal dispute 
between Spain and Morocco over Western Sahara:
‘Even if Spain had accepted Morocco’s proposal to bring before the Court by way of contentious 
proceedings the two questions raised in the letter of 23 September 1974, the case would not have 
been viable. Spain did not have at that time, and does not have today, capacity to be party to a 
dispute with Morocco, or with any other State, as to the present or past titles to sovereignty 
concerning a territory which has the status of a non-self-goveming territory, and of which it is 
administering Power.’86
83 SC Res. 312 (1972).
84 Right o f Passage Case, supra n. 81.
85 ‘The Court finds that the request for an opinion does not call for adjudication upon existing territorial 
rights or sovereignty over territory.’ Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12, at 28.
86 Ibidem, Sep. Op. De Castro, 145.
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Interesting in the Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal case was the elaboration by the arbitral 
tribunal with regard to the competence of the administering powers to conclude treaties
anaffecting the exploitation of natural resources within those territories. In particular, 
Guinea Bissau argued for the invalidity of a 1960 agreement between France and 
Portugal on the delimitation of maritime sectors because it was in violation of a norm of 
ius cogens, thus for the impossibility of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal to succeed to that 
agreement. The decision of 31 July 1989 concluded that such treaties were within the 
competence of the colonial power until the local national liberation movement acquired
o o
international relevance (portee international). Surprisingly, the Tribunal tested such 
international relevance by looking at the employment of exceptional measures by the 
administering power in order to restore order and control.89 In other words, the Tribunal 
referred to a test of internal effectiveness to establish the external effectiveness of the 
national liberation movement. It is unclear whether the reasoning of the Court hints to a 
change of territorial status as determined by the effectiveness of the national liberation 
movement. However, it reduces the limiting function of self-determination on 
effectiveness, by reinforcing the value of effectiveness in the way the right of self- 
determination impacts on other norms of international law, such as those related to 
natural resources and succession of treaties.
Finally, in the East Timor case, the Court, although developing in principle the 
normative significance of the principle of self-determination by declaring it as having an 
erga omnes character,90 adopted a very cautious approach which represents a serious 
setback for its enforcement. The Court was called by Portugal, the former administering 
power, to adjudge the legality of a treaty concluded by Australia and Indonesia in 1989, 
the occupying power at that time. The ICJ refused jurisdiction on the matter because of 
the legal position of a third state, Indonesia, which was not party to the dispute, and 
whose legal situation would be inevitably affected by a decision of the Court. It is 
interesting to observe that the Court, apart from avoiding any engagement with the 
question of the legality of the Indonesian presence in East Timor ergo with the validity 
of the 1989 East Timor Gap Treaty, refrained from pronouncing upon the status of East 
Timor as a NSGT. It limited itself to concluding with the sibylline sentence that it ‘has
87 Guinea Bissau v. Senegal, supra n. 35.
88 Ibidem, 138.
89 Ibidem, 139.
90 East Timor Case (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995,90, at 102.
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taken note in the present Judgement (paragraph 31) that, for the two Parties, the 
Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-goveming-territory and its people has the 
right to self-determination.’91
In conclusion, the principle of self-determination has represented an important 
limitation upon the primacy of effectiveness in territorial situations. This has been 
clearly enunciated by the GA in its Resolution 2625 (XXV):
‘The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has, under the Charter, a status 
separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct 
status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non-self-governing territory 
have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and in particular its 
purposes and principles.’92
No doubt it is exactly to the change of territorial status that the self-determination 
addresses its impact, making sure that any claim of sovereignty by the metropolitan 
state is considered unlawful, where not backed by the genuine consent of the people 
under its administration. Furthermore, the right of self-determination impacts upon the 
legality of any claim and/or implementation of effective statehood which does not take 
into account a genuine expression of popular will, but is openly discriminatory towards 
the majority of the population. Its essential role in the context of de-colonisation can 
hardly be overestimated as it represented the rhetorical, political and legal point of 
reference for the political emancipation of millions of people.
However, its enforcement as a legal entitlement has not been free from difficulty, on 
account of the disadvantaged procedural position in international law of the peoples as 
right-holders. The East Timor case - with the I d ’s solemn declaration of its erga omnes 
character, together with the impossibility of the East Timorese to have their right 
recognised through a legal process - witnesses a profound contradiction, characterising a 
legal system expanding uti universi ratione personae, but at the same time maintaining 
a privileged role of states in the process of determination and enforcement of the law. 
The lack of judicial enforcement by the right-holders has also led to a degree of 
ambiguity on the relation between the right to self-determination, and the protection of 
the peoples’ territorial sovereignty. In other words, international law has not been able 
to provide a precise answer as to when the occupying or administering power becomes 
wrongful occupant, thereby leading to confusion as to how it can act with regard to the
91 Ibidem, 106.
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occupied territory. Whereas Namibia and Southern Rhodesia have represented two 
straightforward cases of denial of self-determination leading to an unlawful territorial 
situation, in other cases, such as that shown in the arbitration Guinea Bissau v. Senegal, 
the line between self-determination and unlawful territorial situation has been much 
more blurred. This answer is of the outmost importance for a precise definition of 
unlawful territorial situation, and it is better considered within the context of state 
responsibility for wrongful occupations.93
5. Normative standards: the principle of territorial integrity
A problematic aspect of the right of self-determination is its current significance in a 
period where many of the NSGTs have reached independence (16 still remaining as of 
today) and the last Trust Territory reached independence in 1992. This question has 
been revived by the dramatic events of the 1990s in Eastern Europe, where several 
secessionist movements have tried, some successfully, to detach parts of territories from 
large multi-ethnic states and create new states along the lines of ethnical identity. 
Secessionist movements have gained momentum not only in unstable regions, but also 
in politically stable areas such as Canada, Italy and Spain. Political movements in these 
countries have called for the secession of territorial units within a state with a view to 
implementing their ‘inalienable right to self-determination’.
The creation of states has traditionally been considered a question of fact either 
automatically accepted by international law or recognised as such by a general norm.94 
Either way, the principle of effectiveness played an unchallenged role in determining 
the acceptance of new states as international legal persons.95 However, the fact that 
international law accepted the consequences of factual situations, does not equate to 
vesting a right in those groups seeking to create a new state. This was made clear by the 
Commission of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations in the Aaland Islands case.96
92 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
93 Infra Ch. 5, section 7.2.
94 See however the seminal study of Crawford highlighting the limitations to the role of effectiveness in 
the creation of states. Crawford, supra n. 25.
95 Supra Ch. 2.
96 League o f Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement 3 (1920), 5.
130
Crawford demonstrates how nothing in the practice of states indicates the 
development of this right after 80 years since that decision.97 It is true that one can find 
at least twenty cases of creation of new states in the post-1945 practice outside the 
colonial context, however in some cases the situation was one of dissolution rather than 
secession, in other cases the agreement of the relevant authorities intervened. In the 
cases of dissolution, the process is by definition factual, and effectiveness determines 
the disappearance of the old state and the creation of new ones on the same territory.98 
Reciprocal consent may also be essential in determining a new set of legal relations.99 In 
only one case, that of Bangladesh, the forcible separation of East Pakistan was 
recognised by the international community, however no explicit mention was made in 
the recognition of any positive right of self-determination giving entitlement to 
secession. Rather, effectiveness and the final acceptance by the Pakistani government 
were decisive in leading the GA and the SC to recognise Bangladesh.100 Even more 
eloquent is the practice of attempted unilateral secession. When the central government 
refuses to grant independence to the seceding entity, the latter has not obtained 
recognition by the international community, even when achieving a large degree of 
effectiveness. This observation begs the question of what is a state in international law, 
what role effectiveness plays and what role recognition plays. However, it clearly 
indicates that unilateral attempts to secede cannot be framed in terms of an international 
legal right. By contrast, the opposite principle, the one of territorial integrity, finds 
overwhelming support in international practice. For example the Friendly Relations 
Declaration in elaborating the normative content of the right of self-determination states 
that:
‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.’101
97 Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’ 69 BYIL (1998), 85.
98 See Opinion n. 1 Badinter Commission, supra n. 22.
99 E.g. Minsk Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, 8 December 1991, 31 
ILM (1992), 143.
100 Crawford, supra n. 97,95-96.
101 1970 GA Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n. 92.
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The same principle, notwithstanding a slightly different formulation, is affirmed by 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration issued at the conclusion of the UN World Conference on 
Human Rights.102 The principle of territorial integrity has been re-affirmed, at least 
nominally, even in cases where international intervention was considered necessary due 
to the repression of national minorities, as was the case of Iraq with Kurdistan and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with Kosovo. The international reaction to these 
internal crises sought a degree of substantial autonomy and internal self-determination 
rather than the creation of new states.103 Furthermore, even a high degree of 
effectiveness in the cases of Biafra, Somaliland, Srpska Republic and Chechnya has not 
led to the recognition of those states by the international community, and central 
authorities have been able to re-gain, at least in part, control over those areas by forcible 
actions.
In this respect the decision of 20 August 1998 of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
case referred to it by the Governor in Council relating to the secession of Quebec from 
Canada should be recalled.104 Of the three questions referred by the Governor in 
Council the relevant one for the present discussion is the second:
‘Does international law give the National Assembly, Legislature or Government of Quebec the 
right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to 
self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, Legislature or 
Government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?’105
The Supreme Court’s analysis is interesting since it argues along two main possible 
justifications for a right of secession: A) the argument of self-determination; B) the 
argument of ‘effectivity’. As to the first argument, the Court indicates three specific 
situations, where the right of self-determination may affect the title to territory over a 
certain region: 1) in cases of colonial occupation; 2) in cases of foreign occupation; 3) 
in cases of systematic denial of civil and political rights by the central government. As 
to 1) and 2) the analysis of the Court is correct and is based on the legal justifications 
presented in the precedent section. As to 3) the Court submits one important caveat 
stating that ‘it remains unclear whether this third proposition actually reflects an
102 UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 
1993,32ILM (1996), 1661, at 1665.
103 See SC Res. 686 (1991); SC Res. 687 (1991); SC Res. 1244 (1999).
104 Re Reference by the Governor in Council concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of 




established international law standard.*106 In fact, the assertion of such a right is 
problematic because of the lack of pertinent international practice. It appears that 
despite the increasing importance of human rights, the focus on territorial integrity is 
not less important at present. The often portrayed conflict between human rights and 
sovereignty is at best artificial, and, even where grave violations of the human rights of 
minorities are alleged, the response of the international community has been to impose a 
series of sanctions on the central governments and promote the right to substantial 
autonomy rather than disrupt territorial unity.107
Very interesting is then the treatment by the Court of the principle of effectiveness. 
The argument advanced by Quebec was that, even in the absence of a positive right to 
secede, the effective creation of an independent state would validate a claim to 
secession. The Court firstly draws a powerful distinction between power and right to act 
in relation to a purported declaration of independence by the Quebec National 
Assembly:
‘A distinction must be drawn between the right of a people to act, and their power to do so. They 
are not identical. A right is recognized in law: mere physical ability is not necessarily given status 
as a right. The fact that an individual or group can act in a certain way says nothing at all about the 
legal status or consequences of that act. A power may be exercised even in the absence of a right 
to do so, but if it is, then it is exercised without legal foundation.’108
It then provides a crystal-clear analysis of the role played by the principle of 
effectiveness in respect of secessionary claims:
‘Arguments were also advanced to the effect that, regardless of the existence or non-existence of a 
positive right to unilateral secession, international law will in the end recognize effective political 
realities -  including the emergence of a new state -  as facts. [...] [I]t should first be noted that the 
existence of a positive legal entitlement is quite different from a prediction that the law will 
respond after the fact to a then existing political reality. These two concepts examine different 
points in time. The questions posed to the Court address legal rights in advance of a unilateral act 
of purported secession. While we touch below on the practice governing the international 
recognition of emerging states, the Court is as wary of entertaining speculation about the possible 
future conduct of sovereign states [...].’ 109
The Court continues at a later point of its decision:
106 Ibidem, 587.
107 See Ringelheim, ‘Considerations on the international reaction to the 1999 Kosovo crisis’ 32 (1999) 
Revue Beige de Droit International, 475; and Bennoune, ‘Sovereignty v. Suffering’? Re-Examining 
Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq’ 13 EJIL (2002), 243.
108 Secession o f Quebec, supra n. 104,577.
109 Ibidem.
133
‘[The principle of effectiveness] proclaims that an illegal act may eventually acquire legal status if, 
as a matter of empirical fact, it is recognised on the international plane. Our law has long 
recognised that through a combination of acquiescence and prescription, an illegal act may at some 
later point be accorded some form of legal status. In the law of property, for example, it is well 
known that a squatter on land may ultimately become the owner if the true owner sleeps on his or 
her right to repossess the law. In this way a change in the factual circumstances may subsequently 
be reflected in a change in legal status. It is, however, quite another matter to suggest that a 
subsequent condonation of an initially illegal act retroactively creates a legal right to engage in the 
act in the first place. The broader contention is not supported by the international principle of 
effectivity or otherwise and must be rejected.’ 110
These Court’s passages are important because they discuss two often misunderstood 
points of international law with respect to the creation of new states. The first is the 
assumed neutrality of international law concerning the secession of new states. 
International law, as it is said, would neither prohibit nor allow the secession of regions, 
but it only takes into account an effective situation which would be consequently 
validated. The Court rejects this notion. There would not exist any positive right of an 
internal entity to secede and the principle of territorial integrity speaks against this right. 
If as a matter of power to do so (and not of right) an entity manages to secede, establish 
an effective situation and find international support, recognition and acquiescence may 
validate the effective situation. However, recognition of the legal effects of a de facto 
situation and its subsequent validation are not tantamount to legalisation of the original 
act, creating a right a posteriori. This idea is further elaborated in the following chapter, 
however suffice it to say that effectiveness does not create any right of self- 
determination and secession ex post facto, exactly as the squatter cannot claim the 
lawfulness of his initial conduct in occupying land.
In conclusion, it is here argued that a right to secession outside the colonial context 
does not exist under current international law. The principle of territorial integrity 
enjoys priority and, in fact, it represents the fourth limitation upon effectiveness in 
territorial situations. This may be the consequence of the dominant role played by states 
in the law-making process which have a vested interest in protecting their own integrity. 
However, recognition and acquiescence can make effective situations legally valid. The 
extent of recognition will most likely depend on the international legitimacy of the 
underlying claim - for example where at the origin of a secessionary movement there is 
a widespread violation of the rights of a minority- and/or the conferral of legitimacy to 
the new state by an authoritative body such as the GA or the SC.111
no Ibidem, 591.
111 Infra Ch. 5, section 8.
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6. Conclusions: problems with the definition of unlawfulness of 
territorial situations
According to the legal norms analysed above, territorial situations can be defined as 
lawful or unlawful. Effectiveness does not amount to lawfulness where contrary to the 
prohibition of territorial change by force, the principle of uti possidetis, the principle of 
self-determination of people under colonial or foreign occupation and the principle of 
territorial integrity. These principles arguably present a well discernible legal core. 
Their strength lies in their ability to accommodate both a need for stability and a need 
for justice and change. Their impact on the law of territory represents one of the main 
features of international law as it is presently conceived. The lawful/unlawful divide 
ought to be neat and objective. In principle, tertium non datur.
Whereas these criteria of legality are fundamental to defining the unlawfulness of 
territorial situations, they ‘suffer’ in two important respects. The first is the precise 
normative content of these criteria vis-a-vis the sovereignty of states or peoples they 
intend to protect. Whereas territorial situations established and maintained in defiance 
of the above criteria cannot be considered lawful, in the sense that international law 
vests a competence to administer the territory in question with the occupier, 
international law does not necessarily translate an adverse occupation into an unlawful 
territorial situation, in the sense that it considers such occupation wrongful. In other 
words, the same principles of legality play two different and not necessarily overlapping 
functions: one vesting title in a state or people, and the other protecting the territorial 
sovereignty resulting from such a title. This fundamental issue is explained in the 
following chapter when dealing with the question of state responsibility for wrongful 
territorial occupations in defiance of the principle of uti possidetis and the principle of 
self-determination.
Secondly, the other problem related to the definition of a certain territorial situation 
as unlawful is that such objective status has to be defined by an authoritative body, 
either judicial or political, or by an international legal instrument. The lack of a 
comprehensive system of compulsory jurisdiction often renders such definition 
problematic. The case of East Timor is illustrative in this respect. This tiny portion of 
territory in the Indonesian archipelago had been administered by Portugal until 1975 as 
a NSGT which, according to international law, was entitled to self-determination. In
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1975, after the last Portuguese troops left East Timor, Indonesia invaded and declared 
its annexation. Indonesia asserted that the annexation of East Timor as its 27th province 
had been carried out in accordance with the wishes of the population as expressed by 
the vote of the ‘Regional Popular Assembly’. This assembly had not been elected but 
had been established by pro-Indonesian parties.112 The East Timorese people, 
represented by FRETILIN, their national liberation movement, claimed together with 
their former administering power their status as a NSGT and their entitlement to 
exercise freely their right to self-determination. However, there could not be any 
judicial decision directly concerned with question of legality/illegality, since national 
liberation movements do not enjoy locus standi before international tribunals and 
tribunals did not have the chance to pronounce. This was made clear in the East Timor 
case, where the issue of the lawfulness of the territorial status of East Timor was 
brought to a judicial body by the former colonial power. The structure of the 
international legal system was such that Portugal, comparable to a trustee for the East 
Timorese people, claimed on their behalf rights related to their sovereignty over natural 
resources. The Court refused to adjudicate upon the dispute because of the lack of 
participation in the proceedings of the occupying power, Indonesia. The ‘objective’ 
formal status of East Timor as a NSGT and, as a consequence, the right of self- 
determination of the East Timorese people was recalled briefly as ‘contractualised’ by 
the two parties to the dispute, Portugal and Australia.113 However, the Court did not go 
so far as to assume an objective unlawful status as evidenced by SC resolutions. Indeed, 
the SC through Resolution 384 (1975) and Resolution 389 (1976) had only requested 
respect for the territorial integrity of East Timor and the speedy withdrawal of 
Indonesian military forces, but never passed judgement on the unlawfulness of the 
Indonesian annexation nor on the obligation of member states to refrain from 
recognising such annexation. In contrast, one can consider SC Resolution 276 (1970) 
with regard to Namibia a binding determination of unlawfulness as evidenced by the 
ICJ approach in Namibia.114
This comparison discloses not only the inconsistencies in the way normative criteria 
are applied by UN political bodies, but also the fundamental role these institutions play 
in either upholding and enforcing those principles, or sacrificing them in the interest of
112 Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal (1995), 224.
113 East Timor Case, supra n. 90,105-106.
114 Namibia, supra n. 70,53.
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‘diplomacy’. Even when the status is defined by a judicial body, perhaps as a result of a 
request of an advisory opinion to the ICJ by a UN organ or the application of a 
‘protecting* state in contentious proceedings, the judicial body may not be in a position 
to fully assess the claim of one of the parties to the political dispute, since such claim 
may not be exactly matching the interest that the ‘protecting’ power is attempting to 
protect.115 Finally, even an objective assessment of unlawfulness ought not remain a 
mere statement of principle if international law is to have any role in regulating inter­
state relations. The following chapter therefore intends to explore what are the 
consequences at a normative level, both in terms of elaborating of a general theory of 
invalidity of unlawful territorial situations, and in terms of their impact upon other areas 
of international law.





The present chapter considers the normative impact of a definition of unlawfulness 
of a certain territorial situation. Firstly, it looks at the meaning of ‘unlawful’ in terms of 
general theory of invalidity. It tries to spell out the difficulties involving a satisfactory 
and comprehensive theory of ‘invalidity’ of territorial situations, with particular 
reference to the legal consequences of such invalidity. As relevant cases highlighting 
the limits inherent in the concept of invalidity of territorial situations, the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ with respect to Namibia and of the ECHR with respect to the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus will be considered. Secondly, the analysis reviews the 
way a determination of unlawfulness can influence the application of other relevant 
norms regulating the underlying political disputes, in particular the norms concerning 
the use of force, the law of belligerent occupation, the creation of states. Thirdly, the 
chapter examines another important legal consequence of a situation of territorial 
unlawfulness, the question of international responsibility, which helps me define the 
exact borders of the primary norms protecting states* and peoples’ territorial 
sovereignty considered in the previous chapters. Finally, it considers the concept of 
legitimacy and its relevance to the legal description of unlawful territorial situations, in 
particular its relevance for the ‘legalisation’ of effectiveness.
2. Consequences of unlawfulness: the ‘invalidity’ of unlawful 
territorial situations
Even overcoming the difficulties in ascertaining the unlawfulness of a territorial 
status thanks to uncontroversial political and judicial decisions, there remains the 
problem of conceptualising the consequences of such unlawfulness from a legal 
perspective. The first legal consequence is that of invalidity. If a certain juridical act is 
vitiated, that is, one of its elements does not satisfy a certain set of criteria spelled out
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by the legal system, normally this will attach a series of legal consequences intrinsically 
linked to that act, which can be summed up under the concept of invalidity. This area 
has been relatively under-investigated by the international doctrine, probably due to the 
fact, as correctly argued by Sir Robert Jennings some decades ago, that a coherent 
system of invalidity is seen to require a centralised system of judicial enforcement that 
can ascertain the unlawfulness of a certain act, and decide on the consequences of that 
invalidity.1 Further, the issue has found conventional regulation only in the area of 
treaty law, namely through the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
has also allowed the elaboration of a differentiation between relative and absolute 
nullity. Yet, treaties are not the only juridical acts which can be vitiated. Very often in 
the unlawful territorial situations the kind of act whose validity is at stake is an 
unilateral act, such as an act of annexation or act of secession. The rules of invalidity of 
these acts must be sought in customary international law.
Guggenheim, in one of the few studies on the concept of nullity in international law, 
explains the traditional differentiation between wrongful act and invalid act.3 In the 
latter case the act lacks some fundamental elements provided by the legal system, thus 
the same legal system attaches to it some consequences as to the production of its legal 
effects. Such elements would be a competent party, a proper object, free consent and 
valid form. For instance, in the traditional laws of war a case of null act is the 
ineffective blockade or a declaration of independence of a certain government missing 
the minimum criteria of statehood. The differentiation between invalid and wrongful act 
is proposed by Judge Anzilotti in his dissenting opinion in the Eastern Greenland case. 
The occupation of terra nullius by Norway was considered by the PCU as non-existent 
and invalid, since Greenland was already occupied by Denmark, thus depriving it of its 
purported character of uninhabited land. Anzilotti contested this finding on the basis 
that while Eastern Greenland was indeed uninhabited, it was not free for appropriation 
due to a binding undertaking entered into by Norway vis-a-vis Denmark. In other words,
1 Jennings, ‘Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law’, in Cambridge Essays in International Law: 
Essays in Honour o f Lord McNair {1957), 64.
2 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. The theory of invalidity of treaties has been 
effected through a ‘transfer’ of domestic principles on the invalidity of contracts to international law. 
Thus the validity of a certain conventional rule can be affected because of defects related to the object of 
the treaty (i.e. object contrary to ius cogens) and defects related to the formation and manifestation of a 
certain will (i.e. treaty concluded because of error or fraud). See, however, the difference between 
concepts of relative and absolute nullity in municipal law and international law. Rozakis, ‘The Law on 
Invalidity of Treaties’ \6Archiv des Volkerrechts (1973), 150.
139
the act should have been considered wrongful rather than invalid.4 The wrongful act 
(acte illicite) would in fact normally produce its own effects, which can be voided (i.e. a 
resolution of the SC contrary to the UN Charter). For example, domestic legislation 
which is in breach of national law is an invalid act, but the same norm, when in breach 
of international law, is wrongful but valid: it produces its own legal effects but it gives 
rise to the state responsibility and a corresponding duty of reparation. In fact, the 
production of legal effects is the result of reception of a given act by a certain system. If 
such an act is considered as producing legal effects per se, we can define it as a juridical 
act. This will mean that the legal system attaches to it some legal consequences. 
Invalidity of that act will be a consequence of that act being vitiated under that system, 
so that the system prevents it from producing legal effects. If not this will be considered 
a legally relevant fact whose legal consequences limit themselves to state responsibility. 
For example, if we had a legislation in breach of a customary rule protecting 
fundamental human rights, its execution will breach international law and give rise to 
state responsibility, yet its validity will not be put into question as its legal effects are 
produced by the domestic system where it has been enacted. Of course, this explanation 
assumes that the domestic system and the international system are two separated and 
autonomous legal systems, albeit with capacity to ‘exchange information*. By contrast, 
if we adopt a monist view on the relationship between the two systems we may think 
that the issue of validity is regulated also under international law, and therefore the 
result will be an absolute nullity of the act concerned.
It is here submitted, and it will be at a later stage confirmed, that the dualist scheme 
still best explains the concept of unlawful territorial situation. Suffice at this stage to say 
that like an internal legislation contravening international human rights law, an act of 
secession purported through a declaration of independence of a part of territory is for 
the international legal system a legally relevant act, and a fact at same time which
3 Guggenheim, ‘La validity e la nullitd des actes juridiques intemationaux’ 74 Recueil des Cours (1949), 
195.
4 *[...] the Court could not have declared the occupation invalid, if the term “invalid” signifies “null and 
void”. A legal act is only non-existent if it lacks certain elements which are essential to its existence. Such 
would be the occupation of territory belonging to another State, because the status of a terra nullius is an 
essential factor to enable the occupation to serve as a means of acquiring territorial sovereignty. But this 
does not hold good in the case of the occupation of a terra nullius by a sovereign State in conformity with 
international law, merely because the occupying State had undertaken not to occupy it. Accordingly, it 
would have been for the Norwegian Government to revoke the occupation unlawfully carried out, without 
prejudice to the Danish Government’s right to apply to the Court, as reparation for the unlawful act, to 
place this obligation on record.’ Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark/Norway), PCD Series A/B, n. 53, at 
95.
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violates international law. However, the fact may produce legal effects internally if the 
new entity is effective. As observed by Marek ‘the illegal act in question combines in 
itself supreme illegality with supreme law-creating force, thus exposing the basic 
problem of international law in all its vulnerability.*5 The same could be said of an act 
of annexation, which will be unlawful on the international plane if contrary to the legal 
criteria seen in the previous chapter, but it will still create legal effects at the domestic 
level.6 Far from being of a purely doctrinal relevance, this point is important in 
understanding some of the common misconceptions related to unlawful territorial 
situations. In particular, it is important since under customary international law there 
exists no duty for a court to withhold recognition of a wrongful act and of its legal 
effects at the domestic level. However, there might be a resolution of the SC demanding 
member states to refrain from any act of recognition of the unlawful occupant as in the 
case of Southern Rhodesia or Namibia.7 In that case, even an act of judicial recognition 
would be contrary to an obligation deriving from a sanctioning measure adopted by the 
SC.
2.1 Consequences of unlawfulness: the chain of invalidity
Given these premises, it becomes clear how the criteria of legality spelled out in the 
first part of this chapter operate at an important, yet somewhat unsophisticated level. 
They only declare a certain territorial situation unlawful, and they prevent the 
acquisition of legal title to the territory. However, effective control assures the exercise 
of all functions normally exercised by a state, and often they can lead to the creation of 
a de facto state of affairs. Far from living in a sort of limbo, de facto entities, both 
institutionally and at the level of individuals, entertain relations with other international 
actors. Inevitably, the ‘unlawful* legal system ‘exchanges* information with the 
international and other national legal systems. How do these systems react? Do they 
consider those data as a legal nullity? Or is there a reciprocal recognition? Is there a 
chain of invalidity that re-conducts the validity of a certain act to a sort of invalid 
Grundnonril The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Namibia and two decisions of the ECHR in 
relation to the TRNC cast some light on the issues anticipated above, and on a possible
5 Marek, Identity and Continuity o f States in Public International Law (1968,2nd ed.), 554.
6 Cfr. SC Res. 478 (1980); and Hanzalis v. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate Court 48 ILR (1969), 93, at 98.
7 SC Res. 216 (1965); SC Res. 276 (1971).
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general operational code on how to deal with unlawful territorial situations from a 
perspective of legal policy.
2.1.1 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Namibia
The historical events which led to the dispute between South Africa and the UN 
political organs over Namibia have already been illustrated.8 SC Resolution 276 (1970) 
had declared the South African occupation illegal and, consequently, that all acts taken 
by the Government of South-Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the 
termination of the Mandate were illegal and invalid. SC Resolution 284 (1970) 
requested the ICJ to render an advisory opinion on ‘the legal consequences for States, of 
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council 
resolution 276 (1970).*
In its reply, the Court affirmed the duty of UN member states to carry out their 
obligations according to Article 25 of the Charter, thus to abide by SC resolutions on 
the regime of sanctions to be imposed upon South Africa. Importantly, it stated the pre­
eminently political nature of sanctions, that
‘[t]he precise determination of the acts permitted or allowed -  what measures are available and 
practicable, which of them should be selected, what scope they should be given and by whom they 
should be applied -  is a matter which lies within the competence of the appropriate political organs 
of the United Nations acting within their authority.’9
However, the Court in responding to the SC’s question, went one step further and 
gave
‘advice on those dealings with the Government of South Africa which, under the Charter of the 
United Nations and general international law, should be considered as inconsistent with the 
declaration of illegality and invalidity made in paragraph 2 of resolution 276 (1970), because they 
may imply a recognition that South Africa’s presence in Namibia is legal.’10
It analysed a series of acts, such as entering into treaty relations, invoking and 
applying already existing treaties, exchanging diplomatic or consular missions, and 
entering into economic relations, which member states should consider incompatible 
with the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia. However, the Court made an 
important exception to the policy of non-recognition, stating that
8 Supra Ch. 4, section 4.
9 Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South-Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 3, at 55.
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‘the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in 
depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-operation. In 
particular, while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa after the termination 
of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for 
instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only 
to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.’11
In the elaboration of this differentiation the Court avoided expressing a general 
principle of invalidity, and its differentiation was only the divide benefit/detriment of 
the individuals. This divide is not endogenous to a legal act per se, but it is part of the 
political decision-making. In other words, envisaging such differentiation is giving 
policy advice on a question of sanctions and non-recognition, rather than providing a 
criterion of validity. This seems to be consistent with the argument presented at the 
outset of the opinion and with the detailed analysis of possible actions presented by
19Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion. The idea is made explicit by Judge Petren in 
his separate opinion:
‘The wording of paragraph 2 [of resolution 276] gives the impression that the non-validity of all 
acts taken by South Africa concerning Namibia is considered to be an automatic effect of the 
illegality of its continued presence in that Territory. The sense of paragraph 5 therefore seems to 
be that States must not recognize such acts as valid. However, having regard to the foregoing, the 
duty incumbent on States not to recognize South Africa’s right to continue to administer Namibia 
does not entail the obligation to deny all legal character to acts or decisions taken by the South- 
African authorities concerning Namibia or its inhabitants. In this regard, the notion of non­
recognition leaves to States, as I have said, a wide measure of discretion.’13
Moreover, according to the French judge, if the criterion on which to base 
recognition is the benefit of the Namibian people, it is unhelpful for the Court to make 
such a neat division between international and domestic acts. Also some international 
agreements, for instance on postal or railway matters, can be upheld on practical or 
humanitarian grounds.14
The reasoning of the Court went further, and it analysed the consequences upon non­
member states of the declaration of invalidity of the SC. In other words, the Court relied 
on norms of general international law, rather than Article 25 of the Charter. It is 
important to recall this passage of the Court’s decision:
10 Ibidem.
11 Ibidem, 56.
12 Ibidem, Sep. Op. Judge Ammoun, 67.
13 Ibidem, Sep. Op. Judge Petren, 135.
14 Ibidem.
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‘In view of the Court, the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of South- 
Africa’ s presence in Namibia are opposable to all States in the sense of barring erga omnes the 
legality of a situation which is maintained in violation of international law: in particular, no State 
which enters into relations with South-Africa concerning Namibia may expect the United Nations 
or its Members to recognize the validity or effects of such relationship, or of the consequences 
thereof.’ 15
The unlawfulness of the Namibian territorial situation is objective and opposable 
erga omnes, and it is not up to the single state to decide whether to give it recognition or 
not. This seems to depart from the previous approach. Whereas previously the Court 
seemed to derive the duty of member states to refrain from entering into relations with 
South Africa on the basis of Article 25 of the Charter to abide by sanctions imposed by 
the SC, but not from a general question of invalidity of those acts, now it makes explicit 
reference to the issue of validity. How can we reconcile the two approaches of the 
Court? It seems that the relationship between UN law and general international law is 
only hinted at in the reasoning of the Court and in some of the separate opinions, but 
never made explicit.
Despite the little practice available in this area, and the complex relationship between 
the law of invalidity and the law of state responsibility, a logical solution can be 
possibly identified. General international law provides that the illegality of a certain 
territorial situation displays its effects in terms of ‘invalidity’, in the sense that the 
occupying power is in violation of another state’s or people’s territorial sovereignty; 
thus, it does not have a legal competence to create rights and obligations concerning that 
territory. Consequently, all international legal acts, such as treaties entered into by the 
occupying power, agreements or unilateral behaviours having international legal 
relevance are deprived of their legal effects. We can talk about invalidity in the classic 
sense that one of the essential elements of the international transaction is missing -  a 
proper object -, hence the treaty is a nullity. In some cases, the occupying power, by 
entering into international commitments with regard to the territory will violate norms 
of ius cogens -  e.g. the right of self-determination -, thus rendering those agreements a 
nullity under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For example, 
a treaty entered into by South Africa with a neighbouring state on the exploitation of the 
continental shelf on the Namibian coast would have been both illegal - contrary to an 
international law norm - and invalid - it would not have produced any legal effect. To 
mention an actual case, the same could be argued for the many agreements concluded
15 Ibidem, Decision, 56.
144
since the 1970s between Morocco and Spain and later between Morocco and the EC 
concerning fishing in the waters facing the coast of Western Sahara, despite the 
disclaimers concerning the recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara 
both by Spain and the EC, and the different formulas used in these agreements only 
recognising the jurisdiction of Morocco over the waters south of Cape Noun.16
The corollary of this solution is that third states have a duty of non-recognition as 
affirmed by the ICJ in Namibia. It is interesting to note that the Court refers to a duty of 
non-recognition regarding unlawful territorial situations in general, not only territorial 
situations established as a result of serious violations of peremptory norms as Article 
41(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility claims.17 The ILC Commentary to 
Article 41 is slightly misleading when referring to Namibia, as it suggests that the erga 
omnes invalidity of the territorial situation can be derived only from the seriousness of 
the original or continuing violation of peremptory norms.18 Such erga omnes invalidity 
is in fact rather derived from the objective character of unlawful territorial situations, 
whose invalidity can be opposed erga omnes because of its territorial nature.
As to the internal acts of the administering powers, these are received by the 
international legal system as mere facts. They may be illegal, thus giving rise to state 
responsibility, yet international law will not control the production of their legal effects, 
since this is controlled by national law. In this sense, it will be up to each state to decide 
whether to recognise or not to recognise the legal effects produced by such acts at the 
domestic level. For example, a concession by South Africa within the same treaty 
framework mentioned above for the exploitation of natural resources by a company 
incorporated in a neighbouring country would represent an internationally wrongful act, 
but it would not be invalid per se.19 It is in this particular respect that the law of state
16 For an analysis of these different agreements see Soroeta Liceras, El Conflicto del Sahara Occidental, 
reflejo de las contradicciones y carencias del Derecho Intemacional (2001), 227. See also Lahlou, Le 
Maroc et le droit des pesches maritime (1990), 173.
17 Art. 41, 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, in Crawford (ed.), The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002).
18 Ibidem, Commentary, 251.
19 It is in this respect interesting to consider the legal opinion rendered by the UN Legal Counsel in 2002 
on the compatibility of agreements entered into by Moroccan authorities with oil corporations regarding 
the exploitation of natural resources in the continental shelf off the coast of Western Sahara. The counsel 
approached the issue as a problem of legality, rather than validity, and he concluded for the ‘legality* of 
the concession agreements between Morocco and Kerr McGee and TotalFinaElf on the basis that they 
provided the exploration, not the exploitation, of natural resources in the area. Letter dated 29 January 
2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President 
of the Security Council (S/2002/161). However see Written Statement of the Secretary-General in 
Namibia (Pleadings, Vol. 1, 109) claiming that ‘since all titles, grants, concessions, charters,
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responsibility for serious violations of peremptory norms plays a distinctive role, as in 
those cases states will be under an obligation not to render any aid or assistance to the 
occupier, thus arguably imposing also an obligation not to give effect to internal acts.20 
Furthermore the SC, by imposing a regime of sanctions, can create new obligations not 
to recognise internal acts and reinforce already existing obligations not to recognise 
international acts. This possibility is also provided by Article 41(1) of the ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility, which spells out a positive duty upon states to cooperate 
through appropriate bodies in order to bring to an end any serious violation of 
peremptory norms.
2.1.2 Cases involving the Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus before the European 
Court o f Human Rights: background of the decisions
The issue of invalidity can also be highlighted by considering the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights on the Cyprus issue. Before analysing the way the 
European Court of Human Rights has dealt with the question of validity of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ legal system, the background of Cyprus’ continuing 
unlawful territorial situation must be explained. Cyprus, formerly a British colony, had 
been granted independence and provided with a constitution in 1960. The constitutional 
framework was backed by a complex system of international guarantees, including a 
Treaty of Guarantee concluded by Britain, Turkey and Greece that would ensure an 
external supervision over the proper functioning of the new constitution. This 
constitution would ensure a fair representation of the two main communities of the 
island, the Greek and the Turkish, in its institutions. In the face of continuing deadlocks 
and difficulties in successfully implementing the constitutional framework and the 
ensuing tensions between the two communities, a coup d ’etat was organised on 15 July 
1974 by the Greek military junta which led to the deposition of President Makarios and 
the substitution of a new government with support from the Greek military. After five 
days, Turkey, claiming a right under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, intervened 
militarily and occupied the north-eastern part of the island.21 Despite the withdrawal of
incorporations, and other rights in Namibia purportedly granted, transferred or vested by the Government 
of South-Africa after the termination of the Mandate are void and without effect, no such rights or acts 
should be acknowledged or upheld in the jurisdiction of any state.’
20 Art 41(2), 2001 ILC Articles, supra n. 17.
21 ‘In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to 
ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible,
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Greek forces from Cyprus, the return to the previous civil administration after only 3 
days, and the demand of the SC for ‘an immediate end to foreign military intervention 
m the Republic of Cyprus’, the occupation by Turkish forces continued over the years 
resulting first in the creation of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, with a view to 
developing a new federal framework for the whole of Cyprus, and, after years of 
unsuccessful negotiations, to the declaration of independence of 15 November 1983 of 
the TRNC. Three days later, the SC in Resolution 541 deplored the declaration of 
independence and qualified it as ‘legally invalid’.
As of today, the TRNC has been recognised only by Turkey. Despite the increasing 
efforts to reach a diplomatic solution that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the island, and the prospects of Cyprus soon entering the European Union, 
the question of TRNC separate statehood and the large presence of Turkish forces in the 
island (30000 in 1996 according to the ECHR in Loizidou)23 remain the main 
impediments to an overall solution.24
2.1.3 How can we link illegality o f TRNC to the invalidity o f its internal provisions?
A. Loizidou v. Turkey
In the case Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) the ECHR had to deal with the claim brought 
by Mrs. Titina Loizidou against Turkey, for having denied her access to her properties 
in an area occupied by Turkish forces. Turkey argued that the property had been 
expropriated for a public necessity according to Article 159 of the TRNC constitution. 
The Court, considering the applicability of Article 159 of the TRNC constitution, 
claimed the invalidity of that provision, thus reaching the conclusion that the claimant 
never lost her title to property. Thus Turkey would be responsible for denying access to 
property under the European Convention of Human Rights Protocol I. Its conclusion 
derived from the reaction of the international community, which, apart from Turkey, 
never recognised the existence of a separate legal entity:
each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing 
the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.’ 1960 Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee, 16 August 1960, 
UKTS (1961), No. 5.
22 SC Res. 353(1974).
23 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement of 18 December 1996, ECHR Series A (1996-VI), 2219.
24 UN Peace Plan for Cyprus, 26 February 2003, in http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org. The plan prepared by 
the Secretary General provided for a referendum to approve it and formally re-unify the island to be held 
on 16 April 2003. No agreement has been reached so far both on the implementation of the provisions 
related to the referendum and on other important constitutional issues. However, the SG’s plan remains 
on the table, and it has been endorsed by the SC in Res. 1475 (2003).
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‘In this respect it is evident from international practice an the various, strongly worded resolutions 
referred to [...] that the international community does not regard ‘TRNC’ as a State under 
international law and that the Republic of Cyprus has remained the sole legitimate Government of 
Cyprus [...]. Against this background the Court cannot attribute legal validity for purposes of the 
Convention to such provisions as Article 159 of the fundamental law on which the Turkish 
Government rely.’25
In other words, the Court took an approach of constitutive recognition to the question 
of TRNC statehood. However, the Court did not engage in a discussion of what was the 
legal basis of this policy of non-recognition. This is in contradiction with the heavy 
reliance put on this original illegality to explain a chain of invalidity.
Furthermore, it avoided spelling out a general principle of interpretation on the 
relationship between the validity of international norms and national norms. It stated 
that it ‘does not consider it desirable, let alone necessary, in the present context to 
elaborate a general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative administrative acts of 
the TRNC.’26 It then concluded by recalling the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Namibia 
case, where the ICJ asserted the validity of certain administrative acts of unlawful de- 
facto entities, for instance as regards the registration of births, deaths and marriages, 
‘the efficacy of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the 
territory.’27 Despite the claim of the Com! to the effect that no general theory of 
invalidity is developed, the underlying assumption of the Court’s reasoning seems to be 
that the unlawfulness of a certain de facto entity affects the validity of its act, with the 
exception of those administrative acts whose non-applicability would be detrimental to 
individual interests. This interpretation would assume a ‘relative invalidity’ of the 
unlawful territorial situation, with some legal effects still being produced and 
recognised in the international sphere due to its ‘remote’ link with the original 
unlawfulness.28 This approach would support a monist relationship between the 
international legal system and the domestic system.
It is my opinion that the Court in reality adopts, perhaps unwillingly, a dualist 
approach disguised as a monist one. Rather than considering a chain of invalidity and
25 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), supra n. 23,2231.
26 Ibidem.
27 The theory can be found already in the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International of 1936 where it 
was stated that ‘[c]es effets extra-territoriaux ne dependent pas cependant de l’acte formel de 
reconnaisance du gouvemement nouveau. Meme k defaut de reconnaisance, ils doivent etre admis par les 
jurisdiction et administrations compdtentes lorsque, considerant notamment le caract&re rdel du pouvoir 
exercd par le gouvemement nouveau, ces effets sont conformes aux intdrets d’une bonne justice et & 
l’interet des particuliers.’ 39II Annuaire de VInstitut de Droit International (1936), 304.
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effecting a test of remoteness, it considers the internal acts of TRNC as mere facts that 
can be applied by an international court according to their compliance with an 
international rule. It is interesting to note that the conclusion of the Court is that it 
‘cannot attribute legal validity for purposes o f the Convention to such provision as Art. 
159.'29 In other words, the internal act will not be tested on its validity per se since it is 
not a juristic act but only a legally relevant fact. It will be tested against the background 
of an international instrument, in this context the European Convention of Human 
Rights. As it is found in breach of that instrument, it gives rise to Turkey’s international 
responsibility and the duty to remedy that situation. However, the invalidity of such acts 
will not be an issue at stake, since it will be ‘foreign’ to the international legal system. It 
is not then a coincidence that the Court, in declaring the ‘invalidity* of the TRNC 
constitution, heavily relies on the reaction of the international community rather than 
testing on legal criteria the supposed ‘invalidity’ of the territorial situation. In fact, such 
‘invalidity* can only be construed as a sanction, and it is rather the non-recognition of 
certain legal effects, which arises as an obligation due to authoritative decisions of UN 
organs, that can substantiate a claim of unlawfulness. The acts themselves are legally 
valid under the domestic TRNC system, but they represent wrongful acts under 
international law giving rise to state responsibility. In fact, Judge Pettiti in his dissenting 
opinion criticised the finding of the Court on the issue of validity by maintaining that 
‘the Court accepted the validity of measures adopted by the TRNC authorities in the 
fields of civil law, private law and the registration of births, deaths and marriages, 
without specifying what reasons for distinguishing between these branches of the law
-5A
and the law governing the use of property justified its decision.* The reliance on the 
concept of invalidity is indeed misleading.
B. Cyprus v. Turkey
Another important decision in this respect is the one delivered on 10 May 2001 by 
the ECHR in an inter-state dispute between Cyprus and Turkey.31 The case was referred 
to the Court by the Government of Cyprus on 30 August 1999 and by the European 
Commission of Human Rights on 11 September 1999 in accordance with the provisions
28 Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963), 75.
29 Loizidou, supra n. 23, 2231.
30 Ibidem, Diss. Op. of Judge Petitti, 2252-2253.
31 Case of Cyprus v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement of 10 May 2001, ECHR Series A (2001-TV), 5.
149
applicable prior to the entry into force of Protocol 11. The case had originated in an 
application against the Republic of Turkey brought before the Commission under 
former Article 24 of the Convention by the applicant Government on 22 November 
1994. The applicant Government claimed that Turkey had continued to violate the 
Convention, in particular Articles 1 to 11 and 13 as well as 14, 17 and 18 read in 
conjunction with the aforementioned provisions, and Articles 1, 2, 3 of Protocol 1 with 
reference to the following subject-matters: Greek-Cypriot missing persons; home and 
property of displaced persons; the right of displaced Greek-Cypriots to hold free 
elections; the living conditions of Greek-Cypriots in Northern Cyprus; and the situation 
of Turkish Cypriots and the Gypsy Community living in Northern Cyprus.
As pointed out by one of the judges, Judge Loucaides, in a recent commentary over 
the case, the extent of the finding of the Court in regard to ‘continuing violations of so 
many rights affecting such a large number of persons over such a long period of time* is 
unprecedented.32 However, it is not my intention to look at the substantive findings of 
the Court in respect to Turkish human rights violations. Rather, I shall consider 
operative paragraph 5 where by ten votes to seven the Court held that
‘for the purposes of former Article 26 (current Article 35 (1)) of the Convention, remedies 
available in the “TRNC” may be regarded as “domestic remedies” of the respondent State and that 
the question of the effectiveness of these remedies is to be considered in the specific circumstances 
where it arises (paragraph 102).’
In other words, the Court spelled out a presumption in favour of the effectiveness of 
judicial remedies in the TRNC. This seems in contradiction with the view taken in the 
admissibility stage, where the Court recalled its findings in Loizidou and rejected the 
objection to its jurisdiction advanced by Turkey, on the ground that the alleged 
violations should not be attributed to Turkey but to the TRNC. However, following its 
previous reasoning in Loizidou, the Court concluded that the Republic of Cyprus 
remains the sole legitimate government in Cyprus by looking at international 
recognition, and that the TRNC should be considered as a puppet-state under Turkish 
effective control.33
In the inter-state case Cyprus v. Turkey the Commission’s report stated that, in order 
to consider the applicant Government’s claims, the limitation of Article 26 of the old
32 Loucaides, ‘The Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Case o f Cyprus v. Turkey” 15 
U IL  (2002), 225, at 226.
33 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra n. 31, 28-29.
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Convention should be addressed, that is whether effective domestic remedies had been 
exhausted. Whether the remedies provided by the TRNC were to be considered 
effective should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The Commission concluded that, 
for the purposes of former Article 26 of the Convention, remedies available in Northern 
Cyprus were to be regarded as ‘domestic remedies’ of the Turkish state. The 
Commission avoided making any statement on the validity of internal acts of the TRNC 
like the Court did in Loizidou. However, by recalling Namibia, it stated that ‘where it 
can be shown that remedies exist to the advantage of individuals and offer them 
reasonable prospects of success in preventing violations of the Convention, use should 
be made of such remedies.’34 In its judgement the Court makes clear that ‘life goes on in 
territory concerned for its inhabitants’ and these would be unfairly punished if they had 
to live in a legal vacuum where they were not recognised any legal status outside their 
borders.35 In other words, the Court follows the approach of the Commission based on 
Namibia, and it tries to look for a ‘pragmatic’ approach that may ensure the protection 
of the inhabitants’ individual rights. As argued by the dissenting judges, it is 
controversial whether recognising those remedies as in principle effective would work 
in favour or to the inhabitants* detriment, considering the distrust of the Greek Cypriot 
community towards TRNC’s institutions.36 In any case, and more importantly for the 
issue of validity, the Court recalls Loizidou and it spells out explicitly the consequences 
of a dualist approach. The Court endorses first the findings of the Commission that 
‘avoided making general statements on the validity of the acts of the “TRNC” 
authorities from the standpoint of international law, and confined its considerations to 
the Convention-specific issue of the application of the exhaustion requirement 
contained in former Article 26 of the Convention in the context of the ‘constitutional’ 
and ‘legal’ system established within the “TRNC”.’37 Moreover, it recalls the fact that 
the ‘invalidity’ of Article 159 in Loizidou was pronounced with respect to the 
Convention, but it did not imply a general statement of invalidity.38 Further, the Court 
explicitly broadens the scope of the public/private act divide proposed by Judge De 
Castro in his separate opinion in Namibia, by admitting that recognition may also
34 Namibia, supra n. 9,56.
35 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra n. 31, 30-31.
36 Ibidem, Partly Diss. Op. of Judge Palm joined by Judges Jungwiert, Levits, Pantiru, Kovler and 
Marcus-Helmons, 107, at 110-111.
37 Ibidem, Decision, 28.
38 Ibidem.
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include ‘acts related to public-law situations, for example by granting sovereign 
immunity to de facto entities or by refusing to challenge takings of property by the 
organs of such entities.*39 Finally, it is interesting to read the conclusion of the Court 
that fo r the purposes o f former Article 26 (current Article 35) o f the Convention, 
remedies available in the “TRNC” may be regarded as “domestic remedies” of the 
respondent State’ {emphasis added).40 In other words, the particular domestic act is 
tested against an international legal instrument: rather than its validity, the Court finds 
on its legality. The underlying assumption is a dualist approach to the relationship 
between domestic and international law.
The Court’s decision on this point found, however, the opposition of numerous 
judges. The reservations on the question of nullity is clear in the Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Palm joined by Judges Jungwiert, Levits, Pantiru, Kovler and Marcus- 
Helmon. The dissenting opinion recalls Loizidou on the issue of nullity of Article 159 of 
the Constitution. Yet, unlike the majority decision, it only endorses the pronouncement 
of invalidity, without stressing the relation of that invalidity to the specific violation of 
the ECHR. It recalls the wish of the Court not to elaborate any general theory on the 
validity of acts of de facto regimes. It asks for a policy of judicial restraint on the 
grounds of three main considerations:
- any consideration of effective remedies under the TRNC courts* system has to cope 
with the fact that this judicial system finds its legal basis in a constitutional provision 
‘whose validity the Court cannot recognise -  for the same reason it could not recognise 
Article 159 in the Loizidou case -  without conferring a degree of legitimacy of an entity 
from which the international community has withheld recognition’;41
- the Court is considering the TRNC judicial system as impartial and above all 
‘established by law*, if it assumes its effectiveness, which should not be done according 
to the invalidity pronouncements of the international community;42
finally, according to Judge Marcus-Helmons, the recognition of the Court’s 
decision is at odds with the practice of non-recognition of the international community 
as witnessed by important domestic judicial decisions 43
39 Ibidem, 31.
40 Ibidem, 32.
41 Ibidem, Partly Diss. Op., supra n. 36,118.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibidem, Partly Diss. Op. Judge Marcus-Helmons, 125,127.
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Despite the dissenting judges’ demand to refrain from elaborating on a general 
theory of invalidity, it seems clear that the six judges are taking a monist view, with a 
general chain of invalidity deriving from the unlawful establishment of the TRNC. The 
same approach was taken by the ECJ with respect to sanitary certificates issued by the 
TRNC for import into EU countries in the case Anastasiou /, which were considered 
invalid as they had not been issued by Cyprus official authorities.44 That decision has 
received critical comments in case reviews, as confusing a matter of political discretion 
to be left to the decisions of competent bodies with matters of legal invalidity 45 For 
instance, Talmon’s conclusion is that ‘the Court of Justice misjudged the scope and 
consequences of the principle of non-recognition in international law. It went far 
beyond that principle and, in fact, applied economic sanctions, a measure that should be 
reserved for political bodies responsible for the conduct of the Community’s foreign 
relations.’46 Interestingly, the ECJ decision is not recalled in the dissenting opinion of 
Cyprus v. Turkey.
In his separate opinion Judge Marcus-Helmons recalls the practice of foreign courts 
in relation to the question of validity of domestic acts of unrecognised states. He recalls 
Adams v. Adams as a ‘recent case’ where ‘the English Court categorically refused to 
recognise any effect for the acts of the secessionist government concerned (the former 
Rhodesian government following the adoption of a unilateral declaration of 
independence).’47 A careful reading of the judgement reveals that the judicial review of 
internal acts by the secessionist South Rhodesian government was still part and parcel 
with the practice of English courts to follow the recognition policy of the Foreign 
Office, in order to avoid a situation where the state appears to be speaking ‘with two 
voices.’ The reform in recognition policies by the FCO in 1980 and the 1991 Foreign 
Corporations Act providing that UK courts are now bound to accept the corporate 
responsibility of a company incorporated in an unrecognised state (with the only 
condition that the ‘State’ is established in identifiable territory and it has a judicial 
system) clearly indicate that courts are now free to give effect to internal acts of de facto
44 Case C-432/92 Anastasiou I [1994] ECR1-3087.
45 Greenwood, Lowe, ‘Unrecognised States and the European Court’ 54 The Cambridge Law Journal
(1995), 4; Talmon, ‘The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice’ 12 EJIL (2001), 727.
46 Ibidem, 750.
47 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra n. 31, Partly Diss. Op. Judge Marcus-Helmons, 127.
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governments as long as they are effective.48 More recent case law applies new principles 
and make the judiciary independent from the FCO in its decisions 49 Also the reference 
advanced by Marcus-Helmons to US Supreme Court case law during the Civil War 
seems misleading. It is true that US tribunals have consistently followed the executive 
in matters of recognition, but the practice of the US courts applies quite consistently a 
neat public/private, domestic/external distinction and recognises those acts whose non­
application would be detrimental to the protection of individuals’ rights.50 For example 
in the case Kadic v. Karadzic (1995) the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the 
findings of the District Court that held that the Republika Srpska could not be 
considered a state under international law because of the lack of recognition.51 It 
recalled the Restatement (Third) o f the Foreign Relations Law that provides that ‘under 
international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the 
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.’52 According to the 
Court of Appeal recognition would not be a pre-condition of statehood that would be 
accorded by the US government for political reasons. It is probably true as Balejikan 
stated some 30 years ago that it is not possible to track down a dominant function of 
recognition and effectiveness if we analyse the last 200 years, but it is also true that 
there has been a growing tendency to give effect to the acts of de facto states and render 
the judiciary more and more independent from the executive in these matters, including 
in states like the US and Britain where traditionally recognition played a paramount 
role.53 This seems to indicate that a legal situation arising out of a breach of 
international law cannot per se be invalidated, but that reasons of public policy and 
protection of individual interests are to be considered at least as important.
2.2 Final remarks on invalidity
The bottom line gives confirmation to the initial hypothesis: policies of non­
recognition of internal acts of de facto entities or situations should be construed as
48 See Talmon, ‘Recognition of Governments: an Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice’ 63 
BYIL (1992), 231.
49 Republic o f Somalia v. Woodehouse Drake, (1993) All ER 371.
50 United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, 254 (1819); MacLeod v. United States, 229 US 416, 33 S.Ct. 955 
(1913); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibario, 139 NE 259,235 NY 255 (1923).
51 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232,2nd Cir. (1995), in 34 ILM (1995), 1592.
52 Ibidem, 1606.
53 Balekjian, Die Effektivitdt und die Stellung Nichtanerkannter Staaten im Volkerrecht (1970), 210.
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sanctions rather than as an invalidation of those acts per se. Invalidity based on 
international norms can only relate to international legal acts, such as international 
treaties creating territorial obligations between the occupying state and a third state. The 
term ‘invalidity’ is used sometimes as synonymous with ‘illegality’, but in order not to 
raise confusion the two terms and the two categories should be kept distinct. Rather than 
having a purely academic significance, this differentiation serves to clarify a confusion, 
which has a practical impact in the way international actors deal with unlawful 
territorial situations. A monist theory of invalidity is not tenable under general 
international law and, some would argue, allows too much room for political actions by 
tribunals. The fact that this dualist framework is derived by judicial decisions also 
shows international tribunals* awareness that such responsibility is better placed with 
international political actors. This conclusion, rather than unveiling a general 
‘impotence’ of international law towards unlawful territorial situations, vests enhanced 
responsibilities upon states both in their individual dealing with such situations and in 
their collective dealing through international organisations. In terms of internal 
dynamics, the definition of ‘unlawfulness’ given to certain territorial situations by 
international law is better placed to potentially develop a remarkable impact on related 
areas of international law, rather than in developing a general system of invalidity of 
unlawful territorial situations. This impact is analysed in the following sections.
3. Consequences of unlawfulness: protection of status quo and ius ad 
bellum
The first area of international law where the impact of a definition of unlawfulness of 
a certain territorial situation is likely to be felt is the international law on the use of 
force. The prohibition of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter shows clearly how the law on 
the use of force and the law of territory are closely intertwined. Indeed, according to 
that provision states shall refrain from the threat or use of force ‘against the territorial 
integrity’ of any other state. What the drafters of the Charter had in mind were the 
attempts of territorial aggrandisement through forcible annexation, which had so 
dramatically characterised the Interwar period and Second World War. This norm is 
spelled out in greater detail in the 1970 GA Declaration on Friendly Relations which 
states that ‘[ejvery State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate 
the existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving
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international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers 
of States.*54
Despite some ambiguity in these formulations,55 the content of these two norms and 
the emphasis in the Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes -  for instance Article 
2(3) and Article 33 -  seem to exclude a modification of an unlawful status quo through 
the use of armed force. In other words, a definition of unlawfulness of a territorial 
situation does not affect the duty of an interested state to refrain from using force in 
order to establish or re-establish a state of legality.56 This principle has been illustrated 
by the practice of the SC during the Falkland/Malvinas conflict. On 2 April 1982 the 
Argentine army initiated a major military operation taking control of the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, which had been since the 19th Century under British 
administration. The military operation was presented by Argentina as enforcement 
action to re-gain control over its own territory and as an action in self-defence in 
response to British aggression.57 The day after the start of the military operations the SC 
adopted Resolution 502, which condemned the Argentine military action, called for an 
immediate cessation of hostilities, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Argentine 
forces from the islands and called on both governments to seek a diplomatic solution to
CO
the dispute. A few days later the British government launched a major military 
response, which led to the full re-taking of the island by mid June of the same year.
The invasion by Argentina of the Falkland/Malvinas islands is indeed a locus 
classicus of the principle that the lawfulness of a territorial claim does not do away from 
the duty to refrain from the use of force. The debate at the SC supported quite 
unconditionally that principle.59 However, it did not address the question of whether the 
protection of possession by international law is unlimited. If that was the case, the
54 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
55 Schachter pointed out that ‘it would be useful to make it clear in authoritative instruments that the 
expression “territorial integrity” in Article 2(4) refers to the State which actually exercises authority over 
the territory, irrespective of disputes as to the legality of that authority.’ Schachter, ‘International Law in 
Theory and Practice. General Course in Public International Law’ 178 Recueil des Cours (1982), 143.
56 See in this sense Kohen, Possession Contestie et Souveraineti Territoriale (1997).
57 It was never exactly specified by the Argentinian government what the act of aggression had been. As 
argued by Harris, it is likely that by that it was meant either the British taking of the Island in 1833 or a 
series of minor incidents occurred in March 1982 between the British army and Argentinian nationals on 
South Georgia. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (1998,5 ed.), 903, note 52.
38 SC Res. 502 (1982), adopted with 10 votes in favour, 1 against (Panama) and 4 four abstaining (China, 
Poland, USSR, Spain). See debate in S/PV.2345, S/PV.2346.
59 Ibidem.
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formula would represent the triumph of immobility in international relations.60 It may 
also be concluded that the British military action to re-take the islands and the 
subsequent re-occupation were unlawful. Such reading would be in accordance with the 
request by the Council to the Parties in Resolution 502 to settle the dispute peacefully, 
and with the dominant view in the Council seeking an immediate cease-fire.61 To a 
further extent, Iraq’s possession of Kuwait in 1990-1991 would be protected. This 
radical reading of the concept of status quo is obviously untenable. The solution is in 
my view to be found in the linkage between the ius ad bellum and the law of territory. 
The Charter framework on the use of force defines the rules protecting an originally 
unlawful possession. In other words, when the re-taking of a territory is part and parcel 
of a lawful military action, the original status quo will not be protected. Of course, the 
mandate given by the SC or the proportionality of the self-defence exercised will be the 
major factors on which to assess the legality of the (re)occupation. For instance, in 1991 
the Coalition’s liberation of Kuwait had been explicitly authorised by the SC, therefore 
international law did not protect the Iraqi status quo.62 As to the British re-taking of the 
Falkland/Malvinas, despite some good arguments to the contrary, in particular 
concerning a level of contradiction between an action of self-defence and Resolution 
502, it seems that overall the action was founded on Article 51, and it satisfied the 
criteria of necessity and proportionality. Therefore, Argentina’s possession was not 
protected.
4. Consequences of unlawfulness: denial of self-determination and ius 
ad bellum
Another important point to be made is that the use of force in a situation defined as 
unlawful according to the criteria spelled out in the previous chapter can never be 
considered as having exclusively domestic relevance, thus being within the reserved 
domain of the administering state. This is a corollary of the fact that the definition of
60 See Grewe stating: ‘But as protection of possession is not the last word in civil law, the international 
legal order should also provide ways and means to examine and to correct situations of unlawful 
possession. It should avoid becoming a rigid order of immobility which may lead to violent explosions. In 
this respect there is much unfinished business to be accomplished.’ Grewe, ‘Status Quo’, in Bernhardt 
(ed.), EPIL, (2000) (Vol. IV), 687, at 690.
61 S/PV.2373. A draft resolution to that effect was supported by nine members and vetoed by Britain and 
the United States.
62 SC Res. 678 (1990).
157
unlawfulness itself shows the relevance of international law to those situations. It can be 
clearly seen in cases of denial of a right of self-determination by the administering 
power. The first consequence of a definition of unlawfulness for the administering 
power is the fact that any forcible action against the people under subjugation will be 
considered unlawful. The principle is clearly asserted in GA Resolution 1514 and the 
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations among States.63 As correctly argued by Cassese, 
in cases of foreign occupation the principle reinforces and restates the general ban on 
the use of force in international relations established in Article 2(4), therefore it does not 
represent in itself a new development.64 However, it represents a subsequent 
development of customary law in respect to one more specific issue: the denial of the 
right of self-determination of peoples or racial groups within a certain community 
through unilateral coercive measures and repressive means.65 The second consequence 
is that foreign supplies of arms and logistical assistance to the colonial or occupying 
power are unlawful. This was one of the first corollaries to be developed by the GA and 
the SC in the 1960s.66 One of the main problems with this principle is that, when not 
defined within a general policy of arms embargo by the SC, it still leaves wide room for 
sale of military equipment apparently for diverse reasons, the same equipment being 
finally re-directed towards the repression 67
More problematic is the question of the legality of the use of force by the oppressed 
people living on a territory which has not yet acquired statehood. Such use of force has 
taken shape in the form of the creation of national liberation movements that would 
represent all the efforts to gain independence through a mix of military and political 
initiatives. Very often the military successes at the national level were the pre-condition 
for their political recognition at the international level. Despite the perceived legitimacy 
of their armed struggle, and the effort of Socialist and Non-Aligned Countries to 
transform this legitimacy into a legal entitlement, the right to enforce the right of self- 
determination through military means was opposed by Western states as inconsistent
63 ‘Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above 
in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and 
independence.’ 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n. 54.
64 Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal (1995), 96.
65 E.g. GA Res. 172 (UV).
66 E.g. SC Res. 180 (1963) ‘requesting’ states to refrain from the sale of military equipment and arms to 
the Portuguese Government for the use in colonial repression.
67 See in the Namibia case (supra n. 9), the separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, which spells out in detail 
the obligation for states not to provide assistance to Namibia (at 94).
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with the UN principles of peaceful settlement of disputes.68 The 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations begged the question of foreign military assistance for national 
liberation movements when it stated that they ‘are entitled to seek and receive support in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ A 
focus either on peaceful means of settling - supported by Western states - or on the right 
of people to respond to an external aggressive policy so long as the SC did not take 
action - supported by the majority of the countries - would dramatically change the 
reading to be given to the ‘purposes and principles of the Charter’. Whatever the 
reading given, it seems that the limitation of the principle of territorial integrity would 
not apply for struggles against foreign or colonial domination. Therefore, the best that 
could be said is that, on the one hand, national liberation movements could not avail 
themselves of the pledge of self-defence according to Article 51. On the other hand, 
they could count on the neutrality of international law towards their claim to resort to a 
military struggle.69 Never has a struggle for self-determination per se, even if conducted 
by military means, been declared illegal.
A different question is whether a struggle for self-determination may become 
illegitimate, because of the means employed such as forms of terrorism against the 
civilian population of the occupying power. Despite the risk that struggles for self- 
determination or against foreign occupations may be perceived as illegitimate when 
pursued and carried out through illegal means, such as in the case of terrorism, it 
appears that the international community has even recently maintained the distinction 
between the legitimacy of the aim and the legitimacy of the means.70
The conclusion is different as far as the right to invite foreign troops in support of 
their military effort is concerned. Despite a general view that peoples under continuing 
foreign domination were the object of a form of aggression and the widespread practice 
of states in the 1960s and in the 1970s in giving support to national liberation 
movements, the claim of self-defence by national liberation movements has not been 
accepted.71 Notwithstanding the lack of a legal entitlement, it is correct to observe with 
Roth that
68 See for example GA Res. 3013 (XXVTII) defining anti-colonial armed struggle ‘in full accordance with 
the principles of international law’, which was met with the opposition of 13 votes cast by the Western 
states.
69 See Cassese, supra n. 64,153.
70 Cfr. latest GA resolutions concerning Palestine A/RES/ES-10/13 and A/RES/57/198.
71 See Namibia, supra n. 9, Sep. Op. Ammoun, 89-90.
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*[g]iven the prevalence of the state practice of rendering military assistance to liberation 
movements, the GA’s pronouncements favouring it and the utter lack of collective opinio juris 
opposing it, one can only conclude that such assistance does not constitute “use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations” under Article 2(4).’72
This is in line with the fact that those territories are not under the sovereignty of the 
state, thus the military actions cannot be possibly considered against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of the occupying state. Further, the legitimacy of the 
armed struggle of peoples under foreign domination makes sure that such violations 
were generally and widely tolerated.
5. Consequences of unlawfulness on the ius in bello
As far as the jus in bello applicable to conflicts related to unlawful territorial 
situations is concerned, the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions applies not only 
to the transboundary use of military force but also to ‘armed conflicts in which peoples 
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes 
in the exercise of their right to self-determination’ by virtue of Article 1(4). In other 
words, these conflicts are considered by all means international armed conflicts under 
the First Protocol. The provision has so extended the application of the law of 
belligerent occupation to certain categories of unlawful territorial situations, which were 
not covered by the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.73 The 
specific provision was adopted with a vote of 84 states in favour, 11 abstaining and 1 
against.74 The only vote cast against is particularly significant, because it came from 
Israel, an occupying power which, as of today, has not become party to the First 
Protocol and still claims the application of the relevant conventions on belligerent 
occupation on a de facto basis. Also among the abstaining countries -  which as of today 
are still not parties to the First Protocol -  we find countries, such as Morocco and 
Indonesia, which are or have been until recently occupying powers under the terms of 
Article 1(4).
72 Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999), 215.
73 Supra Ch. 2, section 4.1.
74 Cassese, supra n. 69,201.
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Article 1(4) also confirms that the unlawfulness of a territorial situation should not 
impinge on the application of the laws of military occupation. The real problem 
however lies in the fact that in most unlawful territorial situations the occupying power 
does not see itself as such, thus it does not feel the need to limit its powers according to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1977 First Protocol. The application of the laws 
of military occupation would run counter to the recurrent claim that the military 
presence is established either due to the request of the local government, for instance in 
East Timor or Northern Cyprus, or due to the fact that the territory is indeed under the 
occupying power’s sovereignty, for instance in Western Sahara or Bakassi. As of today, 
the only occupying powers recognising the applicability of a regime of military 
occupation to their presence in Palestine and Iraq are Israel and the United States and 
the Coalition states respectively, even if, at least in the case of Israel, such application is 
limited to a full application of the customary laws of the Hague Regulations and the de 
facto application of the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.75 
Regardless of the subjective recognition by the occupying power of the applicability of 
international humanitarian law to their occupation, it appears likely that an international 
body or domestic court will recognise the need to assess the actions of the occupying 
power on the basis of international humanitarian law as a separate basis for a review of 
validity of the occupant’s acts typical of unlawful territorial situations.76 In itself, 
however, a determination of unlawfulness will not affect the application of international 
humanitarian law, which will apply equally and regardless of the validity of the legal 
basis for the territorial occupation. This confirms the primacy of effectiveness as a legal 
criterion for the application of international humanitarian law, and the very limited 
impact that criteria of territorial unlawfulness can play in this respect.77
75 See CPA/Reg/16 May 2003/01. Supra Ch.3, section 4.
76 Supra section 2. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr 
John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, 
6 March 2002, E/CN.4/2002/32. A review of legality of the occupant’s power on the basis of international 
humanitarian law will be likely in the Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The request by the GA (GA Res. A/ES-10/L.16 of 3 
December 2003) in fact seeks an evaluation of ‘the legal consequences arising from the construction of 
the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in 
and around East Jerusalem, as described in the Report of the Secretary-General considering the rules and 
principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant SC and GA 
resolutions [...].’
77 For the rationale behind the primacy of effectiveness in international humanitarian law, see supra Ch. 
3, section 6. The conclusion does not aim at underestimating the role that the new principles of territorial 
unlawfulness played in leading to the development of international humanitarian law and the extension of 
its scope of application to new types of conflicts.
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6. Consequences of unlawfulness: access to statehood and referendum- 
setting
Potential room for making international law effective with respect to unlawful 
territorial situations would be its relationship with the creation of states and questions of 
statehood in general. In other words, it is to be seen how a determination of illegality of 
a given territorial situation can enhance the possibility for statehood of those subjects 
who are victims of this violation. I take here four cases, Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western Sahara to see whether the balance 
effectiveness/legality has shifted with respect to statehood in a parallel move to that of 
the territorial status in general.
6.1 Guinea-Bissau
In 1972 the UN Special Committee on Decolonization dispatched a Special Mission 
to ‘liberated’ zones in Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau was an African NSGT under 
Portuguese administration, which had not yet gained independence, because of the 
Portuguese policy of opposition to a free exercise of self-determination. The Special 
Mission was composed of five people, who visited a comparatively small portion of 
territory in a period of roughly a week. The conclusions reached were rather categorical 
in terms of the situation observed on the ground, and they claimed that the African Party 
for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was in control of about two- 
thirds of the territory of Guinea-Bissau. The basis for this conclusion was the 
information gathered from the PAIGC itself, and the verification of foreign journalists 
and observers. The following year the PAIGC declared the independence and creation 
of Guinea-Bissau, obtaining unilateral recognition by 65 states. These states then sought 
an act of collective recognition by the GA, by presenting a draft resolution. The ensuing 
debate was very interesting, as it highlighted the controversy that the new principle of 
self-determination sparked on the vision of statehood given by states. As observed by 
Roth, ‘[wjhereas supporters of the resolution stressed the equities of the situation -  the 
right to self-determination, the prolonged and harsh Portuguese recalcitrance, the 
heroism and accomplishments of the liberation struggle -  opponents focused on legal
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78doctrine.’ Quite surprisingly, the debate rather than weakening the case for 
effectiveness in matters of statehood, seemed to reinforce it. Firstly, the conclusions of 
the UN Special Mission were opposed by Portugal, France and the US, which had on 
their side the fact that the capital, Bissau, and other densely populated areas were under
7QPortuguese control. Chile, Greece and Canada on their side highlighted the difficulty 
to fit the case of Guinea-Bissau into the international legal notion of statehood, because 
of the lack of overwhelming effective control over the territory, and the rejection of a 
constitutive notion of statehood. Even more interestingly, the proponents never 
advanced the thesis of a progressive development in the legal doctrine. Finally, 
Resolution 3061 (XXVIII) was adopted by a majority of 93-7-30, which showed the 
profound division on the issue. The largest Western states all voted against the 
resolution. The deadlock was to find a solution one year later with the leftist coup and 
the renunciation of Portugal to all its colonial possessions, which may have led to the 
impression, contrary to the above analysis, that the case of Guinea-Bissau showed a 
triumphant right of self-determination over effectiveness. On the contrary, the whole 
debate on statehood of Guinea-Bissau before the GA and the outcome itself with the 
voluntary relinquishment of Portugal’s claims show how effectiveness was at the heart 
of the solution given on statehood.
6.2 Palestine
Even more adamant in this respect is the case of Palestine. Palestine, formerly a 
British mandate, had been divided in 1947 into two territorial units, one Arab and one 
Jewish, according to a controversial UN partition plan passed through a GA resolution 
adopted with a majority of 33-13-10.80 The resolution envisaged the division of the 
Mandate Territory in six separate zones, three to be assigned to the prospective Arab 
State and three to the prospective Jewish State, each connected by few crossing points. 
Bethlehem and Jerusalem were to be internationalised under the supervision of the UN 
Trusteeship Council. On 15 May 1948, the day after the mandatory power, Britain, had 
withdrawn its presence from Palestine and terminated the Mandate notwithstanding its 
refusal to give implementation to the partition plan, a coalition of Arab states including 
Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq intervened militarily. These neighbouring
78 Roth, supra n. 72,220.
79 GA Official Records, 2163rd meeting, 130.
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states had opposed explicitly the UN partition plan and with their intervention sought to 
maintain the unity of what they argued was the newly bom state of Palestine. No 
declaration of independence of a Palestinian state was ever effected, because that would 
have implied acceptance of the GA partition plan. They claimed that they were ensuring 
respect of the will of the majority of the population, and that they were acting under the 
invitation of the Palestinian leadership. Israel, which had proclaimed itself as an 
independent and sovereign state on 14 May 1948 in the territory assigned by GA 
Resolution 181, claimed its right of self-defence against the Arab aggression. What 
ensued was an armed conflict that continued until January 1949 and which was 
followed by a series of armistices between Israel and the Arab countries. These 
armistice lines were to be observed and maintained by a UN Truce Supervision 
Organisation (UNTSO). The control over Palestine was carved up among Israel, Egypt 
and Jordan, filling at a jurisdictional level the sovereignty vacuum, which had followed 
the termination of the mandate. In other words, the territory belonging to the former 
mandate was put under the military administration of these three countries. The Six Day 
War of 1967 led to a shift in the balance of effective powers in Palestine, as the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip were occupied by Israel. Following the breakout of a rebellion 
against Israeli military rule over Palestine in 1987, on 15 November 1988, the Palestine 
National Council Meeting in Algiers declared the independence of the State of 
Palestine, having as a territorial basis the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. 
The declaration enjoyed alternate fortunes for the question of Palestine’s statehood. 
Palestinian statehood was recognised by over 100 states and on 15 December 1988 the 
GA adopted Resolution 43/177, essentially recognising the new state of Palestine. 
However, the further attempts by the PLO leadership to see Palestinian statehood 
recognised at a more substantive level failed.81
In fact, the renunciation by Jordan to any territorial claim over the West Bank, the 
official acceptance by the PLO Chairman Arafat of the right to existence of an Israeli 
state within the limits spelled out in SC Resolutions 242 and 338, and the PLO 
commitment to the renunciation of terrorism all enabled the beginning of a series of 
negotiations for an overall solution of the Palestinian problem. These negotiations 
culminated in the signature in Washington on 13 September 1993 by the Israeli Prime 
Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat of the Declaration of Principles on Interim
80 GA Res. 181 (II).
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Self-Government Arrangements.82 The declaration was a fully-fledged international 
agreement, which had the objective to implement a right of internal self-determination 
of the Palestinian people by creating a Palestinian civil administration (Palestinian 
Authority) for the West Bank and Gaza substituting the Israeli military administration. 
It represented the legal framework within which the Erez Checkpoint/Gaza Agreement 
of 29 August 1994 was concluded, which provided for the assumption of Palestinian 
jurisdiction in the spheres of education, culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct
O')
taxation and value added tax on local production. More importantly, despite the 
recalling of Resolutions 242 and 381, the Oslo Agreements did not address the question 
of Palestinian sovereignty and statehood, and the Israeli claim to sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem. They did not envisage any substantive objective for the solution of the 
permanent status of Palestine and its statehood, the complete withdrawal of Israeli 
troops and the question of Jewish settlements, even if a commitment to a general 
solution of these issues was recalled in Article V. Furthermore, the internal 
effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority was reduced by the residual but substantial 
jurisdictional powers of Israeli forces over settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and 
the maintenance of an Israeli substantial military presence along the main ways of 
communication.
Despite initial encouraging steps towards the gradual establishment of the Palestinian 
autonomy, the process has come to a dramatic standstill since the outbreak of the second 
Intifada in 2000, which has resulted in a re-occupation by Israeli forces of the 
Palestinian territory and a strong policy of creation of new settlements and new physical 
barriers between Jewish and Arab communities. The Road Map for a Permanent Two- 
State Solution published on 30 April 2003 under the auspices of the US, EU, UN and 
Russia spells out clearly the final aim of an independent, viable and sovereign State of 
Palestine with permanent borders to be reached by 2005.84 Despite setting a final and 
conclusive solution to the Middle East conflict based on a precise timetable, the Road 
Map does not address any of the most contentious issues concerning Palestinian 
statehood, such as the physical re-drawing of the West Bank border by the construction
81 See Van De Craen, ‘Palestine (1996 Addendum)’, in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (1997) (Vol. HI), 865.
82 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, in 32 ILM (1993), 1525.
83 1994 Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities, in 34 ILM (1994), 455.
84 A Performance Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
30 April 2003, in http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmapl20002.pdf.
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of a wall, the dismantlement of Israeli settlements, Israeli military outposts within the 
West Bank and Gaza and the question of East Jerusalem.
The aim of the UN Partition Resolution was to ensure the exercise of a right to self- 
determination within two new territorial entities, which would allow the co-existence 
between Jewish and Arab communities. However, it is clear that Israel could become a 
state since its very declaration of independence and be admitted to the UN as a fully- 
fledged member thanks to its effectiveness. Likewise, it is clear that Palestine has not 
been a state under the traditional Montevideo criteria, because of the lack of an effective 
government. Even under the 1993 Oslo Agreement with the establishment of a general 
governmental authority over Gaza and the West Bank, the level of effectiveness of the 
Palestinian Authority was limited to certain cities and areas. Further, such effectiveness 
was legally weakened by the very singular provision of Article 3(b), Annex 2 that did 
not extend the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority over Israeli peoples and illegal 
settlements. The Road Map surely represents a step forward in the sense that it spells 
out in detail crucial requirements for the democratic and efficient reform of the 
Palestinian institutions. Whether it can also lead to the creation of a ‘viable Palestine* 
‘with maximum territorial contiguity’ and with permanent borders according to 
Resolution 242 and Resolution 338 is again the most difficult challenge ahead. For 
instance, the interpretation given by the Israeli government to the requirement contained 
in the Road Map of removal of illegal settlements built since 2001 in the first phase is 
not re-assuring, as it is not re-assuring the lack of objection to that interpretation by the 
United States, the main guarantor as far as the document’s implementation is concerned. 
In his statement of 4 June 2003 after the Aqaba Summit meeting, Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon claimed: ‘In regard to the unauthorized outposts, I want to reiterate that Israel is 
a society governed by the rule of law. Thus, we will immediately begin to remove 
unauthorized outposts.’85 It is clear that the reference is to Israeli law, rather than 
international law, and also the substitution of the expression ‘illegal settlements’ with 
the expression ‘unauthorized outposts’ is telling. Furthermore, the so-called process of 
‘natural growth’ of existing settlements has continued during 2002 and 2003 with the 
construction of new houses and new bypass roads, including a 50- to 75- metres buffer 
zone on each side of the road in which no building is permitted.86 Finally, perhaps the
85 Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon after the Aqaba Summit meeting, 4 June 2003, in 
http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHO0nfv0.
86 Report of the Human Rights Commission’s Special Rapporteur for Palestine, supra n. 76,12.
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most disturbing development has been the construction of a security fence, in some 
points in the form of a concrete wall, running parallel to the border between Israel and 
the West Bank, but located within the West Bank itself.87 Leaving aside the question of 
security and the merits of the Israeli decision to address such problems through these 
means, the construction of the security fence raises two troublesome questions with 
regard to Palestinian statehood. The first one is the creeping annexation of Palestinian 
territory through the construction of a physical border that may well become accepted as 
a fait accomplit in the final status negotiations. The second one is the legality under 
international law of a disarmed, ‘democratic’ and ‘self-determined’ bantustan. In other 
words, the creation of a Palestinian state under those circumstances and conditions 
would most likely make its status under international law controversial and, possibly, 
would continue the situation of territorial unlawfulness, as was the case with the South 
African bantustans during the 1980s.
In conclusion, if the right of self-determination had been worked out as a criterion of 
statehood, it should have worked a fortiori in the case of Palestine as opposed to 
Guinea-Bissau. Like in the case of Guinea-Bissau, state entities were claiming 
sovereignty over parts of the Palestinian territory, for example, the claims of Israel to 
sovereignty related to Jerusalem and the claims of Jordan to the West Bank.88 Like in 
the case of Guinea-Bissau, the PLO was meeting a test of political allegiance in the 
Palestinian population. However, whereas Guinea-Bissau involved the question of a 
colonial power unwilling to relinquish its grip over its overseas territories, Palestine had 
been the object of external aggressive policies both from Israel and Arab countries. The 
two criteria of illegality, the prohibition of forcible territorial change and the principle 
of self-determination, should have re-enforced each other and promoted the case of 
Palestinian statehood even more than the case of Guinea-Bissau. However, the criteria 
of illegality have only determined the unlawfulness of the territorial situation, without 
attaching to it full-scale legal consequences. In other words, self-determination and the 
prohibition of forcible territorial change have worked by limiting the criterion of 
effectiveness at the level of Palestine’s territorial formal status, but they have not ousted 
it in the more general question of Palestine’s statehood. In a system largely based on the
87 See most recently Brubacher, ‘Le mur de la honte’, November 2002, Le Monde Diplomatique, 20. See 
also Legality of Wall in Palestine, supra n. 76.
88 Malanczuk, ‘Israel: Status, Territory and Occupied Territories’, in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (1999) (Vol. 
B), 1468, at 1489-1494.
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centrality of the state, the timid role played by legality in dictating questions of 
statehood is unfortunate for the credibility of international law as an effective tool of 
restoring justice in these territories.
6.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina
The importance of statehood to the solution of disputes related to unlawful territorial 
situations can be hardly overestimated. Statehood means equality of status with the 
occupying power not only in bilateral negotiations, but also and more importantly at 
those multilateral political bodies such as the GA and the SC which are entrusted with 
the solution of these issues. Statehood also means access to legal means of adjudication 
in the international arena. Statehood means unconditional legal protection of territorial 
integrity and political independence. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out in 
this respect in stark contrast to the one of Palestine, since the usual terms of the relation 
between territorial unlawfulness and access to statehood were radically reversed.
Whereas in the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Palestine territorial unlawfulness was 
presupposed to the entitlement to statehood, in the case of Bosnia the access to 
statehood promoted by the international community defined the unlawfulness of a series 
of territorial situations. These territorial situations were the Yugoslav Federal Army 
intervention from March to at least May 1992,89 the creation of the Srpska Republic as 
an independent state from December 1991 to December 1995, and the creation of the 
Croat Republic of Herzegovina-Bosnia from November 1992 to March 1994. The 
outcome was that territorial re-adjustments became a non-negotiable issue at Dayton 
and so the statehood and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its 
‘internationally recognised boundaries’ was part of the non-negotiable principles.90 The 
immediate recognition of statehood also allowed a largely ineffective government which 
from 1992 to 1995 retained control over only 30% of its territory, to participate in the 
works of the SC as a fully fledged member of the UN, to start judicial proceedings at 
the ICJ against a neighbouring country for its alleged involvement in the policies of 
genocide carried out by the Bosnian Serb leadership, to have full protection by the UN
89 Tadic v. Prosecutor, ICTY Trial Chambers (1997), in 112ILR (1999), 1, at 49-51.
90 Holbrooke, To End a War (1999).
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Charter in its territorial preservation.91 To be noted is the fact that the Bosnian people 
were not exercising a right of self-determination according to Resolution 1514, and that 
the external intervention of the FRY was considered terminated after May 1992. Even 
after the recognition in the Dayton accords of Bosnian statehood by the FRY, the 
system of internal governance has been largely ineffective and was slowly implemented 
thanks to a considerable international effort. What matters most, however, for our 
discussion is that for once effectiveness was put aside, favouring principles of 
substantive legality, in particular territorial integrity and uti possidetis.
It is submitted that the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is important not so much because 
it creates a general model for creation of states in international law, but because it shows 
the potential for unlawful territorial situations of a substantial shift in the way statehood 
is seen under international law. Fully displaying the effects of principles of legality also 
in the field of statehood enhances the possibilities of those who are subject to unlawful 
territorial situations to acquire their sovereignty. Further, it considerably diminishes the 
room of the occupying state for manoeuvre and its bargaining power in the ‘peace 
process*.92 It is not even true that this would mean a drastic change in the way positive 
statehood is seen. It would only apply in case of unlawful territorial status, where 
principles of legality have already played an important role and they have often played 
an important role in denying statehood - consider for example the cases of Transkei or 
Southem-Rhodesia. Widespread international recognition of statehood would also mean 
external effectiveness and the possibility of an enhanced internal one. Of course, to 
support internally ineffective statehood would require a commitment by the 
international community to its principles of legality, which should result in a system of 
effective sanctions against those who do not abide by those principles. History has 
proven that such commitment is often successful in the long term. However, lack of 
commitment has always proven its dramatic failures. The history of Western Sahara is a 
reminder of that.
91 SC Res. 755 (1992); SC Res. 770 (1992); Application o f the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide, Application of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 20 
March 1993, in http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm.
92 See the critical remarks by Catriona Drew on the fashionable language and substance of peace 
processes as a renunciation to legal entitlements in favour of pragmatic approaches. Drew, ‘The East 
Timor Story: International Law on Trial’ 12 EJIL (2001), 651, at 681.
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6.4 Western Sahara
A one-step approach automatically linking statehood to the unlawfulness of a 
territorial situation, instead of the commonly adopted two-step approach, would also 
address some of the most important problems related to the process of moving to 
sovereignty and statehood in cases of denied self-determination. One of these is the so- 
called question of referendum-setting. A mandatory requirement that the right of 
external self-determination envisioned by Resolution 1541 should be implemented 
through a popular consultation has never existed. This has only applied to cases of
Q<]
integration or association of former colonies. As the ICJ made clear in Western 
Sahara:
‘The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely 
expressed will of the peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly 
has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. These 
instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 
“people” entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally 
unnecessary, in view of special circumstances.’94
In his separate opinion, Judge Ammoun stressed the fact that such special 
circumstances included the struggle of national liberation movements against foreign 
domination. He stated that ‘[n]othing could show more clearly the will for emancipation 
that the struggle undertaken in common, with the risks and immense sacrifices it entails. 
That struggle is more decisive than a referendum, being absolutely sincere and 
authentic.’95
However, practically, when the international community has started considering the 
possibility of integration or association, the referendum-setting process has become 
unavoidable. In other words, as argued by Catriona Drew, the standard approach to self- 
determination has implied a conceptual shift from its substantive territorial meaning to 
its electoral procedural meaning. This has also meant coming to terms with a substantial 
recognition of often forced processes of population transfer, illegal settlements and 
refusals to grant an unlimited right of return to refugees by the occupying power. With 
regard to Palestine, Drew argues that,
‘[o]nce the right of self-determination has been stripped of its core entitlements to territory and 
resources, it becomes possible -  for states, institutions and commentators alike -  to assert both the
93 Northern Cameroons Case, ICJ Reports 1963,15, at 32.
94 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12, at 33.
95 Ibidem, Sep. Op. Judge De Ammoun, 83, at 100.
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inalienable, jus cogens character of the Palestinian right to self-determination, and declare the 
future of Israeli settlements as a matter for political negotiation; to affirm the primacy of the right 
of self-determination, including the option of a state, and envisage a future for Israeli settlements 
on the West Bank.’96
Furthermore, it has perpetuated the continuation of unlawful territorial situations, 
while the parties have engaged in long negotiations over the organisation of referenda, 
in particular voting entitlements, language of the ballot question and environmental and 
security conditions under which the choice should be exercised.97
The case of Western Sahara represents possibly the most dramatic failure of UN 
involvement in favouring the organisation of a referendum leading to either the 
independence and full statehood of Western Sahara or its integration with Morocco. In 
fact, 29 years have lapsed since the ICJ unambiguously stated the right of the people of 
Western Sahara to self-determination and Morocco occupied the region, and 16 years 
have lapsed since the ‘Settlement Plan* for the referendum on the final status of Western
Q O
Sahara was published by the UN Secretary-General. The biggest impediment to the 
implementation of the Settlement Plan proved to be from the very outset the 
identification of those people entitled to vote in the referendum. According to the plan 
those entitled to vote would be all Saharans aged 18 years or over counted in the 1974 
Spanish census. The Identification Commission, the body entrusted with the task of 
providing a final list of qualified voters, was mandated by the settlement plan to update 
the 1974 census on the basis of a calculation of births and deaths and the movements of 
the Saharawi population.99 One of the most problematic issues turned out to be the 
identification of the thousands Shahrawi refugees in the neighbouring countries and 
other countries to be identified by the UNHCR. Even more problematic was the 
unwillingness by POLISARIO to accept the promotion by Morocco of thousands of 
applications with respect to certain tribal groups and in particular with respect to some 
specific subfractions of these tribal groups, as the number of members of these groups 
had been expanded in the years of occupation through Morocco’s demographic policy.
96 Drew, supra n. 92,666-667.
97 According to Drew these procedures were not followed in the case of East Timor (ibidem, 671).
98 SC Res. 658 (1990); SC Res. 690 (1991); S/21360; S/22464. Possibly the most comprehensive 
monograph on the history of the unaccomplished decolonisation of Western Sahara from the point of 
view of international law is the recent work by Juan Soroeta Liceras, supra n. 16. See also Franck, ‘The 
Stealing of the Sahara’ 70 AJIL (1976), 694; Zoubir, ‘The Western Sahara Conflict: a Case Study in 
Failure of Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict’ 26 California Western International Law Journal
(1996), 173.
99 Ramcharan, ‘Recourse to the Law in the Settlement of International Disputes: Western Sahara’ 6 
African Yearbook o f International Law (1998), 205, at 216.
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With regard to these contested groupings, another point of friction was the admission of 
written documentation in place of the oral testimony by one of the sheiks appointed by 
POLISARIO to overcome the refusal by POLISARIO to participate in the identification 
process. This led to an impasse in the process from 1995 to 1997.
In 1997 the Settlement Plan was re-vitalised by the appointment of James Baker, 
formerly US Secretary of State, as Personal Envoy of the Secretary General for Western 
Sahara. The first tangible result was a series of direct talks between the parties in
i o n __Lisbon, London and Houston which led in September to the Houston accords. The 
agreements vested the Special Representative with the final and exclusive authority for 
the organisation and celebration of the referendum, committed Morocco to stop any 
policy of new settlements,101 and POLISARIO to accept applicants from contested 
subfractions at the condition of these applicants not being solicited by Morocco. The 
implementation of the Settlement Plan provided by the framework of the Houston 
accords seemed to work smoothly at the initial identification stage. In January 2000 the 
Secretary General published the complete voters list. Of the 198469 applicants, 86386 
were held eligible to vote. The Moroccan reaction was to doubt the impartiality of the 
UN in completing this list and to solicit the appeal of about 79000 applicants. A new 
controversy between Morocco and POLISARIO arose as to which applicants were 
entitled to appeal the UN decision. This led to a second situation of impasse in the 
identification process, aggravated by the Secretary General’s new and unexpected 
policy of stressing the lack of enforcement mechanisms dealing with the post- 
referendum transitional period.102 After a series of inconclusive negotiations in the 
summer of 2000, the action of the Secretary General and his representative James Baker 
saw a U-turn with the attempt to reach a ‘political solution’ to the dispute. The 
Settlement Plan would not be abandoned, but merely ‘put on hold*.103 A new Draft 
Framework Agreement provided for the creation of a Western Saharan Executive 
authority and an Assembly with a substantial degree of self-government and autonomy,
i°° s/1997/742.
101 The policy of settlement of civilians in Western Sahara had continued uninterrupted for over 20 years, 
which has led some commentators to talk about the Second Green March. For instance the population of 
the capital Laayoune increased from 30000 inhabitants in 1975 to 130000 in 1992, a large part of this 
population being composed of Moroccan public officials and their families. Berrada Gouzi, Godeau, 
‘Laayoun, plus fort que le ddsert’, in ‘Que font les Marocains au Sahara?’, 34 Jeune Afrique 1994, 74, cit 
in Soroeta Liceras, supra n. 16, 305, note 1105. Of course, the Settlement Plan by taking as exclusive 
point of reference the groups and tribes censed by Spain in 1975 nullifies the effects of such policy on the 
number of eligible voters.
102 SG Report of 13 February 2000, S/2000/131.
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recognising for Morocco the exclusive competence for foreign relations, national 
security and external defence.104 A referendum would be held within five years from its 
entry into force, and those eligible to vote would be all full residents of Western Sahara 
for the preceding year.105
The change of policy was dramatic as the procedural barriers to an internationally 
recognised and fully-fledged core entitlement to territory were overcome by apparently 
only shifting procedural mechanisms, but in substance reducing the impact of 
substantive entitlements to territory and resources and of the definition of territorial 
unlawfulness on the final solution. Firstly, the Draft Framework Agreement represented 
the first formal UN de facto recognition of Morocco as administrative power, since 
foreign relations, national security and external defence were vested with Rabat.106 Also 
‘symbolic’ issues like Morocco’s flag, currency, postal and telecommunications were 
formally extended to the whole of Western Sahara.107 The Agreement also ambiguously 
referred to the ‘preservation of the territorial integrity against secessionist attempts 
whether from within or without the territory’ among Morocco’s prerogatives.108 
Secondly, the agreement did away with the main thread of the identification process 
since the elaboration of the Settlement Plan -  and confirmed by the Houston accords -  
which was to declare eligible to vote in the referendum only those individuals which 
had a real attachment to the groups and tribes defined in the 1974 census. By allowing 
to vote residents in Western Sahara for the year preceding the referendum, the 
agreement would have allowed access to the polls for thousands of new Moroccan 
settlers. It is not surprising that POLISARIO condemned the new Baker plan as ‘in 
reality pavfing] the way for a programmed annexation of Western Sahara by the 
Kingdom of Morocco.’109 Also Algeria rejected the plan on the basis that it represented 
a radical departure from the Settlement Plan, and it proposed the establishment by 
action of the SC under Chapter VII of a civil and military mission to implement the 
Settlement Plan following the models of Kosovo and East Timor.110 Morocco, on its
103 SG Report of 20 June 2001, S/2001/613.
104 S/2001/613, Annex 1.
105 Ibidem, para. 5.
106 Ibidem, para. 2.
107 Ibidem.
j08 Ibidem.
109 Memorandum from the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Frente 
POLISARIO), in S/200241, Annex 1.
110 Memorandum by the Government of Algeria on the Draft Status Agreement for Western Sahara, in 
S/2001/613, Annex 2.
173
part, welcomed the new plan, while refusing to consider the new proposals by 
POLISARIO to overcome the stalemate in the Settlement Plan.
This led the Secretary General in his Report of 19 February 2002 to reject the 
Algerian proposal in vague terms and state in unusually plain language that ‘[w]e are 
currently faced with a rather bleak situation with regard to the future of the peace 
process in Western Sahara.’111 The Secretary General proposed to the SC to consider 
one of the following options: 1) to move on to consider the 130000 appeals and 
continue with the Settlement Plan without requiring the concurrence of the parties 
before action could be taken; 2) to allow a revision of the Draft Agreement by the 
Personal Envoy taking into account the concerns expressed by the parties, however 
without agreement from the parties if necessary to reach a solution and with an 
endorsement by the SC; 3) to negotiate with the party a possible division of the 
territory, and, in case of lack of agreement, to formulate the division himself, present it 
to the SC, which then would endorse it and submit it to the parties on a non-negotiable 
basis; 4) to terminate MINURSO and to recognise the impossibility of reaching a 
solution.112 The SC did not agree to adopt any of these courses of action, but insisted on 
the effort to reach a ‘political solution’, despite at the same time underlying the 
continuing validity of the Settlement Plan.113
The new and latest proposal drafted by the Personal Envoy has been informally 
submitted to the parties in January 2003 and circulated in May as an annex to a Report 
of the Secretary General.114 The ‘Peace Plan for self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara* is fundamentally an amendment of the Draft Framework Agreement 
with new elements added to meet some of the concerns of POLISARIO and Algeria. 
The most important feature is possibly the addition of a third option as agreed by 
Morocco and the new Western Sahara Authority (WSA) in the referendum to be held no 
earlier than four years after its entry into force and no later than five. As admitted by the 
Secretary General, the envisaged option is the one of substantial autonomy of the 
Western Sahara within the framework of Morocco’s sovereignty. The main features of
111 The reason for the rejection of the Algerian proposal is quite laconic: ‘[My Personal Envoy] is also of 
the view, which I share, that the proposals submitted by Algeria in lieu of the draft framework agreement, 
by which the United Nations would assume sovereignty over Western Sahara in order to implement 
provisions that appear identical to those of the settlement plan, has no more chance than the settlement 
plan of bringing about an early, durable and agreed resolution of the conflict over Western Sahara.’
S/2002/178.
1.2 Ibidem.
1.3 SC Res. 1429 (2002).
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such substantial autonomy is already envisaged in the Peace Plan, as the executive, 
legislative and judiciary of the WSA enjoy a fully-fledged autonomy apart from a 
number of areas left within the competence of Morocco. These areas are the same as in 
the Draft Status Agreement, but for the prohibition of Morocco to ‘prevent, suppress, or 
stifle peaceful public debate, discourse or campaign activity, particularly during any 
election or referendum period’ aiming at promoting the independence of Western 
Sahara.115 Furthermore, the foreign relations concerning Western Sahara will be 
exercised by Morocco ‘in consultation with the Western Sahara Authority on matters 
that directly affect the interests of Western Sahara.’116 In other words, the Peace Plan 
would also represent the first UN de facto recognition of Morocco as administrative 
power in Western Sahara. The other important element is the new shift in policy 
towards eligibility for the referendum. Whereas the Chief Executive and the Legislative 
Assembly shall be elected by following the criteria of the Settlement -  that is, 1999 
provisional voter list plus UNHCR list -  among those entitled to vote for the 
referendum, the Peace Plan also includes those who have resided continuously in 
Western Sahara since 30 December 1999.117 The extension envisaged by the Draft 
Status Agreement is confirmed even if making the requirement of residence stricter. The 
question of identity of the ‘people’ of Western Sahara is still re-opened by the Peace 
Plan and risks affecting substantially the process and outcome of self-determination.
The reaction of the parties has been predictable, even if more mixed than the reaction 
to the Draft Status Agreement. Morocco’s main criticism concerns the relative departure 
from the approach of the Draft Status Agreement, and more specifically with the 
principle of subsidiarity applied to the interim institutional arrangement in favour of the 
WSA and the power conferred to the Secretary General to issue binding interpretations 
in case of disagreement between the parties.118 POLISARIO has recalled the need to 
abide by the terms of the Settlement Plan in order to reach a just and lasting solution. 
Once again, according to POLISARIO, the Peace Plan would recognise the policy of 
annexation and transfer of population effected by Morocco for more than 20 years.119
1.4 S/2003/565, Annex 2.
1.5 Ibidem, para. 8(b).
116 Ibidem, para. 9.
117 Ibidem, para. 5.
118 •Observations of the Kingdom of Morocco on the proposal of James Baker entitled ‘Peace plan for self- 
determination of the people of Western Sahara’, in ibidem.
1,9 Letter dated 8 March 2003 from the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, in ibidem.
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Algeria’s reaction has been open to the new proposal of departure from the UN voters’ 
list, but it has stressed the need for the UN to have a stronger role in supervising the 
fairness of the electoral process and implementing the results of the referendum. 
Furthermore, Algeria has stressed the need for the UN to put into practice a series of 
mechanisms to ensure a safe return of the refugees listed in the UNHCR list, and to 
avoid new transfers of population in the areas occupied by Morocco.120
In conclusion, the effective control by Morocco of large areas of Western Sahara for 
almost 30 years has left tangible signs not only in the landscape of the region with the 
longest man-made wall ever built since the Chinese wall (over 2000 kms.), but also in 
the way the process of self-determination has been developed. The new language of the 
‘peace process’ and ‘political solution’ is perhaps the most pragmatic approach in a 
situation where the SC fails to fully discharge its primary responsibility in the field of 
international peace and security in accordance with international law. However, it is 
likely to put under a sinister light from the point of view of international law the last 
process of decolonisation. The reference to Morocco’s ‘territorial integrity*, ‘national 
security’, ‘determination of borders -  maritime, aerial and terrestrial -  and their 
protection by all appropriate means’121 not only puts the process of self-determination 
and possible transition to statehood of Western Sahara in an odd framework of de facto 
recognition of its annexation, but also recognises the lawfulness of the territorial 
situation as such. Rather than moving away from effectiveness and shift the focus on the 
entitlement to self-determination and statehood, the Peace Plan, by legally recognising 
Morocco’s occupation of the region, risks undermining the essence of self- 
determination as a legal principle which limits the impact of effectiveness on territorial 
situations and consequently empowers peoples with the right to choose an appropriate 
form of self-rule. Its precedential value may reinforce the case for effectiveness and 
occupation as a bargaining strategy and provide an incentive for the continuation of 
unlawful territorial situations all over the world. Instead of a decisive one step forward, 
Western Sahara risks remaining on historical and international law records as a case of 
two steps backwards.
120 Memorandum from Algeria concerning the proposal from the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations entitled ‘Peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara’, in 
ibidem.
121 Peace Plan for Western Sahara, supra n. 114, para. 8(a).
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7. State responsibility in unlawful territorial situations: re-assessing 
the boundaries of legality
Another important consequence of an unlawful territorial situation is that of the 
international responsibility incurred by the occupying state. This follows straight from 
the fact that ‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.’122 A territorial situation established in violation of the 
principles and norms considered in the previous chapters shall inevitably entail the 
international responsibility of the occupying state. In fact, the ILC in its Commentary 
provides among the examples of continuing wrongful acts ‘the unlawful occupation of 
part of the territory of another State or stationing armed forces in another State without 
its consent’.123 The 2001 Articles spell out the secondary obligations deriving from a 
determination of state responsibility, namely a duty of cessation of the wrongful 
conduct and reparation for the moral or material injury caused in the form of restitution, 
compensation or satisfaction in order of priority.124 The obligation to respect another 
state’s territorial sovereignty being an obligation to abstain and being the violation a 
continuing one, the secondary obligation to cease the wrongful conduct overlaps with 
the continued duty of performance of the obligation breached. In other words, the 
typical remedy is withdrawal from the occupied territory, which is both resulting from 
the continued duty of performance of the primary obligation and from the secondary 
obligation to cease the wrongful conduct. Withdrawal is also part of the secondary 
obligation of restitution, which in some cases will provide a full reparation. In other 
cases, however, reparation may involve restitution of property -  for instance cultural 
property -  removed from the territory, and above all monetary compensation for the 
destruction of public and private property, the use of natural resources and the depletion 
of the environment. It is notable that this type of duty of reparation may result from the 
violation of other international obligations such as the one deriving from international 
humanitarian law and international environmental law.125
122 Ait. 1,2001 ILC Articles, supra n. 17.
123 Ibidem, Commentary, 136.
124 Ibidem, Arts. 30-37.
125 The thesis does not examine the issue of state responsibility of the occupier for violations of other sets 
of norms such as international humanitarian law, human rights law, international environmental law and 
the law of natural resources, which under certain circumstances can provide for more effective remedies, 
as compared to the law of territory. E.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur for Palestine of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Mr John Dugard, supra n. 86. This aspect also raises the issue of double
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However, the controversial point is the exact interpretation and understanding of the 
primary norm, the duty to respect the territorial integrity of another state. The 
controversy is particularly relevant to those unlawful territorial situations which 
crystallise in border or territorial disputes.126 In other words, when does an adverse 
territorial occupation represent a violation of territorial sovereignty? Does it 
automatically follow a judicial decision concerning a territorial dispute that the 
occupying state which is found to have no legal title over a certain territory must be 
considered internationally responsible? The following section addresses these questions 
by looking at the very few territorial disputes dealt with by the ICJ, in which a state 
submitted a claim of state responsibility for illegal occupation. Providing an answer to 
these questions also helps me to make more precise the exact content of the criteria of 
legality analysed in the previous chapter.
7.1 Unlawful territorial situations, territorial disputes and the ICJ
The leading case to be considered is the recent Case Concerning the Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Equatorial Guinea 
Intervening)}21 In the course of the litigation before the ICJ, Cameroon advanced a 
series of requests with regard to Nigeria’s international responsibility, including those 
concerning the continuing occupation of the Bakassi peninsula and the Lake Chad area 
by Nigeria. In particular, Cameroon stressed the violations of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, of the duty of non-intervention in Cameroon’s internal affairs, of the uti 
possidetis principle and more in general of Cameroon’s territorial sovereignty and 
integrity caused by the forcible setting up of a civil and military administration in those 
areas in the course of the 1980s and 1990s.128 Cameroon first asked the Court to declare 
Nigeria’s duty to withdraw its civilian and military presence from the peninsula and 
from the Lake Chad area, to cease the exploitation of natural resources in those areas,
responsibility of the occupier (e.g. UNCC Governing Council’s Decision 9, para. 12, S/AC.26/1992/9) 
and the issue of directness of damage (e.g., ibidem, S/AC.26/1991/1; S/AC. 26/1991/7/Rev. 1; 
S/AC.26/1/1992/15), which have been addressed by the UNCC with regard to the Iraqi occupation of 
Kuwait
126 As said above (Ch. 1, note 24) the difference between territorial disputes and border disputes is not a 
difference in kind, but it is only a quantitative difference in terms of the disputed territory.
127 Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Equatorial 
Guinea Intervening), ICJ Decision of 10 October 2002, in http://www.icj- 
cii.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icn_ijudgment_20021010.PDF.
12 Cameroon’s Memorial (1995), 609-613.
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100and to stop its actions aiming at the settlement of Nigerian nationals. Secondly, 
Nigeria ought to stop its aggression juridique such as the administrative arrangements 
designated to incorporate Bakassi in the Nigerian federal structures, in particular the 
creation of the Council of Bakassi in October 1996 and the circulation of maps 
supporting Nigeria’s claim to the peninsula.130 These duties would derive from the duty 
to cease the unlawful conduct inherent in the compliance with the primary norm of 
respect for Cameroon’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, Cameroon asked the Court to 
declare Nigeria’s international responsibility and a secondary duty of reparation for 
material and non-material damage in a form determined by the Court, including 
restitution and compensation to be assessed at a subsequent stage of the proceedings.131 
As for restitution, Cameroon demanded the return of all properties confiscated, and the 
return or re-building of all equipment and infrastructure used or destroyed during the 
occupation.132 A claim for restitution in territorial disputes would have an important 
precedent in the Temple o f Vihear case, in which Cambodia successfully claimed the 
return by Thailand of pieces of cultural property taken during the occupation of the 
area.133 As for the compensation requested, this should cover the military equipment 
destroyed during the Nigerian military actions, the damage suffered by the civilian 
infrastructures such as roads, the losses of physical property and profits due to the 
abandonment of economic activities related to oil and fisheries exploitation, and the 
damage caused in general to Cameroon’s potential economic development due to the 
downfall in economic activities and the military effort required.134 Compensation shall 
also be provided for the moral injury caused to Cameroon.135 Finally, Cameroon 
demanded a commitment by Nigeria not to violate in the future Cameroon’s territorial 
sovereignty and not to question its internationally recognised boundary.136
The Nigerian response is of particular interest, as it spells out some of the difficulties 
associated with a claim for state responsibility in a territorial dispute. It was built on two 
lines of defence. The first line of defence argued that Nigeria was not in breach of an 
international obligation vis-a-vis Cameroon. Firstly, Nigeria had indeed sovereignty
129 Ibidem, 630-636.
130 Oral Pleadings of Cameroon, Tomuschat, CR 2002/16,64-68.
131 Cameroon's Reply (2000), 473-475.
132 Cameroon’s Memorial (1995), 638.
133 Temple o f Vihear (Cambodia/Thailand), ICJ Reports 1962, 6, at 11 and 37. See Cameroon’s Reply 
(2000), 473-475.
134 Cameroon’s Memorial (1995), 640-641.
135 Ibidem.
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over Bakassi and the Lake Chad area, therefore no issue of state responsibility could 
possibly arise. The sending of a substantial military presence to those areas since 1987 
would only reinforce an already well established security presence in those areas, with a 
view to controlling a situation of civil unrest and the increasing incursions by 
Cameroon’s army and police forces.137 In case the Court would decide to adjudicate 
Bakassi and the Lake Chad area to Cameroon, Nigeria was claiming and exercising 
control over them in good faith. What in fact international law protects from the use of 
force directed against a state is not so much formal sovereignty but a status quo, 
whatever solution a tribunal may reach at the end of a process of territorial litigation.138 
Such a status quo is not protected only when it contradicts an internationally recognised 
boundary, and when it has been obtained through resort to force. Both conditions would 
not apply to the present dispute, since the boundary is obviously contested and Nigeria 
has not used force to acquire control over regions it has controlled over a long period of 
time.139 Furthermore, a claim for state responsibility was unprecedented in territorial 
litigation.140 The case of Temple o f Vihear would not support any doctrine of state 
responsibility concerning territorial disputes, since a claim of state responsibility as 
such was not raised by Cambodia, but it was limited to the return of specific items as an 
ancillary of Thailand’s withdrawal.141
As a second line of defence and argument in the alternative, Nigeria claimed that, 
should the Court have reached the conclusion that a wrongful act of forcible occupation 
had been committed, the following defences exempting Nigeria’s responsibility would 
apply: reasonable mistake or honest belief, and self-defence.142 As to the ground of 
reasonable mistake or honest belief, Nigeria argued that the defences listed in the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility, despite not including these concepts, would not be 
exhaustive, and the possibility to use such defences would particularly characterise 
territorial litigation. Moreover, one should also consider the content of the primary 
obligation, whether it would entail a threshold of objective or fault liability.143 Nigeria 
could not be held responsible for actions it had undertaken in the genuine, reasonable
136 Ibidem.
137 Oral Pleadings of Nigeria, Abi-Saab, CR 2002/20,21.
138 Ibidem, 19-20.
139 Ibidem, 22.
140 Oral Pleadings of Nigeria, Watts, CR 2002/20,26.
141 Nigeria’s Rejoinder (2001), para. 15.57.
142 Watts, supra n. 140, 30.
143 Ibidem, 31-32.
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and honest belief of being the lawful sovereign over Bakassi. As to the ground of self- 
defence, Nigeria claimed that it was exactly exercising that right when responding to a 
series of incursions and military operations by Cameroon’s military forces. Whether 
these acts amounted to an armed attack under Article 51 was something to be left to the 
Court for consideration, but the level of force involved made at least a prima facie case 
for Nigeria, so giving rise to its right to respond militarily.144
The Court’s decision is condensed in paragraph 319 of the judgement. It obviously 
begs many of the questions raised by the parties in their written memorials and oral 
pleadings:
‘In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers moreover that, by the very fact of the 
present Judgment and of the evacuation of the Cameroonian territory occupied by Nigeria, the 
injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the occupation of its territory will in all events have 
been sufficiendy addressed. The Court will not therefore seek to ascertain whether and to what 
extent Nigeria’s responsibility to Cameroon has been engaged as a result of that occupation.’
(emphasis added)
The Court concedes that an injury was suffered by Cameroon due to the Nigerian 
occupation, however it refuses to determine whether this injury was the result of an 
unlawful conduct entailing Nigeria’s international responsibility. The Court stresses 
clearly that ordering the withdrawal from the disputed territory shall provide a sufficient 
and effective remedy for Cameroon, as it had been the case in Temple o f Vihear and 
Libya/Chad,145 It further stresses that
‘the implementation of the present Judgment will afford the Parties a beneficial opportunity to co­
operate in the interests of die population concerned, in order notably to enable it to continue to 
have access to educational and health services comparable to those it currentiy enjoys. Such co­
operation will be especially helpful, with a view to the maintenance of security, during the 
withdrawal of the Nigerian administration and military and police forces.’146
This approach, possibly wise from the point of view of a practical solution to the 
complex dispute between the two countries and of the preservation of the interests of 
the local communities affected by it, begs some of the important questions with regard 
to state responsibility as they relate to unlawful territorial situations. Is a claim of state
lu  Ibidem, 32-33.
145 Decision, supra n. 127, paras. 312-317. An injury or damage can also result from an act which is not 
prohibited under international law or that it is even permitted, insofar entailing a diminished level of 
reparation. See ILC Commentary, supra n. 122, 74-75, 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities and Commentary, in 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/preventionfira.htm.
146 Decision, supra n. 127, para. 316.
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responsibility for unlawful occupation of territories incompatible with a territorial or 
border dispute settled by judicial means as argued by Nigeria? What is the exact content 
and meaning of the primary norm protecting a state’s territorial sovereignty? Can the 
defences of honest belief and reasonable mistake advanced by Nigeria be applied in 
order to preclude the wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal occupation? Finally, is the 
Court possibly implying a form of strict liability upon Nigeria for acts not prohibited 
under international law such as the maintenance of a territorial status quo?
I now turn to consider these four questions. As far as the first question is concerned, 
it is fair to say that the claim for state responsibility and reparation for an illegal 
occupation of territory was almost unprecedented in inter-state litigation. This can be 
imputed to the fact that nearly all territorial disputes considered by the ICJ and other 
judicial bodies have been referred to by ad hoc agreements, which did not refer to the 
court any issue of state responsibility but only asked for a final delimitation of the 
boundary. The present case was almost unique because it was brought unilaterally by 
Cameroon under Article 36(2).147 In fact, the only two territorial litigations which 
involved prima facie issues of state responsibility were cases brought unilaterally by 
one of the parties to the dispute. In 1932, in the case between Denmark and Norway on 
the Legal Status o f the South-Eastern Territory o f Greenland, Denmark in its 
application reserved the right to ask the Court for reparation due to the Norwegian 
violation of the existing legal status of South-Eastern Greenland.148 The proceedings 
were discontinued the year after due to Denmark’s withdrawal of its application.149 In 
the Temple o f Vihear case, Cambodia successfully claimed the return by Thailand of 
pieces of cultural property taken during the occupation of the temple’s area.150 
However, as argued by Nigeria, it is true that in that case Cambodia did not raise a 
claim of state responsibility as such, but it claimed the return of specific items as an 
ancillary of Thailand’s withdrawal.151 In the current case Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute brought by Nicaragua against Colombia under Article 36(2) and the Pact of 
Bogota, Nicaragua has reserved ‘the right to claim compensation for elements of unjust 
enrichment consequent upon Colombian possession of the Islands of San Andres and
147 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, Application Instituting Proceedings, 
29 March 1994, in http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm.
148 Legal Status o f the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, Application Instituting Proceedings from 
the Danish Government, 18 July 1932,1933 PCU Series C, n. 69,12.
149 Ibidem, Order of 11 May 1933,1933 PCU Series A/B, n. 55.
150 Temple o f Vihear, supra n. 133,11 and 37.
182
Providencia as well as the keys and maritime spaces up to the 82 meridian, in the 
absence of lawful title.’152 In conclusion, the judicial practice of states is very scanty in 
this respect, however, the three mentioned cases prove that the demands inherent in a 
claim for state responsibility are not incompatible with a territorial litigation, and in fact 
they characterise most of the territorial disputes brought unilaterally before the ICJ.153
What, however, both Cameroon/Nigeria and Temple o f Vihear do not answer is the 
second question, that is what is the exact content and meaning of the primary duty to 
respect another state’s territorial sovereignty. Such determination is of the greatest 
importance, since the violation of the counter-part sovereign rights is one of the two 
pre-conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act (the other being the 
attribution). A precise understanding of the primary norms is also necessary to re-assess 
the principles of legality that define the ‘unlawfulness’ of territorial situations. Sir 
Arthur Watts’ reference to a threshold of objective or, alternatively, of fault liability in 
Nigerian oral pleadings is particularly apt to catch this problem.154 In fact, a certain 
degree of fault may be required in territorial disputes, since there can be situations 
where one state reasonably and in good faith believes to have sovereignty over a certain 
area it occupies. This can apply for example where the parties to the dispute agree on 
the instrument drawing their boundary, but not on the exact interpretation of that 
instrument. Or, for instance, where a peaceful display of effective authority has not been 
contested by the other party for a long time. In this case, the reasonable mistake can 
apply to the significance to be accorded to that acquiescence. In Cameroon/Nigeria it is 
difficult to think that Nigeria’s occupation of Bakassi originated from a reasonable 
mistake or honest belief. It should have been manifest to Nigeria that Bakassi had been 
considered part of the Cameroons during the British Mandate and Trusteeship 
Administration. Furthermore, Nigeria had recognised the uti possidetis according to the 
1913 Treaty in 1961, and it continued to negotiate its maritime boundary with 
Cameroon under that assumption until 1975. These negotiations even resulted in the
151 Nigeria’s Rejoinder (2001), para. 15.57.
152 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua/Colombia), Application of Nicaragua, 6 December 2001, 
in http://www.icj -cij .org/icj ww w/idocket/inicol/inicolorder/inicol_iapplication_20011206.html.
153 One may ask why states which agree to delimit their boundary by judicial means do not also want the 
tribunal to consider the issue of responsibility and possibly claims for reparation. The answer may 
probably lie in two joint factors. First, most of the territorial disputes are about the exact drawing of the 
boundary and the re-attribution of land is often minimal and/or the dispute does not entail any steady 
pattern of adverse occupation. Second, a risk and cost-benefit analysis of choosing judicial litigation 
discourages both sides from jointly submitting issues of state responsibility.
154 Watts, supra n. 142,31-32.
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signing of a formal instrument, the 1975 Maroua Declaration. After 1975 its actions and 
its presence in Bakassi was the object of a limited but significant number of protests and 
actions by Cameroon. Even if it doubted the validity of certain provisions of the 1913 
Treaty because of the encroachment on Old Calabar’s rights - this being a reasonable 
doubt - it should have been evident to Nigeria that because of Old Calabar’s inaction 
until 1961 and its inaction until 1975, Cameroon had title to Bakassi. Furthermore, the 
qualification of ‘honest belief, even if established, should apply only for the areas 
under established peaceful control, and not for the areas of the peninsula acquired in 
1993-1994 through military action. As argued by Nigeria herself, a peaceful status quo 
is protected against forcible measures when not itself resulting from military action.155 
Such definition of peaceful status quo certainly did not apply to some of Cameroon’s 
towns occupied ex novo by Nigeria in 1993-1994. Finally, choosing a threshold of fault 
liability also excludes the possibility to use the same concepts of ‘honest belief and 
‘reasonable mistake’ as defences available precluding the wrongfiilness of an act of 
occupation as done by Nigeria in its Counter-memorial and Rejoinder.156 This is in tune 
with the Commentary to the 2001 ILC Articles, which does not list the two concepts 
among the defences available, and suggests that the set of circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness is exhaustive.157
The final question I have posed is whether the remedy imposed by the Court upon 
Nigeria implies what international lawyers have defined as ‘liability for acts not 
prohibited under international law*. It must be said at the outset that the elaboration of 
the concept of liability for lawful acts has been elaborated by the ILC with regard to 
state liability for transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, which seems to 
rule out its application to the question of territorial disputes. The category has also 
attracted considerable criticism, as argued by Brownlie who in 1983 claimed that *[t]he 
search for principles governing ‘liability’ for ‘lawful activities* seems to fly in the face 
of all existing legal experience.*158 There appears to be two features of the laconic 
decision of the Court, which apparently fit into the category of liability for non­
prohibited acts. The first feature, as said, is the diminished level of reparation envisaged 
by the Court as a remedy, which differs from the full reparation that state responsibility
155 Abi-Saab, supra n. 137,19-20.
156 Ibidem.
157 ILC Arts. 20-27. Commentary, supra n. 122,162.
158 Brownlie, System o f the Law o f Nations: State Responsibility (Part I) (1983), 50.
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requires.159 In fact, the withdrawal requested of Nigeria by the Court certainly 
represents a form of territorial ‘restitution’ insofar entailing a diminished level of 
reparation, not including the compensation and the undertaking of non-repetition asked 
by Cameroon. Such a feature is also present in Temple o f Vihear, as Cambodia did ask 
for the withdrawal of Thailand and the restitution of archeological items, without raising 
a claim for state responsibility jointly with a claim for full reparation. Most importantly, 
a declaratory judgement in itself and, in some cases, an explicit request of withdrawal 
from the territory have represented the typical form of remedy envisaged by 
international tribunals in the adjudication of territorial disputes not involving a claim for 
state responsibility.160 The second feature is a form of strict or risk liability regarding 
territorial situations which are found to be contrary to the exact determination of 
territorial sovereignty effected by the international tribunal. In fact, all judicial decisions 
concerning territorial disputes involving an adverse possession normally require the 
‘restitution’ of the occupied territory and the compliance with the tribunal’s 
determinations. This is a form of reparation provided for by the primary norm despite 
the bona fide claim of the losing party to the dispute. In other words, the very fact of the 
occupation of a disputed territory potentially affects the legal interest of the other party, 
and it is thus subject to a form of risk liability when such occupation is found to be 
adverse to the determination of the Court.
The main implication of adopting by analogy the concept of liability for non­
prohibited acts seems to be that both Thailand’s occupation of the Temple of Vihear 
area, and Nigeria’s occupation of the Bakassi peninsula and the Lake of Chad area did 
not represent an unlawful act, ergo did not infringe upon the counterpart’s rights. In 
other words, the two occupations did not represent an unlawful territorial situation. This
159 The commonly quoted passage of the Chorzow Factory case (Factory at Chorzow, 1928, P.C.I.J., 
Series A, No. 17,47) states that ‘reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the 
value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which 
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it -such are the principles which 
should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law’. See 
also Art. 31, 2001 ILC Articles. As for the differences regarding reparation between responsibility for 
wrongful acts and liability for acts not prohibited under international law see Barboza, ‘International 
Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law and Protection of the 
Environment’ 247 Recueil des Cours (1994), 291, at 313-314.
160 E.g. Sovereignty over Frontier Land (Belgium/The Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1959, 209; Case 
Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), ICJ Reports 1986, 554; Case Concerning the 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports 
1992,351; Territorial Dispute (Libya/Tchad), ICJ Reports 1994,6.
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conclusion is warranted if the Court considered both occupations as not entailing a 
degree of fault, in which case the analysis given of the primary norm is tenable, 
however different may be the evaluation of the Nigerian conduct, or, alternatively, that 
the analysis of the primary norm has to be adjusted. The argument here bounces back to 
the question of fault, as defined above by the concepts of good faith, reasonable mistake 
and honest belief. It has been argued that Nigeria’s occupation of Bakassi could not 
possibly originate after 1975 from an honest belief or reasonable mistake. It is difficult 
to say whether the Court is implying a higher threshold of burden of proof regarding the 
fault by requiring evidence of dolus or malicious conduct, or whether it simply was 
convinced that the Nigeria claim originated from an honest belief or reasonable mistake. 
The silence of the Court on this point and the little jurisprudence at disposal does not 
help us to answer this question. I will therefore turn to state practice with regard to 
unlawful territorial situations resulting from serious breaches of international law and 
not involving judicial litigation to make sense of this unmapped area.
7.2 Unlawful territorial situations resulting from serious breaches of 
international law
Some useful elements can be drawn from state practice with regard to state 
responsibility arising out of an attempt of territorial aggrandisement by force, or of the 
forcible denial of the right of self-determination of peoples leading to the establishment 
of unlawful territorial situations. These cases are often considered, according to Article 
40 of the ILC Articles, as serious breaches of peremptory international norms, defined 
as ‘a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.’ The 
ILC Commentary suggests that one of the elements involved, apart from the magnitude 
of the violation, is also the intent to carry out such acts in defiance of fundamental 
norms.161 In other words, these violations already entail a substantial degree of fault, 
thereby excluding the possibility to claim a reasonable mistake or honest belief. 
International practice does not leave any doubt as to whether territorial situations in 
violation of peremptory norms entail the responsibility of the occupying state. Firstly, 
the nature of these violations also characterises them as threats to international peace 
and security, which is why in some instances the SC has decided to take action in their 
respect. In the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, this has also involved a
161 ILC Commentary, supra n. 122, 247.
186
determination of state responsibility. SC Resolution 687, which put an end to the First 
Gulf War, affirmed Iraq’s liability under international law ‘for any direct loss, damage, 
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to 
foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait.’162 On that occasion, the SC also set up a claims settlement 
mechanism, by creating the UN Compensation Commission, which has dealt, and in 
fact is still dealing, with claims from individuals, corporations, governments and 
international organisations.163 With regard to South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, the 
UN Secretary General affirmed in his written pleadings submitted to the ICJ the 
international responsibility of South Africa deriving from its breaches of ius cogens 
norms.164 The Same position was adopted by the Organization of African Unity, India 
and Finland.165 The Court, despite being requested by the SC to deal with the legal 
consequences for third parties, also affirmed South Africa’s international responsibility 
for its continuing occupation.166
The other peculiar element of these violations is spelled out in Article 41(2), which 
states that ‘[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious violation 
within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that 
situation.’ In order to clarify its precise meaning, this provision must be clearly 
reconciled within the theory of invalidity of unlawful territorial situations developed by
i fnthe Court in the Namibia case, and the ILC Commentary confirms such need. The 
breach of this duty of non-recognition upon a third party can potentially entail 
international responsibility. In the East Timor case, for instance, Portugal in its 
application asked the Court ‘to adjudge and declare that, by the breaches indicated [...], 
Australia has incurred international responsibility and it has caused damage, for which it 
owes reparation to the people of East Timor and to Portugal, in such form and manner 
as may be indicated by the Court.’168 Among the alleged breaches related to Australia 
entering into a treaty of continental shelf delimitation and exploitation with the
162 SC Res. 687 (1991), para. 16.
163 SC Res. 692 (1991). See Gattini, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New Procedures on 
War Reparation’, 13 EJIL (2002), 161; Caron, Morris, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: Practical 
Justice not Retribution’, in ibidem, 183.
164 Namibia, supra n. 9, Written Statements and Oral Pleadings, Vol. 1,102.
165 Ibidem, Oral Statement OAU, Vol. 2, 101; Written Statement of India, Vol. 2, 117; Written Statement 
of Finland, Vol 1, 373. Finland demanded also compensation for damages.
166 Ibidem, Decision, 54.
167 ILC Commentary, supra n. 122,251-252. Namibia, supra n. 9, 54-56.
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occupying power Indonesia, Portugal also claimed the breach of ‘the right of the people 
of East Timor to self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity and its permanent 
sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources.*169 In its written pleadings Portugal 
argued that reparation may take the form of Australia’s cessation of its unlawful 
activities, a commitment to non-repetition, and finally compensation for the material 
damage caused to the East Timorese people, possibly by financing a common fund for 
the promotion of East Timor’s independence to be put under UN administration.170 The 
case did not proceed to the merits stage due to the Court’s finding that it lacked 
jurisdiction.171
The difference between wrongful occupations typically dealt with before an 
international tribunal, and wrongful occupations resulting from the serious breach of 
peremptory norms, relates both to the gravity of the violation and to a difference of 
approach in the way the international community treats these unlawful territorial 
situations, rather than the result of the application of different legal principles to the two 
categories. In fact also unlawful territorial situations resulting from serious breaches of 
peremptory norms most of the times can be the result of, or crystallise in, territorial 
disputes, and they also are concerned with violations of the law of territory. For 
instance, both Iraq with regard to Kuwait and South Africa with regard to Namibia 
articulated their claim in terms of territorial entitlement, and the two issues can be 
without any doubt classified as being also territorial disputes.172 The question of fault or 
bad faith a fortiori applies also to these cases, and the seriousness of the breach is 
mostly due to the level of open and deliberate disregard of fundamental international 
obligations, rather than the erga omnes character as such of these obligations.
As an analogy to the two cases just mentioned we can take the Nigerian occupation 
of Bakassi and the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. These latter cases also
168 East Timor Case (Portugal/Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90. Application Instituting Proceedings, 22 
February 1991,19.
169 Ibidem.
170 Ibidem, Written Pleadings of Portugal, 231-234.
171 Ibidem, Decision.
172 As to South Africa’s claim to Namibia based on conquest and acquisitive prescription see Oral 
Statement of the UN Secretary General’s Representative, in Namibia, supra n. 164, Oral Statements and 
Correspondance, Vol. n , 57-58. The Iraqi claim to the total incorporation of Kuwait was based on an 
historical title deriving from the inclusion of Kuwait in the province of Basra during the Ottoman Empire 
and the Iraqi succession to that territorial title. See in particular the Statement of Iraq before the Security 
Council of 2 August 1990, in S/PV.2932. For analysis and criticism of the Iraqi claim see Mendelson, 
Hulton, ‘La revendication par l’Iraq de la souverainetd sur le Koweit’ 36 Annuaire Frangaise de Droit 
Internationale (1990), 195.
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involve an attempt of forcible territorial change, the case of Israel also involving a 
denial of self-determination. However, what differs, is the magnitude of the alleged 
violation and the level of malicious conduct involved in breaching international law. In 
fact Nigeria’s claim does not involve a claim of total annexation of Cameroon, but it is 
limited to boundary areas. Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank has been 
justified since 1967 earlier on the basis of a war of self-defence (rather than a war of 
aggression) and after the 1993 Oslo Agreements on security grounds to tackle terrorist 
activities rather than a general disregard for the right of self-determination of the 
Palestinian people. Also the territorial ‘adjustments’ to the 1949 Armistice line claimed 
by Israel are relatively minor, and they are sought within the framework of final status 
negotiations between the two parties in the conflict.173
One definitive conclusion that one can draw from the practice analysed above is that 
where the occupation is the result of a gross or systematic violation of a peremptory 
norm, international responsibility will be entailed through an enhanced regime of 
collective non-recognition. This also clearly indicates that territorial situations 
originating from such breaches are undoubtedly unlawful. The problem however still 
remains for those acts which do no present the same level of magnitude or dolus, for 
instance the two mentioned examples of Bakassi and Palestine. The differentiation 
between serious violations of peremptory norms and ‘non-serious* violations of these 
norms concedes to the argument that there exist a series of cases where these norms can 
be violated without entailing the same level of magnitude or dolus. Unfortunately, the 
ILC is silent on which instances it is referring to. Obviously, determinations by 
authoritative organs like the SC most of the times define the seriousness of the breach, 
and they inevitably entail a degree of inconsistency. However, a judicial body assessing 
a territorial dispute should be in the position to independently decide the matter by 
looking at the level of malicious conduct involved, as much as the magnitude of the 
alleged violation. It is submitted that the concepts of honest belief, good faith, 
reasonable mistake and peaceful status quo tested against the pattern of the adverse 
occupation and the legal claim underlying it should all help to define the threshold of 
malicious conduct leaving for the tribunal or, for that matter, any observer, a wide
173 As far as the final negotiations are concerned, a problematic issue with regard to the continuing Israeli 
occupation could be the duress under which the Palestinian side would negotiate the final territorial 
settlement On this aspect see McHugo, ‘Resolution 242: A Legal Reappraisal of the Right-Wing Israeli 
Interpretation of the Withdrawal Phrase with reference to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians’, 
51 ICLQ (2002), 851, at 861.
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enough margin of appreciation. To envisage a higher threshold of fault means to render 
difficult the distinction between standard violations of a state’s territorial sovereignty 
and serious violations, at the same time making the rules of territorial sovereignty 
particularly loose and weak in terms of remedies available. That is inconsistent with the 
enormous legal, political and symbolic importance states attach to them. That leads me 
to confirm the validity of the analysis made above concerning the occupation of Bakassi 
by Nigeria, and to question the choice of the Court not to even consider Cameroon’s 
claim of state responsibility. As for the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the prohibition 
to change a peaceful status quo by force, the stance adopted by the SC and the GA in 
various occasions demanding the withdrawal of Israel,174 the settlement of more than 
200000 Israeli citizens throughout the years, the promotion, approval and security 
support by the Israeli authorities of these settlements even during the years of the Oslo 
peace process all hint in the direction of a high level of fault. That warrants the 
conclusion that the occupation is unlawful per se, thereby entailing the international 
responsibility of Israel, despite not being necessarily a serious violation of a peremptory 
norm for the reasons outlined above.
In conclusion, the law of state responsibility as it applies to the law of territory helps 
us define the exact content of the primary norms protecting states’ and peoples’ 
territorial sovereignty. Whereas the principles of legality analysed in the previous 
chapter by their automatic application may with certainty define the entitlement to 
territory, the way these principles also protect territorial sovereignty has revealed itself 
to be less clear-cut. Cases involving a change of territorial status through the use of 
force and/or the secession from a state will ipso facto lead to the creation of an unlawful 
territorial situation, unless the forcible change can be construed within a legal use of 
force and the act of secession is legal (obtained through consent and/or in 
implementation of the right of self-determination). In other words, the analysis 
formulated in previous sections is sufficient to define the lawful/unlawful divide. 
However, in territorial disputes where the principles of uti possidetis and/or the 
principle of self-determination are at stake, an adverse occupation resulting from a 
reasonable mistake, good faith conduct and an honest belief -  in other words in 
situations where bad faith, malicious conduct, and magnitude of the alleged violation 
are not proven -  will not be considered ipso facto unlawful. They will entail a form of
174 See in particular SC Res. 242 (1967); SC Res. 338 (1973); SC Res. 478 (1980); more recently GA Res.
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objective liability for acts not prohibited by international law. That makes a definition 
of unlawfulness of a territorial situation more problematic than suspected, and it may 
explain the reason why international judicial and political bodies are often reluctant to 
expressly make such determination. Rather than providing a justification for the lack of 
engagement by authoritative bodies with this important legal issue, such explanation 
highlights the need above all for judicial bodies to map a surprisingly unexplored area 
of international law.
8. Legitimacy, recognition and legitimation of unlawful territorial 
situations
A final important aspect to analyse is that of legitimacy, as this concept also impacts 
on the definition of the legal consequences of unlawful territorial situations. My main 
proposition in this section is that while recognition is the act through which states and 
international organisations recognise the legal effects produced by an unlawful 
territorial situation, in some cases gradually transforming the original unlawfulness into 
lawfulness, legitimacy provides the conceptual element to explain why in some cases 
such recognition is widespread, while in some others it is only isolated. In other words, 
legitimacy is the key concept in reconciling a violating effectiveness and the principles 
of territorial unlawfulness.
The concept of legitimacy has attracted much attention in the fields of law, political 
theory and international relations in the course of the 20th Century.175 Focusing on the 
international arena, it is interesting to analyse the debate in international relations and 
international law.176 For instance, Ian Hurd, an international relations theorist, defines 
legitimacy as ‘the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be 
obeyed’.177 Hurd, despite continuously referring to ‘norms* and ‘rules’, hardly mentions 
the expression ‘international law’. It may be argued that the concepts of ‘normative 
belief and ‘rule’ in international relations are broader than the way the same concepts
A/ES-10/11.
173 For an analysis of the concept of legitimacy from a legal and philosophical perspective see Roth, supra
n. 72,17-35.
176 For some interesting accounts of the way legitimacy is conceived in international relations theory see 
Barnett, ‘Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations’ 49 World 




are seen by an international lawyer. Yet, the ‘case-study’ used by Hurd to test his 
approach to compliance and legitimacy deals with the principle of non-intervention, one 
of the basic principles of international law.
On the other hand, much work on the concept of legitimacy in international law has 
been carried out by Thomas Franck, whose concern has been mostly to define which 
inherent characteristics a positive rule must have to be considered legitimate in the 
international society and therefore complied with.178 These inherent characteristics are, 
according to Franck, determinacy, symbolic validation and coherence.179 Their 
existence would ensure what Franck calls the ‘pull towards compliance’ by international 
actors, so fundamental for a legal system without a developed mechanism of centralised 
enforcement. In other words, it seems that Hurd is approaching legitimacy in the same 
way as Franck, only with a different language and agenda. Yet a closer analysis unveils 
some important differences, which apply by and large to the approach shared by 
international lawyers regarding the concept of legitimacy. International lawyers have 
tended to focus on the legitimacy of positive rules and the decisions of authoritative 
decision-making bodies in the international arena. Whereas Franck provided the most 
original contribution on legitimacy in positive rules, Georgiev for instance addressed 
the question of reconciling potentially contradicting legal principles and norms through 
legitimate decision-making. While he refers to the legitimacy of rules or behaviours in 
the following passage, it is clear that he is also referring to the legitimacy of specific 
decisions within a certain positive legal framework. He states:
‘Answering the question about the legitimacy of a rule or of behavior will involve...making 
choices and constructing solutions which have to conform with contradicting and indeterminate 
principles. Therefore, these choices and solutions could be called ‘political’. Even so, this would 
be politics within law, politics which would not be sheer unrestrained arbitrary power. It would not 
be ‘subjective’ politics destroying the ‘objectivity’ of international law but a process of 
‘politicisation’ of law (and perhaps of ‘legalisation’ of politics) which aims at solving the 
contradictions within international law and enhancing its pertinence for an international rule of 
law.’180
Goergiev’s argument is that the broad scope of certain rules, like for instance self- 
determination and the prohibition to use force, makes their application potentially 
contradictory, thus the legitimacy discourse becomes important in this respect. When a
178 Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ 82 AJIL (1988), 705.
179 Franck, The Power o f Legitimacy among Nations (1990).
180 Georgiev, ‘Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law’ 4 EJIL 
(1993), 1, at 13-14. A similar point is made by Brad Roth, who talks about ‘legal legitimacy’ (supra n. 
72, 33).
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certain factual background is exactly and uncontroversially matched by a positive norm 
definition, legality discourse will provide all we need to analyse the divide 
lawfulness/unlawfulness. However, when the legal assessment of a certain factual 
situation requires examination and application of different and perhaps opposing broad 
principles, then it will be exactly legitimacy discourse, which will justify one choice 
rather than another. This level of legitimacy analysis is particularly useful to assess the 
action of the SC within its broad powers under Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to 
territorial issues. In fact, a more specific analysis of ‘legitimate decision-making* in 
international law has been concerned with the legitimacy of SC’s actions, as a way to 
enhance its credibility and effectiveness as a major actor in the field of international 
peace and security.181
Another important level where legitimacy acts is the ‘accommodation* of the legal 
order to certain actions that, despite representing violations of an international norm, 
produce effects or situations which are perceived as legitimate by a part of the 
international community, or the international community as a whole, and therefore are 
acquiesced to or more or less reluctantly accepted. This does not mean that that 
particular act does not represent a violation of international law, it only means that the 
system ‘tolerates’ and ‘recognises* the legal effects of the factual situation produced by 
that violation. This function of legitimacy is particularly important in some unlawful 
territorial situations. Typically, international lawyers have focused on recognition as a 
key to reconciling an unlawful territorial effectiveness and its recognition by states or 
the international community as a whole. Some other classic modes of territorial 
acquisition could be added such as prescriptive acquisition, or historical consolidation 
in order to explain the process by which originally unlawful territorial situations 
become accepted as ‘valid’ by the international community. Yet it is submitted that a 
step further should be made by explaining why in some cases unlawful territorial 
situations become legalised, whereas in others they do not. Explaining the reasons 
behind this process helps us define also exactly the process by which that happens, 
which does not consist of a ‘supernatural’ power of states to transform illegality into 
legality only by issuing different unilateral declarations of recognition. It also points to
181 Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ 87 AJIL (1993), 552, at 
557; Fassbender, ‘Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: the Role and Functioning of the UN 
Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq’ 13 EJIL (2002), 273, at 292. See infra Ch. 6, 
section 4.
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legitimacy as trait d ’union between effectiveness and legality. Some examples can 
clarify my point.
One example is the 1997 Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in the Quebec case.182 
In that case the Court made clear that the right to secede and the possibility that a 
certain secession, once factually established, creates legal effects at the international 
level were two different matters from a legal point of view. The ‘legalisation’ of the 
effective situation would not change the violating nature of the unilateral secession. 
However, the concept of legitimacy would represent the link between those two gaps 
between violation and legality. If the purported secession of Quebec was declared in 
defiance of the Canadian constitutional principles - democratic principle, federal 
principle, rule of law - and the fundamental principles of the international community - 
respect of human rights, peaceful settlement of disputes, etc.- the process would most 
likely be seen as illegitimate and gain only limited if any recognition in the international 
community.183 The action of effectiveness would be more easily limited. If by contrast 
effectiveness is accompanied by a legitimate claim, its role is boosted. In other words, 
the role of effectiveness as power is enhanced by the legitimacy of the claim and the 
legitimacy of the process through which such a claim is articulated.184 To be noted is the 
fact that the legitimacy is not a concept foreign to the law, but it builds on the basic 
legal principles of a certain community, be it national or international. The Supreme 
Court goes so far as to state that ‘one of the legal norms which may be recognized by 
States in granting or withholding recognition of emergent States is the legitimacy by 
which the de facto secession is, or was, being pursued.’185
Despite arguing for the neutrality of international law towards secession, Buchheit 
similarly explains the recognition or non-recognition of attempted secessions through 
the lenses of legitimacy.186 In particular, Buchheit defines legitimacy through two 
criteria, the ‘internal merits of the claim’ and ‘the disruption factor’.187 The ‘internal 
merits of the claim’ refer to criteria of effectiveness of the self-determining unit such as 
the ethnic and social cohesiveness, the occupation of a distinct territorial basis and the
182 Re Reference by the Governor in Council concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession o f  
Quebec from Canada, 115ILR (1999), 535. See supra Ch. 4, section 5.
183 Ibidem, 576.
184 On legitimacy as a procedural factor underlying a broader notion of fairness see Franck, Fairness in 
International Law and Institutions (1995).
185 Quebec case, supra n. 182,589-590.
186 Buchheit, Secession (1978).
187 Ibidem, 228-238.
194
economic viability of a future state. On the other hand, ‘the disruption factor’ refers to 
the end-result of the secession in terms of maintenance of regional and international 
peace and security, the existence of minorities in the self-governing unity and the 
willingness to respect those groups’ linguistic and cultural rights, and the compliance in 
general with fundamental human rights. In other words, ‘the disruption factor* refers to 
the potential threat of the secession for regional and international peace and security, 
and its compliance with fundamental international norms. In conclusion, Buchheit too 
seems to envisage a legitimacy built within an international legal framework as being 
pre-conditional to the legalisation of an effective secession.
Another case highlighting the relevance of legitimacy to unlawful territorial 
situations, and, in particular, the way such unlawfulness can be cured by its legitimacy, 
is the case of Indian occupation of Goa. On 17-18 December 1961 Indian military 
forces invaded the Portuguese territories of Goa, Danao and Diu on the Indian sub­
continent. On December 18, Portugal asked the SC ‘to put a stop to the condemnable act 
of aggression of the Indian Union, ordering an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal 
forthwith from Portuguese territories of Goa, Danao and Diu of all the invading forces 
of the Indian Union.’188 A resolution along these lines was discussed but not adopted by 
the Council because of the veto put by the USSR. A draft resolution rejecting the 
Portuguese complaint was voted down by seven votes to five.189 The discussion that 
ensued at the SC is interesting because whereas Western states underlined the violation 
of the international norms on the use of force by India and the refusal to accept any 
unilateral change through the use of force, India and those countries supporting its 
territorial claims claimed along the lines of the existence of a right of self-determination 
of those people under colonial domination to have international support in their struggle 
for liberation. The case of Goa is from a legal point of view analogous to the one of 
East-Timor. A territory under Portuguese administration having the status of NSGT; a 
territorial contiguity of the annexing state; a claim by the annexing state to enforce the 
right of the people to free themselves from colonial domination; the lack of democratic 
expression towards the acceptance of the annexation. Yet, the invasion of Goa was not 
condemned by the UN political organs, and Portugal recognised Indian sovereignty in 
1974 followed by the whole international community. The significance of this general 
recognition is not so much of importance because it suddenly transforms an illegal act -
188 S/5030,18 December 1961.
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the invasion and the annexation in the first place - into a legal act; it is important 
because it witnesses the legalisation of the effects of the illegal act and, in particular, the 
annexation from a certain point in time onwards because of the legitimacy of the claims
• * i  onbehind it. Unlike in East Timor, in the case of Goa there was support in the 
population for the incorporation with India. Unlike in East Timor, there was no national 
liberation movement struggling for the option of independence. The claim of India 
acquired legitimacy at the international level because of its conformity with the 
fundamental principles of the international community, in particular the one of self- 
determination, and so did its effectiveness on the former Portuguese territories.191
Whereas these examples rely more on the compliance with other fundamental 
principles of international law to justify the legitimisation of a territorial situation 
produced by an original violation of the norms protecting states’ territorial sovereignty, 
the case of Iraq relies more on the authority of the body conferring legitimacy to an 
originally unlawful territorial situation, namely the UN, and, only to a limited extent, to 
the subsequent compliance with international law of the occupying states. In fact, the 
concept of authority in legitimacy analysis has been neglected by international 
lawyers,192 who have mostly focused on how authoritative decision-making bodies can 
change international rules and legal situations or can make their actions more effective 
by fulfilling internal criteria of substantive and procedural legitimacy. International 
lawyers have looked at legitimacy as a way to make an international body more
189 SCOR, 987th Meeting (1961).
190 Crawford similarly argues that ‘[t]he significance of self-determination in this context is not so much 
that it cures illegality as that it may allow illegality to be more readily accomodated through the processes 
of recognition and prescription, whereas in other circumstances aggression partakes of the nature of a 
breach of jus cogens and is not, or not readily, curable by prescription, lapse of time or acquiescence.’ 
Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law (1979), 113. See also Dugard, Recognition and the 
United Nations (1987), 115.
191 This appears to be also the grounds on which The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
based its conclusion that NATO military intervention in Kosovo was illegal but legitimate. According to 
the Commission, Operation Allied Force was in breach of positive ius ad bellum, but its aims, the 
protection of ethnic Albanians’ human rights and their right to self-government, and means, an aerial 
campaign which complied with rules of international humanitarian law ‘better than any air war in 
history’, showed a general compliance with the ‘spirit’ of the UN Charter and of international law, 
thereby making it legitimate. Furthermore, as in the case of Goa, also in the case of Kosovo a Russia- 
sponsored SC resolution condemning the action was defeated (S/1999/328). The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (2000), 163-198.
192 With possibly the only exception of policy-oriented jurisprudence, which sees authority as a necessary 
element of its notion of law as a process of communication of authoritative decisions. E.g. McDougal, 
Reisman, ‘The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made’ 6 
Yale Studies in World Public Order (1980), 249; Reisman, ‘International Lawmaking: A Process of 
Communication: The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture’ 75 ASIL Proceedings (1981), 101.
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authoritative, in other words they have considered the internal dimension of authority.193 
On the other hand, international relations writers have borrowed from political science 
to focus on the concept of authority. For instance Blau states that ‘we speak of 
authority, therefore, if the willing unconditional compliance of a group of people rests 
upon their shared beliefs that it is legitimate for the superior...to impose his will upon 
them and that it is illegitimate for them to refuse obedience.’194 If we export this idea to 
the international arena, authority becomes the external vehicle to confer legitimacy upon 
international norms or situations.193 This is very important in unlawful territorial 
situations, as the conferral of legitimacy by an authoritative decision-making body, like 
the SC or the GA, upon an unlawful territorial situation is one of the ways a violating 
effectiveness becomes legalised.
Iraq in 2003 is an interesting example. On 20 March 2003 the US and the UK with 
the support of some coalition partners started a massive military operation against Iraq 
{Operation Iraqi Freedom) with the aim of invading the country, overthrowing the 
regime of Saddam Hussein and getting rid of its weapons of mass destruction. The legal 
claim shared by the US and the UK was the authority conferred by a joint reading of SC 
Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441.196 The military operation was a success for the coalition 
forces. By mid April Saddam was no longer in power. On 8 May 2003 the US and the 
UK informed the SC of the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ‘to 
exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, to provide security, to 
allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction.’197 On 22 May 2003 the SC adopted Resolution 1483, which, despite 
‘reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq’, ‘recogniz[ed] the specific 
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these 
states [i.e. the US and the UK] as occupying powers under unified command (the 
“Authority”).’198 It also
*call[ed] upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
international law’ to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration
Supra n. 181.
194 Blau, ‘Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority’ 57 American Political Science Review 
(1963), 305, at 307.
195 Hurd, supra n. 176, 399.
196 UK Attorney General Statement, 17 March 2003, in 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/story/0,2763,916078,00.html. The same legal grounds were claimed by 
the US and Australia.
197 S/2003/538.
198 SC Res. 1483 (2003), Preamble.
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of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security 
and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their 
own political future.’199
Is the territorial situation in Iraq after SC Resolution 1483 lawful or unlawful using 
the thesis’ normative framework? The first issue relating to the ius ad bellum is whether 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was lawful, thereby justifying the current occupation of Iraq. 
The legality of the use of force in Iraq has sparked a very lively debate among 
international lawyers.200 1 will only dwell upon it briefly, as I want to focus primarily on 
the legality of the occupation rather than the use of force as such. It is my contention 
that the military action in Iraq was unlawful, as its legal justification was based on an 
authorisation to use force which dated back to 1990 granted in order to deal with the 
different situation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 1441 put into motion a 
process of enhanced regime of UN inspection with a view to conceding a last 
opportunity to Iraq to comply with previous UN resolutions. The process was based on 
the authority of the SC to deal with the situation on the basis of the UN Chief 
Inspector’s reports.201 In his last report the Chief Inspector welcomed some positive 
steps undertaken by the Iraqi authorities and asked for more months to give a conclusive 
assessment to the SC.202 It is clear that the US and the UK, which had prepared the 
military operation for months, were not ready to wait for such a long period of time.203 
It is also clear that the US, the UK and Spain, despite the strong diplomatic pressure put 
on many of the members of the SC, were not able to gather a majority behind a new 
resolution authorising military action.204 It is my argument here that Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, rather than being based on the authority of the SC and being an enforcement 
of previous resolutions, was exactly the contrary, a military action pursued in defiance 
of the authority of the SC, therefore contrary to international law.
The determination of illegality of the military action is crucial, as the unlawfulness of 
the UK and US presence from April at least until the 22nd of May, when the SC adopted
199 Ibidem, para. 4.
200 See inter alia Meyer, White, ‘Editorial: The Use of Force Against Iraq’ 8 Journal o f Conflict and 
Security Law (2003), 1; Crawford et al., ‘War would be illegal’, The Guardian, 7 March 2003; 
Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force’ 4 San Diego International Law 
Journal (2003), 7; Taft et a l, ‘Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict’ 97 AJIL (2003), 553.
201 SC Res. 1441, in particular para. 11.
202 S/2003/232; S/PV.4714, Statement of UNMOVIC 7.
203 Ibidem, Statement of US 14; Statement of UK 25.
204 ‘Draft resolution on Iraq: text’, in http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/2795747.htm.
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Resolution 1483, derives from it.205 Next it must be asked what is the effect of the SC 
recognition of the US and UK occupation embodied in Resolution 1483. One may argue 
that the wording of the preamble referring to the recognition of the ‘specific authorities, 
responsibilities and obligations under applicable international law of these states as 
occupying powers’ may entail only a recognition of the de facto situation of belligerent 
occupation. In that sense, SC Resolution 1483 would not per se affect the unlawfulness 
of the territorial situation. However, it is clear that the recognition of the ‘Authority* 
entailed in Resolution 1483 is broader, as its powers extend to the ‘effective 
administration of the territory’, the formation of an Iraqi interim administration,206 and 
the management of the Development Fund for Iraq for the ‘humanitarian needs of the 
Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the 
continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civil administration, and for 
other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.’207 The Coalition Provisional Authority on 
13 July 2003 in fact appointed the Governing Council of Iraq, an interim government 
composed of 15 members with the aim of running the Iraqi ministries and drafting a 
constitution until a democratically elected government would take over.208 Resolution 
1500 adopted on 14 August 2003 ‘welcomes the establishment of the broadly 
representative Governing Council of Iraq on 13 July 2003, as an important step towards 
the formation by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative 
government that will exercise the sovereignty of Iraq.’209 Most interestingly, Resolution 
1511 adopted on 16 October 2003 ‘authorizes a multinational force under unified 
command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security 
and stability in Iraq.*210 Such command shall be vested with the US military.211
Resolutions 1483, 1500 and 1511 go beyond the mere recognition of the powers of 
the ‘Authority’ as belligerent occupant under the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949
205 See Dyer, ‘Occupation of Iraq illegal, Blair told’, The Guardian, 22 May 2003. The author reported on 
leaked parts of the legal advice given by the British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to Prime Minister 
Tony Blair on 26 March 2003, warning the government on the lack of legal basis for a long-term 
occupation working towards the de-baathication of the Iraqi society without a new SC resolution. One 
quote by the Attorney General is particularly interesting: ‘The government has concluded that the
removal of the current Iraqi regime from power is necessary for disarmament, but the longer the
occupation of Iraq continues, and the more the tasks undertaken by an interim administration depart from 
the main objective, the more difficult it will be to justify the lawfulness of the occupation.’
206 SC Res. 1483 (2003), para. 9.
207 Ibidem, paras. 12-14.
208 ‘The new men, and women, in charge’, The Economist, 19 July 2003, 20.
209 SC Res. 1500 (2003), para. 1.
210 SC Res. 1511 (2003), para. 13.
211 S/PV. 4844, Statement of the United States 10.
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Geneva Convention IV. The SC is in fact using its powers under Chapter VII to 
derogate from strict application of law of belligerent occupation, and to confer legality 
to a previously unlawful territorial situation. The following question is whether the SC 
can under international law use its powers under Chapter VH to confer legality to a 
territorial situation produced by an illegal military action. The answer to this question 
presupposes an analysis of the relation between SC powers under Chapter VII and 
international law, which is provided in the next chapter. My hypothesis is that the 
answer is negative, as such endorsement is against the principles and purposes of the 
UN Charter, and, possibly, it recognises the effects of a violation of a norm of ius 
cogens.212 In other words, it is submitted that the SC was acting ultra vires when 
adopting certain parts of Resolutions 1483, 1500 and 1511, thus it did not affect the 
original unlawfulness of the Coalition’s occupation of Iraq.
Yet, a simple determination of unlawfulness does not render the whole complexity of 
the role played by international law with regard to the Coalition’s occupation of Iraq. 
The role played by the SC through Resolutions 1483, 1500 and 1511 does not only 
consist in the unsuccessful attempt to transform overnight an unlawful territorial 
situation in a territorial situation valid erga omnes, as the legal non-recognition of the 
US appointed new Governing Council by Arab League Members and by Mexico 
witnesses.213 It is also and foremost aimed to provide an increasing level of international 
legitimacy to a whole operation of regime change in Iraq, which had until recently been 
looked at with suspicion if not open opposition by the largest part of the international 
community. The role of such a legitimacy seal provided by the SC is exactly to boost 
the effective power of the US, the UK and their Coalition partners in Iraq, by facilitating 
a gradual process of recognition by the international community of the legal effects in 
the military and civil sphere produced by the situation on the ground. The conferral of 
legitimacy upon an unlawful territorial situation is in this case effected mostly thanks to 
the international authority of the UN collective body responsible for international peace 
and security, and, to a more limited extent, to the perception that the UN co-operation
212 The hypothesis will be developed in the next chapter, when I deal with the competence of the SC to 
regulate territorial issues.
2 E.g. Nasrawi, ‘Arab Nations Won’t Recognize Iraq Council’, Associated Press News 5 August 2003; 
S/PV.4808, Statement of Siria. See also the statement of the Mexican representative to the effect that ‘we 
associate ourselves with the Security Council consensus on welcoming the establishment of the 
provisional Governing Council as a first logical step towards establishing a genuinely representative 
government that exercises the sovereignty of the Iraqi people. That welcome does not constitute legal
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with occupying states is aiming at an early devolution of powers to a democratically 
elected government, in other words that it does aim at a full transfer of sovereignty to 
the Iraqi people.214 This process can lead in the long-run to a general recognition of 
legality of the Coalition’s military presence, therefore transforming the originally 
unlawful territorial situation in a lawful status quo.
In conclusion, the principles of legality determining a situation of territorial 
unlawfulness may not be able to dictate the legal consequences of such unlawfulness, 
when the violating effectiveness is accompanied by a legitimate claim or is legitimated 
by an authoritative body. This may even lead to a transformation of the original 
illegality of the territorial situation in a subsequent legality. In other words, 
effectiveness can still play an important role in dictating legal outcomes to territorial 
situations, but it is no more the mere acceptance of the fait accomplit typical of an era 
when effectiveness was a fundamental principle of international law. It must be linked 
to the internal legitimacy of its underlying claim and/or to its external legitimation. It is 
undeniable that legitimacy, compared to legality, provides for looser, less transparent 
and less objective devices of power acceptance. It is also undeniable that legitimacy 
discourse can be easily manipulated, and it is one of the most sophisticated forms of 
‘soft power’ exercised by the hegemon, in the sense that it can perfectly complement the 
‘hard power* of effectiveness. However, it is at least built starting from a general 
normative framework provided by the fundamental norms of the international society 
and by the institutions mandated to uphold and enforce these fundamental norms. 
Moreover, explaining the process of recognition of unlawful territorial situations 
through legitimacy helps us to maintain the integrity of the international rule of law, by 
denying the possibility that an illegal act produces per se legal effects considered in 
accordance with international law in contradiction to the principle ex iniuria jus non 
oritur or, that a fortiori, such legal effects can be simply endorsed by authoritative 
bodies like the SC.
recognition. Nor should it be interpreted as endorsement. It is not because the Governing Council is still 
under the authority of the occupying Power.’ Ibidem.
214 The conferral of legitimacy by the SC upon an unlawful territorial situation can be also seen with 
regard to SC Res. 1244 concerning the post-war regime for Kosovo. In that case, the legitimacy was 
arguably reinforced to a greater extent as compared with Iraq by the aims and means of Operation Allied 
Force. See supra n. 191.
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9. Conclusions
In conclusion, the normative impact of a definition of unlawfulness of a certain 
territorial situation is manifold. In terms of invalidity of the territorial situation, the 
system still shows an inherent dualism between the domestic and the international 
plane. Such dualism witnesses both the strong role played by the concept of 
effectiveness, and the inability of international law to pervasively regulate the effects of 
a de facto unlawful situation, if not backed by an institutional policy of sanction and 
non-recognition. At the level of impact on other norms of international law, the law of 
territory and the jus ad bellum are strictly intertwined, which is why a definition of 
unlawfulness of a certain territorial situation is likely to have an important impact on the 
way international actors can resort to force. By contrast, the jus in bello regulating the 
rights and duties of an occupant is deeply entrenched in the idea of effective control, 
thus leaving the question of legality of the occupation in the first place outside the scope 
of its application. Also the access of statehood in the cases of denied self-determination 
analysed -  Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, Western Sahara - is impaired by the lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms and the role played by effectiveness in the definition 
and creation of states. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is provided as an example of 
how a ‘one-step approach* to statehood by the international community may represent a 
solution to instances where the international community is not able to translate its non- 
recognition of an illegal territorial occupation in a fully-fledged entitlement to 
statehood.
This aspect ties in to the question of state responsibility for unlawful occupation of 
territories. Again, whereas nothing prevents an overall question of state responsibility 
from arising out of an unlawful territorial situation, in practice judicial decisions and 
state practice are very scanty. In cases where the contested territorial situations 
crystallise in a territorial dispute, states have often decided to refer their dispute by 
agreement to an international tribunal. They have normally requested the mere 
withdrawal of the allegedly unlawful occupant. The recent case of Cameroon/Nigeria 
shows that, even when a territorial dispute is referred to a tribunal unilaterally and the 
claimant presents a claim of state responsibility, tribunals are reluctant to over-burden 
the losing state with anything beyond the mere withdrawal of the military and civil 
administration. I have argued that as much as it is possible to define a framework of 
illegality of unlawful territorial situations, the consequences of the existence of a
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continuing internationally wrongful act should also be addressed. In fact, defining a 
framework of state responsibility for adverse occupations also contributes to refine the 
analysis of the primary norms concerning territorial sovereignty, in particular the uti 
possidetis principle and the principle of self-determination, thus to better define what 
constitutes an unlawful territorial situation. Bad faith, malicious conduct and magnitude 
of the alleged violation are the main elements to be taken into consideration to decide 
whether the principles of uti possidetis and self-determination as norms protecting a 
state’s or a people’s territorial sovereignty have been breached, thus leading to a 
situation of territorial unlawfulness and the international responsibility of the occupying 
state.
Finally, the chapter has analysed the concept of legitimacy, as it regulates the 
consequences of unlawful territorial situations. Legitimacy tested against the 
fundamental principles of the international community has been found to be the key 
both to reconcile occasionally contradicting legal principles and to transform an 
unlawful effectiveness in a lawful state of affairs. In other words, legitimacy of a claim 
or legitimacy conferred by an authoritative body have been found to be the main factors 
behind the recognition of originally unlawful territorial situations.
In sum, the principles of legality analysed in Chapter 4 work at an important but 
unsophisticated level, both in terms of invalidity and in terms of impact on other areas 
of international law. These shortcomings, rather than proving an ‘irrelevance’ of 
international law to territorial situations, show how international law can only play its 
role of ‘gentle civilizer’ if upheld through collective measures and international 
involvement. Where, on the contrary, a net of bilateral and contractual approach is 
preferred, this will result in deficiencies and lack of substantive legal relevance. 
Bargaining power, effectiveness on the ground and unbalanced political support will 
make international law one of the products on the market place, with the risk that the 
violating state may turn the law to its advantage. In that respect, the legitimacy of the 
claims of the ‘violating* party, tested against the fundamental principles of the 
international community, or the legitimation of the effective situation through 
authoritative bodies, will represent an important factor in the way effectiveness will be 
tolerated, acquiesced, recognised and legalised or, on the contrary, rejected as mere 
usurpation of the stronger.
The next chapter completes my analysis of unlawful territorial situations considering 
the territorial competence of UN authoritative bodies, in particular the SC. Again,
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legality and legitimacy are considered as two distinct but inter-related concepts, which 
help me define a coherent analytical framework to review the action of the SC and its 
impact in the establishment, continuation and extinction of territorial situations.
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Chapter 6
Testing legality and legitimacy in the UN exercise of 
territorial competence: the case of Kosovo
1. Introduction
The UN has actively engaged in the last decade in projects of territorial 
administration such as in Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo. Ralph Wilde has categorised 
UN intervention in this area as addressing inter-related but distinctive problems of 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘governance’.1 As the same writer shows, the involvement of 
international organisations in administering territories has a long-standing history dating 
back to the start of the League of Nations. Furthermore, the UN has exercised in the past 
and still exercises today territorial competencies not only by providing the means and 
resources for direct territorial administration, but also deciding upon issues of formal 
territorial status, and endorsing territorial situations on the ground.
The underlying idea is that global governance in the name of global interests can 
represent the solution to irreconcilable clashes of local interests in local governance. 
The perceived role of the world organisation as the vehicle for fundamental interests of 
the international community as a whole, be it in the promotion of the right of self- 
determination of non-self governing territories, or in the maintenance of peace and 
security in a certain disputed area, make questions of legality as secondary to the 
concept of effectiveness of the world organisation. The question is not so much how to 
make the UN decision-making process in conformity with the positive norms in the 
instituting treaty, but to render the organisation as effective as possible in view of the 
political challenges of the Post Cold-War era. In an age where conflicts and 
unilateralism seem to represent the main threat to a system of global governance, to 
assess the action of the UN in terms of legality sounds pretentious to a pragmatic mind. 
The willingness of the UN founding states not to create a system of judicial review of 
the internal organs’ acts and the consequential presumption of legality of those acts
1 Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: the Role of International Territorial Administration’ 
95 AJIL (2001), 583.
205
developed by the ICJ since the Certain Expenses case makes the realist argument even 
stronger. However, even the pragmatist and realist must bear in mind the fact that the 
activity of an international organisation neither exists in a legal vacuum, nor represents a 
water-tight compartment of international law. In the words of the separate opinion of 
Judge Percy Spender in Expenses, the ICJ may be called to decide on the competence of 
a certain organ of the UN to act in a certain way, and in that case it will only be legal 
considerations that must be taken into account.2 In other words, the UN does not act as 
an absolute world sovereign situated above the rule of law. Abidance by international 
law makes UN organs more legitimate thus more effective thanks to what Franck calls 
the ‘pull towards compliance’.3 But this is not the only role played by legitimacy. 
Legitimacy may also play a fundamental role in shaping the very broad powers of 
international legality as embodied in the theory of implied and inherent powers of 
international organisations. Furthermore, the legitimacy derived by the promotion of the 
UN broad ends and aims provided by Article 1 of the UN Charter may be able to 
accommodate the tension between original Charter violations and de facto territorial 
situations produced on the ground.
This chapter expands the analysis of unlawful territorial situations articulated in the 
previous chapters to consider UN territorial powers and competencies. Such powers 
have been with different aims and purposes exercised in the past by the GA and are 
nowadays mostly exercised by the SC. It assesses the limits in terms of legality and 
legitimacy to the action of the SC in this respect. In other words, the chapter reviews 
how a situation of territorial unlawfulness can result from ultra vires actions by the SC. 
As an example of a partly unlawful territorial situation under the authority of the UN the 
case of Kosovo is considered. The role of legitimacy provided by UN endorsement of 
post-conflict unlawful territorial situations and by different forms of recognition by the 
affected state shows how effectiveness and legality can also be reconciled in the long 
run. Finally, the legitimacy factor can also represent a restraining factor in the way the 
SC acts and justifies its choices, enhancing its accountability towards the international 
community and the direct addressees of its actions. The question of sovereignty and 
final status of Kosovo and the way these two issues have been so far addressed by the 
UN administration shows the important role that legitimacy plays in this respect.
2 Certain Expenses o f the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, 151, Sep. Op. Judge 
Percy Spencer, 182, at 184.
3 Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ 82 AJ1L (1988), 705.
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2. UN competence and powers in territorial situations
The exercise by the UN of territorial competencies and powers is multi-faceted, and, 
albeit conceptually not entirely new, it represents one of the most innovative and 
interesting developments in international governance of the last ten years. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor represent three situations where the UN has set 
up ad interim administrations under the ultimate authority of UN personnel and the SC 
with the aim of solving local conflict, re-establishing international peace and security in 
the region, ensuring sounds standards of governance and eventually settling pending 
issues of territorial sovereignty. In all three cases, the UN has vested legislative, 
executive and judicial competencies and powers in their personnel through a series of 
quasi-legislative resolutions adopted under Chapter VII.4 More specifically, Bothe and 
Marauhn have argued that the establishment of a civil administration with the a view to 
re-establishing a situation of peace and security in the interested region can be 
considered within the SC powers under Article 41, whereas Article 42 would support 
the endorsement or direct establishment of a military presence.5
Although being normally reported under the same heading of ‘UN administrations’, 
the three above-mentioned cases present some important differences, which unveil 
different underlying models of the exercise of territorial competencies and powers. The 
most extensive territorial competence was the one exercised by UNTAET; SC 
Resolution 1272 authorised the establishment of both a civil and a security UN 
authority.6 In the case of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina the SC, while creating a 
UN civil administration, has not established its own military presence, but has limited 
itself to endorsing previous agreements, whereby a regional organisation, namely 
NATO, would undertake the task of ensuring a safe environment in the two regions.7 
This shows that the SC may exercise its territorial competence either setting up and 
engaging directly in civil and military administration, or mandating those tasks to other
4 See SC Res. 1031 (1995) endorsing the content of the Dayton Agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
SC Res. 1244 (1999) setting up UNMIK, the UN administration for Kosovo; SC Res. 1272 (1999) setting 
up UNTAET, the UN administration for East Timor.
5 Bothe, Marauhn, ‘UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and Limitations of 
Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Adiministration’, in Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the 
International Community: a Legal Assessment (2002), 217, at 232.
6 SC Res. 1272 (1999), paras. 1, 3 (c).
7 SC Res. 1244 (1999), Annex 2 and Military Technical Agreement recalled therein; SC Res. 1031 (1995) 
and Annex 1-A to the Dayton General Framework Agreement, in 35 ILM (1996), 91.
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actors, be it a state or another international organisation, while still retaining ultimate 
legal authority, or, lastly, adopting both models at the same time as in the cases of 
Bosnia and Kosovo.
Both models are not historically unprecedented. For instance, after World War I, the 
town of Danzig, mostly inhabited by Germans but within Polish territory, was 
transformed into a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations.8 The 
Council of the League of Nations appointed a High Commissioner who would reside in 
Danzig and would be competent to provide binding interpretations on the existing legal 
instruments binding upon Danzig and Poland, to authorise amendments to the 
constitution and to prepare an annual report to be presented to the LoN Council.9 The 
latter was also competent to decide upon a series of territorial obligations concerning 
the Free City such as the establishment of military or naval bases, the erection of 
fortifications and the manufacturing of war materials in its territory.10 In other words, 
the Free City of Danzig is possibly the first case where the world organisation begins to 
exercise some level of direct territorial administration, albeit considerably limited.
A much more pervasive system of direct UN administration was envisaged for the 
city of Trieste by the Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste.11 The city’s 
appurtenance was inextricably linked to the fixing of the border between Italy and 
Yugoslavia; the creation of a neutral, de-militarised territory had been considered by the 
Allied Powers as the best way in the long run to ensure a peaceful border settlement. 
Potentially, the main innovation was to be the appointment by the SC, after consultation 
with Italy and Yugoslavia, of a Governor for the Free Territory as a guarantor of the 
Statute. The Governor’s powers according to the Statute were surprisingly similar to 
those today exercised by the UN High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as he 
was supposed to exercise civil authority jointly with the local administration. Its 
competence included the powers to refuse the approval of legislation passed by the local 
assembly in violation of the Statute, to adopt executive acts when necessary to exercise 
its functions, to appoint the Chief of the police forces and take control over them in case
8 Treaty of Versailles, Art. 103, in Bevans (ed.), Treaties and Other International Agreements o f the 
United States o f America 1776-1949 (1969), Vol. 2,43.
9 See Lewis, ‘The Free City of Danzig’ 5 BYIL (1924), 94.
10 Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, Art. 5, in League o f Nations Official Journal, Special 
Supplement No. 7,1922.
11 Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, Annex VI, Treaty of Peace between Allied and 
Associated Powers and Italy (1947), in 42 AJIL (Supplement of Documents) (1948), 97. See SC Res. 16 
(1947).
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of threat to the Territory’s territorial integrity, and to conclude international agreements
jointly with the local government.12 The Governor was directly accountable to the SC,
11which retained the power to suspend him and appoint a new one. The Statute was 
never implemented due to the lack of agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia for the 
appointment of the Governor, and the lack of will of the SC to push forward a candidate 
without the states’ approval.14 The Allied Administration over Zone A of the Territory 
was substituted by an Italian administration in 1954, whereas the Yugoslav 
administration maintained its control over Zone B.15 The border was finally settled in 
1975 through the Treaty of Osimo according to the extension of the respective 
administrative areas.16 Despite the lack of implementation, the experience of Trieste 
showed a possible legal framework within which the SC could directly exercise 
territorial competence. Many of its elements have indeed inspired the legal framework 
in Bosnia after 1995. Moreover, its shortcomings, such as the lack of a system of 
compulsory arbitration in case of irresolvable differences between interested parties and 
the non-use of the SC powers under Chapter VII, have been corrected.
The other model of involvement of the UN in the exercise of territorial competence 
with regard to a territory is also not unprecedented. For instance, the establishment after 
World War II according to Chapter XII of a series of Trusteeship Administrations was 
effected through agreement between the UN and the administering state. In particular, 
both the GA and the SC -  the latter for those territories defined as ‘strategic areas’ in 
Article 83 of the Charter -  mandated the administration of those territories detached 
from enemy states during World War II and those previously held under Mandate to a 
particular state. Article 75 specifically stated that the administration of the trust territory 
was to be exercised on behalf of the UN. A particular organ, the Trusteeship Council, 
was created with a view to assisting the GA in supervising the Trusts’ administration.17 
The aim of the Trusteeship Administrations was to promote self-government or 
independence of the inhabitants, and to further international peace and security in those
12 Ibidem, Arts. 16,17, 20, 22, 24.
13 Ibidem, Art. 11. See also Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law (1979), 161-163.
14 Another case where the UN attempted to exercise directly governmental functions in a territory is the 
case of the creation by the GA of the UN Council for Namibia (GA Res. 2248 (XXI)). Also in this case 
the Council never exercised any degree of actual authority because of the unwillingness by South Africa 
to release its control over Namibia.
15 London Agreement between Italy, Yugoslavia, UK and US, 5 October 1954, in 235 UNTS 99.
16 Treaty of Osimo, 10 November 1975, in 60 Rivista di Diritto Intemazionale (1977), 674.
17 For the institutional aspects regarding the Trusteeship system see Rauschning, ‘United Nations 
Trusteeship System’, in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (1983) (Vol. V), 369.
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•  18regions. A much debated and interesting aspect was whether the GA had ultimate 
authority over those territories, or whether its power of disposing of a Trusteeship 
Administration was subject to the consent of the administering power.19 Whereas the 
purpose and overall aims of the Trusteeship system, as confirmed by Chapter XII, 
suggested an ultimate territorial competence of the GA, the fact that the GA did not 
possess under the Charter any legally binding power over states casts some doubt as to 
how this competence could be possibly exercised. The ICJ in the Northern Cameroons 
case seemed to leave no doubt that GA Resolution 1608 (XV), whereby the Assembly 
terminated the British administration over Northern Cameroon, ‘had definitive legal 
effect’.20 Crawford reconciled this passage of the Court and the incapacity of the GA to 
create legal obligations by saying that ‘the Assembly’s function here is a determinative 
one -  that it is designated by the Charter to decide particular matters of political fact, 
applying principles of self-determination implicit in the Trusteeship instruments.*21 This 
interpretation was also supported by the ICJ advisory opinion in the Namibia case.22 As 
a response to South Africa’s claim that the GA did not have a power to revoke its 
Mandate over Namibia, the Court argued that the GA by adopting Resolution 2145 
(XXI) declaring the mandate terminated was only making a determination of a legal 
situation which had been produced by South Africa’s material breach of the Mandate’s 
terms. By analogy between the Trusteeship and the Mandate systems, this reasoning can 
be also extended to the former. In practice, the problem of unilateral revocation never 
emerged with regard to Trusteeship agreements, as the bilateral agreements between the 
GA and the administering power always preceded GA resolutions of termination.
In conclusion, a review of legality concerning a territorial situation where ultimate 
authority is vested with the UN will depend in the first place upon a review of legality 
of the way the particular UN organ exercises its competence. A second level will be 
added in those cases where the UN is directly administering the territory, and it will 
concern the legitimacy of the way the UN acts with regard to that territorial situation. 
Such legitimacy can be construed with reference to UN action in those territories 
assessed against some of the fundamental principles of the Charter such as the
18 UN Charter, Art. 76.
19 See Vedovato, ‘Les accords de tutelle’ 76 Recueil des Cours (1950), 613; Kohen, Possession contestie 
et souveraineti territoriale (1997), 84-86.
20 Northern Cameroon Case (Cameroon/UK), ICJ Reports 1963,15, at 32.
21 Crawford, supra n. 13,343-344.
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maintenance of peace and security, the principle of self-determination and the 
promotion of human rights.23 This review of legitimacy is all-the-more important for 
two reasons. Firstly, it allows a check on the very broad powers envisaged by the 
Charter and by state practice for the SC; secondly, it explains the way some unlawful 
territorial situations can become in the long run accepted and recognised by the 
international community. The next sections respectively consider the question of 
legality and legitimacy of UN organs* exercise of their powers, in particular that of the 
SC, as the SC is nowadays exercising the most pervasive powers with regard to 
territorial situations.
3. Failing the test of legality: the ‘impossible task’ from the doctrine of 
ultra vires acts to the doctrine of inherent powers
The action of the GA and SC in territorial matters has been shaped through an 
extensive interpretation of the powers expressly accorded by the Charter. The problem 
however lies in understanding how broad and extensive such interpretation may be, and 
what is the limitation placed upon the GA and the SC by international law, possibly by 
those principles of legality seen in Chapter 4. This problem is particularly strong with 
regard to the SC, which can adopt enforcement measures which are legally binding 
upon member states. The Charter is clear in stating in Article 24(2) that ‘the Security 
Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.* 
Among the purposes of UN Article 1(1) also includes ‘to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with principles o f justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace’ (emphasis added). Finally, Article 103 creates a normative hierarchy between 
obligations deriving from the Charter and obligations arising out of international 
agreements to the effect that the former shall prevail.
It is my view that these provisions, albeit general, provide some considerable 
guidance to the understanding of the relation between the powers of UN political 
bodies, in particular the SC, and international law. The problem has however lay in the
22 Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South-Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 3.
23 Bothe, Marauhn, supra n. 5, 235-239.
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fact that the UN lacks a system of judicial review of internal acts, which would make its 
principal organs accountable according to the principles of international law. A Belgian 
proposal to vest with the ICJ the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter was defeated 
during the travaux preparatoires.24 Unlike the European Court of Justice, which can 
hear claims of natural and legal persons to review Community Acts according to Article 
173 of the Rome Treaty, the ICJ can only render a decision on the legality of acts of UN 
organs if requested by any other internal organ or authorised specialised agency under 
Article 65 of the Statute, or if such legal issue arises in contentious proceedings between 
states under Article 36 of the Statute. In the former case the decision is advisory, as 
such non-binding, whereas in the latter case the matter arises incidentally to the main 
legal dispute and the decision is binding only upon the parties to the dispute. However, 
the authority exercised by the World Court as the main judicial organ of the UN in 
conjunction with Article 38 of the Statute should ensure that any finding of the Court 
represents strong evidence of existing international law. The few instances when the 
Court has pronounced on these issues can highlight some of the most important legal 
principles developed by its judicial policy of review concerning acts of UN bodies. This 
jurisprudence shows a high degree of judicial restraint by the ICJ, but also the 
elaboration of some useful legal principles in order to understand the relation between 
the SC and international law.
3.1 Case law
The first opportunity for the Court to review the relation between the UN Charter 
and the powers of its organs was given in the advisory opinion on the Reparation case 
of 1949.25 The Court was asked by the GA to render its opinion whether in the event of 
a UN agent suffering injuries in the performance of his duties involving the 
responsibility of a state, the UN could bring a claim on his behalf. The Court stated for 
the first time the so-called doctrine of implied powers.26 The Court argued that an 
analysis of the functions of organisation as spelled out in the treaty becomes the 
precondition of an assessment of legality of a certain activity, which does not depend 
upon an express provision of the constituent treaty. This vision of the legal competence
24 UN Doc. 2, G/7 (k)(l), 3 UNCIO Docs. 335, 336 (1945).




of the UN organs was embedded in the recognition by the court that the international 
organisation has international legal personality, thus it is in its power to adopt all 
necessary measures to pursue its treaty goals.27 Using Bowett’s words the test of 
legality ‘is a functional one’, even if some authors such as Schermers, Blokker and 
White have warned about the ambiguities inherent in the expression ‘implied powers*.28 
Unfortunately, the Court did not proceed to consider such treaty goals and reached its 
conclusion without that assessment.
In the advisory opinion Certain Expenses of 1962 the ICJ had to declare whether the 
GA was entitled to claim jurisdiction in matters related to peace and security, and 
whether it could establish peace-keeping forces in view of the SC deadlock.29 After 
having found that ‘each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own 
jurisdiction’, the Court stated that ‘when the Organization takes action which warrants 
the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of 
the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires.*30 The Court 
was asserting that in order to ensure the effective functioning of UN organs, and to 
avoid challenges of legality by member states creating an operational deadlock, a 
presumption of legality should be given to any act of UN organs. This would not 
prevent a court from declaring an act ultra vires and a doctrine of non-justiciability of 
UN political organs* acts was clearly rejected by the Court in this important passage:
‘It has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with political questions, and 
that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. It is true that most interpretations of 
the Charter of the United Nations will have political significance, great or small. In the nature of 
things it could not be otherwise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a political character to a 
request which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a 
treaty provision.’31
Yet the difficulty that an international tribunal engages in reviewing SC acts, makes 
the presumption of legality very strong. The expansionist policy of the court with regard 
to the implied power doctrine was then complemented by embracing cases of procedural 
irregularity.32 The functional test became all-encompassing, moving from substantive 
irregularities to procedural ones. Furthermore, the doctrine of implied powers was
21 Ibidem, 174.
28 Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (1982, 4th ed.), 337; Schermers, Blokker, International 
Institutional Law (1995), 159; White, The Law of International Organisations (1996), 131.





expanded to consider the absence of any provision prohibiting the exercise of such 
power by the GA, rather than the positive existence of provision justifying those 
powers. The only limitation on the power of the GA in respect to matters of peace and 
security was that only the SC could order coercive action.33
An especially relevant case, due to the subject matter of territorial sovereignty 
involved, was the Namibia case (1971).34 South Africa objected to SC Resolution 276 
and GA Resolution 2145 (XXI). This had first declared the South African mandate 
terminated, on the ground that a) the Covenant of the League of Nations did not confer 
on the Council the power to terminate a mandate for misconduct of the mandatory, and 
that, according to the principle nemo transferre potest quod non habet, the UN could 
not succeed in a non-existing competence; b) quod non datur, even if the Council had 
possessed the power of revocation of the Mandate, such power could not have been 
exercised unilaterally, but only in co-operation with the mandatory power; c) that the 
GA could not act as a judicial body determining questions of fact and that it could not 
issue binding decisions transferring territory; d) that SC Resolution 276 did not invoke 
Chapter VII of the Charter, thus it could not represent a binding decision on South 
Africa.35 The Court’s approach resembled closely the one adopted in Certain Expenses. 
By passing Resolution 276 the SC was acting in pursuance of its task of maintenance of 
peace and security, its decisions were taken in conformity with purposes and principles 
of the Charter, and under Article 25 it was for states to comply with those decisions.36 It 
is important to recall the whole passage of the Court on this issue:
‘Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security Council the necessary authority to take action such 
as that taken in the present case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to specific powers of 
the Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter does not exclude the existence of 
general powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1. Reference may be made 
in this respect to the Secretary General’s Statement, presented to the Security Council on 10 
January 1947 to the effect that ‘the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the 
specific grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VEI and XII...[T]he Members of the 
United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations are the fundamental 
principles and purposes found in Chapter I of the Charter.’37
The Court’s rationale therefore followed that of Reparations and Certain Expenses 
on the doctrine of implied and inherent powers. Since it is the task of the SC to deal
33 White, supra n. 28, 130.




with matters of peace and security, then all its decisions, even if falling short of spelling 
out clearly any legal basis in the Charter, produce legal effects according to Articles 24 
and 25. The only limitations to the powers of the SC in the field of peace and security 
can be found in the fundamental principles and purposes of the UN embodied in 
Chapter I.
- i n
Another important case is the Lockerbie affair case. In 1992 Libya requested the 
Court to indicate provisional measures that would ensure that no step was taken by the 
SC that would prejudice Libya’s rights under the Montreal Convention with specific 
regard to the Lockerbie terrorist attack.39 Three days before the end of the oral hearing, 
the SC passed under Chapter VII Resolution 748 that demanded Libya’s compliance 
with the US and UK requests for extradition of the alleged terrorist.40 The resolution 
also imposed a series of economic sanctions upon Libya.41 In a rather laconic passage of 
its decision, the Court held that ‘at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures, 
[it] considers that prima facie’ the obligation of member states to carry out decisions of 
the SC under Article 25 ‘extends to the decision contained in Resolution 748 (1992) and 
that according to Art. 103 of the Charter ‘the obligations of the Parties in that respect 
prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, including the
42Montreal Convention.’ The Lockerbie decision on provisional measures is relevant to 
the question of legality of UN organs’ acts in respect to three main aspects. The first one 
is the confirmation concerning the presumption of legality accorded to acts of UN 
political organs already defined in previous decisions. Since provisional measures can 
be ordered only with regard to prima facie unlawful acts, it is clear that the refusal of 
the Court to accede to Libyan requests signifies a confirmation of this presumption of 
legality. The burden of proof to reverse this presumption is upon the Libyan 
government and such full review can be considered by the Court only at the merit stage. 
The second aspect is the one spelled out in Article 103 of the Charter, that in case of 
conflict between obligations arising out of the Charter and obligations deriving from an 
international agreement, the former shall prevail. This helps defining the legality 
limitations to the powers of the UN in the sense that international treaties cannot limit
37 Ibidem, 52.
38 Case Concerning Questions o f Interpretation and Application o f the Montreal Convention arising out 
o f the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Provisional Measures) (Libya/US, Libya/UK), ICJ Reports 1992, 3.
Ibidem, Application of 3 March 1992, in http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ilus/ilusframe.htm.
40 SC Res. 748 (1992), paras. 2-3.
41 Ibidem, paras. 4-5.
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the action of the organisation under Chapter VII. However, Article 103 does not provide 
a solution to the possibility of the conflict being between obligations under the Charter 
and obligations under customary international law. Consequentially, this raises the third 
main aspect of the Lockerbie decision, that is to what extent, despite such presumption 
of legality and Article 103, the SC is limited in its actions by general international law. 
The problem is only touched upon in some of the separate and dissenting opinions. 
Judge Bedjaoui in his dissenting opinion reiterates the principle that the SC should act 
‘in conformity with principles of justice and international law’, before moving to a 
substantive criticism of the Court’s decision;43 Judge Shahabuddeen poses the different 
legal questions surrounding the relation between the SC and the ICJ by means of a 
series of rhetorical questions;44 Judge Weeramantry after having analysed the travaux 
preparatoires concerning the competencies of the SC states that
‘a clear limitation on the plenitude of the SC’s powers is that those powers must be exercised in 
accordance with the well established principles of international law. It is true, this limitation must 
be restrictively interpreted and is confined only to the principles and objects which appear in 
Chapter I of the Charter...The restriction nevertheless exists and constitutes an important principle 
of law in the interpretation of the United Nations Chapter.’
The Judge then reaches the conclusion that the Court’s revision cannot include 
actions within the powers conferred to the SC by Chapter VII, such actions being 
entirely within the discretion of the Council.45
Quite surprisingly, the latest thorough investigation and review of the SC’s powers 
under Chapter VII has come from an ad hoc tribunal, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in its very first decisions rendered by the Trial 
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber on jurisdiction in the Tadic case.46 The Defence 
filed a motion disputing the jurisdiction of the Court on a series of grounds, including 
the unlawfulness of the creation of the ICTY by SC Resolution 827 47 In response to the 
Defence’s claim, the ICTY recalled the powers entrusted to the SC by Article 24(1) and 
the decision made during the travaux preparatoires to apply a theory of implied and 
inherent powers to the competence of the SC. After having recalled that, the Court made
42 Lockerbie, supra n. 38,15.
43 Ibidem, Diss. Op. Judge Bedjaoui, 143, at 156.
44 Ibidem, Sep. Op. Judge Shahabuddeen, 140, at 142.
45 Ibidem, Diss. Op. Judge Weeramantry, 160, at 176.
46 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A “Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion o f Jurisdiction), ICTY, 10 
August 1995,105 ILR (1997), 427.
47 Ibidem, Preamble.
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the following controversial statement: ‘The broad discretion given to the Security 
Council in the exercise of its Chapter VII authority itself suggests that decisions taken 
under this head are not reviewable’ (emphasis added).48 Further, the ICTY mentioned 
Namibia, where the ICJ stated that it did ‘not possess powers of judicial review or 
appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned’, and 
Judge Weeramantry* s dissenting opinion in Lockerbie where he stated that ‘the 
determination under Art. 39 of the existence of any threat to the peace...is one entirely 
within the discretion of the Council’ and that ‘the Council and no other is the judge of 
the existence of state of affairs which brings Chapter VII into operation.’49 The Trial 
Chamber finally raised the principle of non-justiciability to maintain that a 
determination by the SC under Article 39, and the decision to adopt binding measures 
according to Article 41 and 42 to remedy a situation of threat to peace and security is 
totally within the political discretion of the SC and a court cannot sit in judgement of 
those decisions.50
Despite reaching quite the same outcome, the approach taken by the Appeals 
Chamber in its decision of 2 October 1995 was considerably different.51 The Court 
rightly rejected the way the Trial Chamber had reviewed the SC’s powers. It correctly 
pointed out that the dicta of the ICJ in Namibia quoted in the decision of the Trial 
Chamber ‘address the hypothesis of the Court exercising such judicial review as a 
matter of “primary” jurisdiction’ but they ‘do not address at all hypothesis of 
examination of the legality of the decisions of other organs as a matter of “incidental” 
jurisdiction, in order to ascertain and be able to exercise its “primary” jurisdiction over 
the matter before it.’52 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber went on to dismiss the theory 
of non-justiciability as applied to actions carried out by the SC pursuant to Chapter VII 
and it recalled the decision of the ICJ in Certain Expenses.53 Having declared justiciable 
the action of the SC, the Appeals Chamber rejected the approach of the Trial Chamber 
to consider the SC as legibus solutus, and it correctly claimed that a finding of the 
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the UN Charter.54 Moreover, Judge Sidhwa, in his separate opinion, also added that the 
SC, when acting under Chapter VII should be also bound by the fundamental norms of 
the international community, such as the rules of ius cogens.55 Having reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s approach on the issue of legality and justiciability of SC actions, the 
Appeals Chamber confirmed the validity of the doctrine of implied powers. It concluded 
that the establishment of a criminal court as a means of addressing a threat to 
international peace and security was completely within the discretionary power granted 
to the SC by Article 41 of the Charter, which did not provide for an exhaustive list of 
actions but only a number of examples.
3.2 Assessment: limits of legality and effectiveness of the Security Council
An analysis of the way tribunals have tried to review the actions of UN political 
organs shows an on-going tension between two approaches. On the one hand, a realist 
approach has tended to put the efficacy of the action of the UN political organs, in 
particular the SC, as a priority and to situate actions under Chapter VII beyond any 
check-and-balance mechanism, if not those already inherent in the working procedure of 
these organs, and in particular the veto power as regards the SC. On the other hand, a 
legalist approach has stressed the supremacy of law over politics, more specifically the 
need to anchor the political organs of the UN to the respect of UN Charter provisions 
and general international law. The jurisprudence developed by the ICJ has tried to strike 
a balance between these two opposing trends. The doctrines of implied and inherent 
powers has provided a very extensive means of interpreting the Charter, however 
recalling the frame of the purposes and principles of the UN. As a matter of scholarly 
treatment, such balance is easily comprehensible and it may represent a flexible 
understanding. However, at the same time, such flexibility in legality discourse has been 
worked out too vaguely and too broadly to provide for a satisfactory tool of analysis of 
such delicate issues. This major flaw can be seen in a number of respects.
Despite paying lip-service to the ‘principles and purposes of the UN Charter’ the ICJ 
has not tried to spell them out while analysing the legality of acts of UN organs, and its 
defence of legality has been rather timid. This is hardly surprising. Josd Alvarez is right 
in arguing that such principles and purposes can be among the most contradictory
54 Ibidem, 465.
55 Tadic, supra n. 51, Sep. Op. Judge Sidhwa, 555.
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international law has ever tried to reconcile: state sovereignty and human rights, 
territorial integrity and self-determination.56 Not one single concrete example has been 
provided by the ICJ or, for that matter, by the ICTY of a SC action which could be 
deemed outside the realm of legality because contrary to the principles and purposes of 
the UN Charter, including the settlement of disputes according to principles of justice 
and international law. We may however think that an action by the SC preventing a 
people from exercising their right of self-determination under international law would 
be against the ‘principles and purposes of the UN Charter’. Likewise, an action by the 
SC endorsing and legalising a de facto territorial situation resulting from a war of 
aggression would also be against the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. In 
both instances, the SC would act beyond its powers and its endorsement would not 
transform the previously unlawful territorial situation into a lawful territorial situation 
by virtue of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII. In other words, some of the 
principles of legality considered in Chapter 4 would become relevant to the possibility 
of reviewing the action of the SC in territorial issues.
This raises a further important problem concerning the relation between the SC 
powers and international law, which has not been considered by the ICJ and the ICTY. 
Article 103 creates a normative hierarchy between obligations arising out of the Charter 
and obligations arising out of international agreements. This provision was used by the 
ICJ in Lockerbie to limit the possibility to review the action of the SC in derogation of 
the 1987 Montreal Convention. As another example, one can also argue that the duties 
of the occupying powers in Iraq under the Hague Regulations with regard to their 
exercise of governmental authority have been relaxed by SC Resolution 1483 in 
accordance with Article 103.57 Furthermore, even if the case of conflict between 
obligations under the Charter and customary international law is not foreseen in Article 
103, it is possible to use the general rules of interpretation on the relation between 
custom and treaty, and in particular the lex specialis principle, to conclude the
56 Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’ 90 AJIL (1996), 1.
57 SC Res. 1483 (2003), in particular para. 4 where the SC ‘[c]alls upon the Authority, consistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi 
people through the effective administration of the territory[...].’ See, however, para. 5 calling upon ‘all 
concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907’. Bowers argues that ‘[i]n the case of 
Iraq, the main purpose of obtaining a mandate in the form of a Security Council resolution was to evade 
legal difficulties if the occupying powers sought to move beyond the limited rights conferred by the 
Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV to vary existing arrangements.’ Bowers, Iraq: law o f 
occupation, June 2003, 25, in House of Commons Research Paper 03/51.
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obligations arising out of a Chapter VII SC resolution would prevail over those deriving 
from a customary norm. However, the problem still remains whether ius cogens norms 
can represent a limit of international legality to the action of the SC. A positive 
inference can be made by extension of the UN Charter’s principles and purpose.58 In 
fact, the two hypothetical examples made above of breach of a right of self- 
determination or endorsement of an act of aggression would count as violations of ius 
cogens norms too. A number of writers support such limits under general international 
law.59 Moreover, if the purpose of ius cogens norms is to protect the interests and values 
of the international community as a whole, one wonders why those collective bodies 
created with the aim of promoting and taking responsibility for the protection of such 
interests and values should be allowed to derogate from them. Finally, it cannot go 
unnoticed that, the SC in particular, is not only an institutional world body aiming at the 
protection and enforcement of global interests, but it is inevitably also a negotiating 
forum between different sovereign states. Its action can at best represent the 
compromise between these sovereign states, at worst the interest of those able to impose 
in some way or other their will upon other states. To think that such a body should be 
left unchecked by the fundamental principles of international law is tantamount to 
leaving unchecked the powers of member states.
Another major gap as to the judicial policy of the ICJ and the ICTY is the failure to 
spell out what would be the legal effects of a finding of illegality. This casts many 
difficulties, since according to the realist view such niceties as the difference between 
absolute nullity and voidability can only arise in developed legal systems, where there is 
a whole machinery of judicial review of private and governmental acts. However, the 
‘incidental’ jurisdiction of the ICJ and the ICTY and their ‘inherent* powers could have 
given them the opportunity to pronounce on that. Furthermore, states may wish to take 
up such illegality in appropriate fora. For instance, in the IMCO case the ICJ interpreted 
in a rather restrictive way its role of ‘legal advisor’ and it only declared that the 
Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO was not constituted in accordance with the
58 See Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in Genocide case who argued that SC Res. 713 of 1991 providing for an 
arms embargo against the whole of Yugoslavia would prevent Bosnia from defending itself against 
genocide, thus it should be considered null and void. Application o f the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punshment o f the Crime o f Genocide, Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, 325, at 439. See 
also Professor Alain Pellet statement before the ILC in A/CN/. 4/SR. 2257,16.
59 E.g. Franck, ‘The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?’ 86 AJIL 
(1992), 519; Graefrath, ‘Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court The Libyan Case’ 4 EJIL (1993)
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Convention, which established the Organisation. It did not specify what could be legal 
consequences of that finding.60 The issue is only cursorily dealt with by Judge Sidhwa 
in his separate opinion in the Tadic Trial Chamber’s decision, where he states that, were 
the Tribunal to find any illegality in its own establishment, it may make ‘a simple 
declaration to that effect and leave it to the Security Council to correct the situation, or 
having made such a declaration, continue as an ad-hoc tribunal till the said body or 
Organisation comes to its aid.’61 In case of UN endorsed or administered unlawful 
territorial situations, Judge Sidhwa suggestion may be translated into a duty by the SC 
to correct the situation with a new action under Chapter VII. At a further conceptual 
level a territorial action by the SC in defiance of its powers may represent an 
internationally wrongful act, and to that extent entail the international responsibility of 
the UN as such. This may result in a claim by the victim state or states against the UN 
for restitution or reparation. At a practical level, to the difficulties associated with a 
claim for state responsibility related to unlawful territorial situations, one should add the 
procedural difficulties inherent in such a claim in particular with regard to the forum 
competent to adjudicate the dispute.62
To conclude, Professor Seyersted view of international organisation, worked out in 
1966, as having full international legal personality and as being entitled to exercise 
whatever functions and powers are within the aim and scope of the organisation and are 
not expressly prohibited by its constitution, has been accepted consistently in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ and, lately, by the ICTY 63 This gives strong support to those 
who argue that international organisations are ‘sovereign’ entities, like states, with the 
only difference represented by the limitation of their capacity to their scope. This 
analysis is possibly undermined by the very fact that international organisations derive 
their functions and powers from an international legal instrument, whereas the attribute 
of sovereignty is commonly associated with the very nature of the state. However, states 
also do have a constitution which can limit their freedom of actions in international
184; Watson, ‘Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court’ 34 Harvard International Law 
Journal (1993), 1.
60 Constitution o f the Maritime Safety Committee o f the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1960,150.
61 Tadic, supra n. 46, Sep. Op. Judge Sidhwa, 555.
62 Supra Ch. 5, section 7.
63 Seyersted, United Nations Forces in Law o f Peace and War (1966).
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relations,64 and the scope and purpose of the SC’s actions has been broadened to include 
direct territorial administrations such as in Kosovo and East Timor, which is usually 
considered one of the pre-rogatives par excellence of sovereign states. In this latter 
respect, paradoxically, principles of international legality appear to apply to a more 
limited extent than they do for states. The concept of effectiveness shows in this specific 
respect its ambivalent nature: by stressing the need for the efficacy of their action, 
multilateral bodies can often overcome the limits imposed by international law upon 
states. This raises the further issue of how these multilateral bodies such as the UN can 
be ‘used’ by the states to circumvent those legal norms and boost their effective power 
in the international arena.
Failing legality to represent a significant limit, one seems to rest with the unpleasant 
option of dealing with international political crises around the world with three likely 
alternatives: bully unilateralism, bully UN multilateralism, inaction.65 Excluding the 
first and the third option for the scope of this chapter, it is submitted that the principle of 
effectiveness can be retained without making UN multilateralism ‘bully’ by addressing 
the question of legitimacy of UN actions. The next section will revolve around the 
concept of legitimacy within the law as defined in the previous chapter for the purpose 
of elaborating further than the simple divide lawfulness/unlawfulness of SC endorsed or 
administered territorial situations.
4. Substantive and procedural illegitimacy in SC actions
Questions of substantive and procedural illegitimacy in the way the SC acts can 
arise in many respects. One could assert that SC powers are in principle unlimited 
ratione materiae, as long as they are deemed to address a threat to peace and security. 
The reserved domain clause articulated in Article 2(7) of the Charter does not apply to 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. One could possibly argue that enforcement 
measures are not the only kind of measures envisaged under Chapter VII, however the 
possibility to distinguish such measures from ‘preventive* measures is not always
64 E.g. Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution. See Cassese, ‘Wars Forbidden and Wars Allowed by the Italian 
Constitution’, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Balladore Pallieri (1978), Vol. n, 131.
65 See Chinkin, ‘The State that Acts Alone: Bully, Good, Samaritan or Iconoclast?’ 11 EJIL (2000), 31.
222
feasible, given the all-encompassing nature of practice of the SC.66 So, for instance, the 
activism of the SC in the last decade has engaged this organ with territorial settlements 
and endorsement of territorial status. Commentators have questioned the legality and 
legitimacy of these actions. The two terms being here confused, it has been here 
submitted that the legality of these actions can most of the times hardly be questioned, 
however the application of principles of substantive and procedural legitimacy makes 
the issue more problematic. Whereas legality only requires SC actions to be consistent 
with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and not to be expressly prohibited 
by that instrument, a legitimacy test requires the SC to justify its actions in terms of 
preference of certain principles and purposes and values of the Charter rather than 
others. Whereas, a legality test does not require the SC to prove that a certain action was 
necessary to promote certain values sacrificing others, a legitimacy test would require 
the SC to justify the necessity of a certain action if certain values of the Charter have to 
be sacrificed. The analysis of some important cases can highlight the relevance of this 
distinction.
One example is SC Resolution 687, which put a formal end to the hostilities 
between Iraq and the alliance of states which rescued Kuwait from Iraqi's aggression. 
Inter alia SC Resolution 687 demanded Iraq to respect the boundary established by a 
1963 agreement signed by both Iraq and Kuwait and later challenged by Baghdad, and 
created a UN Boundary Demarcation Commission entrusted with the task of marking 
the existing frontier.67 As is cogently argued elsewhere, this agreement had been validly
•  Afi _subscribed to by Iraq and its later challenge to it lacked a sound legal basis. The SC, 
aware of the continuing threat to peace and security that the Iraq-Kuwait frontier dispute 
represented, decided to act as a quasi-judicial body by endorsing a legal instrument 
defining the frontier and proceeding to demarcate the boundary, in order to practically 
ensure the inviolability of this frontier.
The resolution was adopted by 12 votes in favour, one contrary (Cuba) and two 
abstaining (Ecuador, Yemen). During the discussion which led to the adoption of the 
resolution, concerns of legitimacy of the SC’s action were raised by the Iraqi, the Cuban 
and the Yemenite representatives. They questioned the substantive legitimacy of
66 See Kirgis, ‘Security Council Governance of Postconflict Societies: A Plea for Good Faith and 
Informed Decision Making’ 95 AJIL (2002), 579, at 580.
67 SC Res. 687 (1998), para. 2.
68 Mendelson, Hulton, ‘La Revendication par l’lraq de la souverainetd sur le Koweit’ 36 Annuaire 
Frangais de Droit International (1990), 195.
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Resolution 687 on its boundary settlement as being in contradiction with previous 
Resolution 660, which had called upon Iraq and Kuwait to settle the dispute by 
negotiations and peaceful means.69 To impose a solution under duress and to sacrifice 
the principle of sovereignty of one of the parties to the dispute would be contrary to the 
principles and purpose of the UN Charter. The Indian representative took the same 
theoretical approach, however in practice it held that such illegitimacy was cured by the 
fact that the SC had endorsed an agreement which was already in force.70 Questions of 
selectivity were also raised by the Cuban representative. Despite these objections Iraq 
formally accepted Resolution 687 and its boundary settlement a few days after the 
adoption of the resolution.71
It is here submitted that Resolution 687 was in principle legitimate, since the SC was 
entitled to make a choice between the principle of state sovereignty and the guarantee of 
peace and security in the region, which a final demarcation would bring about. Further, 
the change of policy since Resolution 660 was justified by Iraqi reluctance to reach an 
agreement by peaceful means, as proved by the invasion of August 1990. Iraq’s consent 
may well have been superfluous and, despite the fact that Article 52 VCLT did not 
apply as a result of the duress being imposed against an aggressor state according to 
Article 75 VCLT and, as a consequence of that, Resolution 687 could not be claimed to 
be invalid, such consent did not add further legitimacy to the action of the SC.
What however would make such legitimacy controversial is the lack of clarity and 
transparency in what the SC was doing. Apparently, the SC was solely reaffirming an 
already existing delimitation and the scope of the SC’s action would be to ‘re-start’ 
from such a legal basis and proceed to demarcation. However, the problem exactly lay 
in the solution the SC provided and the SC could not have ignored that. Indeed, the
no1963 Agreement recalled and endorsed an exchange of letters dating back to 1932 
between the Iraqi government and the British Ruler of Kuwait.73 Such agreement 
recalled in its turn an exchange of letters of 1923 between the British mandatory 
authorities in Iraq and the Ruler of Kuwait, such exchange of letters providing for a
69 S/PV.2981, Statement of Iraq 32, Statement of Yemen 41, Statement of Cuba 61.
70 Ibidem, Statement of India 77-78.
71 S/22453,5 April 1991; S/22456, 6 April 1991.
72 Agreed Minutes between the State o f Kuwait and the Republic o f Iraq Regarding the Restoration o f 
Friendly Relations, Recognition, and Related Matters, 4 October 1964,485 UNTS 321.
73 The document can be found in Lauterpacht, Greenwood, Weller and Bethlehem (eds.), The Kuwait 
Crisis, Basic Documents (1991), Vol. 1,49-50.
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somewhat imprecise definition of the boundary.74 Despite the attempt by the British 
authorities to clarify these imprecisions in 1940 and 1951, Iraq never agreed to them 
and the 1963 Agreement also did not provide for a solution. All in all, it was clear that 
the UN Boundary Demarcation Commission would not be engaged solely with 
demarcation, but part of its task would be to delimit the boundary. Such reality became 
even more clear during and after the works of the UNBDC.75 One can definitely 
conclude that much of the result reached by the UNBDC and endorsed by SC 
Resolution 833 was corresponding to the British claims of 1940 and 1951, which, 
however, were never accepted by Iraq. Despite statements to the contrary in SC 
Resolution 773 and 833 and by the President of the SC, the SC re-apportioned territory 
in the North Sector in favour of Kuwait, which contained important oil wells exploited 
for years by Iraq, and parts of the Umm Qasr port complex too. This casts serious 
doubts on the transparency and good faith of the SC action under Chapter VII. Despite 
having the legal power to effect a delimitation, it did not spell out clearly what it was 
actually doing in order to not convey the impression that it was, for the very first time, 
dealing with the most sacred idol of states’ sovereignty, that is territory. Had it spelled 
out clearly what was the task of the UNBDC, it should have justified more thoroughly 
why it was necessary for the maintenance of peace and security in the region to change 
the pre-invasion de facto boundary line between Iraq and Kuwait and the reason why it 
was adopting an interpretation of treaty instruments, which was mostly coincident with 
that always rejected by Iraq. This might have been a more difficult task, yet it does not 
excuse the way the SC acted and, above all, it can hardly fill a gap of legitimacy that 
characterised the action of the SC.
The issue of good faith with respect to Resolution 687 recalls a wider problem of 
good faith in the way the SC ascertains ‘a threat to peace and security’ under Article 39. 
In its creative interpretation of its powers under Chapter VII, the SC has declared to 
represent ‘a threat to peace and security’ not only classic inter-state armed conflicts, but 
also internal upheavals,76 legal disputes about extradition,77 gross violations of human
7ft 70 onrights , post-conflict situations, humanitarian crises. As Kirgis rightly states ‘Art. 39
74 Ibidem.
75Mend6lson, Hulton, ‘The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary’ 64 BYIL (1993), 135.
76 SC Res. 1199 (1999) on Kosovo.
77 SC Res. 748 (1992) on the Lockerbie affair.
78 SC Res. 217 (1965) on Southern Rhodesia.
79 SC Res. 1031 (1995) on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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calls on the Council to make a determination, not just a recitation.’81 Whereas in some 
cases it may be self-evident that a certain situation represents a threat to peace and 
security such as in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it is highly questionable 
whether a legal dispute over extradition like in Lockerbie was a threat to peace and 
security four years after the criminal act and two weeks before the ICJ was to pronounce 
on a request by Libya for interim measures protecting Libya’s rights under the Montreal 
Convention. Also it is questionable whether the US decision not to extend the mandate 
of its own peace-keeping forces in the Balkans, unless covered by absolute immunity 
from the jurisdiction of the ICC, was indeed a threat to peace and security under Article 
39 justifying an action under Chapter VII.82
As proposed by Kirgis, in such cases the SC could make use of Article 28 of its 
Provisional Rules of Procedure, which allows it to ‘appoint a commission or committee 
or a rapporteur for a specified question.*83 Such group of experts could both investigate 
the situation on the ground, thus really determining whether such situation amounts to a 
threat to peace and security, and, if such determination occurs, consider the best course 
of action. The reality is that more and more often the decisions of the SC under Chapter 
VII are just reactive, rather than pro-active, if not, even worse, just an endorsement of 
actions taken by a concert of powers. The good faith requirement is therefore often 
ignored, leaving aside all too easily a fundamental legal principle. This may cast an 
important doubt over the legitimacy of such SC actions and, more importantly, of the 
legitimacy of the SC as the authority entrusted in the international community with the 
maintenance of peace and security. Further, the rationale of decisions is hardly 
mentioned in the preamble of the resolutions and even the minutes of meetings often do 
not represent any satisfactory guidance in this respect. For example, the policy of 
sanctions towards Iraq left for years a big question mark on the legitimacy of the choice 
for a strict regime of sanctions giving preference to a concern for peace and security in
Oi
the region over the need to guarantee basic human rights to the local populations.
The question of good faith and of justification of decision-making recalls another 
significant legitimacy gap of some SC actions. Such a gap relates to procedural
80 SC Res. 794 (1992) on Somalia.
81 Kirgis, supra n. 66,580.
82 SC Res. 1422 (2002). See comment in Stahn, ‘The Ambiguities of SC Res. 1422 (2002)’ 14 EJ1L 
(2003), 85.
83 Supra n. 66, 581.
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guarantees in favour of interested Parties. Procedural unfairness may eventually make 
the whole decision illegitimate. One simple principle is that, if the Council is to decide 
upon a dispute between two or more parties, procedural fairness would require both 
parties to be given the opportunity to be heard. Such requirement is usually complied 
with by the SC. For example, during the work of the UNBDC, such principle was 
generally applied, and it was Iraq’s own choice often not to provide the commission 
with its views. However, more specifically, a problem of procedural fairness arose with 
respect to an on-site visit to a part of the boundary, of which allegedly only the 
Kuwait’s expert was informed in due time.85
A more significant problem of procedural fairness is related to the particular role 
that the SC may play in a particular dispute. If, as in Lockerbie, the SC limits itself to 
endorsing decisions taken unilaterally elsewhere, it goes without saying that formal 
procedural guarantees do not protect adequately the position of interested parties. 
Professor Graefrath raises this point with reference to the adoption of Resolution 731:
‘This kind of procedure, if applied by any court to an individual, would raise an allegation that the 
right to fair trial had been breached. However, the procedural rules of the Security Council, a 
political organ which “shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations” (Article 24(2) of the Charter), do not contain any procedural safeguards which a State 
would automatically enjoy if involved in Court proceedings.’
Despite the well-established practice of both national and international bodies that 
the decision-making process can be influenced and determined in the course of informal 
meetings, the fact that the SC limits itself to endorsing such decisions, and the fact that 
it does not make any efforts to protect the interests of one of the parties to the dispute 
may well be within the limits of legality of what the SC can do, yet the legitimacy of 
such course of action casts again serious problems of procedural fairness, hence of the 
legitimacy of the decision itself.
4.1 The pull towards compliance: the problems of selectivity and ‘ad-hocism’ of SC 
actions
Dworkin and Franck have pointed out that a norm or a certain legal code of conduct 
is legitimate when it is applied coherently, in other words when like cases are treated
84 E.g. articles on the issue of sanctions by Craven et al., in the Symposium ‘The Impact on International 
Law of a Decade of Measures on Iraq’, 13 EJIL (2002), 43.
85 Mendelson, Hulton, supra n. 68,154.
86 Graefrath, supra n. 59,191.
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R7alike. The failure to apply norms in a consistent way makes the law selective. A 
certain action may not be necessarily illegal, but certainly illegitimate, if such selectivity 
is not justified by reference to another, general or specific, overriding principle of the 
international legal system. Selectivity can certainly prevent the creation of a customary 
norm, and, when occurring after its creation, it can slowly lead to the desuetude of a 
customary norm. As such, selectivity can affect also the legality of a certain behaviour. 
As to treaty norms, these do not derive their validity from a consistent state practice and 
opinio iuris, but from a validly expressed consent. Once entered into force treaty norms 
are valid, even if applied incoherently. However, if they are applied selectively and such 
selectivity is not justified by recourse to other legal principles, international actors will 
perceive them as illegitimate.
One example of a claim of selectivity is the one advanced by Cuba in the discussion 
related to the Iraqi-Kuwait boundary leading to the adoption of Resolution 687. Cuba 
argued that the SC’s policy was selectively defined in that it considered such a 
territorial dispute as a threat to peace and security in the region justifying a binding 
decision under Chapter VII; yet in similar regional cases such as the Israeli occupation 
of the Golan Heights and the Palestinian territories, the SC had kept a low profile, 
without taking any measures under Chapter VII.88 As seen, it was in the legal 
competence of the SC to decide those measures under Resolution 687, yet the fact that 
in similar cases, such as the Middle East, no action was taken, makes any justification 
invoking the need to protect regional peace and security less legitimate. This raises a 
broader problem of legitimacy concerning the veto power of permanent members of the 
SC, which still remains untouched after almost 60 years since the end of World War II 
and after a series of dramatic changes in the state of international relations. This 
problem is strictly speaking procedural, but it obviously entails a substantive dimension 
as the veto-power always prevents any action against a direct interest of the permanent 
members.89
The question of selectivity is also connected to a broader problem of legitimacy of 
the way the SC has recently acted. This problem has been called by Bianchi *ad-
87 Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986); Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 38-41.
88 S/PV. 2981, Statement of Cuba 61.
89 E.g. Winkelmann, ‘Bringing the Security Council into a New Era: Recent Developments in the 
Discussion on the Reform of the Security Council’ 1 Max Planck Yearbook o f United Nations Law 
(1997), 35.
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hocism\ 90 I share the view of that writer, that the lack of development of general 
principles and standards of conduct, not to talk about the lack of reference to 
international legal principles, and a pragmatic approach based on ad-hoc solutions to 
‘exceptional* circumstances have led the SC to lose the Post-Cold War momentum. The 
SC, far from becoming a genuine guarantor of world peace and security, has invested 
major resources in trying to avoid being marginalised by the unilateral action of the 
only Super-Power, the United States, and not to be condemned in a new era to the 
inaction of Cold War. The United States and those countries supporting it in specific 
situations have been very cautious in allowing the development of invocation of internal 
normative standards, aware of the fact that such normative standards could one day 
backfire on them. This has resulted in the SC being perceived as mostly guarantor and 
endorser of their interests and creating a gap of legitimacy not only in the way it deals 
with specific actions, such as the regimes of sanctions against Iraq and Libya, or the 
creation of UN territorial administrations in Europe, but more in general as an 
institution itself. Further, as correctly argued by Bianchi, the lack of internal normative 
standards has made impossible the development of a framework of accountability of the 
SC and states involved in its decision-making.91 Lack of accountability leads also to the 
perceived illegitimacy of the SC and its actions. More in general, illegitimacy of the SC 
and illegitimacy of its actions may have the disturbing outcome of rendering any 
genuinely multilateral framework of co-operation ineffective, and measures being 
complied with thanks to the stick of the Prince, rather than the awareness and consensus 
of its members.
5. The territorial status of Kosovo: beyond the limits of UN legality and 
legitimacy?
As an example of UN-led territorial administration it is worth considering the case of 
Kosovo. Kosovo, a province within the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (until recently 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), has been placed since 1999 under the authority of the 
SC and directly administered by a UN civil presence under the leadership of the
90 Bianchi, ‘Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law’ 13 EJIL (2002), 263.
91 Ibidem, 270.
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Secretary General Special Representative for Kosovo (hereinafter SGSR).92 Kosovo is 
particularly interesting in order to show how a framework of UN territorial 
unlawfulness can be defined with regard to a specific situation. The case of Kosovo also 
encapsulates the two main models of exercise of UN territorial authority seen above. On 
the one hand, the UN exercise their territorial competence by endorsing the 
establishment of a NATO-led security presence in the province through the powers of 
the SC under Chapter VII. On the other hand, the UN, through a Chapter VH 
authorisation by the SC, directly administer the province. Both models can be reviewed 
through the legality and legitimacy framework developed above, which clearly shows 
how the problems faced by each of the two models in terms of international legality and 
legitimacy are peculiar and distinct. This section will first review the legality of 
Kosovo’s territorial situation as of today, and it will then consider the question of 
sovereignty over the province in the light of 2001 Delineation Treaty dispute and the 
policy adopted in that respect by the SGSR.
5.1 The events leading to the international administration of Kosovo
Kosovo had been since 1974 a province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) constitutional framework.93 The 1974 constitution 
endowed Kosovo with a substantial autonomy, in view of the distinctive ethnic 
composition represented by a majority of ethnic Albanians. After Milosevic took power 
in Serbia in 1989, the degree of autonomy granted by Belgrade to Kosovo was 
substantively reduced, and the participation of ethnic Albanians in public office was 
actively discouraged. In response, Kosovo Albanian leaders withdrew from all public 
institutions, created parallel administrative structures and on 19 October 1991 declared 
Kosovo a sovereign and independent state. Kosovo’s statehood was not recognised by 
any state and, apart from the parallel administrative structures, it did not fulfil the 
effective control test set out by the Montevideo Convention. The second part of the 
1990s saw, on the one hand, the pursuit by most ethnic Albanians of a policy of civil
92 The FRY has changed in 2003 its constitutional structure to a looser form of federation and its official 
name is now Union of Serbia and Montenegro (hereinafter USM). Articles 14, 59 and 60 of the new 
constitution adopted on 4 February 2003 imply the continuation in the USM of the international legal 
personality of the FRY. See The Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, in 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/charter_el.html. When referring to events prior to the entry into force of the 
new constitution, I will continue using the acronym FRY, when referring to subsequent events I will use 
the acronym USM.
93 1974 SFRY Constitution, Art. 1.
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and peaceful disobedience, and, on the other, also the uprising of different local armed 
groups under the banner of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).94 In the course of 1997 
and 1998, the level of violence was intensified by the KLA with attacks on both military 
and civilian targets, which led to increasing reaction by the Yugoslav security forces. 
This also led to an increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons. The 
first definition by the SC of the Kosovo internal conflict as a threat to international 
peace and security dates back to the beginning of 1998, when, on March 31, it adopted 
Resolution 1160, which condemned ‘the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces 
against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by 
the KLA’95. Acting under Chapter VII, the SC imposed an arms embargo on the FRY 96 
On September 23 the SC through Resolution 1199 again became seized of the matter, 
and it called for a cease-fire. The cease-fire was agreed three weeks later. Under the 
terms of the agreements struck thanks to the mediation of Richard Holbrooke, the 
number of Yugoslav troops in Kosovo was significantly reduced by Belgrade, at the 
same time allowing 2,000 unarmed OSCE verifiers to step in, in order to oversee 
compliance with the cease-fire agreement and the establishment of an air verification 
mission over Kosovo by NATO forces.97 Such agreements were endorsed by the SC 
through Resolution 1203, which was also adopted under Chapter VII. Despite a short 
standstill in armed activities, by the end of December violations of the cease-fire by the 
KLA started to intensify once again, leading to initial proportionate responses by 
Yugoslav forces,98 but a few weeks later to the massacre of 45 civilians in the village of 
Racak.99
This sparked the diplomatic reaction of NATO countries which led, under the threat 
of air strikes, to an international peace conference in Rambouillet, France, at the 
beginning of February 1999. The negotiations lasted for one month and revolved around 
a draft agreement proposed by the Western members of the Contact Group, under the 
name of Rambouillet Agreements, providing for an interim substantial autonomy for 
Kosovo, the possibility of a referendum in three years for full independence from
94 For an historical account of the events of the 1990s in Kosovo, which led to the crisis see Malcolm, 
Kosovo: a Short History (1998).
95 SC Res. 1160 (1998), para. 2.
96 Ibidem, para. 8.
97 Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, 16 October 1998, S/1998/278; KVM 
Agreement Between NATO and the FRY, 15 October 1998, S/1998/991.
98 OSCE, KVM, Press Release n. 08/99,9 January 1999.
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Belgrade, the withdrawal from Kosovo of all Yugoslav security forces and the 
establishment of an international security force led by NATO. The deal was accepted by 
the Kosovo leaders, but refused by Belgrade.100 On 24 March 1999, NATO started an 
aerial bombing campaign on the FRY, immediately followed by a retaliatory offensive 
of Yugoslav forces against the Albanian population in Kosovo. The campaign continued 
until 9 June 1999, when the FRY accepted at Kumanovo the withdrawal of any security 
presence from Kosovo and the deployment of a NATO-led military force.101 The 
following day the SC adopted SC Resolution 1244 (hereinafter 1244) under Chapter 
VII, which endorsed the Kumanovo Agreement and the Agreement on Political 
Principles of 3 June 1999, between the FRY, and the EU and Russian envoys, Martii 
Ahtisaari and Victor Tchemomyrdine. The resolution decided the establishment of a 
UN civil administration, in charge of governing over Kosovo with a view to 
implementing self-administration of the province and to facilitating a political process 
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.102 No mention was made in 1244 of any 
deadline for such a determination. Ultimate authority was vested with the UN 
administration (UNMIK) for a transitional but indefinite period.103 This was confirmed 
by the very first regulation of the Secretary-General Special Representative (SGSR), 
who assumed all executive and legislative powers within Kosovo, the right to appoint 
judges and civil servants and to remove them from their position, and asserted his 
authority to administer all funds and properties of the FRY within Kosovo.104 Since 
then, Kosovo has been an internationalised territory.105
99 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
Responses, Lessons Learned (2000).
100 For an account of the Rambouillet Conference see Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, 
75 International Affairs (1999), 211; Decaux, ‘La Conference de Rambouillet: Negotiation de la demitie 
chance ou contrainte illicite’, in Tomuschat, supra n. 5,45. See also letter of FRY to the SC of 1 February 
1999 (S/1999/107) condemning the practice of NATO to seek a political solution under military threat.
101 Military-technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, signed in Kumanovo, FYROM, 9 June 
1999 (usually referred to as ‘Kumanovo Agreement’), in 38 ILM (1999), 1217.
102 SC Res. 1244 (1999), paras. 6,10-11.
103 Ibidem, para. 19.
104 UNMIK/REG/1999/1, UNMIK Official Gazette, 25 June 1999.
105 The definition of Kosovo as an internationalised territory can be drawn from an analogy of past 
regimes such as the Free City of Danzig, the Free Territory of Trieste (this latter was never implemented), 
and contemporary arrangements such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor. Such definition can be 
applied to those territorial arrangements where international organisations exercise full or partial 
jurisdiction in respect to the legislative, executive or judicial functions. See Marazzi, I  territori 
intemazionalizzati (1959); Ydit, Internationalised Territories (1961); Beck, Die Intemationalisierung 
von Territorien (1962); more recently Wilde, supra n. 1,583.
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5.2 The Significance of Resolution 1244 in Relation to its Underlying Agreements: 
the Application of Article 52 VCLT to the Kumanovo Agreement
5.2.1 The Legal Basis of the International Presence in Kosovo: the Relation between 
SC Resolution 1244, the 3rd o f June Agreement and the Kumanovo Agreement
The legal basis of the involvement of the international community in Kosovo is more 
complex than normally claimed. Reading through UNMIK documents and SC 
resolutions, one may first get the idea that UNMIK and KFOR authority under 
international law is provided by 1244, adding to the perceived legality and legitimacy of 
Kosovo’s territorial administration. However, an in-depth analysis of the events which 
led to the end of NATO’s campaign and a contextual reading of 1244 tend to muddy the 
seemingly transparent waters of UN legality and legitimacy. As a starting point, a 
contextual reading of 1244 in relation to the other legal instruments recalled in its 
operative part is necessary.
As in previous resolutions concerning Kosovo, 1244 starts in the preamble by 
recalling the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo and the need to comply with 
all previous SC resolutions; it reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
FRY; and it condemns all acts of violence against the Kosovo population and all 
terrorist activities. The first important element of the resolution is also in the preamble 
and it states:
‘Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 
1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in 
Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper’.
These two instruments are then recalled in operative paragraph 2, where the SC, after 
invoking Chapter VII, decides that a political solution will be based on these two 
agreements. As also indicated in the same paragraph, the first instrument was a 
unilateral statement adopted by the G-8 Foreign Ministers conference on May 6, 
enunciating those political principles which were then elaborated in detail in the second 
agreement, the 3rd of June Agreement. Its repetition in the resolution as Annex 1 does 
not play any self-evident function, since that statement was only a broad unilateral 
political basis for the accord of June 3. Such role may well be the one of reiterating the
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novel authority of the G-8 as a body competent for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, given that the draft resolution was the result of political negotiations 
within the G-8 in June, or providing a basis for a more conciliatory approach by the SC 
towards Yugoslavia, thus accommodating Russian and Chinese demands. However, this 
is only speculation, since no mention is to be found of this in the discussion leading to 
the adoption of 1244.
As to the agreement of June 3, this was a more significant instrument both from a 
formal and a substantive point of view. From a formal point of view it can be seen as an 
agreement binding upon Yugoslavia. This is the way at least the FRY considered it, 
given that it went through the normal process of ratification of treaty by the Serbian 
Assembly.106 Further, it may have served the important purpose of giving a consensual 
basis to a resolution, whose legal effects upon the FRY could have been found to be 
controversial, given the uncertainty surrounding the FRY status at the UN at that 
time.107 From a substantive point of view the 3rd of June Agreement provided for the 
establishment of a UN civil presence entrusted with the task of providing ‘a transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional 
democratic self-governing institutions.*108 Such civil presence may act under Chapter 
VII of the Charter in the manner decided by the SC.109 Indeed, this legal basis for the 
UN civil authority over Kosovo was superseded by 1244. The referral in its preamble to 
Chapter VII gives the authority to the SRSG to act as civil authority in Kosovo in the 
interim period, whose length is left undefined.110 That would be one form of authority to 
decide non-coercive measures according to Article 41, however the fact that reference is 
made to the maintenance of law and order and establishment of police leads to the 
conclusion that probably Article 42 also represents a legal basis of these specific 
powers. Enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42 are not subject to the domestic 
jurisdiction exception of Article 2(7) of the Charter. Further, such basis is 
complemented by UNMIK Regulation 1 and by the 2001 Constitutional Framework,
106 On the events within FRY leading to the ratification of the 3rd of June agreement see Mijatovic, ‘A 
Hard Loss to Spin’, Report on the Balkans’ crisis, 5 June 1999, Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
107 See the ICJ decision of 3 February 2003 on the FRY request for a review of the Court’s decision on 
jurisdiction in the case on genocide between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY (Case Concerning 
Application o f the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide, ICJ Reports 
1996, 595) in accordance with Art. 61(1) of the Statute (Application for the Revision o f the Judgement o f 
11 July 1996, in www.icj-cij.org/idocket/iybh/iybhfirame.htm). See also commentary by Craven, ‘The 
Bosnia Case Revisited and the ‘New’ Yugoslavia’, 15 LJIL (2002), 323.
108 3rd of June Agreement, UN Doc. S/1999/649, para. 5.
109 Ibidem, para. 2.
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which specify the powers entrusted to the SRSG by 1244. These two instruments clearly 
show how the SRSG is the supreme authority in Kosovo, and also that Kosovo 
institutions are subject to these powers.111 The practice of the SC to back the 
establishment of a UN civil administration through its powers under Chapter VII had 
already been experimented within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it has been eventually 
rendered explicit in East Timor.112
As to the military arrangement, the 3rd of June Agreement provided for the
withdrawal of all Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo before a limited amount of
personnel would be permitted to return, whereas the G-8 statement of May 6 did not
1 1 ^specify the ‘quantity* of forces to be withdrawn. The agreement recalled the 
deployment of international military presence under Chapter VII, whereas in the 
previous statement no mention to Chapter VII was made.114 It demanded that such 
military presence would be established ‘with substantial NATO participation ... under 
unified command and control’, whereas in the G-8 statement mention was made only of 
a military presence ‘endorsed and adopted by the United Nations’.115 It is important to 
note that, as confirmed by the preamble, Yugoslavia accepted only points 1 to 9 of the 
political agreement of June 3. It did not accept point 10 that would have committed 
Yugoslavia to accept a timetable for withdrawal of forces agreed in a military-technical 
agreement, and the condition that military activities would stop only after the 
verification of the beginning of such activities. Further, such military agreement would 
also decide the timetable and limits of returns of Yugoslav/Serb personnel with the role 
spelled out in paragraph 6.
The military-technical agreement is given a very low profile in 1244.116 However, its 
signature on the 9th of June in Kumanovo by KFOR chiefs and Yugoslav army officers
110 SC Res. 1244 (1999), para. 19.
111 UNMIK/REG/1999/1, supra n. 104, Sections 1, 4, 6; Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self- 
Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, UNMIK Official Gazette, 15 May 2001, Arts. 12,14(3).
112 SC Res. 1031 (1995); SC Res. 1272 (1999). For a comparative analysis of these instruments see 
Wilde, supra n. 1; Bothe and Marauhn, ‘UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, 
Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration’, in Tomuschat, 
supra n. 5,217.
See para. 2 Agreement 3 June, compare with point 2 of the G8 declaration.
114 Para. 3, compare with point 3.
115 Para. 4, compare with point 3.
116 The agreement is re-called in Annex 2, through para. 10 of the 3rd of June Agreement.
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can hardly be overestimated and, indeed, its legal significance has been 
underestimated.117 In Article 1(2) it states that the FRY authorities
‘understand and agree that the international security force (“KFOR”) will deploy following the 
adoption of the SCR (1244) ... and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the 
authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens 
of Kosovo and otherwise cany out its mission.’
Article 1(4) then spells out the purposes of the agreement: a) establish a durable 
cessation of hostilities; b) ensure the withdrawal of all Yugoslav and Serb forces and 
prevent any re-entry without prior consent by the KFOR commander; c)
‘to provide for the support and authorisation of the international security force (“KFOR”) and in 
particular to authorize the international security force (“KFOR”) to take such actions as are 
required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and 
protection of the international security force (“KFOR”), and to contribute to a secure environment 
for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, 
and non-governmental organisations.... ’1
The suspension and termination of the bombing campaign by NATO is then 
conditioned upon the verification of a very detailed schedule of withdrawal of all 
Yugoslav forces.119 The final important provision is Article 5 which establishes that 
KFOR commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of the Agreement.
The Kumanovo Agreement (hereinafter KA) is thus fundamental to the 
understanding of the legal framework created by 1244 despite its very low profile. It 
complements 1244 in a crucial respect for the territorial status of Kosovo, that of 
security and effectiveness. This had been the most disputed issue at the Rambouillet 
negotiations and it had led to the refusal by the FRY to sign the agreements and the 
beginning by NATO of the bombing campaign.120 The 3rd of June Agreement, through 
its vague formula of end of all violence and repression in Kosovo and withdrawal of all 
military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and the subsequent return of limited 
personnel for such purposes such as ‘liaison with the international civil mission and the 
international security presence’, provided a basis for interpretation that would justify a 
gradual return to Belgrade’s control over Kosovo. In addition, paragraph 4 referred to 
NATO substantial presence in the security presence, but not to NATO authority over
117 With one recent notable exception: Guillaume, ‘Le cadre juridique de Faction du KFOR au Kosovo’, 
in Tomuschat, supra n. 5,243.
1,8 See also KA, Art. n, para. 3c); Appendix B, paras. 2,5.
119 Ibidem, Art. II, ffl.
120 Cfr. Weller, supra n. 100.
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such military presence. Any more detailed commitment implicit in paragraph 10 was 
refused by the Yugoslav leadership. It was only one week after that consent was given 
to vest final security authority over Kosovo with KFOR commander. And it was only 24 
hours after such consent was given that the SC approved the same draft resolution 
mentioned in Article 1(2) KA. Further, 1244, despite being adopted under Chapter VII 
and despite authorising the establishment of an international security at paragraph 7, 
neither recalls any issue concerning the composition of the military force if not for 
paragraph 4 of the 3rd of June Agreement, nor mentions the fact that the international 
security force is put under the ultimate and exclusive authority of a NATO commander. 
The KA, however, comes in 1244 through the back door of paragraph 10 of Annex 2. 
To think of it as a mere military technical agreement of cease-fire, movements and re­
deployment of troops, and, perhaps, as argued by one writer,121 of establishment of a 
regime of belligerent occupation is too restrictive. Its importance for a general political 
settlement is witnessed by the fact that suspension of military activities occurred only 
after its entry into force. 1244 and the KA recall in many respects SC Resolution 687, 
whose acceptance by Iraq had been a pre-condition to the cessation of hostilities in 
1991.
5.2.2 'Were the KA and the 3rd o f June Agreement procured by the threat or use of 
force?
The possible existence of coercion as an objective element affecting the legality of 
the KA and the 3rd of June Agreement, and the impact of this coercion on the adoption 
of 1244 have been analysed only en passant by some writers. Cerone only recalls this 
possibility and he makes the point that even if coercion was proved the invalidation by 
Article 52 would only apply if NATO intervention was found contrary to the rules of ius 
ad bellum}2Z Zappalk derives from the Chinese non-opposition to the adoption of 1244 
on the basis that consent was given by the FRY, that such consent was not coerced 
through an unlawful intervention. His assertion seems, however, to imply the existence 
of an objective element of coercion.123 Kohen is right in asserting that 1244 did not 
authorise the NATO intervention ex post facto. It is however difficult to agree with him
121 Cerone, ‘Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo’ 12 EJIL (2001), 
469.
122 Ibidem, 484.
123 Zappalk, ‘Nuovi sviluppi in tema di uso della forza armata in relazione alle vicende del Kossovo’ 82 
Rivista di Diritto Internationale (1999), 975, at 988, note 57.
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that some parts of 1244 do not represent a deal coerced through the use of force upon 
the FRY.124 As seen, the KA is an integral part of 1244. It is true that the content of the 
Rambouillet differs from that of 1244 plus KA in the three important respects 
mentioned by Kohen: no unrestricted right of movement by KFOR throughout the 
whole of the FRY territory;125 no deadline for the holding of a referendum;126 no 
reference to the will of Kosovo’s people.127 However, that does not mean that 1244 plus 
KA was not an attempt of legalisation of the conditions imposed by NATO. It is just 
that those conditions were different as of the beginning of June 1999 from those of 18 
March 1999. This may indicate a partial political achievement in Milosevic’s strategy, 
however those conditions were in any case imposed and the consent extorted through 
the use of force. This was made clear by the Yugoslav representative during the SC 
meeting of 10 June 1999, which led to the adoption of 1244, and confirmed by the 
representatives of other states, even NATO states.128 More explicitly, some important 
elements in the KA tend to support this interpretation: Article II talks explicitly at points 
a) and e) about suspension and cessation of the bombing campaign only once the 
withdrawals would comply with the agreement’s requirements. The statements of 
NATO political representatives were very clear on the fact that, if the FRY wanted 
military action to halt, it should accept NATO’s demands.129 Furthermore, it is arguable 
that it is not the imposition itself which makes an agreement null and void according to 
Article 52, but the extortion of the consent through the use of force.130 In other words, a
124 Kohen, ‘L’emploi de la force et la crise du Kosovo: vers un nouveaue ddsordre juridique 
international’, 32 Revue Beige de Droit International (1999), 122, at 141.
125 Rambouillet Agreement, Annex B, para. 8.
126 Ibidem, Ch. 8, Art. 1(3).
127 Ibidem.
128 Statement of the FRY representative Mr. Jovanovic: ‘I must note with regret that the draft resolution 
proposed by the G-8 is yet another attempt to marginalize the world Organization aimed at legalizing post 
festum the brutal aggression to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been exposed in the last two 
and a half months. In doing so, the Security Council and the international community would become 
accomplices in the most drastic violation of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations to 
date and in legalizing the rule of force rather than the rule of international law...The solutions which are 
being tried to be imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia set a dangerous precedent for the 
international community.... They provide a broad authority to those who have conducted a total genocidal 
war against a sovereign and peace-loving country and legitimize the policy of ultimatum and diktat’. See 
also statements of the USA representative Mr. Burleigh, of the UK representative Mr. Greenstock (S/PV. 
4011). And statement by the Cuban representative Mr. Rodriguez-Parrilla (S/PV.4011, Resumption 1).
129 E.g. NATO’s spokesman’s, James Shea, statement of 6 June 1999 referring to the KA negotiations 
These talks ... could take some time to conclude, but I must stress it is in the interest of the Serbs for the 
signing to be as rapid as possible. The linkage is simple: we will not stop until they start, and as they are 
not starting their withdrawal, we are not stopping out operations.’ (in 
http://www.cnn.com/world/europe/9906/06/kosovo.04/index.html).
130 Bothe, ‘Consequences of the Prohibition of the Use of Force-Comments on Arts. 49 and 70 of the 
ILC’s 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties’, 27 ZaoRV (1967), 507, at 513.
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direct causality link ought to be proved. Claims of imposition can be evidence of a 
situation fitting into Article 52, but imposition is in itself insufficient. It may have 
economic and financial connotations rather than military ones, and it could lead states to 
denounce treaties whenever they perceive them as politically unequal.131
As to the 3rd of June Agreement the existence of coercion is more controversial. The 
G-8 proposal presented by the Russian and the EU envoys did not fully embody 
NATO’s demands, and they represented a compromise between NATO’s original 
demands, on the one side, and Russia and the FRY, on the other side.132 The political 
principles established were rather broad and they were apt to support a rather favourable 
interpretation for the FRY. The reference to the suspension of military activities being 
conditioned to the acceptance of a detailed schedule of withdrawals, as seen, was not 
accepted by Belgrade. Further, no agreement was reached on the number of Yugoslav 
armed personnel allowed to return to Kosovo. It is true that the 3rd of June Agreement 
represents the first acceptance by the FRY of the deployment of international troops 
with substantial NATO presence under Chapter VII, and that such consent possibly 
would not have been given without NATO’s military action. However, it seems that the 
causality link between NATO’s use of force and the acceptance of the G-8 principles is
r r lnot easily proven. Even if it was proved, the significance of the 3 of June agreement is 
superseded by the KA as regards its security provisions, and by 1244 as regards the 
deployment of the UN civil administration.
5.2.3 Was the Use o f Force by NATO in Violation o f Principles o f International Law 
Embodied in the UN Charter? Some Exercises in ‘Lateral Thinking9
At this stage the relationship between Article 52 and the ius ad bellum becomes crucial. 
Was the NATO intervention according to Article 52 ‘in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’?
It is not the purpose of this section to re-start a lengthy examination of the legality of 
NATO’s military intervention in the FRY in 1999, which has already been the subject
131 To be noticed is the fact that the inclusion of the ‘inequality’ of treaties as a ground for invalidation 
was ruled out by Western states during the diplomatic conference which led to the adoption of the VCLT. 
A compromise was reached in allowing a Declaration on the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of 
Economic and Political Coercion in Concluding a Treaty, which, however, is not a legally binding 
instrument (UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents (1968-1969), 285, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 39/1/Add. 2 (1971)).
132 See Black, ‘Talks raise hope of breakthrough’, The Guardian, 2 June 1999.
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of much international law literature in the last few years.133 I only engage in an exercise 
of ‘lateral thinking*, by discussing the legal claims put forward by NATO states and 
commentators in order to justify the action.
Firstly, some international lawyers have argued for the emergence of a customary 
right of humanitarian intervention, in extreme cases of humanitarian crisis.134 This 
argument is flawed, as it does not prove a consistent and widespread practice and a 
general opinio iuris required for the modification of existing customary law, and, a 
fortiori, for the modification of a norm of ius cogens like that on the prohibition of the 
use of force. The best case that can be made in favour of the existence of the right of 
humanitarian intervention is that the international community is divided on the question 
of the right of humanitarian intervention without SC authorisation, and that there was a 
measure of tolerance and support towards Operation Allied Force in some sectors of the 
international community such as the West and Islamic countries. However, the largest 
and most populated countries China, India, Russia, most of Latin American countries 
and some African countries opposed the action and the invocation of a right of 
humanitarian intervention.135 That can hardly be seen as confirmation of an already 
existing customary norm or as crystallising an existing trend to a relaxation or reform of
133 Contesting the legality of the intervention see Brownlie, ‘Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the 
International Law Aspects’; Chinkin, ‘The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) under International Law’, 4th Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee (1999), reprinted in 49 ICLQ (2000), 878-925; White, ‘The legality of bombing in the name of 
humanity’ 5 Journal o f Conflict and Security Law (2000), 27; Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (2001); Gazzini, ‘NATO Coercive Military Activities 
in the Yugoslav Crisis’ 12 EJIL (2001), 391; Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and 
the Use of Force Against Iraq’, 13 EJIL (2002), 1. Supporting the legality see Chamey, ‘Anticipatory 
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’, 93 AJIL (1999), 834; Greenwood, ‘International law and the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo’, in 4th Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
supra, 926; Henkin, ‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention’” 93 AJIL (1999), 824; 
Wedgwood, ‘NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia’ 93 AJIL (1999), 828; Franck, ‘Lessons of Kosovo’ 93 
AJIL (1999), 857.
134 Supporting to different degrees the right of humanitarian intervention without SC authorisation see 
Fonteyne, ‘The Customary Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: its Current Validity Under the 
UN Charter’, 4 California Western International Law Journal (1974), 203; Teson, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (1997, 2nd ed.); Lillich, ‘Kant and the Current Debate 
Over Humanitarian Intervention’, 6 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy (1997), 397; Chamey, 
‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’, 93 AJIL (1999), 834; Zappalk, supra n. 123; 
Greenwood, supra n. 133.
135 S/PV. 3988, Statement of FRY 13; Statement of Russia 2; Statement of India 15; Statement of Belarus 
15; Statement of Namibia 10; S/PV. 3989, Statement of China 9; Statement of Ukraine 10; Statement of 
Cuba, 12. 13th Meeting of the Human Rights Commission, E/CN.4/1999/SR. 30, Statement of Mexico 13; 
Statement of Uruguay 14; Statement of Peru 14; Statement of Mauritius 14; Statement of Chile 14; 
Statement of Venezuela 14; Statement of Colombia 15; Statement of Sri Lanka 15; Statement of Ecuador, 
15; Statement of South-Africa, 17; Statement of Botswana, 17. XIII Ministerial Conference of the Non- 
Aligned Movement (NAM), 8-9 April 2000, Final Declaration, at
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a norm of ius cogens, unless we are easily ready to discount the universality of 
international law.136
Secondly, another important argument was that of implied authorisation given by 
Resolutions 1160, 1198 and 1203. As already seen, those resolutions were all passed 
under Chapter VII, however no authorisation was given by their wording. Russia and 
China expressly stated that they would not veto the Resolution 1203, because of the lack
i 'xnof such authorisation. In Resolutions 1160 and 1198, the SC only recalled the 
possibility to take further action, were the SC’s requests not met by the FRY. To open 
the door for such kind of implied authorisation would prevent the SC from taking any 
type of policy and actions within Chapter VII but short of forcible measures. Further, as 
the Iraq experience before 2003 shows the UK and US are isolated in claiming such 
right to act, in defiance of the literary sense of Chapter VII resolutions and of the 
debates preceding those resolutions.138
Thirdly, Belgium and Britain claimed the state of necessity as a further ground of 
justification for its participation in the NATO action.139 Such necessity would consist of 
the need to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The state of necessity is in the law of state 
responsibility one of the circumstances which can preclude the wrongfulness of a 
certain action otherwise unlawful. However, the new ILC Commentary on the 2001 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility clearly states that a plea of necessity cannot cover 
forcible measures of humanitarian intervention, since these are regulated in principle by 
the primary obligations.140 In any case, even considering the law of state responsibility, 
NATO action does not fit into the criteria for the application of the state of necessity as
http://www.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/finall.htm. Group of 77 South-Summit, Havana, Cuba, 10-14 Apr 
2000, Final Declaration, at http://www.g77.org/Docs/Declaration_G77Summit.htm.
136 Brownlie, ‘International Law and the Use o f Force Revisited’ 21 Australian Yearbook o f International 
Law (2001), 21, at 34-35.
137 S/PV. 3937, Statement of Russia 12; Statement of China 14-15.
138 Gazzini, supra n. 133; Sicilianos, ‘L’autorisation par le conseil de sdcuritd de recourir h la force: un 
tentative devaluation’ 106 RGDIP (2002), 5.
139 Legality o f Use o f Force case (Provisional Measures), Oral Pleadings of Belgium, 10 May 1999, CR 
99/15; S/PV. 3988, Statement of the UK 11.
140 Crawford (ed.), The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries (2002), 185. A plea of necessity should be assessed within the more general 
question of the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention (ius ad bellum) and not as an ‘excuse’ 
precluding the wrongfulness of a certain conduct (law of state responsibility). As seen, the reactions in the 
international community to Operation Allied Force do not seem to support a relaxation of Art. 2(4) on 
humanitarian grounds.
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spelled out by Article 25 and 26 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which have 
been characterised as customary norms by the ICJ in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros,141
Fourthly, some authors have also argued that 1244 did provide for an ex post facto 
endorsement of the NATO action.142 Nowhere in 1244 is NATO action condemned, 
however, in the same manner, nowhere does the resolution afford any endorsement of 
the action. Lack of condemnation can hardly be seen as an approval of the action by the 
SC. It is true that in Annex 2 there is reference to the acceptance of military-technical 
agreement (i.e. the KA) as a condition for the cessation of military activities. But this is 
exactly the point in question. Was the procurement of the KA in violation of principles 
of international law as embodied in the Charter? This determination turns on the legality 
of NATO intervention, which may eventually turn on the existence of an ex post facto 
endorsement by the SC of this intervention. The circle may become vicious. It is 
incorrect to argue that the existence of such reference to the KA can be seen as an 
implied endorsement. The only referral of the agreement in the annex does not provide 
any clear evidence of such intention. Further, it is clear from the discussion preceding 
and following the adoption of the resolution that the resolution only aimed to restore the 
authority of the SC starting from the de facto situation created by NATO intervention. It 
did not aim in any way to legalise and legitimise such intervention, but only to legalise 
and legitimise the effects of such intervention. The above-question should be rephrased. 
Was the SC acting within the boundaries of international law by doing that? Or are we 
rather facing a classic operation of the principle of effectiveness in international law?
Fifthly, another possible way of interpreting the use of force by NATO countries as 
being within the boundaries of UN legality is to conceive the intervention as a way to 
ensure the achievement of the right of self-determination of the Kosovo-Albanian 
people. However, the argument of legality also fails on this ground. Firstly, it is 
noteworthy that no NATO country justified its action using this legal basis. 
Furthermore, by adopting this approach, two insurmountable complications have to be 
faced. The first one is that the Kosovo-Albanians cannot be considered a people having 
a right to implement their self-determination outside and beyond the FRY
141 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, 7, at 40. 
For the non-applicability of the state of necessity see Kohen, supra note 124, 137; Chesterman, supra 
note 134, 214.
142 E.g. Henkin, supra n. 133; Wedgwood, supra n. 133; Franck, supra n. 133.
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administrative boundaries.143 Finally, foreign states cannot lawfully intervene in an 
internal armed conflict, in order to support militarily the group striving for self- 
determination.144
In conclusion, the analysis of the arguments actually employed by NATO countries 
to justify the action, and other possible arguments such as the ex post facto endorsement 
and the enforcement of a right of self-determination reveal that NATO intervention was 
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter, hence Article 
52 would apply to the Kumanovo Agreement.
5.2.4 Can the SC Endorse through Chapter VII an Agreement which is Invalid under 
Article 52 o f the Vienna Convention o f the Law of the Treaties?
At this stage one should ask whether the SC can cure the invalidity under Article 52 
VCLT of an international agreement by using its powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. If such power is acknowledged, it may become a purely academic exercise to 
review the validity of the KA under the VCLT, since the KA is endorsed in Annex 2 of 
1244.
As seen, international tribunals have defined very broadly the competence of the SC 
to act within the powers provided by Chapter VII. Due to the lack of an institutionalised 
system of judicial review of the acts of the political organs of the UN, the SC would 
have the authority to decide its own competence in a particular matter by declaring that 
matter a threat to international peace and security, and to decide which kind of coercive 
or non-coercive measures to adopt. Such actions would enjoy a presumption of legality. 
The only legal limitation to the authority of the SC would be the compliance with the 
principles and purposes of the UN and norms of ius cogens. Given the scope of this 
authority conferred to the SC, one should possibly rephrase the initial question in the 
negative, that is whether the SC would be acting contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the UN Charter, if it endorsed a treaty which is ‘procured by the threat or use of force 
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations.’ The answer may seem self-evidently affirmative.
143 Re Reference by the Governor in Council concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession o f 
Quebec from Canada, 115 ILR (1999), 535. Ringelheim, Considerations on the international reaction to 
the 1999 Kosovo crisis’ 32 Revue Beige de Droit International (1999), 475, at 484-486. See also 
confirming the non-applicability of the right of ‘external’ self-determination to the dissolution of the 
SFRY Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of 
Statehood’, 16 Australian Yearbook o f International Law (1995), 199, at 238.
144 Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples (1995), 150-158.
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However, it is worth looking at the practice of the SC in endorsing through Chapter 
VII imposed territorial settlements, in order to ensure peace and security in a certain 
area. Such practice is relatively recent. Despite not being originally envisaged, it may 
represent one of the new creative developments of the way the SC has acted since the 
end of Cold War and it may find legal support in the doctrine of inherent powers.145 
Yet, the precedents do not speak in favour of the development of any new normative 
standard enabling the SC to validate an agreement otherwise invalid under Article 52. 
Resolution 687 imposing a binding territorial settlement upon Iraq by way of 
endorsement of a conventional instrument was coerced by the military operation Desert 
Storm, however such military action had been authorised by the SC.146 Article 75 VCLT 
indeed exempts from the application of Article 52 any ‘treaty which may arise for an 
aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations with reference to that State’s aggression.’ Resolution 1031 endorsed the 
Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina, however a direct causality link 
between the signature of the agreements by the Bosnian-Serbs and Operation 
Deliberate Force cannot be easily proved. What can at best be said is that the NATO 
bombing of Bosnian Serb position in the summer of 1995 created the momentum for the 
military offensive of Bosnian and Croat forces on the ground, which then led to a 
general cease-fire. Such cease-fire was a starting point for a meaningful negotiation in 
Dayton, but it did not determine the final outcome of the negotiations.147 Further, it is 
still generally held that NATO military action in Bosnia was lawful.148 In other words, 
Article 52 VCLT could not apply to these agreements, as, in the case of Iraq, the use of 
force was not in defiance of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter; in the case
145 White, Keeping the Peace (1997, 2nd ed.), 99.
146 SC Res. 678 (1990). On the question of application of Art. 52 to the consent given by Iraq see 
Mendelson and Hulton, supra n. 75,149.
147 See Holbrooke, To End a War (1999).
148 On Operation Deliberate Force see White, supra n. 145, 99; Sarooshi, The United Nations and the 
Development o f Collective Security: the Delegation by the Security Council o f its Chapter VII Powers 
(2000), 262-263; Gray, supra n. 133, 4. These authors all reach a conclusion of lawfulness of that 
operation. See, however, contra Gazzini, supra n. 133, 428-430. The controversial point is whether the 
UN Secretary General, who had been entrusted by the SC with the authority to order air strikes, still had 
ultimate control over the start, continuation and termination of military operations. Former UN Secretary 
General Boutros-Boutros Ghali suggests that, despite the delegation of his ‘dual-key’ authority on 26 July 
1995 to the NATO and UN military commanders on the ground, he received a formal commitment by a 
letter of NATO Secretary General General Claes that he would be still in a position to take back the 
authority delegated whenever he considered it necessary (see Boutros-Boutros Ghali, Unvanquished: a 
US-UN Saga (1999), 236-248). See, however, the American envoy Richard Holbrooke’s reading of the 
events supporting different conclusions as to where the ultimate decision-making power in the operation 
would lie (Holbrooke, supra n. 147).
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of Bosnia, even if we admitted the illegality of the action, the element of coercion is far 
from clear. More problematic is the understanding of Resolution 1203 related to 
Kosovo. In this resolution, the SC, acting under Chapter VII, endorsed the agreements 
of October 15 and 16, 1998 between the FRY and OSCE, and the FRY and NATO 
respectively, which were concluded after the issuance of an activation order by NATO 
Secretary General.149 Such threat of the use of force without SC authorisation was 
clearly in defiance of international law, however reservations as to the validity of the 
agreements were never raised. It seems that some delegations were more concerned 
with avoiding an escalation of the internal conflict and preventing any actual use of 
force by NATO, which was claimed to be contrary to international law and the UN 
Charter. They saw the Belgrade agreements as the means to avert such developments.150 
Despite that, the lack of reference to international law, the ad hoc solution provided and 
the uniqueness of the precedent hardly speak in favour of the development of new 
normative standards relaxing the obligation of the SC to abide by the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter.
As to the compliance with norms of ius cogens, the answer is in this case less self- 
evident. However, given the fact that the prohibition of the use of force outside the UN 
Charter framework has been considered by the ICJ and the ILC a principle of ius 
cogens, it may well be asserted that Article 52 also represents a norm of ius cogens, as it 
represents both a protection of legal interests of those who are victim of an unlawful 
armed attack and of the international community as a whole.151 A SC resolution 
endorsing an invalid agreement under Article 52 would be in breach of a norm of ius 
cogens, thus beyond the limits of UN legality.
The conclusion claims the illegality of the KA and parts of 1244 recalling and 
endorsing it. Hence, the legal basis of NATO security presence in Kosovo seems to be 
shaky, prima facie making the territorial status of Kosovo unlawful as far as NATO’s 
security presence is concerned.
149 S/1998/978; S/1998/991. The US representative at the SC stated quite frankly at the debate of 24 
October 1998 which led to the adoption of Res. 1203 that ‘[w]e must acknowledge that a credible threat 
of force was key to achieving the OSCE and NATO agreements and remains key to ensuring their full 
implementation.’ S/PV. 3937, Statement of the US 15.
150 Ibidem, Statement of Ukraine 4; Statement of Costa Rica 6; Statement of Brazil 10; Statement of 
Russia 11; Statement of China 14.
151 Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (Nicaragua/US), ICJ Reports 1986,62, 
at 100; ILC Yearbook, 1966 H, 247.
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53  Consequences of invalidity: the role of legitimacy in legalising the status quo
Once arrived to a finding of invalidity of a part of the legal framework provided by 
1244, one should ask what are the legal consequences of such invalidity. One of the 
main difficulties in ‘legalising’ the powers of the SC is the lack of definition of what 
would be the legal consequences of a finding of illegality. The principle of effectiveness 
seems in this respect bound to play a dominant role. However, there is no reason why 
one should not apply the VCLT framework, if the substantive basis of invalidity is a 
treaty such as the KA.
The first question to be asked is whether Article 52 provides for a ground of absolute 
or relative invalidity. In other words, whether the KA ought to be considered as null and 
void ab initio, or whether it can still produce some legal effects and/or be cured by the 
coerced party’s subsequent acquiescence or acceptance. The wording and the location of 
Article 52 within the VCLT seem to support the view that Article 52 describes a ground 
of absolute nullity.152 Also the ILC Commentary leans towards this solution. The ratio 
of this finding is that the protection against the threat of use of force is of such 
fundamental importance for the international community, that any juridical act 
concluded against such principle ought to be fully invalidated. When discussing the loss 
of a right to invoke a ground of treaty invalidity by way of acquiescence or subsequent 
consent (Article 45), the ILC is unambiguous in stating that
‘the effects and implications of coercion in international relations are of such gravity...that a 
consent so obtained must be treated as absolutely void in order to ensure that the victim of the 
coercion should afterwards be in a position freely to determine its future relations with the state 
which coerced it. To admit the application of the present article in cases of coercion might, in its 
view, weaken the proposition given by article 48 and 49 [then 51 and 52] to the victims of 
coercion....’153
By contrast, both ILC Special Rapporteurs Fitzmaurice and Waldock thought that the 
coercion would vitiate the consent of the state, thus the state would be entitled to 
express subsequent implicit or explicit consent to the execution of the treaty provisions, 
once coercion had ceased.154 According to such premises, the Swiss delegation to the 
1969 Vienna Diplomatic Conference proposed an amendment to the draft article to the 
effect that the coerced state would be entitled to waive the invalidity of the treaty. The
152 See Arts. 48-50 and compare with Arts. 51-53 VCLT.
153 ILC Yearbook, 1966II, 239.
154 ILC Yearbook, 1958 H, 26; ILC Yearbook, 1963 I, 50-67, 227-230; ILC Yearbook, 19661, 22-37, 122- 
125.
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proposal was defeated 63-12, thereby supporting the idea that only a subsequent treaty 
would be able to confirm the validity of that legal regime.155 It should be noticed that, 
apart from one author,156 the absolute nullity thesis has found acceptance in all writings, 
even if it is controversial whether such differentiation exists also under customary 
law.157
Despite a general claim of imposition, the FRY/USM has neither claimed that the 
KA was null and void under Article 52, nor that parts of 1244 could be found invalid as 
a consequence of that. It has never started any procedure under Article 65 to 68 VCLT 
for the determination of such invalidity. Nor has the FRY/USM, in the case initiated 
before the ICJ against ten NATO member states, amended its original application and 
claimed that, as a consequence of the illegality of the use of force by NATO, the KA 
and parts of 1244 should be declared invalid.158 This may seem to imply a form of 
acquiescence towards the ‘legalisation* of the KA. However, the formula of absolute 
nullity embodied in the VCLT hardly supports the idea that acquiescence can cure the 
invalidity of an agreement under Article 52. That is confirmed by the fact that Article 
45(b) VCLT does not apply to coercion.159 Likewise, the Declaration of the Parliament 
of the Republic of Serbia of 27 August 2003, in which for the very first time a 
constitutional organ of the USM ‘provides full support to the consistent implementation 
of [...] The Military-Technical Agreement on Kosovo and Metohia of June 9, 1999’ 
should be considered as not affecting the absolute invalidity of the agreement.160 The 
only way the FRY/USM could cure the substantive invalidity of the KA would be 
through subsequent agreement to which it has freely consented. However, despite the
155 See Cahier, ‘Le caractdristique de la nullitd en droit international et tout particulidrment dans la 
Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des T rails’ 76 RGDIP (1972), 645.
156 Rozakis, ‘The Law on Invalidity of Treaties’ \6Archiv des Volkerrechts (1973) 150.
157 Cahiers, supra n. 155; Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law (1977); Napoletano, 
Violenza e trattati nel diritto intemazionale (1977); Aust, Modem Treaty Law and Practice (2000); 
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2001,3rd ed.).
158 Legality o f Use o f Force (Provisional Measures) (Yugoslavia/Belgium and others), ICJ Reports 1999, 
124.
159 Art. 45 states that a ‘State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing 
from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after 
becoming aware of the facts: a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or 
continues in operation, as the case may be; or b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having 
acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be.’
160 Ibidem. Declaration 2435 of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, 27 August 2003, in 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/declarationKIM_e.html. Apart from the fact that Art. 45(a) does not apply 
to the present Declaration, further problematic constitutional issues are raised by the possibility of the 
parliament of Serbia expressing an internationally relevant consent for the purpose of the USM’s 
international obligations. Whatever the answer to this latter question, it seems that the importance of the 
Declaration lies in the conferral of legitimacy to NATO’s presence by the sovereign state.
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political re-approaching between Belgrade and NATO, such agreement has never been 
concluded. The UNMIK-FRY Common Document of 5 November 2001 only reiterates 
the acceptance of 1244’s basic principles, and it addresses areas of co-operation 
between the FRY/USM and UNMIK in the field of Kosovo’s civil administration, not 
military control.161 Hence, the nullity of the KA and of relevant parts of 1244 is not 
affected by subsequent agreement of the FRY/USM.162
Notwithstanding such conclusion, one has to face the reality that international law is 
a system largely based on self-help. The fact that the FRY/USM does not challenge the 
validity of the KA, even once it has ceased to be under coercion, makes international 
law ineffective in re-addressing the results of its own breaches. On the other hand, the 
de facto  situation originated by a violation of international law - such as KFOR’s 
security administration in Kosovo -  may produce juridical effects which are recognised 
at the international level. This phenomenon can be explained through the role played by 
the principle of effectiveness together with the international legitimacy acquired by 
NATO’s security presence as evidenced by SC support for such presence as well as, 
more recently, by the Parliament of Serbia. In other words, the role played by NATO in 
terms of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement in the province makes KFOR’s presence 
legitimate, as the presence is seen as protecting some of the fundamental interests of 
international community, that of maintenance of peace and security, as an end and 
means to promote in turn self-governance, human rights and, from the point of view of 
Serbia, the territorial integrity of the USM. In that sense, effectiveness on the ground, 
recognition by the affected state, and legitimacy in the wider community ensure the 
recognition of the juridical effects produced by the originally unlawful territorial 
situation. In conclusion, despite the shaky legal basis for NATO’s presence, and despite 
the lack of legal ‘continuity’ between, on the one hand, a violation of international law
UNMIK-FRY Common Document, 14 November 2001, in 
http://www.ecmi.de/ops/download/kosovo%20UNMIK-FRY.PDF.
162 Given recent USM’s efforts to enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program and the prospect of the 
USM dropping its legal claims against NATO countries before the ICJ, one possibility to bridge this gap 
of legality may lie in the signature of a SOFA between Belgrade and NATO. Annex B of the KA in Art 3 
provided for the conclusion of a SOFA in a short period of time. This provision has not been followed-up 
as yet. See FRY Foreign Ministry’s Statement of November 2002, ‘Foreign Political Position of the FR of 
Yugoslavia with Emphasis on the Accession to the Partnership for Peace Program’, in 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu. See also Guillaume, supra n. 117, 253. Rather, it has been superseded by the 
UNMIK-KFOR Common Document of 17 Aug 2000 and by UNMIK Reg. 2000/47 of 18 Aug 2000, 
which have spelled out in detail the immunities enjoyed by KFOR personnel. The regulation can be found 
in http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg47-00.htm. It is interesting to note that the KA is 
never re-called in Reg. 2000/47.
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and an invalid territorial title or competence based on that violation, and, on the other 
hand, the possibility of ‘normalisation* and recognition by the international community 
of juridical effects related to that factual situation, Kosovo represents another case 
where a (partly in the specific case) unlawful territorial situation is in the long-run 
transformed in a lawful territorial situation, thanks to the joint action of effectiveness 
and legitimacy.163
5.4 Schizophrenic views of state sovereignty: the 2001 Yugoslav-Macedonian 
delineation agreement
Another problematic aspect with respect to the status of Kosovo is the issue of the 
USM sovereignty. In the preamble, 1244 reaffirms ‘the commitment of all Member 
States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*. 
Such assertion of principle is highly problematic from a legal point of view. If we take 
Judge Huber’s famous definition in Island o f Palmas, whose qualitative content can be 
hardly disputed even today, we can see how the question of USM sovereignty over 
Kosovo is controversial: ‘Sovereignty in relations between States signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise 
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.’164 If the substantive 
meaning of sovereignty is independence, and independence means a general right to 
exercise therein the functions of a state, it is clear that the USM under 1244 plus KA 
does not have such right to exercise civil and security functions with respect to Kosovo. 
If the lack of effectiveness can be seen as evidence of the lack of sovereignty of the 
USM over Kosovo, the conclusive element is exactly the lack of competence-de-la- 
competence. Such powers are vested with UNMIK and with the KFOR commander.165 
Even the partial return of hundreds of FRY forces’ units to the border between Kosovo 
and FYROM in 2001 has been effected through KFOR request and consent.166
163 Ultimately, the Declaration by the Parliament of Serbia -  although it does not per se provide a legal 
basis for NATO’s presence - is the final and decisive factor in a process of ‘accumulation’ of legitimacy, 
that transforms the territorial situation from unlawful to lawful. This is in particular the case because of 
the representive nature of that institution, and because it represents the actor directly affected by the 
unlawful territorial situation. In an article based on events before the Declaration, I argued for the 
illegality of NATO’s presence in Kosovo. See Milano, ‘Security Council’s Action in the Balkans: 
Reviewing Kosovo’s Territorial Status’ 14 EJIL (2003), 999.
164 Island o f Palmas case (1928), RIAA (Vol. II), 829, at 831.
165 See UNMIK/REG/2001/9, Section 7; Art. 5, KA: ‘The international security force (“KFOR”) 
commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement and the security aspects of the 
peace settlement it support. His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons (italics added).’
166 Art. l(4)(a) KA.
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The confusion surrounding the substantive meaning of USM sovereignty over 
Kosovo has been highlighted by the signature by Belgrade of a boundary agreement 
with FYROM. The Agreement Between the Republic o f Macedonia and the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia on Delineation of State Border was signed on 23 February 
2001.167 After ratification by the two assemblies, the agreement entered into force on 16 
June 2001. The agreement represents the outcome of the work of a Joint Diplomatic 
Expert Commission established by Skopje and Belgrade in accordance with Article 2 of 
an agreement regulating the relationship and the co-operation between the FRY and 
FYROM signed in Belgrade on 6 April 1996.168 It delineates the frontier between the 
FRY and FYROM, but at the same time it represents a formal instrument of delimitation 
of the frontier between Kosovo and FYROM. It is more correct to define the agreement 
as a treaty of delimitation, rather than demarcation, even if it follows for 95% of its 
course the uti possidetis identified by the previous administrative boundary.169 Physical 
demarcation of the boundary is entrusted to a Joint Commission according to Article V.
Despite its simplicity, the agreement caused unease in the international community 
and vibrant protest by Kosovo Albanians. The question revolved around the competence 
to enter into a frontier agreement on behalf of Kosovo. As the conclusion of a boundary 
treaty is a matter essentially within the scope of foreign affairs, the main question was 
whether such issues were vested with Belgrade’s authority, with UNMIK, or with 
Kosovo’s institutions. As to the reactions of the international community the EU’s 
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Chris Patten, gave uncontroversial support to the 
agreement immediately after its conclusion.170 Also the SC, notwithstanding the use of 
ambiguous language, endorsed the agreement through a presidential statement on 7 
March 2001.171 On their part, UNMIK and KFOR did not pronounce any statement until 
the beginning of 2002. Between January and February 2002 UNMIK and KFOR
167 An unofficial translation of the agreement can be found in IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 
Summer 2001,97-98.
168 Agreement Regulating the Relationship and the Co-operation between the FRY and FYROM, 35 ILM 
(1996), 1246.
169 Milenkoski, Talevski, ‘Delineation of the State Border Between the Republic of Macedonia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, Summer 2001, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 93, at 94.
170 Ibidem, 95.
171 ‘The Security Council recalls the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this context it emphasizes that the border demarcation agreement, 
signed in Skopje on 23 February 2001, and ratified by the Parliament of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia on 1 March 2001, must be respected by all.* S/PV.4290.
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officials were reported to doubt the legality of the FRY-FYROM agreement.172 As a 
response to those statements, both the FRY and FYROM issued formal complaints to 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and NATO.173 As to the reaction of the Kosovo 
Albanians*, this was of strong opposition to the agreement. According to some analysts, 
the agreement was among the main causes which triggered the spill-over of armed 
militias from Kosovo to Macedonia and the beginning of the conflict between 
FYROM’s forces and Albanian rebel groups in northern and western Macedonia in 
March 2001.174 After the general elections of November 2001 and the creation of 
provisional self-government institutions in Pristina, the Assembly of Kosovo passed a 
resolution on 23 May 2002 declaring the Delineation Agreement between the FRY and 
FYROM null and void. The same day UNMIK’s head Michael Steiner declared and 
decided the action of the Assembly to be in violation of Kosovo’s Constitutional 
Framework and that the resolution would be null and void, since Kosovo’s institutions 
are not competent to conduct foreign relations. That agreement would be clearly within 
such competence, which would be vested solely with UNMIK.175 A few hours later, the 
SC President in a press statement declared the SC opposition to the Assembly resolution 
and expressed full support for UNMIK’s decision.176 The FRY and FYROM also 
expressed in two letters to the SC the opinion that the Assembly’s resolution was legally 
null and void.177
This diplomatic row underlines how the question of sovereignty is crucial to the 
understanding of the legal framework created by 1244.178 Taking literally and formally 
1244’s assertion of FRY sovereignty over Kosovo is a diplomatic and juridical fiction 
used by the UN to claim that despite preventing any form of effectiveness in 
government of Kosovo, the territory was still part of the FRY and the UN was not 
endorsing any state’s split-up. Such a radical position was tenable as long as Milosevic
172 Statements by UNMIK spokesman Perhan Haak and KFOR Brigadier General Keith Huber reported 
by Deliso, ‘Blurring the Boundaries in Macedonia’, in http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso33.html.
1 ‘Yugoslav President Asks Kofi Annan to Exert his Influence on KFOR and UNMIK’ and 
‘Macedonian Government Stunned, Will Send Demarche to United Nations’, Yugoslav Daily Survey (22 
February 2002), in http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b220202_e.html
174 Milenkowski, supra n. 169,96.
175 UNMIK News 23 May 2002, in http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm.
176 SC/7412.
177 S/2002/585; S/2002/609.
178 Mutatis mutandis the situation reminds us of the East Timor case (Case Concerning East Timor 
(Portugal/Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90). See also Chinkin, ‘The East Timor Case (Portugal v. 
Australia)’ 45 ICLQ (1996), 712; and more recently Ong, ‘The Legal Status of the 1989 Australia- 
Indonesia Timor Gap Treaty Following the End of Indonesian Rule in East Timor’, 31 NYIL (2000), 67.
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was in power in what became to be considered a pariah state ruled by alleged war 
criminals, whose leadership was even prevented from participating in SC debates.179 
Since a new leadership came to power, a partial shift has occurred in the approach of the 
UN to the participation of the USM in the decision-making of Kosovo. From a policy of 
exclusion, UNMIK has started to consider Belgrade as an active interlocutor. The 
involvement of FRY forces in March 2001 in patrolling the border with FYROM has 
been the first tangible sign of this policy. More importantly, the creation in Pristina of 
the Co-ordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohia and the signing by its President of an 
UNMIK-FRY Common Document in November 2001 has gone in the direction of 
putting on an equal footing the USM and Kosovo’s institutions in negotiations related to 
Kosovo’s Serb minority and Kosovo’s future status.
Yet decision-making power remains in this respect with the ambit of competence of 
Kosovo’s institutions and UNMIK, and UNMIK respectively. The issue of the 2001 
FRY-FYROM agreement reveals how the picture is blurred. If the USM is entitled to 
delimit and demarcate boundaries with respect to Kosovo, one would assume that the 
USM is entitled to conduct foreign relations as it happens in the looser forms of federal 
state (Bosnia and Herzegovina being one example). However, it is clear from UNMIK’s 
statements concerning the above-mentioned Kosovo Assembly’s resolution and from 
previous practice of UNMIK, that foreign policy competence is in general under the 
authority of the SGSR. The basis of this power seems to be the general authority 
conferred to the SGSR through 1244 and more specifically through Article 8(1) points 
i), m), n), o) of Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework enacted on 15 May 2001.180 It 
seems that the delimitation and demarcation of boundaries is an exception to this rule, 
yet its legal basis is controversial given that according to Article 8(1 )(i) the SGSR 
should exercise 'powers and responsibilities of an international nature in the legal field.’ 
The only way to reconcile this is to imply it from the general statement of 1244 
regarding the FRY sovereignty over Kosovo. However, even conceded the legality of 
such differentiation, a question of legitimacy arises. The lack of clarity and coherence in 
the application of USM sovereignty, hence the perceived illegitimacy of the 
‘boundaries* exception, seems to be at the basis of the Kosovo Assembly’s declaration 
of invalidity of the FRY-FYROM agreement. If foreign policy ought to be conducted by 
UNMIK, why are such vital issues such as the delineation of a boundary left within the
179 Infra n. 188.
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authority of Belgrade?181 What is the rationale of this choice? The answer to these 
crucial questions lies beyond the boundaries of legality and it turns to the general 
legitimacy of UNMIK’s role and aims in Kosovo. The final section considers this 
important issue.
5.4.1 “Hamlet's ghost” and the Legitimacy o f UNMIK Action in Kosovo
Defining Kosovo’s formal status is question-begging. Defining it as an 
internationalised territory provides a doctrinal and descriptive answer to an inextricable 
analytical conundrum. Defining the purpose of the UN involvement in Kosovo cannot 
be simply describing Kosovo’s UN administration as addressing problems of 
‘governance’ rather than ‘sovereignty’. As seen the issue of sovereignty is at the very 
heart of the Kosovo arrangement. Some basic questions should be addressed, in order to 
consider whether UNMIK’s presence is legitimate. What is the international community 
striving for apart from inter-communal peace? Is it going towards independence and 
statehood of Kosovo? Is it going towards the incorporation of Kosovo in the loose 
federation created by Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003?182
The legal framework on which UNMIK is based does not substantively address the 
question of the final status of Kosovo. As to the procedures to be followed for the 
determination of the future status, on which the final outcome may be heavily 
dependent, 1244 at paragraph 11 decides that among the main responsibilities of the 
international civil presence there will be also the facilitation ‘of a political process 
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet 
accords’ (emphasis added). It is clear that the wording of this passage does not support 
the idea that the requirement of the Rambouillet agreements, of a referendum to be held 
after three years from the establishment of the international administration, is 
mandatory. That has been confirmed by the preamble of Kosovo’s Constitutional 
Framework, which states that ‘the determination of Kosovo’s future status* will be
180 UNMIK/REG/2001/9, Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo.
181 Such choice is confirmed by the agreement on establishment of a joint expert committee by UNMIK 
and Macedonia, which ‘does not deal with demarcation, but only with practical problems on the ground* 
(S/PV.4498, Statement of SRSG 1) and by the establishment of a Yugoslav-Macedonian joint 
commission (‘Yugoslavia-Macedonian border under jurisdiction of Belgrade and Skopje*, Office of 
Communication of Serbian Government, 13 May 2002.)
182 The Constitution states in its preamble that ‘the state of Serbia [...] comprises the Autonomous 
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija which, under United Nations Security Council 1244, is
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effected 'through a process at an appropriate future stage which shall, in accordance 
with UNSCR 1244 (1999), take full account o f all relevant factors including the will o f 
the people’ (emphasis added).183 In a note released on 25 May 2001, UNMIK Legal 
Advisor Alexander Borg-Oliver made clear that it was not in the powers of Kosovo’s 
institutions such as the assembly, the government or the judiciary to make such a 
decision.184 Paragraph 5 of UNMIK-FRY Common Document is even more adamant in 
stating that it ‘[r]eaffirms that the position on Kosovo’s future status remains as stated 
in UNSCR 1244, and that this cannot be changed by any action taken by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government.’185 However, no real indication is given to what this 
decision-making process may look like. The lack of answers to these questions is made 
emphatically clear in one of the statements of Singapore’s representative at the SC:
‘I want to use two metaphors to illustrate some of the difficulties we face as we meet every month 
to discuss Kosovo. The first metaphor I will use is the one of the play Hamlet and the ghost. You 
cannot stage the play Hamlet without having the scene of the ghost. In the same way, every time 
we meet to discuss Kosovo, there seems to be a ghost hanging around this room, asking us, what is 
the ultimate destination and how are we going to get there.’186
These answers ought to provide a general framework of legitimacy to UNMIK’s 
administration over Kosovo. Such legitimacy should be construed striking a balance 
between different imperatives embodied in the preamble of 1244, such as the right of 
self-government of the people of Kosovo, the need to maintain peace and security in the 
region, the protection of human rights and the preservation of the USM territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. These imperatives are drawn from the principles and purposes 
of the UN.
It is arguable that the lack of clarity in the aims of the international community for 
Kosovo in the long-run depends on priority being given to the maintenance of peace and 
security and the development of good governance in the short run.187 In other words, the 
basic argument is that as long as a process of normalisation and reconciliation between 
ethnic communities is not completed, and sound and inclusive standards of self-
currently under an international administration.’ See The Constitutional Charter of Serbia and 
Montenegro, in http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/charter_el.html.
183 Constitutional Framework, supra n. 180, Preamble.
184 UNMIK/FR/0040/01, 25 May 2001.
185 UNMIK-FRY Common Document, supra n. 161.
186 S/PV. 4309, Statement of Singapore 14. See also statement of the same representative in S/PV. 4498, 
14.
187 S/PV.4702, Statement of SRSG 2.
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government have not developed, it is not feasible for the international community to 
commit itself to a vision for Kosovo. That would cause further tensions between ethnic 
communities. Such a policy also postpones any conflict between different visions on the 
future of Kosovo within the international community. However, it presupposes on a 
narrower scale the possibility of success of what was considered failed on a larger scale. 
One does not understand why a policy of reconciliation between an Albanian majority 
and a Serb minority in Kosovo should be necessarily more successful than a policy of 
reconciliation between a Serb majority and an Albanian minority in Serbia. The answer 
may unfortunately lie in the unconscious/conscious designation of many policy-makers 
of the Serbs as mono-ethnic. This designation gained momentum during the time of 
Milosevic’s nationalist leadership. It led to the adoption of the ‘negotiate and threaten’ 
approach before NATO’s military action and later to the exclusion of the FRY 
representatives from any discussions about Kosovo.188 Such designation is no more 
tenable with the new governments in Belgrade. It seems that SGSRs, Michael Steiner’s 
and Harri Hoiked’s, policy of involvement of Serbian authorities in the decision­
making over Kosovo represents a positive step in reconsidering these flawed 
assumptions. Any sacrifice of the right of self-government of Kosovo’s people, in order 
to confer a substantive meaning to the FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity (as in 
the case of the FRY-FYROM agreement) seems to be in this sense legitimate and 
justified.
Even then, placing UN policies in a legitimacy framework is not likely to make 
easier the decision on final status. Ideally, the answer will come from an agreement 
between Belgrade and Pristina. Any solution imposed by SC resolution may get caught 
up in a difficult conundrum. A choice to decide for Kosovo’s independence and 
statehood even if backed by a referendum according to the Rambouillet accords, which 
were never signed by Belgrade, would be unprecedented and legally dubious. A choice 
to decide for Kosovo’s autonomy within the USM with a return to an even limited 
USM’s civilian and military control would be likely to find strong opposition from 
Kosovo’s institutions and the large majority of the population. The inherent risk is that 
Hamlet’s ghost may be hanging around longer than anticipated.
188 During the SC meeting of 23 June 2000 (S/PV.4164) concerning Kosovo, the participation of the FRY 
representative was refused by 4 votes in favour, 7 against and 4 abstaining on the ground that Mr 
Jovanovic was representing ‘a Government whose senior leadership has been indicted for war crimes and 




The present chapter has broadened the analytical framework on unlawful territorial 
situations, to include cases where the UN, in particular through the SC, exercise 
territorial competencies. It has argued that the broad powers entrusted to the SC in the 
field of international peace and security by the UN Charter, subsequent practice and 
judicial decisions can be interpreted as including the exercise of such powers. Territorial 
competence can be exercised by the UN according to two models, one of direct 
territorial administration and one by mandating territorial administration to a state, 
group of states or another international organisation. In both scenarios, a review of 
legality of the action taken by the SC can be carried out by assessing its compliance 
with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and fundamental norms of 
international law.
The endorsement by the SC of a territorial competence over Kosovo established by 
NATO through coercion outside the UN Charter framework of collective security has 
been held to be beyond the legal competence of the SC. Such default in legal 
competence has affected the territorial status of Kosovo, which has been found to be 
unlawful as far as NATO’s security presence is concerned at least until August 2003. 
Yet the cumulative effect of NATO’s effectiveness, of the legitimacy of its presence as 
a result of its action with regard to security in the region in support of UNMIK’s 
operation and as a result of its support by the SC, and, most importantly, of the recent 
endorsement to the implementation of the KA by the Serbian Parliament, seem to have 
gradually transformed the originally unlawful territorial situation in a lawful territorial 
situation.
Finally, a further level of ‘legitimacy analysis* has been added to show that, when 
the legality of a certain action is established -  and given the wide-ranging powers of the 
SC, that will occur most of the times - , the authority and legitimacy of the SC will 
benefit from the adherence to principles of substantive consistency, good faith and 
procedural transparency and fairness in the way it acts. More specifically, when the UN 
engages directly in territorial administration, the legitimacy of its choices will be tested 
against these principles and the fundamental aims and principles of the organisation 
itself. The case of UNMIK’s action in Kosovo with regard to the controversial 2001
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Delineation Agreement has been tested on that basis and found to be legitimate. It has 
been finally argued that the dispute over the 2001 Delineation Agreement shows that the 
issue of substantive sovereignty remains at the core of Kosovo’s ad interim 
arrangement, and that neither a legitimacy framework established by UNMIK, nor the 
reaffirmation by SC Resolution 1244 of USM sovereignty and territorial integrity are 
likely to make future choices any easier on where ultimate competence will remain.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions: reconciling effectiveness, legality and legitimacy
This concluding chapter recaps the main points developed in the thesis, and it 
assesses the effectiveness of international law towards unlawful territorial situations by 
reverting Jellinek’s maxim ‘die normative Kraft des Faktischen’ and looking at ‘die 
faktische Kraft des Normativen’. It finally presents some additional reflections on the 
possible reconciliation between effectiveness, legality and legitimacy in international 
law and on the enduring vitality of the concept of effectiveness.
1. Answering Mr Smith’s questions
Mr Smith may like to look at this thesis to find an answer to his questions regarding 
the state of international law on unlawful territorial situations in the 21st Century. The 
language of formal status is indeed fashionable nowadays. Strangely enough, the 
language of ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity*, rather than being in radical opposition 
to the language of effectiveness, tends to enhance the role of the latter in the way 
international law ‘regulates’ -  or rather does not regulate - territorial issues. In fact, such 
a concept of sovereignty is deprived more and more often of its original and substantive 
meaning of legal right and competence to become a bargaining chip to be negotiated 
and often sacrificed in the overall political solution of disputes. Even the concept of 
‘territorial integrity’ is given a formalistic meaning, as the territorial integrity is referred 
to as stability of frontiers rather than the effective exercise of territorial competence by 
the right-holder. The cases of Kosovo and Western Sahara stand out in this respect, 
insofar as both the USM and POLISARIO are currently deprived of a territorial 
competence, and even their future entitlement risks being undermined in the process of 
reaching a political solution.
Yet Mr Smith may learn that international law provides the instruments to go beyond 
formal designations and effectiveness and to assess the legality of territorial situations. 
These are the prohibition to use of force to modify the status of a territory, the principle
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of uti possidetis, the principle of self-determination and the principle of territorial 
integrity. Despite to different degrees being inconsistently enforced and for all the 
uncertainties surrounding the way in particular the uti possidetis and self-determination 
protect states’ and peoples’ territorial sovereignty, these primary norms have been 
consistently declared and applied by states and international organisations throughout 
the post-1960 era. In particular, the actions of the GA and the SC in terms of non­
recognition of territorial situations established in defiance of these norms has been 
crucial. It has been shown how the application of these legal principles to territorial 
situations can render international law effective with regard to issues of territorial 
sovereignty. On the one hand, it can render it effective, insofar it enables a 
determination of legality or illegality of a territorial situation by any observer, 
overcoming the vicious circle of evading any assessment by vacillating between looking 
at the formal status or, alternatively, recognising a status quo. This may contribute to a 
positive and constructive role played by civil society in putting pressure on 
governments and governmental organisations in acting in accordance with international 
law and in taking political action against the perpetuation of unlawful territorial 
situations. On the other hand, institutional enforcement of those principles of legality 
can overcome the weaknesses of international law with regard to the consequences that 
the system draws from a determination of unlawfulness.
The thesis has shown how state and judicial practice with regard to the inherent 
invalidity of unlawful territorial situations confirms a preference for a dualist 
framework of relations between these international legal principles and the legal effects 
produced by the de facto situation. The dualist scheme is due to the still dominant role 
played by states in international law and the strong impact of the concept of 
effectiveness in the definition of state, territory and territorial sovereignty under 
international law. Whereas such framework gives states, international organisations and 
international tribunals more flexibility in the way they deal with unlawful territorial 
situations, it also shifts responsibilities away from tribunals towards states and 
international bodies, in particular the SC, in upholding and enforcing those legal 
principles, by adopting sanctions towards occupying states, or providing for overall or 
temporary solutions to territorial disputes often underlying unlawful territorial 
situations. Furthermore, the effectiveness of international law can be enhanced by also 
addressing at an institutional level the legal consequences of unlawfulness in the 
different areas analysed in Chapter 5, such as the regulation of the use of force, the
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entitlement to statehood, the right to obtain reparation for the injury derived from the 
illegal territorial occupation. As argued in the course of the thesis, the impact of a 
definition of unlawfulness on those areas of international law, with the possible 
exception of the regulation of the jus ad bellurn, has been most of the times diminished 
by ad hoc solutions influenced by effective situations on the ground, which have not 
taken fully into account the legal entitlements of the subjects under occupation.
Finally, whereas since the 1990s the SC has played a more and more important role 
in territorial disputes and territorial settlements, the thesis has argued that the SC ought 
to abide by norms of ius cogens and the principles and purposes of the UN embodied in 
the Charter when enforcing principles of legality related to territorial situations. Even 
within its broad legal powers under Chapter VII, it ought to justify the legitimacy of its 
choices to sacrifice certain legal values, in order to promote others - for example, the 
principle of self-determination over state sovereignty -. Both the legality arid the 
legitimacy of the SC action shall make it more acceptable to the parties disputing the 
legality of a territorial situation, thus promoting the effectiveness of international law.
2. Reconciling effectiveness, legality and legitimacy in international law
The thesis has argued that international law is a set of norms having an objective 
normative content, equally applicable to all members of the international society and 
capable of defining issues of territorial sovereignty in a contextual and specific manner. 
On the other hand, by focusing on the concept of effectiveness, it has also addressed the 
role of international law in legitimising material processes of power recognition in the 
international society. The thesis has unveiled this tension between the egalitarian 
element and the hegemonic element in the nature of international law by looking at the 
issue of unlawful territorial situations. The concept of effectiveness has been found to 
permeate the discourse on sovereignty in modem international law. Its role as 
‘fundamental principle* of the international legal system has been reduced only in the 
second half of the 20th Century, with the affirmation of the principles of substantive 
territorial illegality. The thesis has shown how the concept of effectiveness still plays an 
important role in the way international law regulates territorial issues, above all when 
accompanied by a legitimate claim or through external legitimation by authoritative 
bodies like the SC. The thesis seems in fact to point in the direction of a concept of
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effectiveness re-gaining ground with regard to vital issues such as territorial sovereignty 
and, in part, the use of force to the detriment of legality discourse. This is probably due 
to the novel situation of an international society characterised by the existence of a 
single super power. Effectiveness is in some sense limited by the need for legitimacy in 
a society more and more integrated in everyday life; however, legitimacy discourse has 
also a more sinister task of enhancing the role of effectiveness in international law by 
providing, compared to legality, looser, less transparent and less objective devices of 
power acceptance and recognition. Adopting legitimacy as a device of transformation of 
illegal effectiveness into a legal one, is also a way for the international community to 
safeguard the integrity of its principles of substantive legality developed in the last 60 
years, despite making them in some cases peripheral to the actual regulation of disputes. 
In fact, it has been submitted that either we must be ready to accept that a violation of 
these principles produces per se legal effects in the international sphere, or, 
alternatively, we must find an explanation beyond positive legality in concepts such as 
effectiveness and legitimacy. The thesis obviously advocates the latter solution, as the 
former is simply incompatible with the existence of a rule of law in the international 
society. It is, indeed, striking that while many states and international lawyers have 
argued in the last few years against the legality of some forcible interventions leading to 
changes of territorial status, the same states and international lawyers have then been 
ready to easily acquiesce and accept the status quo produced by those interventions.
Finally, the thesis suggests that there may be a deeper reason behind the enduring 
‘vitality* of the concept of effectiveness in international law. This reason relates to the 
inherent ambivalence of the concept of effectiveness as either a criterion provided by 
positive rules or, alternatively, as a legal-normative device situated on the borderline 
between positive law and social reality. At the outset of the thesis, I argued that
‘effectiveness is here considered as a legal-normative organising concept, which allows the 
transformation of effective realities into international law. It represents possibly the concept par 
excellence showing the concreteness and material nature of international law. However, its exact 
nature as a device situated on the borderline between law and social reality, or, alternatively, as a 
device situated within international legal norms has been disputed. From the latter approach one 
derives that effectiveness should be kept conceptually separated from overlapping concepts of 
‘socio-legal’ effectiveness, efficacy or compliance. From the former, one may infer that these 
concepts may end up overlapping. The thesis attempts to provide some elements to resolve these 
tensions.’1
1 Supra Ch. 2, section 2.
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The thesis has shown that in reality the alternative is moot, and that the concept of 
effectiveness is both a criterion of positive legality and a device of transformation of 
factual realities into law. However, it is this latter nature of the concept of effectiveness, 
which also explains its enduring relevance to international law. International law needs 
to accept social realities, in order to become effective. This point is illustrated through 
the case of Iraq. Whereas I have argued that ‘using* the SC has been the way for the 
Coalition states to legitimise and, in the long-run, legalise their violating effectiveness, 
paradoxically going back to the SC has also meant making international law again 
relevant, in other words effective. After the initial success the discussion was not only 
and not so much whether the SC would recognise the de facto occupation of Iraq, but 
rather whether the Coalition would recognise a ‘vital role* or ‘central role’ to the UN; in 
other words whether the occupiers would allow the SC to take effective action.
The roles were dramatically reversed, in the sense that it was a group of states 
recognising the partial authority of the SC to deal with the matter, rather than the SC 
recognising the authority of those states to re-build Iraq. ‘Allowing’ the SC to play a 
‘vital’ role also meant rendering international law again partly relevant and effective, 
after months in which a majority of countries and observers thought that international 
law was being deeply undermined. In fact, whereas the ultimate decision-making power 
with regard to Iraq remained with the Coalition states, the UN was now involved in the 
political and physical reconstruction of Iraq and the SC could demand the Coalition’s 
full compliance with international humanitarian law, with international human rights 
standards and with the principle of internal self-determination. In a sort of mutual 
exchange, international law and the institutions upholding it had to sacrifice the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, despite all formal declarations, and to 
recognise effectiveness on the ground in order to become relevant themselves in other 
areas. That shows how the concept of effectiveness lies on the borderline between the 
law and social reality and it affords a continuous exchange between the two. ‘Die 
normative Kraft des Faktischen’ and ‘die faktische Kraft des Normativen’ are nothing 
but two sides of the same coin, and international law has to recognise power as its 
material source in order to be able to influence and limit it. This is possibly the main 
reason behind the enduring vitality of the concept of effectiveness in international law.
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